Fostering Global Security:
Nonviolent Resistance and US Foreign Policy

A Dissertation presented to
The Faculty of the Joseph Korbel School of International Studies
University of Denver

In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Doctor of Philosophy

By
Amentahru Wahlrab
November 2010
Advisor: Jack Donnelly
ABSTRACT

This dissertation comprehensively evaluates, for the first time, nonviolence and its relationship to International Relations (IR) theory and US foreign policy along the categories of principled, strategic, and regulative nonviolence. The current debate within nonviolence studies is between principled and strategic nonviolence as relevant categories for theorizing nonviolent resistance. Principled nonviolence, while retaining the primacy of ethics, is often not practical. Indeed, most nonviolent movements have not been principled, or solely principled. Strategic nonviolence is attractive because it does not require any individual or group to believe in a particular faith or ethical tradition. However, strategic nonviolence is problematic as a source for action because it empties nonviolence of ethical content. If left with only the categories of principled and strategic nonviolence any analysis of US foreign policy is hampered by either principled nonviolence’s impracticability or by the possibility that strategic nonviolence will be used for unethical ends, what I term “imperial nonviolence.” This tension led me to search for a middle path between principled and strategic nonviolence. “Regulative nonviolence” is so-called because the concept owes an intellectual debt to Immanuel Kant. It is theoretically possible to argue for a US foreign policy that is grounded in the regulative ideal of nonviolence while it is nearly impossible to get from the current American policy of overwhelming force to one of principled nonviolence. In the end, regulative nonviolence is more ideal than strategic nonviolence, it retains the ethical core of principled nonviolence without removing all forms of violence.
from its operational tool kit. However, it is also more “realistic” than principled
nonviolence because it recognizes that politics is the art of the possible. In this sense, this
dissertation owes a debt not just to Kant but also to Machiavelli, with a slight twist. While
Nicoló Machiavelli argued that political leaders must learn how “not to be good” I am
arguing that they must learn how to be good, or, at least, to be less violent in their pursuit of
political change.
Acknowledgments

No dissertation is ever conceived, written, and endlessly re-written without wide-ranging support from mentors, advisors, colleagues, family, and friends and this one is no different. My committee Chair, Jack Donnelly, encouraged me, coaxed, and eventually and humorously cajoled me into reframing the dissertation into a coherent and comprehensible form. Alan Gilbert, who served as co-chair, helped me to see good ideas amidst the morass and fog of dissertation writing and he relentlessly cheered me on through to the finish line. Rachel Epstein was from the beginning a tether to the real, an ever present and much needed reminder to think in terms of practical, pragmatic politics. Her dictate to always think in terms of publishing, audience, and coherence has not always been easy to follow but her advice will remain a mantra as I prepare the manuscript for book publication. I owe an un-repayable debt to Manfred B. Steger whose advice and mentoring over the years has time and again pulled me from the brink and back into the light. He honorably agreed to serve on the committee at the last minute when it became clear that I needed him. I cannot thank him enough. Finally, Roscoe Hill graciously and skillfully served as Outside Chair.

I would also like to thank the following friends and colleagues, without whom I might not have finished: Rebecca Otis, Chris Seager, Anwar Hossain, Sasha Breger, Arturo Lopez-Calleja, Micheline Ishay, Jack Donnelly, Alan Gilbert, Susan Rivera, George DeMartino, Matthew Weinert, Eric Fattor, Manfred Steger, Isaac Kamola, Sherri Replogle, Noha Shawki, Rachel Epstein, Lane Crothers, Sarah Sass, Jeremy Engels, Michael McNeal, Randy LeBlanc, Asli Calkivik, Garnet Kindervater, Ali Riaz, Carlos Parodi, Erik Rankin

This dissertation is dedicated to Leela Plesse and Sarah Sass.
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INTRODUCTION:
Fostering Global Security

America will act against such emerging threats before they are fully formed….In the new world we have entered, the only path to peace and security is the path of action. 
~2002 US National Security Strategy (NSS)¹

The survival of liberty in our land increasingly depends on the success of liberty in other lands. The best hope for peace in our world is the expansion of freedom in all the world. ~George W. Bush “Second Inaugural Address”²

There is only one force of history that can break the reign of hatred and resentment, and expose the pretensions of tyrants, and reward the hopes of the decent and tolerant, and that is the force of human freedom. ~George W. Bush “Second Inaugural Address”³

Resistance through violence and killing is wrong and it does not succeed. ….This same story can be told by people from South Africa to South Asia; from Eastern Europe to Indonesia. It’s a story with a simple truth: that violence is a dead end. ~Barack Obama “Cairo University Speech”⁴

On September 20, 2002, the Bush administration released its National Security Strategy of the United States of America.⁵ Most notable for its emphasis on America’s “right” to preventively wage war, it was quickly dubbed “the Bush Doctrine” by critics and defenders


³ Ibid.(cited).


The enunciation of the doctrine was notable more for the praise than the criticisms it elicited when, for example, the human rights scholar, Michael Ignatieff, wrote that: “The 21st century imperium is a new invention in the annals of political science, an empire lite, a global hegemony whose grace notes are free markets, human rights and democracy, .... It [the United States] is an empire without consciousness of itself as such, constantly shocked that its good intentions arouse resentment abroad.” Critics also called it “imperial”: “The document is meant not so much to be read as to be brandished. This is internationalism imperial-style -- as in Rome, when Rome ruled. Its scope is breathtaking. There were large parts of the world that Rome couldn’t reach, but the Bush doctrine recognizes no limits.”

After Bush’s second inaugural address, the term “Bush doctrine” metamorphosed into the United States’ “freedom agenda” with its attendant goal of promoting democracy around the world—thereby promising security for the United States and the world.

Missing from all of the commentary on the Bush Doctrine is a discussion of its support for “those who struggle non-violently.” This is understandable because this minor adverbial usage of the term “nonviolence” was written into a small section of the 2002 NSS dealing with international cooperation, an admittedly neglected component of the overall Bush approach to the world. While this reference was almost an afterthought, perhaps even a left-over from the boilerplate of past national security strategies, it turned out to be a huge success as first seen during the Bush era in Georgia’s “Rose Revolution” of 2003. This adverbial afterthought became central to the re-articulation of the freedom agenda in the

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Gitlin, "America's Age of Empire: The Bush Doctrine."
2006 edition of the NSS, meriting prominent placement on page two under the heading “Championing Aspirations for Human Dignity.”\textsuperscript{9} Here the document proudly proclaims the successes, for example, of the nonviolent “color revolutions” stating that “Since 2002, the world has seen extraordinary progress in the expansion of freedom, democracy, and human dignity.” With the election of President Obama and the publication of his administration’s NSS it can also be shown that the semantic range of the term nonviolence has expanded to include “respect” for “nonviolent voices to be heard around the world.”\textsuperscript{10} Critics have subsequently accused the United States of sponsoring “soft coups,” “peaceful,” “nonviolent,” “regime change.”\textsuperscript{11} Ultimately, we need a theory of nonviolent security. But one that has not been co-opted by empire or, at the very least, one that recognizes that there is always the potential that such a theory will be co-opted.

However, there is little scholarly attention paid to the recent US foreign policy of using nonviolent means to promote its national interests: specifically its policy of promoting democracy. For the past three decades the United States has increasingly emphasized the role of promoting “democracy” as a key component of its foreign policy.\textsuperscript{12} This is due

\begin{footnotes}
\footnotetext[12]{Prior to the 1980s, the United States supported the idea of spreading democracy but there was little in the way of “scientific” evidence to support such a policy. It was after all Woodrow Wilson who at least rhetorically claimed that the US fought WWI in order to make the world safe for democracy. Constance G. Anthony, "American Democratic Interventionism: Romancing the Iconic Woodrow Wilson," International Studies Perspectives 9, no. 3 (2008), David Chandler, "Back to the Future? The Limits of Neo-Wilsonian Ideals of Exporting Democracy," Review of International Studies 32, no. 03 (2006).}
\end{footnotes}
primarily to three things: 1) the popular overthrow of US puppet regimes in Iran\textsuperscript{13} and Nicaragua,\textsuperscript{14} 2) the rise of democratic peace theory—the theory that democratic states do not go to war with other democratic states,\textsuperscript{15} and 3) the combined development of the Correlates of War project (COW),\textsuperscript{16} along with the creative insights concerning COW’s relationship to democracy by scholars like Michael Doyle in the early 1980s. Thus the popular overthrow of two US authoritarian allies, together with the production of scientific evidence supporting a democratic peace theory, combined into permissive conditions to allow US foreign policy elites to adopt a policy of democracy promotion. This was not exactly an enlightened change in foreign policy. The United States’ interests remained the same; it was its thinking about how to control people that changed. Instead of creating and supporting dictatorships, the US would now support “democracy,” at least in name. In the social sciences, the version of democracy promoted by the United States is known as polyarchy: in practical terms promoting polyarchy meant that the United States orchestrated (where feasible) elections within regimes in order to ensure the continued success of elites who supported US interests and global capitalism (in the following the terms polyarchy, elite democracy, low-intensity


democracy, and oligarchical democracy will be used interchangeably).¹⁷ Like the term elite democracy, which names democracy that is for the few at the expense of the many, the US developed a kind of “elite nonviolence” which sought to achieve the political goals of elite classes whose interests cohered with US and global capitalist interests. The United States would so master the policy of promoting polyarchy that by the year 2010 the world had witnessed a series of nonviolent revolutions in Serbia, Georgia, Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, and Iran; all were collectively dubbed “color revolutions” for their various colors identifying them as members of their nonviolently rebellious political parties. The United States thus began a policy that grew slowly in the 1980s,¹⁸ picked up speed in the 1990s, and culminated in a wave of elite nonviolent and democratic “color revolutions” in the first decade of the 21st century. The problematique of this dissertation is that in order for nonviolence to be a means to promote polyarchy and achieve US national security goals it must be emptied of its ethical content.

Under the language of democracy promotion hides an elite form of hegemony and tyranny—and that Empire has even colonized the very idea of nonviolence. In order to promote polyarchy, the United States authorized the creation of new and support of existing foundations, institutions, and groups that could overtly promote elite democracy outside of the United States.¹⁹ These various organizations primarily supported US interests, taking on elements of the role formerly played by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). These


¹⁹ The best work in existence on the role foundations is: Joan Roelofs, Foundations and Public Policy : The Mask of Pluralism, Suny Series in Radical Social and Political Theory (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2003). However, this argument is advanced in the pioneering work of: Robinson, Promoting Polyarchy.
organizations had the one advantage that their activities were conducted in the open and thus reduced the risk of “blowback”²⁰ (the unintended consequences of US activities abroad kept secret from the American public). Much of these activities included: training election monitors (1980s: Nicaragua, Chile, Philippines), funding newspapers, training journalists (though often to produce misinformation about the existing regime), organizing worker’s unions, training potential leaders in organizing tactics (strikes, marches, and protests) and using commercial television advertising. Generally the goal of these activities was to create the necessary conditions (including mass movements) to put pressure on the targeted regime and force nonviolent elections (though, as in the case of Nicaragua and the Contras, occasionally the US simultaneously funded violent and nonviolent opposition). Elite democracy promotion operated in conjunction with the development of tactics typically thought of as “nonviolent.” While some of these tactics were employed in post-WWII Europe,²¹ it is not clear that the tactics were used in conjunction with a theory of nonviolent action; elite nonviolence was created, at least in nascent form, during the mid to late 1970s along side of the policy of promoting democracy. Often (as in the case of Chile in the 1980s), the goal of elite nonviolence was to steer the larger movement away from the expansive, radical aspirations for social justice and towards more “achievable” goals (e.g., elections).


²¹ Here I am thinking specifically of the use of the Office of Strategic Services, the precursor to the Central Intelligence Agency, which orchestrated elections in Greece after WWII: Stephen E. Ambrose and Douglas G. Brinkley, *Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy since 1938*, 8th Revised ed. (New York: Penguin, 1997).
Bush, for example, made this point in the preface to the 2002 National Security Strategy (NSS) when he argued that: “We will defend the peace by fighting terrorists and tyrants…. We will extend the peace by encouraging free and open societies on every continent.” In other words, democracy, terrorism, peace, and security were intertwined from that point onward. Promoting democracy was a form of fighting terrorism, according to Bush, because “Terrorism cannot grow in democracy’s soil.” The “war on terror” managed to link disparate concepts together, including the environment, poverty, authoritarianism, capitalism, and democracy. Accordingly, Bush’s National Security Advisor, Condoleezza Rice argued that the GWOT had united the world behind the goal of defeating terrorism: “This confluence of common values and common interests creates a moment of enormous opportunity” where “we can seek to marshal great power co-operation to move forward on problems that require multilateral solutions - from terror to the environment.” Bush, Rice, and other political elites had indelibly linked fighting terrorism and promoting democracy and all subsequent discussion of foreign policy was made in this context.

During the Bush years, US foreign policy elites articulated what amounts to a 21st century global security agenda. United States and global capitalist interests converged around the (largely US elite defined) global security agenda of promoting elite democracy, defeating terrorism, controlling nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and solving the world’s gravest threat to the environment (climate change/chaos)-- Which can clearly be seen in the two NSSUS documents produced by the Bush administration. Given the recent successes won by using nonviolent action at much lower costs than military force,

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it is in the interest of the United States to further examine the central US foreign policies of promoting democracy and fighting terrorism in light of the United States’ simultaneous policy of supporting those who “struggle non-violently” in order to show that it is possible to foster global security with nonviolent means. Further, the specific items comprising a 21st century global security agenda are political, not acts of nature, and therefore it may be even more efficient to use nonviolent means to foster global security. Because of the timeliness of this topic, this dissertation also questions whether a nonviolent foreign policy has greater chances of success in the era of Obama. The search for global security is of the utmost importance in an era where the process of globalization means that phenomena (war, recession/depression, disasters, etc.) anywhere may affect peoples’ lives everywhere. Creating a theory of nonviolent action to deal with these problems is as timely and necessary as it is challenging. This is in part due to the diversity of definitions for and uses of the terms “nonviolence,” “nonviolent,” and “nonviolently.” Complicating matters further, most of the literature on nonviolence focuses on national and transnational social movements rather than nonviolence as a policy of states. In order to analyze the US policy of promoting democracy and fighting terrorism in light of nonviolence, it is important to understand what is meant by nonviolence.

LINGUISTICS OF NONVIOLENCE—NONVIOLENCE AS SYMBOL AND SIGN

The term “nonviolence” is linguistically slippery and hard to pin down, which in and of itself is confusing and makes it hard to theorize nonviolence. “Nonviolence is a philosophical position,” writes Manfred Steger, “and an associated set of political actions of those who refrain from the intentional infliction of physical and psychological injury on
persons.” Steger’s definition reflects a careful comparative analysis of a variety of traditions of nonviolent theory. Such a comparative study is important because the theory and practice of nonviolence is the product of a historically rich tapestry of ideas. The term “nonviolence” has roots in divergent religious traditions. It can be traced to the Hindu teachings in the Vedas and the Sanskrit word “ahimsa” which, translated into English, means “non-harming.” Like the English variant, “ahimsa” takes the Sanskrit word for violence (himsa) and adds the prefix “a” which means “without.” Buddhism, also from the Indian subcontinent, includes in its “noble eightfold path” the precept of “right action,” often interpreted in English as the rule or principle prescribing nonviolence—specifically the idea of loving kindness which teaches the interconnectedness of all life. Scholars also trace the roots of nonviolence in China to the founder of Taoism, Lao Tzu (sixth century BCE), and to the rebel philosopher Mo Tzu (ca. 479-391 BCE) who argued for universal love (chien ai). Within the Hebrew tradition, nonviolent resistance is traced to as far back as the cases of Hebrew midwives hiding slave babies from the murderous decree of the Pharaoh (ca. 1300 BCE). These definitions all share a common, unifying feature, they all generally focus on the actions of individuals, not states.


In spite of its etymology, nonviolence is also more than the opposite or absence of violence. It is also, contrary to the conventional wisdom, always active. Nonviolence has been used in various ways which has caused imprecision in the meaning and scope of the term. For example, it has been used as an adjective (e.g., nonviolent strategy, resistance, conflict, and struggle), a noun (e.g., simply nonviolence, principled nonviolence, strategic nonviolence, and “nonviolence of the brave”), and an adverb (struggle nonviolently). Even though there have been numerous attempts to pin this concept down to a single meaning, a broad consensus definition has not yet been achieved.

The current history of the idea of nonviolence, as recorded in journalistic and scholarly sources, further demonstrates the ongoing struggle to define and put a name to a


32 Kurlansky, Nonviolence: Twenty-Five Lessons from the History of a Dangerous Idea.


34 Kurlansky goes so far as to say that “there is no word for it.” Kurlansky, Nonviolence: Twenty-Five Lessons from the History of a Dangerous Idea 5. This seems to be overstating things since I have been able to show that there are in fact many words for it. It would be more accurate to say that nonviolence is “polyvocal” or what Bakhtin would call “heteroglossic,” they have many different meanings: M. M. Bakhtin and Michael Holquist, The Dialogic Imagination : Four Essays, University of Texas Press Slavic Series ; No. 1 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1981). I would like to thank Jeremy Engels for explaining this concept to me and pointing out its use here.
range of actions loosely called “nonviolent.” A host of examples from the past century and
the first decade of the current one exemplify the range of action, resistance, and struggle
deemed nonviolent including strikes, sit-ins, boycotts, fasts, and refusal to cooperate. At the
end of the Cold War the term “Velvet Revolution” was adopted to refer to the nonviolent
overthrow of communism.\(^3\) The phrase “people power” has made its way into popular
discourse to describe mostly nonviolent instances of groups seeking social change."\(^4\) Gene
Sharp used it, for example, to refer to the overthrow of communist and other dictatorships
from the 1980s onwards.\(^5\) The phrase “a force more powerful” was coined by the
American Public Broadcasting Service (PBS) documentary series and a companion book to
refer to a number of successful cases of \(^2\) century nonviolent resistance (including to
authoritarian regimes, racism, colonialism, and imperialism).\(^6\) Since 2000 the term “color
revolution” has come into vogue to describe the mostly nonviolent movements of the
“Bulldozer Revolution” in Serbia (2000), Georgia’s “Rose Revolution” (2003), Ukraine’s
“Orange Revolution” (2004), Kyrgyzstan’s “Tulip Revolution” (2005) and, some would add,
Lebanon’s “Cedar Revolution” (2005) and Iran’s “Green Revolution” (2009). In a recent
collection of essays by the former director of the International Center on Nonviolent
Conflict (ICNC), Maria Stephan highlights the term “civilian jihad” to refer to nonviolent

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\(^6\) Ackerman and Duvall, eds., *A Force More Powerful: A Century of Nonviolent Conflict*.
struggles in the Middle East.\footnote{Maria J. Stephan, \textit{Civilian Jihad: Nonviolent Struggle, Democratization, and Governance in the Middle East}, 1st ed. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009).} Using descriptive phrases that explicitly link nonviolence to democracy, a variety of sources have referred to these mostly nonviolent political movements as “electoral revolutions” and a “wave of democratisation.”\footnote{Clark, \textit{People Power: Unarmed Resistance and Global Solidarity} 10. See also the final chapter of: Adam Roberts and Timothy Garton Ash, \textit{Civil Resistance and Power Politics: The Experience of Non-Violent Action from Gandhi to the Present} (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009) Chapter 22: A Century of Civil Resistance: Some Lessons and Questions.} In sum, the range of terms suggests the ongoing attempt to theorize, conceptualize, categorize, and thematically organize this thing called nonviolence and reflects how totally scrambled our understanding of it is.\footnote{It is possible that there is something specific to the term itself that makes for this rhetorical confusion}

The various social movements generally included in discussions of electoral revolutions are similar insofar as they have all employed a variety of tactics which have typically been called “nonviolent.” They include: strikes, marches, protests, speeches, twittering, pamphleting, blogging, youtubing, sit-ins, building occupations, facebooking and more. They also used a creative mix of slogans and political symbols to articulate their frustration, desire for change, and solidarity in struggle: the Serbian group “Otpor!” borrowed the raised fist from the American black power movement and the “color” movement in Ukraine used the color orange whereas the Iranians in summer 2009 used green as means of creating solidarity with fellow activists. The Iraqi group “la onf” whose organizational name, like the word nonviolence and ahimsa, takes the Arabic word for violence and adds “without” to the prefix, has organized conferences, marches, and even rallied around and successfully abolished the sale of toy guns (for the very practical reason
that Iraqi children wielding toy guns are often mistaken by American soldiers to be insurgents, with deadly consequences for the children). Western Sahara’s Aminatou Haidar, who is sometimes referred to as the “Saharawi Gandhi” or Sahara’s Gandhi\(^{42}\) has nonviolently shattered the stereotype that all Muslims are violent,\(^{43}\) partly by employing nonviolent tactics (particularly the hunger strike) against the Moroccan government.\(^{44}\) Even though there is little or mixed agreement on exactly what is nonviolence, the various movements that have used nonviolence as a tactic, a noun, an adjective, a philosophy, or even a worldview offer considerable evidence that nonviolence is a force, even if it is not a force “more powerful.”

Nonviolence in its adjectival and adverbial variants has made its way into US foreign policy. Given the United States’ history of westward expansion, manifest destiny, imperial wars, overthrows, and proxy wars it may seem strange that the United States would pay even a small amount of foreign policy attention to nonviolence (broadly defined). Nevertheless, in the 2002 and 2006 versions of the US National Security Strategy (NSS) documents, there are explicit references to supporting nonviolent social movements as a component of US foreign policy. In an earlier work I argued that the United States’ proposed use of


nonviolence in the 2002 NSS was a positive step for US foreign policy. Though, at the time, I was skeptical of the likelihood of US foreign policy makers actually following through on this portion of the policy document. I suspected that, more likely, since the emphasis within the document lay heavily on preemptive war and the predominance of US military power, that military means would take precedence over nonviolent means. Unfortunately, I made two mistakes. First, I was wrong to assume that the US would not employ nonviolent means. In fact, as William Robinson pointed out in his *Promoting Polyarchy*, it has been the policy of the United States, at least since the early 1980s, to fund nonviolent social movements (for example: Chile, the Philippines, and Indonesia). Second, I was wrong to assume that it would be an unqualified good if the United States adopted nonviolent means. At the time my argument was simple: better the United States use nonviolent means than to bomb states and peoples into submission. I remain convinced, given this binary construction, that even elite and strategic forms of nonviolence are better than bombing as foreign policy.

Though it is preferable for the United States to employ strategic nonviolence over strategic bombing, this binary (either/or) opposition does not mean that critique of US nonviolence policy is unnecessary or not useful. The policy of promoting nonviolent social organizations and movements outside of US territory is problematic in part because there is some evidence linking increased repression of nonviolent activists to US support of

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In addition US motivations for promoting democracy and nonviolence, which include “helping fuel the myth that America is a benign and democratic leader of international affairs,” are often suspect. Further concerns include the possibility that US funding for even nonviolent and democratic movements might create future dependency. Finally, there is the criticism that elite and strategic nonviolence are only capable of bringing about elite democracy which in turn sustains pre-existing class divisions and other structural inequalities and structural violence.

In order to better understand this line of criticism, it is necessary to return to a distinction made earlier between “principled” and “strategic” nonviolence. In the clearest language possible, principled nonviolence is about choosing nonviolence because it is the right thing to do (in philosophy this is a “deontological” position) whereas strategic nonviolence is about choosing nonviolence because it will achieve a usually short-term, 

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instrumental goal (in philosophy this is a “consequentialist” position). This division between principled and strategic was first made by Gene Sharp who argued that nonviolence needed to be made accessible to everyone and not just those who were capable of adopting, for example, the strictures of Gandhi’s conception of nonviolence.⁵⁰ In a word, Sharp wanted to “mainstream” nonviolence. In and of itself, this would appear to be a good thing: the more people use nonviolence the less overall violence there will be in the world. However, in order to mainstream nonviolence Sharp had to strip nonviolence of the ethical and moral components commonly associated with the Hindu, Buddhist, Taoist, Jewish, Christian and other spiritual traditions of nonviolence. Without an ethical component, nonviolence becomes a tool like any other and can be used for any purpose—at least this is the criticism leveled against strategic nonviolence.⁵¹

Sharp and others have responded to the charge that the United States is using nonviolence to further its national interests (instead of altruism). In a revealing interview Sharp said, “why not?” “What do they prefer that the US spend the money on?” The interviewer, who was trying to speak for those critics of US nonviolence policies, pressed: “They just shouldn't interfere. No country should interfere in the affairs of another country.” Sharp responded at length, bringing up the Nazis, and argued that it is the duty of states to intervene and interfere when horrors are being committed. Ultimately, he returned to a common theme of his regarding resources: “I think any superpower has a responsibility to explore other kinds of struggles that might be developed so that frustrated people seeking


⁵¹ Robert Burrowes essentially predicts this criticism in: Burrowes, Strategy of Nonviolent Defense.
democracy don’t kill thousands of people.” If the United States spends money on exploring “other kinds of struggles” then this is a net good for all of humanity.\textsuperscript{52}

This dissertation seeks to understand the uses and misuses of nonviolence in US foreign policy. It does this by examining the US policy of democracy promotion as it is contained and constrained by the “global war on terror.” It argues that three categories of nonviolent resistance can be used to analyze US foreign policy. Whereas principled and strategic nonviolence are commonly pitted against each other in a mutually exclusive universe, a third category may be able to create common ground between principled and strategic nonviolence. By keeping much of the ethical content of principled nonviolence and the pragmatic elements of strategic nonviolence, I have created a third category that I call regulative nonviolence. Regulative nonviolence, following Immanuel Kant, is meant as a guiding light to move towards rather than as an absolute set of acceptable behaviors. It is, therefore, both realistic and idealistic.

\textit{Overview of Chapters}

The dissertation is divided into four parts. Part I (comprised of two chapters) charts and develops the idea of nonviolence through several incarnations: Gandhian/principled nonviolence as a theory and practice of resistance; strategic nonviolence developed by Gene Sharp; and regulative nonviolence. Part I ends by introducing a new derivative: critical nonviolent security. Part II (comprised of one chapter) argues that the United States has created a 21\textsuperscript{st} century security agenda which includes four “pillars” of global security which if achieved will, according to the United States, create security: Anti-terrorism, democracy

\textsuperscript{52} Sharp and Spencer, "Gene Sharp 101."
promotion, non-proliferation, and environmentalism. Part III uses the three categories of nonviolence to examine two of the pillars introduced in Part II: anti-terrorism and democracy promotion. It offers a systematic analysis of US policy regarding anti-terrorism and democracy promotion. While it might be ideal for the US to employ principled nonviolence, to the extent that it practices nonviolent at all, it practices strategic nonviolence. As a possible and practical course correction, this section suggests that it is unlikely that the US will adopt principled nonviolence in the near or medium term. However, it is at least conceivable that the US might adopt regulative nonviolence. Part IV suggests some implications for President Obama. It concludes the dissertation by suggesting that nonviolent means are more likely than violent means to foster global security and that the US is more likely to adopt policies consistent with regulative nonviolence.

The first chapter lays out the three categories of nonviolence. It is divided into three sections and uses three historical cases of nonviolence to illustrate each category. Each category is evaluated in theoretical and practical terms. It argues that principled nonviolence is too ideal to expect the US to follow its strictures. However, it also explains that strategic nonviolence has several fatal flaws of its own. Thus, it is not enough for the US to adopt strategic nonviolence alone. In order to guide US policy along ethical lines, something like regulative nonviolence is necessary.

Chapter two deepens the principled and strategic understanding of nonviolence by setting it in the context of four other approaches to political action: power politics, pacifism, human security, and critical theory. This is done in part to show that nonviolence is distinct from but also borrows from these approaches. The final section suggests that elements of
nonviolence share enough commonality with critical theory that a combined critical nonviolence would be useful in fostering security.

Part II is comprised entirely of chapter four which argues that the United States sees its security as a product of the accomplishment of four agenda items: defeating terrorism, promoting democracy, controlling WMD, and solving climate change. This agenda amounts to a 21st century global security agenda. Because the United States is the sole remaining superpower it has the global agenda setting powers and therefore its agenda becomes a defining feature of the global security discourse. All states, with varying levels of internalization, have adopted this agenda. This chapter suggests that regulative nonviolence means will be more likely to accomplish these goals than principled or strategic means.

Part III is comprised of two chapters, one on anti-terrorism and another on democracy promotion. Chapter four, after reviewing the literature on terrorism studies, argues that the US foreign policy framing of the “war on terrorism” has lead to the belief that violence is the only appropriate response to terrorism. Further, it assumes that terrorism is an identity, not a tactic. In fact, terrorism is a tactic and one cannot wage war on a tactic. The chapter is also organized around a set of “lessons learned” 1) from terrorism studies, 2) state responses to terrorism, and 3) nonviolence studies literature. It concludes by reviewing some of the suggestions for nonviolent responses to terrorism and argues that regulative nonviolence is more likely to address the root problems of terrorism than military force.

Chapter five argues that the United States’ focus on democracy promotion is primarily a product of a particular reading of the democratic peace theory. However, it

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53 The planned book version of this project will include a chapter each on WMD and climate change/chaos.
shows that when the United States says democracy it really means elite/oligarchical democracy. This policy of elite democracy promotion reproduces the hierarchies of power that led to the original protests. Thus, the chapter ends by arguing that instead of promoting elite democracy through strategic nonviolence, it should promote popular democracy through regulative nonviolence.

Part IV is comprised solely of chapter six and it suggests some implications for the Obama administration.
Part I
Thinking about Nonviolence
CHAPTER ONE: Three Categories of Nonviolent Resistance

It is tempting to interpret elements of President Obama’s 2009 speech in Cairo, Egypt as categorical condemnations of violence of all kinds and equally wide-ranging recommendations of nonviolence. However, it is more useful to read his speech as a condemnation of violent resistance and a recommendation of three categories of nonviolent resistance. First of all, the relevant passages condemning violence and promoting nonviolence are directed primarily towards Palestinians who have been resisting Israeli occupation since 1967. In his speech titled “On a New Beginning,” President Obama said that “Palestinians must abandon violence.” It would appear, in subsequent passages that his condemnation of violence is not just in reference to Palestinians but, rather, a condemnation of violent “resistance.” Indeed, in the next line he narrows his condemnation of violence to specifically refer only to violent resistance: “Resistance through violence and killing is wrong and it does not succeed…. violence is a dead end.” He then added, by way of example, that the frequent use of indiscriminate attacks on Israeli civilians has not helped the Palestinian cause: “It is a sign neither of courage nor power to shoot rockets at sleeping children, or to blow up old women on a bus. That’s not how moral authority is claimed; that’s how it is surrendered.”

Thus, what may appear to be a condemnation of violence in general terms

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1 Obama, Remarks by the President on a New Beginning ([cited].
turns out to be condemnation of a particular kind of resistance, “resistance through violence.”

After proscribing resistance through violence the President goes on to compare Palestinians with African-Americans and the struggle for civil rights in the United States. The President uses the example to generalize from the specific civil rights context and to then make the argument that since nonviolence worked for African-Americans, it will work for Palestinians and presumably all others who “resist.” The following passage illustrates the President’s attempt to universalize the concept of nonviolence:

For centuries, black people in America suffered the lash of the whip as slaves and the humiliation of segregation. But it was not violence that won full and equal rights. It was a peaceful and determined insistence upon the ideals at the center of America’s founding.

The President expanded his discussion by drawing a parallel between black people in America and the US Civil Rights movement with the Palestinian intifada. Both suffer discrimination and injustice and both faced and continue to face choices between violence and nonviolence. He simultaneously introduces several rationales for abandoning violent resistance and adopting nonviolent resistance. However, what is most interesting about the President’s discussion of the power of nonviolence is that in spite of his attempts to universalize the single category of nonviolence it actually suggests that there are three types of nonviolence: 1) principled, 2) strategic, and 3) regulative.

The foremost category, “Principled” nonviolence, is discerned from the first half of Obama’s sentence which reads: “Resistance through violence and killing is wrong and it does not succeed.” This is the ethical imperative, a principled stand, in philosophy “deontology.” Other scholars have alluded to this category. For example, Max Weber writes about an
“ethics of conviction” whereby the practitioner’s ethical political actions are captured in the phrase “here I stand, I can do no other.” Principled nonviolence epitomizes this ethics of conviction when, for example, people refuse to compromise their principle that killing and violence is wrong. Principled nonviolence represents the far end of a political action spectrum, where violence is strictly prohibited for ethical reasons. It speaks from a position of moral authority; those who practice it believe that, when practiced, it actually generates moral authority. Weber writes that “the person who subscribes to the ethic of conviction feels ‘responsible’ only for ensuring that the flame of pure conviction (for example, the flame of protest against the injustice of the social order) is never extinguished.”

When Obama says in his speech that “killing is wrong,” he therefore articulates an absolute statement that matches the ethics of conviction characterized by principled nonviolence.

Strategic nonviolence is on the other end of the spectrum. Obama’s statement that “Resistance through violence and killing is wrong and it does not succeed” captures the essence of the meaning of strategic nonviolence. Rather than an ethical position, strategic nonviolence is concerned with the successes or failure of nonviolent practice. At this end of the spectrum, political actionists are concerned with results, with the outcomes that nonviolence produces. It is goal oriented and based on instrumental rationality, in philosophy “consequentialism.” Strategic nonviolence approaches conflict from a cost-benefit analysis perspective. Certain conflicts are inevitable, perhaps structurally assured (e.g. the American founders did not deal with slavery, thus cementing into place the structural

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3 Ibid., 360.
conditions for the Civil War). The point of strategic nonviolence is therefore to weigh the costs and benefits of the means of waging conflict, when conflict is understood to be inevitable (though violence is not). As one pair of authors write, “By creating a better risk-reward relationship, nonviolent methods may make waging conflict a more efficient option than either violent conflict or compromise.”4 Thus, the President answers the risk-reward question by asserting that violence is all risk and no reward and then makes the seemingly rational argument that violence does not work. In essence, the President ends his point by arguing that violence is strategically unsound. Strategic nonviolence leaves aside questions of ethics or morality, focusing solely on whether, when, and how nonviolent conflict works.

This leaves a middle position between the two extremes, one I call “regulative nonviolence.” The notion of a regulative ideal stems in part from Plato5 but finds its full articulation in Immanuel Kant.6 Simply put, although ideals are by definition transcendent, they are nonetheless perfectly suitable to praxis as they are capable of guiding human conduct. In a sense, regulative ideals can be compared to the North Star, which guided sailors as they navigated at night before the invention of global positioning systems. Thus, regulative ideals point the way but they cannot guarantee the safe completion of a journey. In politics, we may not achieve the goal (positive peace, a nonviolent world, politics, culture, etc.) but ideals may regulate our approach in such a way as to make our world at least less

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4 Ackerman and Kruegler, Strategic Nonviolent Conflict 3.


violent. This position suggests that we will fall short of our ultimate goal and, therefore, we will have to make concessions.

In Obama’s Cairo speech, this middle path can be gauged in his reference to a possible troop withdrawal in Afghanistan: “Now, make no mistake: We do not want to keep our troops in Afghanistan. We see no military -- we seek no military bases there. It is agonizing for America to lose our young men and women. It is costly and politically difficult to continue this conflict. We would gladly bring every single one of our troops home if we could be confident that there were not violent extremists in Afghanistan and now Pakistan determined to kill as many Americans as they possibly can. But that is not yet the case.” In this passage, the American President clearly indicates that he would prefer to follow the ideal of nonviolence (troop withdrawal), but this is not possible under the current circumstances. Thus, the position of regulative nonviolence entails a strong element of compromise—in its more negative sense of giving something up. In other words, while retaining his hopes for an eventual end of violence, Obama concedes that he must sacrifice these aspirations to prevent, as he sees it, more egregious manifestations of violence that would ensue from a premature troop withdrawal.

This chapter explores these three kinds of nonviolence in the context of historical cases of nonviolent resistance. In the subsequent chapters these categories will be used to analyze International Relations and US foreign policy. These three categories of nonviolence may ultimately help scholars, practitioners, and policy analysts act in ways that are both constrained by the realm of the possible and guided by an ethical light.
SECTION ONE: PRINCIPLED NONVIOLENCE

I want to avoid violence. Nonviolence is the first article of my faith. It is also the last article of my creed. But I had to make my choice. I had either to submit to a system which I considered had done an irreparable harm to my country, or incur the risk of the mad fury of my people bursting forth when they understood the truth from my lips. I know that my people have sometimes gone mad; I am deeply sorry for it. I am, therefore, here to submit not to a light penalty but to the highest penalty. I do not ask for mercy. I do not ask for any extenuating act of clemency. I am here to invite and cheerfully submit to the highest penalty....

~Mahatma Gandhi’s statements while on trial for sedition in 1922

Gandhi’s rise to political prominence in India parallels one of the few classic examples of principled nonviolence. As the following recounts, Gandhi chose purity of nonviolence over Indian independence in 1922, at a moment when the British Empire’s crown jewel was about to be plucked from its crown by an almost entirely nonviolent movement. The story actually begins in 1919 when the British imposed a series of degrading requirements upon the population of Punjab designed to suppress all forms of dissent, especially assemblies. In a particularly horrific enforcement of this policy, the British Brigadier General Reginald Dyer ordered his men to open fire on a large gathering of nonviolent protestors in an enclosed courtyard (Jallianwala Bagh) in the northern Indian city of Amritsar with the only exit blocked by soldiers. The Amritsar massacre left some 379 dead and over one thousand wounded. Shortly thereafter, predicting a backlash, the British imposed martial law on the Punjab. Dyer’s men treated the population to public floggings

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and other cruel and humiliating punishments—all with the stated goal of rooting out subversives.\textsuperscript{9} While the massacre and the subsequent imposition of martial law took place in April 1919, Gandhi did not hear about it until early summer, around June.

When he finally became aware of the events, Gandhi began to organize a nationwide noncooperation campaign and promised that it would end British rule in India within one year. The details were a little sketchy but among them were his urging Indians to withdraw all forms of support for the British, including, but not limited to: forsake all British titles, medals, and even elections. The courts would also be off limits to nationalists. Students should quit government sponsored schools. All in all, “Thousands of professionals and students followed his call, abandoning their positions forever.”\textsuperscript{10} It is also at this time that the Indian nationalists begin to boycott British cloth and clothing in general—Gandhi also dons his signature loincloth for the first time. Thus, it is at this time that Gandhi truly rises to the forefront of the nationalist movement in India, replete with all of the trappings that history would eventually remember him by: the loincloth, the spinning wheel, and nonviolent noncooperation.

These actions, simple though they may seem, in a relatively short period of time led to the near collapse of British rule in India. The British were so afraid of Gandhi that while they did round up most of the other leaders of the nationalist movement they dared not arrest Gandhi for fear of mass violence. Indeed, as Lloyd George, the governor of Bombay, later stated:

\textsuperscript{9} Vinay Lal, "The Incident of the 'Crawling Lane': Women in the Punjab Disturbances of 1919. (the Prejudices of the Britishers During Their Rule in India)," \textit{Genders}, no. 16 (1993).

He [Gandhi] gave us a scare. His program filled our jails. You can’t go on arresting people forever, you know—not when there are 319,000,000 of them. And if they had taken his next step and refused to pay taxes! God knows where we should have been!11

In the midst of the British panic over where Gandhi’s movement was sending them, there occurred several outbursts of violence that broke through the otherwise nonviolent movement. The first took place in April 1921 when a mob killed a police inspector and four constables. Another occurred in Bombay in November 1921 when Hindus and Muslims, ironically acting in unison, attacked Christians and Parsis who had, contrary to Gandhi’s edict not to support the Empire, welcomed the Prince of Wales.12 In spite of Gandhi’s worries, these events did not slow down his campaign. So taken off guard by the noncooperation forces that even these bouts of horrific violence did not seem to slow the movement or provide the British with the necessary excuse or means to use more counter violence.

Neither of these events troubled Gandhi as did what occurred early in the New Year.13 By 1922 the British government was seemingly on the verge of collapse and Gandhi’s predictions of self-rule within one year seemed possible. The nonviolent movement was experiencing major success. This success was set back on February 5, 1922, in the Northern Indian village of Chauri Chaura, when a nonviolent protest march turned into a grisly scene in which local police, after abusing several of the protestors, were gruesomely murdered by a portion of the protestors turned mob. Upon hearing the news, a

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11 Quoted in: Ibid. 167.

12 Ibid. 161-62.

13 The slaughter that ensued has been captured graphically on the silver screen version of “Gandhi.” Richard Attenborough et al., “Gandhi," ([Mumbai: Marketed by National Education & Information Films Limited : Distributed by Diskovery Video & Laser Co. Pvt. Ltd., 2006]).
horrified Gandhi quickly called off the national campaign to atone for the crimes of the Chauri Chaura massacre. Needless to say, many of Gandhi’s fellow nationalists were angered by his decision, though they eventually conformed to Gandhi’s dictate. Jawaharlal Nehru, who would go on to become the first Prime Minister of an independent India, summarized the mood of those who spent nearly a year in jail for their nonviolent noncooperation efforts:

We were angry when we learned of this stoppage of our struggle at a time when we seemed to be consolidating our position and advance on all fronts….Chauri Chaura may have been and was a deplorable occurrence and wholly opposite to the spirit of the non-violent movement; but were a remote village and a mob of excited peasants in an out-of-the way place going to put an end, for some time at least, to our national struggle of freedom? If this was the inevitable consequence of a sporadic act of violence, then surely there was something lacking in the philosophy and technique of a non-violent struggle. For it seemed to us to be impossible to guarantee against the occurrence of some such untoward incident. Must we train the three hundred odd millions of India in the theory and practice of non-violent action before we could go forward?14

Gandhi was, however, unmoved by their arguments. His response and explanation was published under the title “The Crime of Chauri Chaura.” Gandhi initially writes his response in a way that may appeal more to instrumental reason than principle: “Non-violent non-cooperators can only succeed when they have succeeded in attaining control over the hooligans of India, in other words, when the latter also have learnt patriotically or religiously to refrain from their violent activities at least whilst the campaign of non-co-operation is going on.” However, Gandhi’s assumption here is that the leaders and most of the people must be pure though he understands that some elements of the masses will take longer to transform. Though potentially problematic from a theoretical standpoint, the thrust of his

response focuses on purity of will and intention when, for example, he writes, “Let the opponent glory in our humiliation or so-called defeat. It is better to be charged with cowardice and weakness than to be guilty of denial of our oath and sin against god. It is a million times better to appear untrue before the world than to be untrue to ourselves.”

This example shows how Gandhi prioritizes individual integrity and will: first be true to oneself. In this example Gandhi also makes clear the implications to the claim that the means and the end must cohere. He states that if the goal is nonviolence then the means cannot contain violence. His nonviolence is understood, in this case, to be as pure as possible. This is in spite of the possibility that had mass civil disobedience continued in 1922, India might have been decolonized more than 20 years sooner than it did—and potentially without the civil war that ensued after India’s eventual independence in 1947.

For Gandhi the point was that the goal or the end that might have been achieved through impure nonviolence would be as bad or worse than the current reality of British colonial rule.

Once the movement crumbled, eventually succumbing to Gandhi’s demand for purity in nonviolence or continued British rule, and with Gandhi no longer a threat, the British promptly arrested him for sedition. As the epigraph to this section records, Gandhi asked for the full punishment allowable under the law. But the judge was impressed by Gandhi’s moral argument and awarded him the minimum sentence and added that if the Queen were to reduce his term further, he would not object. Lloyd George soberly

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summarized the situation when he stated that “Gandhi’s was the most colossal experiment in world history; and he came within an inch of succeeding. But he couldn’t control men’s passions. They became violent and he called off his program. You know the rest. We jailed him.”\textsuperscript{17} Gandhi ended an amazingly successful nonviolent movement because he felt that it was not nonviolent enough. Purity of means, in this case, took precedence over successful political practice.

The Gandhian example is meant to illustrate the idea of principled nonviolence. Very few empirical examples of principled nonviolence actually exist. Nonetheless, Gandhi’s nonviolence is not synonymous with principled nonviolence. As several scholars have noted, many of Gandhi’s campaigns were not as pure as the one discussed here.\textsuperscript{18} In contrast to his practice, his writing often strikes a more principled tone. For example, the Sanskrit word “ahimsa” which Gandhi translated into English as “nonviolence,” means, in Gandhi’s words, “the largest love”\textsuperscript{19} which “does not burn others, it burns itself.”\textsuperscript{20} In other words, a practitioner of nonviolence willingly suffers violence rather than inflict it upon others. Contained within this argument is the assumption that by suffering, one could soften the heart of the violent aggressor. Further, Gandhi argued that, “the essence of violence is that there must be a violent intention behind a thought, word, or act, i.e., an intention to do harm

\textsuperscript{17} Lloyd George, quoted in: Steger, Gandhi’s Dilemma 167.

\textsuperscript{18} Sharp, Gandhi as a Political Strategist.

\textsuperscript{19} Mahatma Gandhi and Raghavan Narasimhan Iyer, The Moral and Political Writings of Mahatma Gandhi (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986) vol. 2, 212

to the opponent so called.”21 Following from Gandhi’s understanding of violence then, principled nonviolence has something to do with the absence of violent intention in thought, word, and deed.

However, principled nonviolence is more than simply a lack of violent intention. It has ultimately been conceived and re-conceived as a universal philosophy based upon a metaphysical conception of an interconnected spiritual and physical universe. Johan Galtung summarizes this Gandhian notion of unity thusly: “In our mental universe all forms of life, particularly human life, should enjoy closeness and not be kept apart by steep Self-Other gradients that drive wedges in social space. Any justification derived from the hard core of a culture, e.g. a calling as a Chosen People, would be rejected when it conflicted with this even higher, even ‘harder’ axiom.”22 Gandhi’s view that all life in this world is interconnected serves as the foundation upon which Gandhi builds his conception of nonviolence.23 In this way, he also exemplifies the primary characteristics of principled nonviolence.

One of the unfortunate but logical conclusions to be drawn from this discussion of principled nonviolence is that it is very difficult, if not entirely impossible, to practice. The principles are so strict as to make their practice unlikely. A related consequence of these principles is to create a disincentive to even try to practice nonviolence. It is tempting,


23 Agnew writes that, “Knowing by seeing the world as a horizontal but hierarchically organized whole was finally institutionalized as the modern alternative to the vertical Great Chain of Being (connecting the supernatural to the human worlds) that had been the dominant cosmology of other, older civilizations.” John A. Agnew, *Geopolitics: Re-Visioning World Politics*, 2nd ed. (London ; New York: Routledge, 2003) 23.
therefore, to agree with Max Weber in his famous essay on politics that one must choose either violence or nonviolence. The binary opposition that he constructs seems so unquestionably true that it is almost unimaginable that someone could possibly construct a middle ground between violence and nonviolence. Weber writes persuasively, for example, that “It seems that the ethics of conviction is bound to founder hopelessly on this problem of how the end is to sanctify the means. Indeed, the only position it can logically take is to reject any action which employs morally dangerous means.” While Weber, in this passage, sets up the beginning of a critique leveled against those he characterizes as advocates of an “ethics of conviction,” it also captures the basic principle of principled nonviolence: reject any and all violence. Weber goes on to argue that in practice, advocates of this “ethics of conviction” tend one minute to preach nonviolence and then “they call for one last act of force to create the situation in which all violence will have been destroyed forever…” His charge of hypocrisy may have some merit but is too general. The larger point about the logic does, however, fit with the current discussion of principled nonviolence. Indeed, the Gandhian view of nonviolence is similarly as puritanical as Weber’s conception of an ethic of conviction in this regard: being nonviolent requires nonviolence in thought, word, and deed. If Weber’s distinction between violence and nonviolence is too general, it does have the advantage of being elegant enough to provide a general outline of the principles of a “principled” nonviolence.


25 Ibid., 361.

26 Ibid. Weber, lecturing in 1918 Germany, was generalizing from his critique of socialist writers of his time (not, incidentally, Gandhi who was at that time about to embark on a massive all India noncooperation campaign).
Gandhi counters Weber’s overly simplified view of nonviolence with a broad, usually
tolerant and “loving”\(^{27}\) approach to political change. In Weber’s binary opposition, the
devotee of nonviolence has only two choices: irrelevance in the real world or inherent
contradiction between theory and practice. In contrast, Gandhi’s is a special view of
nonviolence that includes a conception of action. The goal is to be both nonviolent and
politically relevant. As Gene Sharp observes, there are a variety of ethical systems that reject
violence and some are not concerned with action at all.\(^ {28}\) Nonetheless, all forms of “not
violence” do not gather together to form a monolithic whole. All of this is to say that it is
not advisable to follow Weber’s binary opposition, more options are available than simply
violence or nonviolence (defined as non-action).

Though it is difficult to apply, the most important reason to defend a principled
nonviolence is the way it connects means with ends. Gandhi summarizes this point when he
writes that: “I have often said that if one takes care of the means, the end will take care of
itself.”\(^ {29}\) The larger argument is that if an individual or a group uses violence as a means
then whatever outcome is achieved will also contain violence. Thus, violent movements for
social change, especially those that claim to want social justice, will find that after the
revolution they may have changed rulers but not necessarily the relationship between ruler
and ruled. It is possible to imagine that Gandhi’s quest for purity in nonviolence may not be
possible to achieve in real life. Worse, a quest for purity may result in continued violence,

\(^{27}\) In the Greek sense of “agape.”

\(^{28}\) For a typology of nonviolence as well as references see: Sharp, Gandhi as a Political Strategist 201-34.

University Press, 1994) 263.
e.g. it took India more than 25 more years after Gandhi called off the 1920-1922 noncooperation movement to gain independence.

**SECTION TWO: STRATEGIC NONVIOLENCE**

Strategic nonviolence is defined as a means of achieving political goals that refrains from the use of violence for strategic reasons, for example because it is deemed to “work better,” in some way, than violence in a particular instance. Nonviolence may even be superior to violence for practical reasons, e.g., because those seeking to achieve their goals do not possess the military might to use force. Indeed, this is typically the argument given.

While Gandhi’s example shows that principled nonviolence is a difficult political path rarely followed, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict represents one of the many instances of strategic nonviolence. This example is illustrative because it has historically been viewed as extremely and intractably violent—a word, it is a hard case even for the limited concept of strategic nonviolence. The caricature of the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians is often one-sided. For example, if someone looks for stories depicting Palestinians as murderers of the innocent, then find them she will—the discussion at the beginning of this chapter about President Obama’s speech in Cairo is but one example. Similarly, stories of Israelis’ inhumanity towards Palestinians abound. The demonization and recriminations know no.

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30 The following joke captures some of these elements: A female CNN journalist heard about a very old Jewish man who had been going to the Western Wall to pray, twice a day, every day, for a long, long time. She watched him pray and after about 45 minutes, when he turned to leave, using a cane ...and moving very slowly, she approached him for an interview. 'Pardon me, sir, I'm Rebecca Smith from CNN. What's your name?' 'Morris Fishbein,' he replied. 'Sir, how long have you been coming to the Western Wall and praying?' 'For about 60 years' '60 years! That's amazing! What do you pray for?' 'I pray for peace between the Christians, Jews and the Muslims. I pray for all the wars and all the hatred to stop. I pray for all our children to grow up safely as responsible adults, and to love their fellow man.' 'How do you feel after doing this for 60 years?' 'Like I'm talking to a fuckin' wall.'

31 See for example reports on Israel’s operation “Cast Lead”: http://www.hrw.org/en/features/israel-gaza
bounds. And yet, many of the participants of the first intifada employed strategic nonviolence. As one researcher of the first intifada writes: the organizers of the first intifada “challenged monopolies of power and truth based on armed struggle, viewing nonviolent sanctions as a more realistic alternative” to violence.32

The tractable point here is that Palestinians and quite a few Israelis did not choose nonviolence for entirely principled reasons, they chose it for strategic, “realistic” reasons. Some summary remarks about the conflict are required though it should be understood that this conflict usually defies even lengthy, often multi-volume accounts.33 To begin, what Israelis mark as their national independence day (May 14, 1948), Palestinians refer to in Arabic as “al-Nakba” (“the catastrophe”). As Benny Morris and others record, at this time between 600,000 and 760,000 Palestinian Arabs “departed their homes….”34 Today Palestinian refugees number between four and five million. They live primarily in the West Bank, Gaza, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon. Though they are referred to as “camps” they are in fact concrete slums that are home to several generations of “refugees.” Though the media records the conflict as existing primarily in the West Bank and Gaza, it may be useful to remember those Palestinians not living in Israeli-occupied territory since every peace talk between Israelis and Palestinians tends to stumble on the question of what to do with the

32 King, *A Quiet Revolution* 2.

33 There are numerous accounts of the birth of the conflict. Benny Morris’ historical account is a good place to start because his research is relatively accepted by a variety of sides and he simultaneously frustrates all sides. See, for example: Benny Morris, *The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited*, 2nd ed., *Cambridge Middle East Studies* ; 18 (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), Benny Morris, *One State, Two States: Resolving the Israel/Palestine Conflict* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009). Mary King’s work is also excellent regarding the neglected nonviolent history of the struggle: King, *A Quiet Revolution*.

millions of Palestinians living outside of Palestine. Today, the contrast between, on the one hand, an advanced Israeli military force that is outfitted in significant measure by the United States and, on the other hand, the starving masses in the Gaza strip who use weapons like suicide terrorism, rocket propelled grenades (RPGS), stones and strikes is often overlooked in the heated debates over the possibility of peace. However, the contrast goes a long way to explain why Palestinians might want to choose strategic nonviolence over force of arms. As Mary Elizabeth King writes, “For four years prior to the intifada, a handful of catalytic agents argued that the Palestinians should stop using violence in their efforts to fight the occupation, because it confronted a belligerent presence where the Palestinians were at their weakest.”

The catalyst that sparked into life the flames of the first intifada was a car crash involving an Israeli truck and two vehicles carrying Palestinian laborers who were returning to Gaza after a day of working in Israel on December 9, 1987. Four Palestinians were killed and rumors rapidly spread that the deaths were not, as was asserted by the Israeli government, accidental, but, rather, retribution for the preceding day’s murder of an Israeli in Gaza. Demonstrations erupted in conjunction with funerals for several of the accident victims. When Israeli troops arrived on the scene, they were greeted with stones thrown by Palestinian youths. It is this image more than any other that captures the extreme power differential between the Israeli occupier and the Palestinian occupied.


36 King, A Quiet Revolution 4.
Perhaps surprising given the available data, the image of the stone throwing Palestinian seemed rather to prove that the Palestinians were suicidal, irrational, and insanely violent. As one Israeli professor wrote after the intifada, “One of the main goals of the Palestinian uprising…was to alter U.S. policy through a political communication process based on violence.”37 If that were true, then the Palestinians failed spectacularly. The U.S. news media reported the Israeli side of the story and did not balk when Israel’s Defense Minister declared that “The first priority is to prevent violent demonstrations with force, power, and blows.”38 However, the available evidence suggests that the first intifada was a primarily nonviolent affair, in many ways even more nonviolent than Gandhi’s 1920-1922 noncooperation movement with its several horrific bouts of violence. Israeli Defense Forces data support this observation. In 1988 four Israeli soldiers were killed in the West Bank; two soldiers were killed each in the West Bank and Gaza in 1989; two were killed in the West Bank and one in Gaza in 1990; and one in the West Bank in 1991. In the same four-year period 706 Palestinians were killed by Israeli Defense Forces.39

It is not fair to say that the Palestinians did not have a choice between violence and nonviolence. They absolutely did and the available evidence suggests that by wide margins they chose nonviolence as their means of ending the Israeli occupation. Whereas the media reported and usually continues to report the activities of leaders who use violence to gain influence, many of the leaders of the first intifada were radicalized as union, student, and local community organizers, not revolutionaries in the traditional sense. The leaders of the

37 Eytan Gilboa, quoted in: Ibid. 6.

38 Yitzhak Rabin, quoted in: Ibid. 7.

39 Ibid. 10.
intifada cut their political teeth on small but democratic practices like voter registration drives, election monitor training, and other similarly nonviolent activities: “School and commercial strikes, petitions, protest telegrams, advertisements and condemnations in the daily papers, and the attempts to boycott Israeli goods are, in fact, manifestations of nonviolent struggle.” The activists who participated in these activities would not gain the media attention of violent revolutionaries like, for example, Yasser Arafat. By 1987 most of the well known Palestinian freedom fighters did not actually live inside of the occupied territories and were not able to organize anything inside of them. This left the leadership of the intifada to those who did live in them. Therefore these leaders understood the abilities, capabilities, and resources of the Palestinian masses living in occupied Palestine. Most importantly, their assessments led them to choose strategic nonviolence as the best means to fight the occupation.

In the middle of January, 1988, Hanna Siniora, a Palestinian intellectual and editor of the Jerusalem newspaper al-Fajr, published two articles detailing a plan for nonviolent resistance to the Israeli occupation of Palestine. Similar in a number of ways to Gandhi’s 1920 noncooperation campaign, it asked Palestinians to quit smoking Israeli cigarettes, then to stop drinking Israeli soft drinks. Several weeks later, Palestinians were then asked to withhold their tax payments. Finally, they would stop going to their jobs in Israel. The plan’s primary intention was to achieve a psychological shift within Palestinians away from


41 The 1982 Israeli invasion and occupation of Lebanon succeeded in forcing Yasir Arafat and the Palestinian Liberation Organization to flee 2,500 miles away to Tunis.

submission and towards resistance. However, it also included more concrete goals including “the release of political prisoners, an end to Israeli water drilling and settlements, and an end to the ‘iron fist’ of Israeli control of the territories.” The primary and most well known theoretical architect of the plan, Mubarak Awad, had studied Gandhi as well as the Muslim “frontier Gandhi,” Badsha Khan, and was convinced that nonviolence was a tactic that would work in the Occupied Territories because the Israelis had more power and because they depended so much on Palestinians for their economy. The strategic nonviolence of the first intifada was thus based on clear cost-benefit analysis that, in Awad’s words, insisted that “Non-violence is the most effective method of resisting the Israeli occupation in the West Bank and Gaza today.” In other words, regardless of whether Awad was himself committed to nonviolence on a principled level, he was arguing, contra Gandhi, that Palestinians should adopt it for strategic reasons “today.” Tomorrow, another method might be available. It is precisely this level of instrumentality articulated by an advocate of strategic nonviolence that provides grounds for doubting the sincerity and even the likely success of nonviolent action.

While Gandhi argued that the Indian population needed to be sufficiently religiously motivated to practice nonviolent resistance, advocates of strategic nonviolence like Awad and others argued that Palestinians needed to adopt strict nonviolence because it was strategically necessary and effective for those living inside the occupied territories. However, he writes, “This does not determine the methods open to Palestinians on the outside; nor


44 Easwaran, *Nonviolent Soldier of Islam*.

does it constitute a rejection of the concept of armed struggle. It does not rule out the possibility that the struggle on the inside may turn into an armed struggle at a later stage.”

An early indicator of the slippery ethical slope that strategic nonviolence (especially as articulated by Awad and others) created could be seen in the treatment of Palestinian collaborators. By comparison, the use of nonviolence was more ably applied against the Israelis than against Palestinians. Paralleling Hindus and Muslims attacking Christians and Parsis for welcoming a British dignitary against Gandhi’s demands, the scholars Ackerman and Duvall record that shops owned by Palestinians who decided to keep their stores open during strike days were torched as punishment for violating the edicts of the resistance leadership. Even more horrific were the death sentences meted out by Palestinians against their fellow compatriots who actively collaborated with the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) or Secret Service (Shin Bet): 190 collaborators were executed by Palestinians in the first 16 months of the intifada alone. This leads Ackerman and Duvall to argue that “for every ten instances of civil disobedience, it took only one act of viciousness to diminish the sympathy within Israel and around the world that Palestinians hoped to cultivate.”

While Gandhi would attribute similar incidents of violence against fellow countrymen as evidence that Indians were not sufficiently nonviolent in thought, word, and deed, it is also possible that the logic of strategic nonviolence is partially to blame. After all, the strategic argument makes sense when directed against Israelis, but the power differential breaks down when Palestinians are matched by fellow Palestinians. Simply put, it is much easier for Palestinians

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47 Ackerman and Duvall, eds., A Force More Powerful: A Century of Nonviolent Conflict 413.
to kill Palestinians than Israelis. Thus, the argument for strategic nonviolence only applies to Israelis, not collaborators.

Although advocates of strategic nonviolence have made powerful arguments in favor of disciplined nonviolent action, they have typically made the case that violence simply does not work in some cases and that nonviolence is the only rational form of resistance available to certain groups. For example, when a group faces an occupier who is militarily and technologically superior, it makes rational sense to avoid using the same types of weapons as the oppressor. In other words, the resulting logic amounts to “we don’t have the guns so use nonviolence.” There is nothing theoretically wrong per se with being goal oriented. However, it is at least theoretically possible that the overemphasis placed on instrumental rationality by advocates of strategic nonviolence increases the chances that the tactic of nonviolence will not have the transformative effect that is often desired by those who use nonviolent means. An advocate of strategic nonviolence, Mubarak Awad, for example, writes that “Non-violent struggle achieves its goals and effect upon the hearts and minds of the Israeli soldiers.” However, this transformative effect is less likely to occur when the IDF experiences stones, Molotov cocktails, and other dangerous projectiles hurled at them when they advance into a Palestinian area. Further, when they hear nonviolent leaders arguing that nonviolent struggle does not mean that violence is unacceptable in possible future campaigns, they are less likely to believe the campaign’s avowed philosophy of nonviolence. Finally, there is the added concern that a lack of ethics and ideals will make even more possible the switch from nonviolent to violent struggle within a short period of

time. These factors make it easier to conclude that strategic nonviolence’s theoretical inconsistencies will lead to future violence.

The advantages of using strategic nonviolence are: 1) it does not require devotion to a particular religious or spiritual tradition; 2) its focus on strategy means that success and failure can be measured by the outcomes; 3) it can be adopted by a wide number of group members, including those who previously advocated violence and who may in the future return to violent means. The disadvantages are 1) its focus on outcomes strips nonviolence of its deontological or ethical components; 2) this, in turn, makes it easier for participants to switch tactics more quickly, possibly setting back an otherwise successful movement; 3) it might be less convincing to the oppressor and therefore fail to transform him according to the argument presented by Awad and others. Ultimately, strategic nonviolence may go too far in the opposite direction of principled nonviolence. It is hoped that a third way between these approaches can, at least theoretically, work better than either principled or strategic nonviolence.

SECTION THREE: REGULATIVE NONVIOLENCE

The regulative principle of reason is grounded on the proposition that in the empirical regress we can have no experience of an absolute limit, that is, no experience of any condition as being one that empirically is absolutely unconditioned. The reason is this: such an experience would have to contain a limitation of appearances by nothing, or by the void, and in the continued regress we should have to be able to encounter this limitation in a perception—which is impossible. ~Immanuel Kant

49 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason 455.

The regulative ideal of nonviolence is one that, following Kant’s conception of the “regulative principle of reason,” understands that empirical reality is “conditioned.” Thus, “perfect” or “unconditioned” nonviolence does not exist. As Kant indicates,
perfection could only occur if time were to stop. Regulative nonviolence assumes that in a series of given moments in time nonviolence can only approach perfection, but never achieves it. Further, regulative nonviolence is conditioned by a variety of forces, including violence and instrumental reason. In spite of this conditioning process, the regulative ideal helps to guide nonviolent political practice in a direction that is towards a less, or at least differently, conditioned, form of nonviolence. Thus, the impossibility of ever achieving perfect or pure nonviolence is not an excuse to give up on the ideal or even the pursuit of pure or unconditioned nonviolence. In this sense, regulative nonviolence is a guide to more nonviolent (or less violent) political action. “More nonviolent” means that there may be numerous episodes of political compromise, but the overall trajectory (Kant’s “empirical” and “continued regress”) of political practice guided by regulative nonviolence will progress towards the ideal of nonviolence. The following examples of two different civil rights campaigns will help to illustrate benefits and challenges that face practitioners of regulative nonviolence.

During Gandhi’s 1920-1922 noncooperation campaign, African Americans were carefully watching for clues and comparisons that might benefit the civil rights work in America. Predicting the December 5, 1955 Montgomery bus boycott, an African American contemporary and journalistic observer of Gandhi’s campaign wrote: “We believe that some empty Jim Crow cars will some day worry our street car magnates in Southern cities when we get around to walking rather than suffer insult and injury to our wives and children.”⁵⁰ A number of African American leaders even made pilgrimages to India to meet with Gandhi to

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discuss the philosophy of nonviolence and then returned to the United States to discuss and spread the message of nonviolence throughout the African American intellectual (e.g. Marcus Garvey and W. E. B. DuBois) and political world. As early as 1936 Dr. Howard Thurman, an African American Minister, traveled to India to discuss nonviolence, asking Gandhi: “Is non-violence from your point of view a form of direct action”? Gandhi responded to Thurman’s question with the following:

It is not one form, it is the only form. I do not of course confine the words ‘direct action’ to their technical meaning. But without a direct active expression of it, non-violence to my mind is meaningless. It is the greatest and the activist force in the world. One cannot be passively non-violent. In fact ‘non-violence’ is a term I had to coin in order to bring out the root meaning of ahimsa.51

Martin Luther King Jr. would himself eventually make a pilgrimage to India, though by then he could only meet with Gandhians, not Gandhi. Although King adopted many of Gandhi’s views of nonviolence, he altered it in a variety of ways to make it work in the American context. Gandhi, somewhat contradictorily, spoke of the universality of nonviolence but primarily organized his political activity in terms of Indian independence. King, on the other hand, would eventually conceptualize a more truly cosmopolitan nonviolence, as for example, when he spoke out against the American war in Vietnam.52 King would also adopt certain controversial strategies that blurred the boundaries between principled and strategic nonviolence.


Two cases of nonviolent resistance that help illustrate the idea of regulative nonviolence are: the Albany, Georgia campaign and the Birmingham, Alabama campaign. While there may be several alternative case studies that could be discussed to introduce the concept of regulative nonviolence (e.g. Nelson Mandela's switch from nonviolence to violence and South Africa’s ANC), the example of Albany’s police Chief Laurie Pritchett’s “nonviolent” response to the civil rights campaign waged there as compared to the Children’s March in Birmingham, Alabama, offers an appropriately hard case for regulative nonviolence. This is because in Albany police Chief Pritchett appears to use nonviolence to defend segregation and in Birmingham King appears to violate the standards of nonviolence by instrumentally using children to further the cause of civil rights.

In December 1961, William G. Anderson urgently requested that King come to Albany to help the movement for desegregation and voter registration that was ongoing there. King agreed to come in for a speech only. The Albany movement was facing an intransigent white political establishment and hundreds of protestors had been jailed and were languishing in prison. In one example, 54 girls were locked up in a cell made for six.\(^53\) King arrived to give his speech in a packed Shiloh Baptist Church where the crowd was singing “we shall overcome” and chanting “Freedom! Martin Luther King wants freedom!” In the intensity following King’s speech, Anderson told the crowd that King would lead them in a march the next day. King agreed though he had not intended to do any such thing, this was meant to be a quick revitalization tactic for a flagging campaign. The next day King translated Gandhi’s universalistic message of an interconnected universe: “You

hear it said some of us are agitators. I am here because there are twenty million Negroes in the United States and I love every one of them. I am concerned about every one of them. What happens to any one of them concerns all indirectly.” It was not enough to show the interconnection between all black Americans, he needed to show that his conception of the beloved community represented true integration: “I am here because I love the white man. Until the Negro gets free, white men will not be free…”54 “Then he led them on a march and was promptly arrested for parading without a permit, disturbing the peace, and obstructing the sidewalk.55

This led to a series of events that brought King and his organization, the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) to attempt its first community-wide desegregation campaign in Albany, Georgia. King was strategically challenged and ultimately outmatched by police Chief Laurie Pritchett who had studied King’s writings, speeches, and Gandhian techniques. When King said his movement was going to fill the jails, Pritchett arranged to have all arrested protestors brought to neighboring county prisons, thus keeping Albany’s prisons empty. No matter how many times King led a protest, he was incapable of filling the jails (a vital component of the nonviolent tactic because with full jails the government would be pressured to negotiate). In addition to not filling the jails, Pritchett instructed his men to be polite to those being arrested. As one King biographer reports, “When demonstrators knelt in prayer, Pritchett bowed his head, then arrested them with a puckish smile. He never clubbed anybody, never called anybody names, and never let his men do so either.” This meant that the images of brutality were missing. The national news media had

54 Ibid. 191.
55 Ibid. 192.
nothing to report. As one city official remarked, “We killed them with kindness.”\textsuperscript{56} Though King and his colleagues would eventually acquire a grudging respect for the police Chief, even calling off a planned march to allow him to spend his anniversary with his wife, it is difficult to agree with the view that Pritchett was using nonviolence, that his plan was to “overcome nonviolent protest with nonviolent law enforcement.”\textsuperscript{57} After all, if nonviolence is to mean anything, then it cannot nonviolently support the continuation of a violent and racist system like racial segregation by jailing nonviolent activists for integration and civil rights.

After a movement leader’s wife was assaulted, resulting in her miscarriage, riots broke out, replete with angry people throwing stones at the police. Pritchett was even quoted sarcastically asking reporters “You see them nonviolent rocks?” Such examples would be echoed nearly two decades later during the first intifada with similar affects. The movement was thus cast in a violent light while the police were seen as nonviolent in their restraint.\textsuperscript{58} While it may be difficult to understand how someone who used the police to continue to uphold segregation could be called “nonviolent,” it may be helpful to consider Pritchett’s conception of nonviolence in the context of strategic nonviolence. Gene Sharp has argued convincingly that one of the great features of strategic nonviolence is that anyone can use it. Thus, nonviolence can also be used for any end (so long as it does not entail physical harm (violence in deed). Pritchett’s actions could not be considered nonviolent by the standard of principled nonviolence, but they could be by the standard of strategic

\textsuperscript{56} Ibid. 195.  
\textsuperscript{57} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{58} Ibid. 196.
nonviolence. The value neutrality of strategic nonviolence was, therefore, used to support and prop up the violent institution of segregation.

King would eventually leave Albany, arguing that progress was made despite failing to achieve any of the stated goals of desegregation: “the Negro people there straightened up their bent backs.” Though modest progress was made, problems continued (e.g. a series of Klu Klux Klan bomb attacks on churches occurred around Albany in September 1962). King’s despair reached its nadir after viewing the wreckage; he wrote in his diary that “Tears welled up in my heart and in my eyes. No matter what it is we seek, the Negro stands little chance, if any, of securing the approval, consent, or tolerance of the segregationist South.”

Yet, King’s movement would emerge from the Albany experience having learned some hard lessons from police Chief Pritchett. The movement would experience success and strike a blow for desegregation in Birmingham, Alabama where civil rights leaders there were organizing a boycott of segregated businesses.

Birmingham was home to a deep-seated violence inspired by racism against African Americans. One neighborhood had even been bombed so frequently that locals commonly referred to it as “Dynamite Hill” and Birmingham itself as “Bombingham.” The local SCLC leader, Reverend Fred Shuttlesworth of Bethel Baptist Church, had seen his wife stabbed and his house and church bombed by the forces of segregation. The city had tried to sue him for three million dollars and since his initial attempt to desegregate the busses in 1956, he had been jailed eight times. The public face of violence was police Commissioner Eugene “Bull” Connor who repeatedly ignored the bombs that went off and instead locked up the

59 Ibid. 205.

60 Ibid.
protestors and the victims of the racist violence.\textsuperscript{61} King and Shuttlesworth hoped that with their combined years of experience with civil rights advocacy they could turn Birmingham into an example and “make a confrontation which would bring the nation…to recognize the injustice.”\textsuperscript{62} King brought the full weight of his organization to Birmingham, a city King referred to as “the most thoroughly segregated city in the country” and biographer Stephen B. Oates described as “an American Johannesburg that was ruled by fear and plagued by hate,” in the fall of 1962.\textsuperscript{63}

“Project C” as the SCLC leadership referred to it because of its focus on confrontation was a carefully organized and meticulously planned campaign that directly contrasted with the haphazard example of Albany. Their approach was more focused than Albany where they tried to attack the political establishment directly. In Birmingham they targeted the merchants, specifically Woolworth’s, and two other stores by means of the boycott and the sit-in. They would march, picket, boycott, and eventually they would go to jail. The protest was also directed at the federal government and the “court of world opinion.” As King would insist, nonviolent action “would force his oppressor to commit his brutality openly—in the light of day—with the rest of the world looking on.” Summarizing King’s new strategy, Oates would later write, “provocation was now a crucial aspect of King’s nonviolent strategy.”\textsuperscript{64} King would do just that in Birmingham but it is also clear that he received unintentional help from the white racists themselves, especially police

\textsuperscript{61} Ibid. 209-10.

\textsuperscript{62} Ibid. 210.

\textsuperscript{63} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{64} The preceding quotations are from: Ibid. 212.
Commissioner Bull Connor, “Ole Bull, as whites called him, hated ‘junkeateering journalists’ and sniffed that ‘the trouble with America is communism, socialism, and journalism,’ all of which were out to ‘inta-grate’ America and destroy the white race.” It would be in Birmingham that America would get a chance to see segregation without the conventional niceties that were on display in Albany. Instead, Birmingham would exhibit the brutality, replete with the now infamous images of dogs biting little girls, riot police beating protestors, and firemen turning their hoses on nonviolent protestors—the iconic images of the segregated, racist southern United States. In other words, the contrast between Albany and its Chief Pritchett on the one hand and Birmingham and its Bull Connor on the other could not be starker.

Project “Confrontation Birmingham” was a success. But before it succeeded it ran up against at least one roadblock. By May 1963 King and the SCLC were running out of marchers and funds. The city had arrested King but then let him out, deflating the movement even further. In perhaps the most controversial strategic decision in the movement’s history, King’s team reasoned that if the parents were running out of money and energy, then perhaps their children could march. Later dubbed “the Children’s March,” the movement employed a strategy of training high school students in nonviolent tactics. What began as a strategy of using high school students rapidly turned into a strategy of using children of nearly all ages as the high school students brought their younger siblings in on the action. As one prominent activist, James Bevel, later recounted, they asked King “why not launch a ‘D-Day’ when hundreds of school children of all ages would get arrested and imprisoned?” King thought about it and eventually agreed. While it succeeded in

65 Ibid. 212, but read the entire chapter “The Dreamer Cometh”. 52
galvanizing public opinion, it also raised an important question about the level of instrumentality that might be permitted in a nonviolent campaign before it slipped so far passed principled and into strategic nonviolence. King spoke almost entirely from the perspective of principled nonviolence. Yet, his willingness to use children, generally considered to be not fully cognitively developed enough to make fully informed and reasoned decisions,\textsuperscript{66} indicates a level of instrumentality that transgresses the boundary between principled and strategic nonviolence. To put it bluntly, he ‘used’ the children because he knew that on a purely instrumental level, in Oates’ words, “with the children, King might literally be able to fill up the jails.”\textsuperscript{67} And he did. On the first day 1,000, some as young as six years old, marched and nearly 900 were jailed—forcing the police to use school busses to round up the youths. As Oates records, “When Bull Connor saw all those ‘little niggers’ demonstrating in his town, he charged about in a rage, commanding his men to lock them all up.”\textsuperscript{68} In response to the inevitable judgments by reporters that King was “using” the children, King replied: where were their judgments “during the centuries when our segregated social system had been misusing and abusing Negro children”? In response to arguments about the risks to the children, Oates summarized King’s reasoned response: “Negro children were maimed every day of their lives in the segregated South. If an incessant torture could be ended by a single climactic confrontation, he thought it worth the

\textsuperscript{66} Note: this is the same reasoning that informs the arguments to ban child soldiers.

\textsuperscript{67} Oates, \textit{Let the Trumpet Sound} 232.

\textsuperscript{68} Ibid. 233.
risk.” On a deeper level, King thought that the children’s march would result in a rebirth as “our family life will be born anew if we fight together.”

James Bevel also made the argument for ‘using’ the children. In a speech to Albany’s African American youth, he argued the following:

I want everybody to listen to me…You get an education in jail, too. In the schools you’ve been going to, they haven’t taught you to be proud of yourselves and they haven’t taught you good history—they haven’t taught you the price of freedom…..As long as one Negro kid is in jail, we all want to be in jail. If everybody in town would be arrested, everybody would be free.

Nearly 2,500 hundred children marched on the second day, and each day after their ranks grew larger and larger. Bull Connor brought his German police dogs, his police, his firemen, and eventually an armored car. One official, Director of Public Safety Al Lingo, was quoted saying “I’d shoot them god-damn son-bitches.” Soon after, the national and international press reported on the horrors occurring in Birmingham. All the while, King continued to preach his message of love:

We must say to our white brothers all over the South who try to keep us down: We will match your capacity to inflict suffering with our capacity to endure suffering. We will meet your physical force with soul force. We will not hate you. And yet we cannot in all good conscience obey your evil laws. Do to us what you will. Threaten our children and we will still love you….Say that we’re too low, that we’re too degraded, yet we will still love you. Bomb our homes and go by our churches early in the morning and bomb them if you please, and we will still love you. We will wear you down by our capacity to suffer. In winning the victory, we will not only win our freedom. We will so appeal to your heart and your conscience that we will win you in the process.

69 Ibid. 232-33.
70 Ibid. 234.
71 Ibid. 236.
A minor miracle seemed to occur on May 5th when some 3,000 youth, lead by Reverend Charles Billups and others, marched up to a massive line of Bull Connor’s police, firemen, dogs, and the infamous armored car. The children all knelt and prayed. Connor yelled at them to turn around. In a Churchillesque cadence, Billups spoke the following: “We’re not turning back. We haven’t done anything wrong. All we want is our freedom….How do you feel doing these things?...Bring on your dogs. Beat us up. Turn on your hoses. We’re not going to retreat.” After his speech, he continued to march towards the police line. Connor, incensed by this uppity black preacher, screamed at his men to turn on the hoses. They simply watched and eventually parted the way for the marchers. Some began to cry. Others stood as if spellbound. The marchers went on to the jail to sing and pray for those inside and then, just as peacefully, returned to the church. One observer later said: “Well, it did something to them. They had experienced nonviolence in its truest form.” King himself would admit that, “It was one of the most fantastic events of the Birmingham story. I saw there, I felt there, for the first time, the pride and the power of nonviolence.”

One renowned pacifist, Dave Dellinger, argued that the vital strategic decision that resulted in the eventual success of project C was the use of the children. He believed that it was the children who eventually forced white people to open their eyes and see what they had been unwilling to see for so long: “the impact of segregation and racism on Negro youngsters.” The conflict exposed and may even have “tortured” the white moderate, Dellinger’s “silent integrationist,” and that it may even have “got to hardened segregationists, too, that even they recoiled from the sight of a police dog lunging at a child.” According to King’s original plan, “Project Confrontation Birmingham” exposed the evil, “the boil of

72 Ibid. 236-37.
segregation to the medicine of air and light.” 73 Controversial though it may have been, the children’s march was, according to many supporters of the civil rights movement, “inspired.” However, it also helps to open up a space between principled and strategic nonviolence.

Whereas “principled” nonviolence proposes an unyielding moral position and “strategic nonviolence” advocates a morally vacant pragmatism, a “regulative” understanding of nonviolence is teleological or charted by our ethical negotiations in reality. The notion of a “regulative ideal” is originally and most clearly brought to life in the work of Immanuel Kant. 74 For Kant, a regulative ideal is understood as something to strive towards. Humans, in their freedom, are able to create their own laws toward their own normative ends. But, being human-created, such laws are not absolute or unbending. As Kant wrote on a similar point: “The principle of reason is thus properly only a rule, prescribing a regress in the series of the conditions of given appearances, and forbidding it to bring the regress to a close by treating anything at which it may arrive as absolutely unconditioned.” 75 In other words, our ideas serve as an orientation in thought but they do not determine our success or our failure. In the case of the Civil Rights movement, success was achieved in the form of the passage of the Civil Rights Act and the Voting Rights Acts of 1964-1965. These laws did not result in an integrated society. Instead, they are merely guideposts along Kant’s empirical regress. Perfection is not attainable or at least it is impossible to know if perfection is attainable. Such was the point articulated by Kant in his antinomies of reason suggesting the unknowability

73 Ibíd. 238.

74 For example elements of Socrates’ spheres begin to theorize the ideal as something to strive for even though it may never be achieved in reality. Kant similarly calls God a regulative idea.

75 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason 450.
of God, Morality, and Freedom. Although these ideals cannot be proven in determinate fact, for Kant, they also cannot be disproven. Thus, they remain absolute others to reason itself within the realm of human possibility.

A regulative ideal is also not a dictate, “nor is it a constitutive principle of reason, enabling us to extend our concept of the sensible world beyond all possible experience. It is rather a principle of the greatest possible continuation and extension of experience, allowing no empirical limit to hold as absolute.” Simply said, the point is to practically transform our current state of being-in-the-world more in consonance with a guiding moral image of the world. But, a regulative ideal is not completely disconnected from a possible reality. For example, Kant writes that “I must limit my assertions to the rule which determines how experience, in conformity with its object, is to be obtained and further extended.” The “object” is the goal. In King’s time, the object was a combination of legal reforms (e.g. the Civil Rights Act and the Voting Rights Act) and social reforms (integration). Though King often preached about these goals in ways that may have indicated to his audiences that their achievement would bring about “the promised land” or his “beloved community,” in reality they would simply bring the movement to the next point in the “continued regress.” The promised land would remain a goal. In this sense the struggle for desegregation and integration could never achieve “perfection” or the kind purity that Gandhi often thought he could achieve. Unlike principled nonviolence, regulative nonviolence understands that

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76 Ibid. 384-484.
77 Ibid. 450.
79 Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason* 457.
perfect is not possible. To the extent that something like “perfection” is considered, it is only considered as a regulative ideal, something to aspire to though never actually achieve. In a long but relevant statement, Kant clarifies this point:

This proposition, which virtually states that the only conditions which we can reach in the empirical regress are conditions which must themselves again be regarded as empirically conditioned, contains the rule in terminus, that however far we may have advanced in the ascending series, we must always enquire for a still higher member of the series, which may or may not become known.

Put differently, even if we were to achieve our goal, something that was at a previous time and space identified as perfection (e.g. the promised land, the beloved community, a truly non-discriminatory society), it would be necessary to then ask if there was not in fact some further state of perfection (e.g. once getting rid of racism, there may still exist sexism, heterosexism, ageism, etc.). What Kant is really suggesting is that we continually evaluate our current state of existence, to remain critical, to never rest comfortably because there is always more to achieve.

Kant elucidates further implications for a regulative ideal, discussing a “good will” which differs from attributes of the mind (wit, judgment, temperament, courage, resolution, perseverance, etc) which can, in various ways, become corrupted, bad, and even harmful. Even “gifts of fortune” like power, honor, and health are corruptible and not inherently good. All must be guided by a good will. Thus Kant writes that “There is no possibility of thinking of anything at all in the world, or even out of it, which can be regarded as good without qualification, except a good will….A good will is good not because of what it effects or accomplishes, nor because of its fitness to attain some proposed end; it is good only

80 Ibid. 455.
through its willing, i.e., it is good in itself.”

A good will must act solely of a good will and not for its purported inclinations. Through said volition it is the will that acts with consideration for what we know and understand of the events at a given moment in time.

The Children’s March, for example, was conditioned by this good will. Regulative nonviolence, combined with a good will, opens up a space between principled and strategic nonviolence. Thus, it has the distinct advantage over principled nonviolence because it allows for certain actions that are instrumental rather than principled. Without this good will, however, regulative nonviolence may easily slip into strategic nonviolence which, being purely instrumental, may be used for violent ends like Pritchett’s support of segregation.

CONCLUSION

The remaining chapters evaluate and assess IR theory and US foreign policy. This is the first time that anyone has written a comprehensive evaluation of nonviolence and its relationship to IR theory and US foreign policy along the categories of principled, strategic, and regulative nonviolence. This in itself is justification for publication. The current debate within nonviolence studies is between principled and strategic nonviolence as relevant categories for theorizing nonviolent action. Strategic nonviolence is attractive because it does not require any individual or group to believe in a particular faith or ethical tradition (indeed, members of groups can easily belong to different and/or multiple faith or ethical traditions). However, strategic nonviolence is problematic as a source for action because it empties nonviolence of ethical content. Principled nonviolence, while retaining the primacy of ethics, is often not practical. Indeed, most nonviolent movements have not been

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81 Kant, *Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, And "On a Supposed Right to Lie Because of Philanthropic Concerns"* 7.
principled, or solely principled. If left with only the categories of principled and strategic nonviolence any analysis of US foreign policy is hampered by either principled nonviolence’s impracticability or by the possibility that strategic nonviolence will be used for unethical ends, what I term “imperial nonviolence.” This tension led me to search for a middle path between principled and strategic nonviolence. “Regulative nonviolence” is so-called because the concept owes an intellectual debt to Immanuel Kant. It is theoretically possible to argue for a US foreign policy that is grounded in the regulative ideal of nonviolence while it is nearly impossible to get from the current American policy of overwhelming force to one of principled nonviolence. In the end, regulative nonviolence is more ideal than strategic nonviolence, it retains the ethical core of principled nonviolence without removing all forms of violence from its operational tool kit. However, it is also more “realistic” than principled nonviolence because it recognizes that politics is the art of the possible. In this sense, this dissertation owes a debt not just to Kant but also to Machiavelli, with a slight twist. While Machiavelli argued that political leaders must learn how “not to be good”82 I am arguing that they must learn how to be good, or, at least, to be less violent in their pursuit of political change.

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The following chapter shows how Gandhi’s insights fit or do not fit into the larger context of theoretical approaches to solving and preventing international conflicts. It specifically discusses nonviolence in the context of power politics, pacifism, human security, and critical theory. It is useful to situate nonviolence within the broader traditions of

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international conflict and conflict resolution in order to better understand why a specifically nonviolent approach is necessary in the current era.
CHAPTER TWO: Situating Nonviolence

“Situating” nonviolence means revealing the places where nonviolence already exists and illuminating places for future growth. The geographical analogy of “situating” and “place” is intended to highlight the geopolitical dimension of nonviolence as an emancipatory and decolonial project. Nonviolence is commonly practiced as the product of what John Agnew refers to as the “geopolitical imagination…a feat of imagination impossible before the encounters of Europeans with the rest of the world beginning in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries.” In other words, nonviolence has been over-determined by British, European and, later, American imperial encounters with the world.

The goal of this chapter is to showcase nonviolence as instances of emancipatory encounters and contrasts with power politics, pacifism, human security, and critical theory. This chapter serves as a nonviolent intervention into the debates over creating peace and security, one that continues the process of understanding nonviolence as a critical method of local and global resistance and as an implicated tool of empire.

POWER POLITICS

America sees itself as an anomaly among the Western states—Americans are idealists not realists who cynically employ power political ideas like “the end justifies the means,”

\[1\] Agnew, *Geopolitics: Re-Visioning World Politics* 15.
“the enemy of my enemy is my friend,” or “might makes right.” Its political class has seen itself as above the power politics of European states. Americans, like most people, see themselves as good, moral, even righteous. They understand themselves in specifically moral terms in opposition to other states that they see as corrupt. Given America’s history of imperialism (e.g. “manifest destiny”) it may seem bizarre to know that Americans simultaneously reject the separation of means and ends and yet practice this very dualism throughout their history. In psychology the name for this phenomenon is “cognitive dissonance.” The rationalizing process that reconciles these two at odds beliefs is typically discussed in the literature as “American Exceptionalism.”

Henry Kissinger nicely captures the American view in contrast with the standard realist ‘truisms’ of ‘European diplomacy’ as power politics:

the emphasis American leaders placed on the moral foundations of America’s conduct and on its significance as a symbol of freedom led to a rejection of the truisms of European diplomacy: that the balance of power distilled an ultimate harmony out of the competition of selfish interests; and that security considerations overrode the principles of civil law; in other words, that ends of the state justified the means.²

This worldview grew in the United States in proportion with its material and geographical size and as it became more powerful in relation to all other states. By extension, the US is, therefore, not only good, but can do no wrong. The United States has become, in former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright’s phrase, the “indispensable nation.”³ Following from


³ This quotation is really a quotation from former President Bill Clinton 1997 second inaugural address. Albright just got more attention because when she used the phrase it was in an attempt to rally support for more aggression against Iraq. The full quotation from February 18, 1998 in Columbus, Ohio reads: “If we have to use force, it is because we are America. We are the indispensable nation. We stand tall. We see further into the future.” This quotation can be found: <http://secretary.state.gov/www/statements/1998/980219a.html> (accessed: May 24, 2010). Elements of
this view of America, one sees that the US has reformulated the Weberian state conception (the state is that entity which maintains the legitimate monopoly on the use of force within a given territory). The United States now sees its use of force on a global scale as legitimate. Whenever it uses force, that force is defined as legitimate.

When others use force (especially in opposition to the US) that force is defined as illegitimate. The US self-conception as indispensable causes means and ends to disconnect and, at best, translates into the age old Athenian argument that might makes right. This position is somewhat nuanced, as William Fulbright once wrote:

> The inconstancy of American foreign policy is not an accident but an expression of the two distinct sides of the American character. Both are characterized by a kind of moralism, but one is the morality of decent instincts tempered by the knowledge of human imperfection and the other is the morality of absolute self-assurance fired by the crusading spirit.4

Americans are gripped by their idea of themselves as good. They seek to make the world after their own self-image. The result of this crusade is often, if not always, the use of destructive means to achieve their goals. Their very rejection of one version of the means-end dualism (balance of power) creates a new means-end dualism: democracy promotion.

It is here that principled nonviolence might be useful in solving the problem of means-ends. It too is opposed to the philosophy that might makes right. For Gandhi, means and ends are intertwined, if one takes care of the means, the end will take care of itself. If one uses violence in the means, then the end will also contain violence. If one’s

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goal is to create a world without violence, then one must use nonviolent means. American academics do often point out the inconsistency of American self-conception and actual practice. Not surprisingly, American’s, with notable exceptions, do not appreciate it when academics and other critics call attention to these contradictions because they see themselves and their state as an ethically guided actor. Principled nonviolence is not likely to be adopted by US foreign policy experts but a more thorough understanding of it might help US citizens see more clearly the connection between US policy and the insecurity it creates.

If one leaves aside the conflicting perceptions of American citizens and focuses solely on academic understanding of the use of power, there still remains significant nuance over the use of force. In Robert Art’s essay on the “Fungibility of Force” he writes that “the forceful use of military power is physical: a state harms, cripples, or destroys the possessions of another state. The peaceful use of military power is intimidating: a state threatens to harm, cripple, or destroy, but does not actually do so.” Aside from the disturbing, almost Orwellian, use of the term “peaceful” this is actually fairly straightforward language among scholars and practitioners of international relations. Yet there is a moment when Art seems to indicate that violence is not the norm in international relations: “for any given state, war is the exception, not the rule, in its relations with other countries, because most of the time a given state is at peace, not war. Consequently, states use their military power more frequently in the peaceful than in the forceful modes.” Though violence is the exception, the military is always in use, force is always on hand, and peace is defined as the absence of

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5 Kissinger, Diplomacy see chapter 2.

war. Finally, peace is possible only because of the ever present use of or threat of the use of force. Though his argument indicates that peace is the more common phenomenon in life, the logic of the fungibility of force actually justifies and normalizes the use and threat of the use of force.

Art’s use of the term “peace” here seems to imply merely preparation for war. From the perspective of nonviolence it is positive that he also allows that peace is the norm and war is the exception. There are mixed signals being sent here. On the one hand peace is the norm in international relations. On the other hand, peace is the time used to prepare for the next war. “Peace” simply means that the military is not engaged in war; peace is merely the absence of war. It is hard to imagine how nonviolence could possibly fit into the minds of those who follow this view of peace. The logic created here conditions the representatives of states to be skeptical of peace. After all, why would a state agree to peace if peace allows its enemies time to build more weapons?

 Israeli and Palestinian military organizations, to use a tragic but perennial example, do appear at times to be behaving according to this view. Israel has been at war with or occupying Palestine since its inception in 1947. For the Israeli military has been alternately operating in the peaceful and forceful modes. They do not accept or very reluctantly accept ceasefires, a term that is quantitatively not qualitatively different from peace (if one follows Art’s logic to its conclusion).

From the Israeli perspective, the winter 2008 Israeli invasion of Gaza was justified in large measure with the argument that Hamas was arming itself by digging tunnels under the

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7 Apologies to the many Israelis and Palestinians who do not fall into either of these violent stereotypes.
Egyptian border. Israel accused Hamas of using, as the theory predicted, the ceasefire simply as a stoppage of war to prepare for future war. Benny Morris, for example, exemplifies the standard Israeli view that nearly all of the various Palestinian political organizations are simply biding their time until they are eventually able to, violently or otherwise, create a single state with an Arab majority at the expense of the Jewish state and Jews in general: “Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and the other Palestinian parties and military organizations will continue their war to uproot Israel…they, and not [Mahmoud] Abbas and his bloated, duplicitous apparat ensconced in Ramallah, constitute the real power in the Palestinian territories.”

From the Palestinian perspective, Israel is seen as using “peace” and especially periods of negotiation to establish “facts on the ground.” Specifically, Israel continues to build and expand settlements on ground that Palestinians view as the territory upon which the future state of Palestine will stand. Thus, a number of elements of the Israel-Palestine conflict appear to support Art’s view that “peace” simply means that the military switches from the use of force to the threat of the use of force. In either case, “force” is understood to mean military force. Each side in the above conflict thus justifies their respective positions according to logic consistent with notions of power politics. As Gene Sharp has argued with

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9 Morris, One State, Two States: Resolving the Israel/Palestine Conflict 176.

reference to the Bush administration, this logic is almost theological in the sense of a belief or faith in the power of violence to achieve political goals. This merging of balance of power with religion results in the notion that “war itself can be viewed as ordained by God as an alien act of his mercy to check power with power.” Whether violence is conceived of as “ordained by god” or not, critical to the present thesis is that violence is often viewed as normal, natural, structurally determined and/or otherwise expected.

Power politics assumes that violence is perennial. This leads many to view violence as inevitable, a part of the human genetic make-up. Machiavelli infamously begins his discussion of politics by stating that “all men are bad and ever ready to display their vicious nature” and Sigmund Freud referred to a human “death instinct.” In fact, some go so far as to argue that humans are by their nature warlike. These views are subtly refuted by Max Scheler who writes that: “War does not rest on human nature. Rather, striving for power and struggle in general do [rest on human nature], not what we call war as such. Striving for power can express itself, in for instance, vis-à-vis gods, vis-à-vis one’s own life processes (asceticism ), vis-à-vis human beings (drives to dominate, or drives of submission understood as drives to dominate on the part of the weak).” Johan Galtung similarly writes that “We find people seeking food and sex under (almost) all external circumstances. But aggression and dominance exhibit tremendous variation, depending on the context,


including the structural and cultural conditions.” Realist insistence and observation that the world is a scary place has unfortunately been used to attack realists as cynical instead of clear eyed.

This assumption that violence is perennial does not always mean that it is inevitable or that individuals and groups should give in to the death instinct. When pushed, individual realist theorists have historically argued in favor of policies that translate into a notion of the common good. Most problematically though, realist IR theory continues to produce theory that appears to recommend imperialism (e.g. Mearsheimer’s “Offensive Realism”) while simultaneously recommending policy that is anti-imperial (e.g. Mearsheimer and Walt’s opposition to the invasion of Iraq).

Ronald Stone is a less well-known (in IR circles) theorist who has recently posited a variant of realism he calls “prophetic realism.” Professor Stone’s work focuses attention on biblical scholarship and what is usually referred to today as “classical realism.”

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14 Galtung, "Cultural Violence," 44.

15 Alan Gilbert, Must Global Politics Constrain Democracy?: Great-Power Realism, Democratic Peace, and Democratic Internationalism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999) chapter 2. At the 2010 annual meeting of the International Studies Association, on a roundtable entitled “Uniting Ethics and International Relations,” William Wohlforth emphatically stated that realism has consistently been anti-war and anti-imperialism. When I asked him if he thought that realism’s conception of the national interest included the view that the communities and the individuals contained within the state ought to be protected, he agreed. When I asked him if realist theory specifically makes this argument, or rather if any “realists” had published this view, he wavered. I then suggested that there might be a distinction between realist theory and realist policy recommendations. Again, he agreed.

16 Here I am thinking specifically of John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2003 [2001]). However, a sensitive reading of this text reveals that even here Mearsheimer is critical of crusades. Nonetheless, he also argues that the logic of anarchy requires states to be offensive and expansionist (he frames it clearly enough in terms of is and ought).


Specifically, Stone highlights Reinhold Niebuhr and Hans Morgenthau among others. He teases out of these prominent public intellectuals a distinction between “national interest” and what he terms “national purpose.” This intriguing distinction, coming from the Christian tradition, partially short-circuits the parochial realist logic of “the enemy of my enemy is my friend” that helps statesmen to rationalize America’s alliances with dictators, authoritarians, and torturer regimes. Stone writes instead that: “Sometimes the enemies of our enemies are not democratic, but we must hold to them provisionally in alliance to thwart the purposes of our more threatening enemies. U.S. foreign policy over two centuries has been successful in general terms but far from pure.” This realist “hiding” of national purpose inside of the national interest was done in order to criticize morality in foreign affairs, a contentious subject for IR.

Stone argues that realists actually do spell out their moral positions, adding that: “In their writings on the morality of international politics, realists have attempted to show how the pursuit and/or defense of the national interest is a moral policy.” Realists do not oppose all wars but they do seem to oppose many if not most wars. In the 2003 lead up to the US invasion of Iraq, a number of liberals and human rights advocates argued for the “lesser evil” of invasion and even justified torture. Most realists, on the other hand, opposed the invasion. Stone’s work combines insights gathered from the pacifist and the

19 Ibid. 80.

20 Ibid.


22 Mearsheimer and Walt, "An Unnecessary War."
realist tradition (specifically from those realists considered “classical realists”). However, his insights apply to offensive realists like John Mearsheimer who opposed the invasion of Iraq and advocates for policies that would theoretically force Israel to make peace with the Palestinians. While power politics does focus a considerable amount of energy on fighting wars, its intention is to end them. The problem with over focusing on fighting wars is that when one is always prepared for the next war, true peace is almost impossible to achieve or hold on to if achieved.

PACIFISM

Etymologically the word “pacifism” begins its life in the Greek term “pax” which usually gets translated as “peace.” Pacifism commonly means opposition to war. Gene Sharp writes that “pacifism” “includes the belief systems of those persons and groups who, as the minimum, refuse participation in all international or civil wars or violent revolutions, and base this refusal on moral, ethical, or religious principle.” Adam Roberts defines it similarly as “A rejection of all reliance on armed force, particularly in the realms of politics and international relations—is often best understood as part of the belief system of individuals.” Kuralansky defines pacifism in contrast to nonviolence, asserting that “Pacifism is treated almost as a psychological condition. It is a state of mind. Pacifism is passive; but nonviolence is active. Pacifism is harmless and therefore easier to accept than


24 Sharp, Gandhi as a Political Strategist 205-06.

25 Roberts and Garton Ash, Civil Resistance and Power Politics 7.
nonviolence, which is dangerous.\textsuperscript{26} Like nonviolence, there are many pacifisms: Anti-war, nonresistance, and nonviolent to name a few.

Walter Wink, a leading scholar of the biblical roots of nonviolence, writes that those pacifists who advocate nonresistance misinterpret Jesus’ teaching in Matthew 5:38-42 (“resist not evil”). Unlike Kurlansky, Wink offers a more sophisticated account: Christian pacifism “understood Jesus to be commanding nonresistance. Consequently, some pacifists refuse to engage in nonviolent direct action or civil disobedience, on the ground that such actions are coercive. Nonresistance, they believe, licenses only passive resistance. Hence the confusion between ‘pacifism’ and ‘passivism’ has not been completely unfounded.”\textsuperscript{27} Wink does differentiate pacifism from nonviolence but he does it in such a slight way that by the end of his lengthy analysis it is clear that he views them as essentially the same. Any differences ultimately arise out of other’s misreading of Jesus.\textsuperscript{28} From his perspective, Jesus was a radical who “attacks his accusers with truth. He forces them either to accept the truth or to silence him.”\textsuperscript{29} Wink offers an internal critique of pacifism and the church’s contradictory relationship with just war theory and pacifism. He offers pacifism a new lease on life by infusing it with a radical Jesus who practices nonviolent resistance.

Pacifism is also concerned with militarism. For example, Ronald Stone’s project is a rejection of militarism. Stone captures the essence of militarism by arguing that the Vietnam

\textsuperscript{26} Kurlansky, \textit{Nonviolence: Twenty-Five Lessons from the History of a Dangerous Idea} 6.


\textsuperscript{29} Wink, \textit{Engaging the Powers} 227.
War deeply affected two leading realists of the day, Reinhold Niebuhr and Hans Morgenthau; it “open[ed] their eyes…to the dangers of militarism…[and to the] fragility of democracy in the United States.” In this case, Stone focuses on the negative effects that war has on American democracy:

They saw how easily national purposes and rhetoric were corrupted and how willing the establishment—academic, governmental, and ecclesiastical—was to be corrupted. The conflict psychologically turned them from being defenders of the broad outlines of U.S. policy to critics in exile from those who were making decisions in Washington, D.C. By providing an example of foreign policy that so flagrantly violated moral standards, the Vietnam War brought a new force into their moral critique of the United States. Rather than emphasizing the moral ambiguities of foreign policy, they proclaimed the moral horror of this particular policy. Realism as a practical philosophy was not intended by either Niebuhr or Morgenthau to contribute to the reification of certain concepts of international politics. Both thinkers rejected as quite inappropriate to the 1960s and 70s the earlier rhetoric and policies of the Cold War.30

Stone’s description of the Vietnam War’s effect on Niebuhr and Morgenthau goes a long way to explain why some might confuse their views with pacifism. However, neither their theory nor their practice fits into pacifism or nonviolence per se. Stone reveals how their own intellectual growth is triggered by the war and how they then struggled to make sense of and reconcile their previous thinking with their new criticism.

In spite of pacifism’s roots in opposition to war, leading pacifists and pacifist publications have had a sordid past when it comes to, among other things, imperialism. As Reginald Reynolds writes:

A reading of “official [British] pacifist literature from, say, 1920 onward would reveal some odd things which many pacifists would prefer to forget. People accepted as “leading pacifists” were, as late as 1930, writing abusive articles about Gandhi and defending British Rule in India. Such articles and letters could be found in The Friend (weekly unofficial paper of the Quakers), in Reconciliation (monthly organ of the Fellowship of Reconciliation, and in No More War (the monthly organ of the [No More War] movement).  

To be fair, pacifists are human beings, prone to human weaknesses. Pacifism itself does not preach imperialism or colonialism. Today, the Fellowship of Reconciliation routinely praises Gandhi and Martin Luther King, Jr., alongside figures like Oscar Romero. In addition the organization’s traditional pacifist stance has historically nuanced. This is in part due to its creation during World War I as a group of Christians seeking to create peace, a decidedly activist position.  

Nonetheless, Gandhi stopped using the term passive resistance to describe the movement he and his compatriots in South Africa were building, instead using a new term. Gandhi would later write in his autobiography that:

When in a meeting of Europeans I found that the term “passive resistance” was too narrowly construed, that it was supposed to be a weapon of the weak, that it could be characterized by hatred, and that it could finally manifest itself as violence, I had to demur to all these statements and explain the real nature of the Indian movement. It was clear that a new word must be coined by the Indians to designate their struggle.

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33 There is some irony here in that Gandhi himself was extremely pro-British Rule for a number of years. The larger point is less about pacifisms dark side and more about the details of pacifist ideology and practice.

34 Gandhi quoted in Sharp, Gandhi as a Political Strategist 204.
The Gandhian tradition explicitly differentiates between nonviolence and pacifism by claiming that pacifism is merely opposition to war while Satyagraha and ahimsa combine in Gandhi’s philosophy and practice to create a broader orientation. Specifically, “Gandhiji goes much deeper and sees that war cannot be avoided, so long as the seeds of it remain in man’s breast and grow and develop in his social, political and economic life. Gandhiji’s cure is, therefore, very radical and far-reaching. It demands nothing less than rooting out violence from one’s self and from one’s environment.”

Gandhi’s overarching point is that nonviolence cannot use the same techniques of politics as violent oppressors. Gandhi also reportedly criticized pacifists for being “rank cowards,” “passive,” and, “impotent.”

Pacifism is a big tent term that includes nonviolence and is similar to nonviolence insofar as those who practice nonviolence typically also oppose war. For a wide range of people who advocate nonviolence, anti-war is merely one component. Gandhi, King, and others link nonviolence with a variety of community building and organizing works. King for example, specifically ties his opposition to the Vietnam War to the appropriation of resources from social projects and instead used for the war effort. Gandhi, as mentioned, focuses a considerable amount of energy on the constructive program within India. The pacifist organization Fellowship of Reconciliation links war with poverty, environmental destruction, and a variety of other social and political ills. For these reasons pacifism and nonviolence are understandably confused in peoples’ minds.

35 Bharatan Kumarappa quoted in Ibid.

36 Kurlansky, Nonviolence: Twenty-Five Lessons from the History of a Dangerous Idea 147.

37 Though see Steger’s discussion of Gandhi’s participation in the various wars of the 19th and 20th centuries: Steger, Gandhi’s Dilemma. In his justification for support of the Boer War, Gandhi writes, for example, “it would be unbecoming to our dignity as a nation to look on with folded hands at a time when ruin stared the British in the face as well as ourselves, simply because they ill-treated us here [in South Africa]” (143).
The primary literature on the subject of pacifism invariably leads one to the “historic peace churches” made up of the Quakers, Mennonites, and Brethren. It is here that one finds the bulk of the ‘principled’ language in opposition to war. Though the scholarship has expanded in the last 20 years, a good place to start is Duane Friesen’s *Christian Peacemaking and International Conflict*. For example, Friesen creates a scheme in which there are four possible conceptions of the nature of peacemaking. Two use violence and two use nonviolence: 1) “System Maintenance through Violent Means;” 2) System Change through Violent Means; 3) Nonviolent means to maintain a system of order; and 4) Nonviolent means toward system change. In this simple scheme Friesen allows for a discussion of means and questions whether violent or nonviolent means are best suited for social and systemic change. Given the often visceral distinctions (e.g. Kurlansky and Gandhi’s critiques) made between nonviolence and pacifism, it is surprising the extent to which a pacifist like Friesen sounds like a devotee of nonviolence.

Friesen cuts into the discussion of nonviolence by dealing with the nature of power. He criticizes the power politics view referred to by Art. Whereas Art reduces power to military force, Friesen focuses on power as “the capacity or ability to do something.” It is also in this context that Friesen emphasizes the positive aspect of nonviolence: “the ultimate goal of nonviolent action (in contrast to violence) is to achieve some kind of positive solution that leads to reconciliation or friendship. While genuine friendship or reconciliation may be too idealistic, certainly the importance of a positive solution to a conflict where all

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38 Friesen, *Christian Peacemaking & International Conflict*.

39 Ibid. 23-27.
the parties are able to realize some measure of justice is the only genuine basis for lasting peace.”

He thus asks the important question of those in power, what are they able to do? Perhaps it is unfair to draw hard and fast lines between nonviolence and pacifism as so many do. A more rounded analysis of pacifism might conclude that the primary difference between pacifists and nonviolentists is that pacifists tend to be Christians, or at least religious, whilst nonviolentists are as likely to be religious as they are to be secular.

**Human Security**

In the final analysis, human security is a child who did not die, a disease that did not spread, a job that was not cut, an ethnic tension that did not explode in violence, a dissident who was not silenced. Human security is not a concern with weapons—it is a concern with human life and dignity. ~1994 *Human Development Report*[^41]

Human security is the view that individuals in most of the world are more concerned about finding food, shelter, water, and work than they are about global war or invading armies. Thus, achieving human security means making sure that individuals have the necessary food, shelter, water, and work that would allow them to live full and meaningful lives. In recent years, this concept has become ever more popular and less critical. Whereas once human security was understood as oppositional to the state, today it is often understood as a product of the state.

The 1994 *Human Development Report (HDR)* begins with the following passage: “The concept of security has for too long been interpreted narrowly: as security of territory from external aggression, or as protection of national interests in foreign policy or as global security of nuclear weapons. As the world’s population continues to grow, this traditional concept of security has become less relevant to the needs of many people.”

[^40]: Ibid. 147.

security from the threat of a nuclear holocaust.” Given this skeptical view of state centered security, it is easy to see how this concept would be popular among critical advocates of nonviolence. The shift away from territory, national interest, and a narrow conception of “global” security fits with a wide range of nonviolent theory.

Human development finds support in the writings and political actions of Gandhi and King, both of whom spent significant energy on communities. In particular, Gandhi’s focus on what he called the “constructive programme” and King’s critique of militarism. Martin Luther King Jr. wanted to change America, but he understood that black Americans had to win the internal struggle for independence while they simultaneously struggled for community and national independence as equal citizens of the US. King would have easily understood the critique of traditional security as having “been related more to nation-states than to people.” After all, it was King’s statements against the Vietnam War that brought home the idea that the war was stealing resources from President Johnson’s “Great Society.”

Similarly, the 1994 HDR notes:

Forgotten were the legitimate concerns of ordinary people who sought security in their daily lives. For many of them, security symbolized protection from the threat of disease, hunger, unemployment, crime, social conflict, political repression and environmental hazards. With the dark shadows of the cold war receding, one can now see that many conflicts are within nations rather than between nations.

Given superpower criticisms of colonialism, it is therefore hypocritical of them to “forget” the needs and concerns of ordinary people. It is true that post-colonial leaders were to blame.

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42 Ibid.

43 On the African American communities response to Gandhi see: Kapur, *Raising up a Prophet*.

for the immisseration of their people. It would be an understatement to say that
decolonization was messy and that in that mess, former fighters for justice and equality
turned into authoritarians. However, the point is that with the end of the Cold War also
comes the end of the logic that was used to justify the effective theft of goods and resources
from the masses of the world. The 1994 HDR is perfectly clear about the sources of
insecurity for the average person:

For most people, a feeling of insecurity arises more from worries about daily life
than from the dread of a cataclysmic world event. Will they and their families have
enough to eat? Will they lose their jobs? Will their streets and neighbourhoods be safe
from crime? Will they be tortured by a repressive state? Will they become a victim of
violence because of their gender? Will their religion or ethnic origin target them for
persecution?45

In sum, human security is about people not states. Yet, as the beginning of this section
indicates, between 1994 and the present, the idea of human security has potentially been co-
opted by the society of states. Ken Booth goes so far as to say that “human security has
taken on the image of the velvet glove on the iron hand of hard power.”46 There remain
serious theoretical and practical debates regarding the role of the state as the last arbiter of
oppression.

The most prominent of the revolve around the role of the state as the guarantor of
safety or creator of insecurity. The state is both the single largest purveyor of violence and
the best hope for security. On the one hand there are those who follow what Robert J.
Burrowes refers to as civilian based defense (following the writings of Gene Sharp) and on the

45 Ibid.

University Press, 2007) 324.
other social defense (following Brian Martin). These two categories will be discussed synonymously with strategic and principled nonviolence respectively. Burrowes contrasts these approaches in the following manner:

Exponents of civilian-based defense would use nonviolent sanctions because of their practical value; they make no claims regarding the ‘moral superiority of nonviolent behavior.’ In contrast, while not all exponents of social defense are practitioners of principled nonviolence, concerns regarding the morality of the means would usually weigh at least as heavily with them as pragmatic concerns for the outcome. For exponents of social defense, then, a commitment to nonviolence is equal to, if not more important than, the ‘rational superiority’ of social defense.47

There is some agreement across this divide. Both sides in the debate agree that the military is a problem. This agreement reflects the radical core of both strategic and principled nonviolence. Civilian-based-defense ultimately sees the abolition of the military as its goal and thus supports, at least in theory, a radically reduced state. Here the human security approach overlaps with both principled and strategic versions of nonviolence. The 2003 document on human security, Human Security Now, states this point clearly enough:

The international community urgently needs a new paradigm of security…. The state remains the fundamental purveyor of security. Yet it often fails to fulfill its security obligations—and at times has even become a source of threat to its own people. That is why attention must now shift from the security of the state to the security of the people—to human security.48

Both versions of nonviolence and the human security approach agree that the state is a problem but it remains to be seen whether this radical collective critique will be able to so radically transform the state.


Though there are important similarities and overlaps between nonviolence and human security, any joining of nonviolence with human security must be done with care, for “The ‘cold monster’ of the sovereign state has appropriated human security in order to help further entrench its own.” The original conception of human security as a de-centering of the state in favor of the individual is to be applauded for its emphasis on protecting and promoting the lives of individuals. The re-centering of the state is, therefore, to be criticized for re-creating the conditions that allow human suffering. A regulative nonviolent approach might help to bridge the divide between state security and human security. It would do this, in part, by constantly reminding the representatives of the United States (and other states) of its original purpose—to protect the lives of individuals. The ideal of a nonviolent world is perfectly consistent with the individual and collective security of people and states. While regulative nonviolence gets much of its intellectual heft from Immanuel Kant, it is also useful to consider another offshoot of Kantian thought: critical theory.

CRITICAL THEORY

In a summary chapter on Marxism in IR, Andrew Linklater writes that “[Karl] Marx developed an analysis of capitalism which must remain a key reference point for anyone interested in a critical theory of world politics concerned with the promotion of human emancipation.” However, he goes on to ask (without answering) whether the Marxian notion of human emancipation was not always “at heart a project of domination or


50 Andrew Linklater, ”Marxism,” in *Theories of International Relations*, ed. Scott Burchill, et al. (New York: Palgrave, 2005), 119.
assimilation?‖ In brief, Linklater seems to deal a lethal blow to the idea of emancipation, especially as the term is understood in connection with the Marxian tradition. However, he ultimately salvages Marxism from this apparent doom when he writes that Marxism’s “belief that the concern with asymmetries and inequalities should drive the analysis remains a major achievement with lasting significance for the study of international relations.”

It would appear that Marxism’s salvation exists within the context of an expansive notion of critical theory, one that is implicitly connected to the regulative ideal conceived of by Kant.

Richard Devetak writes that critical theory is “reflexive.” Critical theorists, for heuristic purposes, usually contrast critical theory with “traditional” or “problem solving” theory. In summary, traditional theory: “by working within the given system it has a stabilizing effect, tending to preserve the existing global structure of social and political relations.”

The Kantian approach would also have a problem with traditional theory because it appears to threaten the world as if it were possible to freeze time. By this I mean to refer specifically to Kant’s antinomies of reason and his argument that as long as time marches on, perfection is not possible. In contrast, critical theory rejects the positivist distinctions between fact and value, object and subject….by adopting these reflexive attitudes critical theory is more like a meta-theoretical attempt to examine how theories are situated in prevailing social and political orders, how this situatedness impacts on theorizing, and, most importantly, the possibilities for theorizing in a manner that challenges the injustices and inequalities built into the prevailing world order.

51 Ibid., 124.

52 Ibid., 135.


54 Ibid., 143.
In a sense, Devatak is returning to Kant when he discusses the “reflexive” nature of critical theory. Reflexivity is simply another way of getting at Kant’s infinite or empirical regress. The point is to constantly look for ways to fine tune our existence in time, even as time moves on. It is possible, and even advisable, to ask: to what extent is nonviolence “situated” in the prevailing social and political order. In the most basic sense, one ought to wonder: what is the difference between the nonviolence practiced by the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo and the nonviolence practiced and/or supported by the United States?

Kant’s empirical regress and critical theory’s reflexivity can also be usefully considered in the context of the principled (and Gandhian) nonviolent conception of swaraj. Gandhi’s concept of Swaraj holds considerable potential as a source of critical theory. Gandhi argued throughout his life that swaraj, usually translated into two separate concepts, on the one hand, self-rule and, on the other, home-rule. Gandhi did not believe that India, for example, could become truly free until its people attained self-rule. This insight has considerable power. It means, for example, that individuals have the ability to affect change, both internally and externally. Gandhi wrote, in a letter to a despairing colleague:

Please do not carry unnecessarily on your head the burden of emancipating India. Emancipate your own self. Even that burden is very great. Apply everything to yourself. Nobility of soul consists in realizing that you are yourself India. In your emancipation is the emancipation of India. All else is make-believe. If you feel interested, do persevere. You and I need not worry about others. If we bother about others, we shall forget our own task and lose everything. Please ponder over this from the point of view of altruism, not of selfishness.55

Critical theory adds the concept of emancipation to the rich intellectual tapestry of concepts like empirical regress and reflexivity. Gandhi also allows for continued growth and

movement in time at the individual and collective levels. Like nonviolence, emancipation similarly becomes a regulative ideal, something to strive for but never quite within reach. Emancipation may be the destination but there are many paths. Paradoxically, Gandhi writes here that those seeking emancipation may proceed along multiple paths at once. For example, it is possible to seek inner freedom while one seeks community or national freedom.

Anthony J. Parel offers a similar argument about Gandhi’s conception of swaraj. He writes that Gandhi’s view is “one that teaches that there is a link between inner life and outer achievement, that individual regeneration and national regeneration constitute one continuum.”\textsuperscript{56} Critical theory’s conception of emancipation is similarly constructed. Both Gandhi’s and critical theory’s emancipation is about connecting theory to practice; both require internal and external understandings. Gandhi’s point, “In your emancipation is the emancipation of India” captures the means-ends relationship contained in much of Gandhi’s theory and practice. It also summarily rejects the dualisms and false dichotomies of Western thought.

It is not enough to merge Gandhi’s principled nonviolence with critical theory to create something that approximates regulative nonviolence. In order to produce a critical nonviolence approach to security that rejects the mind-body /means-ends dualism it is also necessary to include the Kantian notion of regulative reason. Internal, self-reflection has not been a well-known feature of US foreign policy. Yet, security as a means of achieving

emancipation must be internally and externally focused. It is possible to tease out of the Obama administration elements of internal and externally focused self-reflections. President Obama has been comparatively willing to look inward, and even admit mistakes. Most of this has been of the problem solving variety. For example, his pause over the Afghan strategy falls into this category. Obama’s apology for the overthrow of Mossedegh might be another. On October 1, 2010, his administration apologized for the sadistic medical experiments conducted by American doctors on Guatemalans during the 1940s. He has also publicly stated, with respect to the April 5, 2010 explosion in the Upper Big Branch mine in West Virginia, that the government was at least partially to blame. The president also said that “the buck stops with me” in response to the Christmas bombing attempt. Similarly, the BP oil spill disaster elicited a belated “the buck stops with me” from the president. This is not the radical internal critique or transformation that is demanded by Marxian or Gandhian critical theory. The President’s inability to “be the change you wish to see” may be a result of his own limitations but it probably traces to larger structural

57 President Clinton’s apology to Latin Americans for US interventions dating as far back as the war with Spain in 1898 is a notable exception.


One may therefore understandably come to the conclusion that if Obama cannot make radical change then it is likely that the problems are bigger than one president.

**SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION**

Choosing nonviolence means acting in such a way that, at a minimum, physical harm is avoided when seeking social change. On a deeper level, choosing nonviolence means ridding oneself of violent thoughts, words, and deeds. The discussion of power politics reveals that the problem of means and ends is truly perennial. Even if power is conceived of in general terms as “fungible,” then we are still left with the problem of the threat of force with its attendant understanding that peace is simply the prelude to war. Peace through war is better understood not as an aspiration towards perpetual peace but rather perpetual war. Nonviolence and peace are interpreted through the eyes of the powerful not the oppressed. The merging of nonviolence and power politics has resulted in what I call “Imperial Nonviolence”: nonviolence used to further the interests of a particular state or class.

**Pacifism**, in contrast to power politics, is closer to the position of the oppressed. As Duane Friesen reminds, “A pacifist perspective” is “the rejection of violence as a means to preserve or bring about peace and justice.” There is little doubt that Friesen’s brand of pacifism has a number of similarities with Gandhian nonviolence and the stricter conception of nonviolence articulated by Gandhi. Indeed, as the discussion above shows, nonviolence is active and political, not passive. Pacifism, however, carries with it considerable baggage as indicated in the variety of pacifisms mentioned.

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62 The military-industrial-complex is the usual suspect.


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Although Human Security seemed to bear initial promise as a re-orientation of the referent object of security (back in the early 1990s) from the state to the individual, today it appears that the state has re-asserted itself as the beneficiary of human security. Similar to the discussion within the human rights literature dealing with humanitarian intervention, human security has become an excuse for imperial maneuvers. For example, consider the aftermath of Haiti’s January 12, 2010 7.0 magnitude earthquake. Once a net exporter of agricultural products, Haiti’s status as a major recipient of international aid has turned it into a highly dependent society. Human security is now the cause célèbre for foreign intervention of all kinds. As Booth and others have shown, when the US, along with the formerly “Western” states, intervenes to manipulate and control others for their own interests they use human security as a device to infiltrate or insinuate themselves into formerly closed societies.

Critical Theory, in its various forms, brings the focus of theory and practice back to the many instead of the few. This is a self-consciously political theory that seeks change. Beyond the obvious comparison between Obama’s campaign message, “Change you can believe in,” and his actual policies there is another reason that critical theory is an appropriate approach to adopt when analyzing US foreign policy and global security: the physical and human world is in crisis. Critical theorists like Booth have suggested that nonviolence might be an appropriate means to deal with this crisis. Theorists and practitioners of nonviolence have historically been critics of “business-as-usual” modes of operation. Tolstoy, Thoreau, Gandhi, Doris Day, King, Petra Kelly, and the Mothers have all objected to being quiet in the face of oppression and injustice. As Martin Luther King Jr.

84 Booth, Theory of World Security chapter seven “Business-as-Usual”.

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infamously stated one year to the day before his assassination, “there comes a time when silence is betrayal.” Thus, the union between critical theory and nonviolence is already present; the purpose here is simply to highlight its continued importance. The final point that bears repeating is that in order to maintain the utility of nonviolence in a violent world it is necessary to move beyond the binary opposition between principled and strategic nonviolence. The best means available to do this is regulative nonviolence.

The next chapter discusses the “21" century security agenda.” Specifically, it focuses on the war on terror as the dominant framework for understanding security in the new millennium. Following the groundwork laid from critical theory, contained within a new agenda is the possibility for reform and critical nonviolent security.
Part II
A 21st Century Global Security Agenda
CHAPTER THREE: A 21st Century Security Agenda

In an article in the *New Yorker*, Jon Lee Anderson records a former Somali military officer’s perspective on security in Somalia that illustrates the integration of US security concerns with Somalia’s:

The former Somali military officer expressed a wary optimism…. “finally we appealed to Allah. We asked him to give us oil, so as to interest Americans, or else, we said, we need a couple of fighters from Afghanistan’ …“So now the Somalis have a weapon: we are a staging ground for the fight against global terrorism….After so many years, with our piracy and our jihad, we are finally able to project fear.”

This passage shows how even in the far-off corners of the world, the “war on terror” has become a part of a global story. Somalis are using the “war on terror” to attract the attention of the hegemon. It also illustrates the evolution of the hegemonic trope. Instead of being a Cold War proxy, in the era of globalization and the “war on terror” Somalis must market themselves as worthy players in the “war on terror.”

As the world’s sole superpower, the United States is exceptional for its military might, economic power, and arrogance. These factors alone are not enough to allow the United States to implement its global security agenda for the 21st century; it must also have what the geographers John Agnew and Stuart Corbridge term a “global message.”

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United States’ global message is composed of: “mass consumption, personal liberty, private property, markets and electoral democracy,” all in exchange for obedience to the demands of the United States and global capital.\(^3\) This message is contained the primary national security strategy documents of the United States.\(^4\) Since the United States is the globalized nation-state par excellence, its national security becomes synonymous with global security. Following from the work of Agnew and Corbridge, this chapter asks whether the United States is a hegemon in the process of ushering in a new geopolitical order or if instead the world is entering into a transitional “geopolitical order.”\(^5\) As Agnew and Corbridge argue, “there is always hegemony, but there are not always hegemons.”\(^6\)

A *global* security agenda for the 21\(^{\text{st}}\) century must include agenda items that affect the global population—including states. In order to be implementable, there must be political power and will to act upon the agenda. Borrowing from Ole Wæver’s discussion of the creation and maintenance of the European Union,\(^7\) this chapter argues that this political will exists and is demonstrable in the *National Security Strategy of the United States of America (NSS)*. From these conditions it is deduced that the 21\(^{\text{st}}\) century global security agenda includes the following items and that the recognized threats to the planet and the population are (in no

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\(^3\) Agnew and Corbridge argue that this message is seductive: “In a world with massive material deprivation and immense inequality this is an attractive message for both political élites and poor populations.” Ibid.


\(^6\) Ibid. 17.

particular order): political oppression, terrorism, weapons proliferation, and climate chaos. Past eras have had their unifying tropes. This one is no different: global security can only be achieved by fighting a “war on terror.”

The so-called “war on terror” has in fact reached most of the global population in one form or another (see Appendix I). Although the Obama administration has stopped using the language of a “war on terror,” it is clear that much of the policy established during the Bush administration has carried over into the new one. One exception is noted: climate chaos was not a security concern for the Bush administration. Disturbingly, the essence of the war on terror remains and with it so too does the notion that the entire world is a battlefield.

The 21st century security agenda is similar to Cold War security from the perspective of the global south and the global north. From the south there is considerable resistance but also an effort to benefit from the “war on terror.” It is through the “war on terror” that major US aims will be accomplished: democracy promotion is defended as a weapon against terrorism, nonproliferation is framed primarily as a means to control WMD so that they do not fall into the hands of terrorists, anti-terrorism (self-referentially) guides global security (promoting freedom implies fighting terrorism), and environmentalism is couched in the language of “promoting stability” (unstable, rogue, and failed/collapsed states resulting from climate chaos serve as “safe havens” for terrorists). Therefore, in order to argue against the

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8 Isaac Kamola argues that globalization is a trope that only works when one excludes, in particular, Africa: Isaac A. Kamola, "Producing the Global Imaginary: Academic Knowledge, Globalization and the Making of the World" (Doctoral Dissertation, University of Minnesota, 2010).


10 Gardner, American Global Strategy and The "War on Terrorism" especially “Chapter 5: Manipulating US Global Power".
standard view of the war on terror it is also necessary to problematize the standard view of strategy as “the application of military power to achieve political objectives, or more specifically, “the theory and practice of the use, and threat of use, of organized force for political purposes.”

This chapter is composed of six sections. Section one focuses on the hegemonic origins of the global security agenda and argues that power guides what I call the 21st century global security agenda. Sections two through five focus on four, or four pillars of the 21st century global security agenda. These sections foreshadow the chapters contained in Part III. Section six concludes the chapter with a discussion of prospects for nonviolence in the 21st century. Each section combines to create a chapter that presents the NSS as the foundational text of the 21st century global security agenda.

**HEGEMONIC ORIGINS OF A 21ST CENTURY GLOBAL SECURITY**

New international orders come from systemic changes. The obvious recent examples include the transition from multipolarity to bipolarity after World War Two and the transition from bipolarity to unipolarity after the Cold War. More nuanced conceptions of order stem from Marxist/Gramscian accounts and focus on the concept of “hegemony” and include political economy as well as power in their formulation. It is therefore

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uncontroversial to say that the new global security agenda’s origins lie in power dynamics at the global level.\textsuperscript{14} Without ignoring the counter-power demonstrated on September 11, 2001, the US reaction to 9/11 effectively created a global “war on terror” more than did the actions of the suicide terrorists themselves.\textsuperscript{15} The US could have approached the bombings in an investigative, police fashion. Instead, the US chose to wage war on terror. This decision altered the face and the guiding hand of the international order.\textsuperscript{16}

Within International Relations (IR) literature, debate exists over whether institutions are able to remain after power departs but there is very little debate over their creation.\textsuperscript{17} Hegemony comes from power. The Marxist David Harvey, following Arendt and Arrighi, describes hegemony from an economic perspective noting that “any hegemon, if it is to maintain its position in relation to endless capital accumulation, must endlessly seek to extend, expand, and intensify its power.”\textsuperscript{18} More recently, Doug Stokes has advanced this

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argument by contending that the United States is acting as the guarantor of the global capitalist order. In international relations, might makes right.

“Might makes right” ideology is clear within the pages of the US National Security Strategy. The document itself weaves together the goals of democratization, the war on terror, de-proliferation, and even elements of concern for the environment (this does not come to fruition until the election of Barack Obama). Traditionally, power-political aspirations are couched in language made to appear universally appealing. Terms such as liberty, freedom, democracy, free enterprise, human rights, political and economic freedom, and human freedom are abundant. A black-and-white distinction is made between the US conception of security and that of the terrorists. That is, the United States and freedom is placed on one side and the terrorists and tyranny is placed on the other. As Agnew and Corbridge show in their discussion of the domino effect, “it effectively externalizes local conflicts into aspects of the overarching global conflict. It does so by tying American national security into distant places through the possibility of spread of revolution or the incubus of Communism.” Here one can replace “communism” with “terrorism” with little of the meaning lost. These agenda items are framed in the present text as four pillars of global security.

Pillar number one: Democratization. The NSS document lays out a policy of global security wherein, as Americans, “We will extend the peace by encouraging free and open

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20 Agnew and Corbridge, Mastering Space 75.

21 Hardly a new mission for the United States, one need only recall President Eisenhower’s campaign speeches announcing to the world that the US must not sleep “until the enslaved nations of the world have in the
societies on every continent.”

Echoing the speeches of President Eisenhower, the US security strategy articulates both a security strategy and a civilizational mission: to free the peoples of the earth. Democracy and terrorism are pitted against each other in a new ideological and geopolitical battle.

*Pillar number two*: Anti-terrorism. “Defending our Nation against its enemies is the first and fundamental commitment of the Federal Government.” Additionally, in an age of globalization, anti-terrorism requires cooperation among states: “The war against terrorists of global reach is a global enterprise of uncertain duration. America will help nations that need our assistance in combating terror.” Critics will rightly point out that the statement reads as an offering of help to foreign nations, but the following statement defines the boundaries: “…America will hold to account nations that are compromised by terror -- because the allies of terror are the enemies of civilization.” The US security strategy does not hide the corollary to this pillar: in order to fight terrorists of global reach, the US must have global power.

*Pillar number three*: Nonproliferation. “The gravest danger our Nation faces lies at the crossroads of radicalism and technology. Our enemies have openly declared that they are seeking weapons of mass destruction, and evidence indicates that they are doing so with determination.” Again, we find both a particular and a universal agenda item; the US will make the world safe from weapons of mass destruction not by getting rid of all WMDs but by controlling all weapons of mass destruction.

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fullness of freedom the right to choose their own path….” Quoted in: Ambrose and Brinkley, *Rise to Globalism* 127.

Collectively, these initial three pillars constitute the United States’ means and ends of global security. As George Bush states, “the United States will build on these common interests to promote global security.” As the world’s most powerful state, it is clearly within its interest to defend and promote an order which benefits it. The question remains, is it in any one else’s interest?

_Pillar number four:_ Environmentalism. After the election of Barack Obama a fourth pillar must be added: environmental security. While the Bush administration policy of denying climate chaos is symbolized most notoriously by his rejection of the Kyoto emissions protocols,23 Obama’s call for the creation of a green economy adds the environment to the list of global security concerns.24 In each case success depends, in part, upon the means employed. Though the Obama administration has been sympathetic to the relationship between means and ends, it will take broad participation to implement a critical nonviolent security and the kind of emancipation as security discussed in previous chapters. The fact of US hegemony both limits and makes possible emancipation as security in the 21st century.

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THE “WAR ON TERROR” AND THE COUNTER-TERRORISM PILLAR

American politicians have rhetorically crafted a “war on terror” as a conceptual frame that encourages the use of violence over that of nonviolence in its efforts to defeat and defend against terrorism. In addition, the means it employs to wage this war have ruined its moral authority while simultaneously increasing the likelihood of terrorism around the world. Though the proclamations have consistently articulated a goal of “rooting out” terrorists in order to create security, the actions have done little to create stability in the bombed-out targets of the “war on terrorism.” Instead, the US policy in Afghanistan and Iraq has attempted to defy the past experiences in other conflict zones: Macedonia, Bosnia, Russia, Georgia, Northern Ireland, El Salvador, Guatemala, Columbia, Chile, Haiti and on the African continent. Ultimately, current US strategy frustrates its own agenda (a strategy of might makes right undermines both the goal of preventing terrorism and promoting democracy). Indeed, a recent World Public Opinion poll summarizes the global public assessment of the US ‘war on terrorism’ thusly:

In the struggle between the United States and al-Qaeda, the predominant view among world publics is that neither side is winning and that the “war on terror” has not weakened al-Qaeda. In recent years most have also seen the war in Iraq as increasing the likelihood of terrorist attacks around the world.


While the US occupation of Iraq continues to produce new recruits for the “war on terror” as well as Jihad, the occupation of Afghanistan continues to spread across the territorial boundaries of the state into Pakistan. Several critics have noted that US actions, ostensibly with the permission of the Pakistani government (if not the Pakistani people), constitute a third war and occupation. Engelhardt’s critique of the Obama administration is indicative of this creeping spread of the “war on terror”: “Even as our Afghan and Pakistani wars are being sucked dry of whatever meaning might remain, the momentum is in only one direction—toward escalation.”

Obama’s team, in Engelhardt’s phrase, seems only capable of repeating a simple mantra of “al Qaeda must be destroyed” and this, sadly, is as much a strategy for defeating terrorism as saying that ‘taxes must be cut’ is a strategy for reviving the economy.

Seymour Hersh takes the US strategy for defeating terrorism to task even further by way of a chilling conversation with a retired Pakistani Army veteran. The officer believes that the more the United States intervenes into Pakistan with drones and military advisors, the more likely it is that Pakistan will experience a coup. Given the United States’ heavy use of mercenaries like Blackwater, it is fitting that the soldier, Tarar, insists that: “The Americans are trying to rent out their war to us”:

If the Obama Administration persists, “there will be an uprising here, and this corrupt government will collapse. Every Pakistani will then be his own nuclear bomb—a suicide bomber,” Tarar said. “The longer the war goes on, the longer it will

spill over in the tribal territories, and it will lead to a revolutionary stage. People there will flee to the big cities like Lahore and Islamabad.”

Hersh’s account is illustrative of questionable means and ends in global security. Unless the US is able to re-conceive its democracy promotion pillar as the promotion of popular democracy instead of its current strategy of promoting elite democracy then it is unlikely to achieve its ends. A passage in a letter from Gandhi to his friend Dishaw Wachha illustrates what is at stake when popular democracy is sacrificed on the altar of elite democracy: “I think the growing generation will not be satisfied with petitions, etc. We must give them something effective. Satyagraha is the only way, it seems to me, to stop terrorism.” Gandhi believes that nonviolence is the only way to stop terrorism. Nonviolence might mean talking with terrorists, negotiating with terrorists, and even giving in to terrorists’ demands. Though troubling for some, “dealing with legitimate governments that engage in terrorism may require either secret talks, or bilateral or multilateral mediation, or the engagement of international regimes, or other forms of mediation.” Ultimately, defeating and defending against terrorism may require the United States to restrain its military security establishment, reframe its “war on terror” as less a war on a tactic and more a sophisticated response to a rational action, use a variety of less violent and strategically nonviolent tactics, and, finally, end its policy of foreign aggressions and occupations.

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30 Seymour M. Hersh, "Defending the Arsenal: In an Unstable Pakistan, Can Nuclear Warheads Be Kept Safe?,” New Yorker, November 16 2009, 33.

31 Gandhi, CWMG Vol. 17 : 26 April, 1918 - April, 19.

32 Gardner, American Global Strategy and The "War on Terrorism" 80.
POLITICAL OPPRESSION AND THE DEMOCRACY PILLAR

Democracy is seen as the best antidote to political oppression. American foreign policy elites have elevated democracy promotion to the level of national security strategy. As the sole superpower the United States was able to put its vast military and economic might behind this project. As Gene Sharp observed, “The thing that has been most shocking is that the Bush Administration acted on the basis of the belief—dogma, “religion”—in the omnipotence of violence, which ignores the history of how the dictatorships under communist regimes and certain other regimes had been removed. It’s by people power. That’s all ignored. The assumption is an invading country can come in, remove its official leader, arrest some of the other people, and well, then, the dictatorship is gone.” Instead, the Bush administration invaded two countries and promoted the overthrow of both the democratically elected government of Hamas and the authoritarian but stable regime of the Islamic Courts Union in Somalia. It did this under the influence of a neoconservative interpretation of democratic peace theory—the theory that democratic states do not go to war with democratic states. Thus, the Bush administration crafted a foreign policy that advocated the promotion of democracy through war. On this point, Tom Engelhardt writes, “one thing can be said about the Bush administration: it had a grand strategic vision to go with its wars.” In contrast, the Obama administration does not appear to have a strategic

vision in the wars of Iraq and Afghanistan, yet they continue. As Engelhardt stated: “The
vision may be long gone, but the wars live on with their own inexorable momentum.”

As the 2002 and 2006 US National Security Strategies indicate, the United States
combined its democracy promotion pillar with a doctrine of so-called “preemptive war.”

Daily reports have indicated the problematic nature of the democracy promotion pillar. In a
recent article, the award winning investigative journalist Jonathan Schell summarizes the
problem with regards to Afghanistan:

there is no political solution that serves the foreign invader either. The problem is
structural and fundamental. Like the imperial powers of the past, the United States
wants to impose its will on other countries. Yet it is different from those previous
powers in at least one respect: it does not aim to rule the countries it invades
indefinitely. Conscious that the American public will not support war without end, it
means to leave one day. Therefore the art of victory has to be to try to set up a
government that can both survive US withdrawal and serve US interests. The circle
to be squared is getting the people of a whole country to want what Washington
wants. The trouble is that, left to their own devices, other peoples are likely to want
what they want, not what we want.”

Schell’s description of US foreign policy, in this case regarding Afghanistan, is indicative of
the US use of democracy as a weapon. The United States comes into every encounter with
its view of the world: what use is it to me? Even democracy is defined specifically in terms
of obedience to the US interest.

The United States seems to have its short term interests met when it approaches the
entire world as an extension of its interest. Condoleezza Rice’s pronouncement that the
United States’ interests are the interests of the entire world38 is one of the strongest

that “American values are universal” (49).
assertions of this nature. The Bush administration, however, failed to make the case that its goal was to bring security to the world. To the contrary, as Christian Reus-Smit demonstrates, the American rhetoric of liberty flies in the face of “the absolutist nature of the [Bush] administration’s crusade, with its categorical belief that there is but a single model of national success [i.e. democracy American-style].”\(^{39}\) Similarly, Hall Gardner argues that the US holds a double standard and that, absolutism and democracy are incompatible.\(^{40}\)

As the US prosecutes its “war on terror,” it violates the values that it seeks to promote by empowering extralegal activities of the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), including assassinations (usually with Predator Drones), torture, and spying on US citizens and residents. Further, as Lieven and Hulsman note, “Among neoconservatives and liberal hawks, the desire to spread democracy can also take a form that is explicitly dedicated to the weakening or even destruction of other states, even when these are by no means full fledged enemies of America.”\(^{41}\) In its current operation then, democracy promotion is used as a weapon. The result is that peoples around the world lose faith in American democracy.\(^{42}\) In contrast, whereas the Bush administration failed to make the case that the United States is striving to promote global security, the Obama administration has managed, in a surprisingly short period of time, to change global public opinion.\(^{43}\) Much like global sentiment towards


\(^{40}\) Gardner, *American Global Strategy and The "War on Terrorism"* 200.


\(^{43}\) See: “Global Views of United States Improve While Other Countries Decline,” *World Public Opinion.org*
the United States after 9/11, this accomplishment may be short lived. Engelhardt cuts to the heart of the issue:

We’ve moved from Bush’s visionary disasters to Obama’s flailing wars, while the people of Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq continue to pay the price. If only we could close the curtain on this strange mix of farce and tragedy, but evidently we’re still stuck in act four of a five-act nightmare.44

Engelhardt laments the suffering both of Americans and those who serve in the military and must implement US foreign policy. The democracy promotion pillar is flawed because it conceives of democracy in elite democratic terms not in popular democratic terms.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THE NONPROLIFERATION/WMD PILLAR

The gravest danger to the American people and global security continues to come from weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons. ~2010 US National Security Strategy45

Historically, countries with nuclear weapons are not invaded.46 This pillar is discussed in brief here, as it is relevant (but beyond the scope) of a more detailed discussion in a chapter in the present dissertation. This content is to be included in a proposed book as it poses a significant challenge to the creation of global peace and stability. As long as people suffer from the threat of nuclear attack, peace will remain a hollow term. It is significant that one of the first things President Obama did after he was elected was to take the lead on nonproliferation and stated “clearly and with conviction America's commitment


44 Engelhardt, "Obama's Flailing Wars."


to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons.” 47 This was followed a year later with a new treaty between the US and Russia and a multi-nation conference on nonproliferation. Finally, the administration released its nuclear posture review promising not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states.

These positive signs should be tempered with critical analysis. For example, the recent nuclear posture review indicates that the US has inconsistent policy. Specifically, the US advocates fewer nuclear weapons yet simultaneously threatens use of its own nuclear weapons against those regimes that remain noncompliant with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The new posture review begins by stating that the US will not use nuclear weapons to deter non-nuclear states that are a party to the non-proliferation treaty (NPT). However, it is important to recognize that this is only a reduction in the use of nuclear weapons to deter non-nuclear attacks. In other words, the US will continue to use nuclear weapons to deter non-nuclear attacks: “The United States will continue to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in deterring non-nuclear attacks.” 48

The most celebrated element of the policy (celebrated by advocates of a more peaceful US nuclear policy) deals with its “negative security assurance.” This is the promise that the United States will not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states: “by declaring that the United States will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear


weapons states that are party to the NPT and in compliance with their nuclear non-
proliferation obligations.”

The document continues by pretending to employ a carrot and stick approach. It
states that its new posture is meant to increase security for those who comply with the
demands of the United States but implies that not complying offers no similar guarantee.
This is similar to the discussion in chapter two of Robert Art’s essay on the “Fungibility of
Force” and will hardly appear to be a carrot to those on its receiving end of United States
attempts to: “persuade non-nuclear weapon states party to the Treaty to work with the
United States.”

The NPR also makes it clear that the US continues to retain the “right” to modify its
posture in order to respond to new bio and chemical weapon technologies. This decidedly
limits the significance of the U.S. security guarantee: “the United States reserves the right to
make any adjustment in the assurance.” Again, the continued strategy of threatening force
is consistent with Art’s conception of the fungibility of force. However, by maintaining a
threatening posture the US does not serve its interests. The document itself reflects ongoing
debates in the security community over the benefits of assurances. On the one hand, the
NPR does make promises of security to “compliant” regimes, but by stating upfront that
those promises may change in the future, any assurance that might have been made has
simultaneously been taken away. This is most important in the context of North Korea and
Iran.

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49 Ibid., viii.

50 Ibid.
In a paragraph that can only be understood in the context of the standoff between the US and Iran and the US and North Korea, it is stated that the US will use or retains the “right” to use nuclear weapons. In these cases, the US might even use nuclear weapons to deter conventional attacks: “The United States is therefore not prepared at the present time to adopt a universal policy that deterring nuclear attack is the sole purpose of nuclear weapons, but will work to establish conditions under which such a policy could be safely adopted.”

The nuclear posture review then offers a sleight of hand: it claims that the new NPR does not increase the likelihood of US use of nuclear weapons. It is not in the interest of the US to use such weapons, it states. Yet, it remains useful to threaten their use (again a la Art). One cannot but help to wonder why then would it not be useful for others to threaten their use? For example, the document reads: “The United States wishes to stress that it would only consider the use of nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances to defend the vital interests of the United States or its allies and partners.” This should be clear but one wonders why this is exceptional? Its further clarification that, “It is in the U.S. interest and that of all other nations that the nearly 65-year record of nuclear non-use be extended forever,” only begs the question that if it is in everyone’s interest not to use nukes, then why have them. Again, the notion of the fungibility of force is meaningful independent of whether its US force or Iranian force.

The document represents a positive step towards a world free of nuclear weapons. Statements contained within the document clearly insisting that the United States will not be the first to use nuclear weapons are encouraging, especially in contrast with past administrations that routinely insisted that “all options” were on the table in a given conflict.

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51 Ibid.
Though the document contains vague elements, strong statements like, “The United States will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states that are party to the NPT and in compliance with their nuclear nonproliferation obligations” are a good beginning.

Hall Gardner and Amitai Etzioni are among security and foreign policy experts who argue that Iran and North Korea in particular, and states in general, seek security guarantees, especially from the US. Failure to supply such promises results in the continued stalemate between opposing states. Unwillingness to provide such assurances leads enemy states to believe that the US is actually employing a policy of regime change. Unfortunately, even security guarantees may not be sufficient if the US is not convincing enough. Indeed, Gardner writes, “US or international promises not to attack or intervene in the country does not preclude such regimes from claiming that outside forces and exile groups (supported by foreign powers) are still attempting to undermine their leadership—and hence engaging in “regime change.” For example, Iran’s leaders argued that the so-called “green revolution” was a product of US destabilization, not authentic grassroots popular democracy during the 2009 summer presidential elections. Thus, in cases where specific states like Iran and North Korea seek security promises from the United States, the NPR does very little to assuage their legitimate fears that the United States is seeking their overthrow.

The US and its allies have reasons for not granting these assurances. As Gardner writes, “the fundamental issue remains that multilateral security accords may appear to

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52 Ibid., 14-15.

53 Amitai Etzioni, Security First: For a Muscular, Moral Foreign Policy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007). & Gardner, American Global Strategy and The "War on Terrorism".

54 Gardner, American Global Strategy and The "War on Terrorism" 106-07.
legitimize the regime.” However, he adds, “concurrently, security guarantees do not necessarily preclude the possibility of evolutionary reforms—or even radical political change coming from within.” The nature and complexity of these regional and global security concerns demonstrate the importance of new institutions and means for creating global security.

The third pillar, “preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction,” also stands on a false logic. First and uncontroversially, WMD are assumed to be dangerous. Second, and seemingly contrary to the first idea, the US maintains that it should be able to continue to hold as many WMD as it would like. Thus the US seeks to prevent the spread of WMD beyond itself. While it may be rational for the US to strive to control all WMD, it is, however, irrational for any state to give up WMD capability it may currently possess or to stop trying to acquire them if it did not already possess them. American development of the “Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator” or a nuclear “missile shield” only serves to fuel the fears of potential US enemies, friends, and allies and inspire them to produce their own nuclear arsenal. The recent signing of the “New Start” pact indicates positive movement on this front. Obama’s stated goal of creating a world free of nuclear weapons is contrasted with the Bush era focus on creating a new generation of tactical nuclear weapons.

55 Ibid. 106.

56 On this debate, specifically in the context of Iran, see: Scott Sagan, Kenneth Waltz, and Richard K. Betts, "A Nuclear Iran: Promoting Stability or Courting Disaster?,” Journal of International Affairs 60, no. 2 (2007).

57 Note: On October 25, 2005 US Senator Pete Domenici indicated that negotiators working toward an agreement on funding for the Department of Energy for FY2006 had agreed to drop funding for continued research on the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator (RNEP) project at the request of the National Nuclear Security Administration. However, over $20 million have already been invested in this project. < http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/systems/rnep.htm > (1-18-2007).

The New Start pact set the stage for a “Nuclear Security Summit” of 47 states who agreed to limit the spread of nuclear weapons technology and was specifically aimed at “a far broader effort to persuade African, Latin American, Asian and European nations to agree on steps to deny terrorist groups the two materials necessary to make a bomb: plutonium and highly enriched uranium.” It seems likely that while the particular formulation of the US strategy is flawed, Obama’s adjustments and modifications make it possible to imagine that a modified version of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons might be at least thinly universal—even if only 47 states met during the April 2010 summit. It still remains to be seen if Obama will further alter the strategy designed to achieve the goals of 21st century global security. Obama has been much more willing to act within a multilateral framework than his predecessor.

Obama’s strategy in the new NPR appears to be similar to the one recommended by Hans Blix. This logically coherent strategy for limiting the proliferation of WMD is found within the pages of the WMD Commission report Weapons of Terror. In it, Blix, the head inspector on WMD, states that “the best solution to the problem of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction [is] that countries should no longer feel that they needed them and that violators should be encouraged to walk back and rejoin the international community.” This is also the policy recommended by both Amitai Etzioni and Hall

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60 Hans Blix et al., Weapons of Terror: Freeing the World of Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Arms (Stockholm, Sweden: EO Grafiska, 2006).
The primary difference between these two approaches appears to be the degree of intentionality behind Obama’s version.

**CLIMATE CHAOS AND THE ENVIRONMENTAL PILLAR**

Even if the world survives depleted uranium, American poisoning of the environment, and climate chaos, it may not be a world anyone wants to live in. Obama represents hopes for a productive green economy instead of a ruined military financial casino. Nonviolence and the environment are related insofar as both depend upon an understanding of the world as interconnected. Duane Friesen has argued that Christians (not just Christian pacifists) “must be, therefore, concerned about the global structures which seek to preserve a physical environment that is inhabitable.” He goes on to link the environment, nuclear weapons, and human rights. He chastises former President Jimmy Carter for failing to make this obvious connection. Obama’s focus on the environment often does not go far enough, but positive movement can be detected:

> While the United States makes up less than 5 percent of the world's population, we create roughly a quarter of the world's demand for oil. And this appetite comes at a tremendous price -- a price measured by our vulnerability to volatile oil markets, which send gas prices soaring and families scrambling. It's measured by a trade deficit where as much as 20 percent of what we spend on imports is spent on oil. It's measured in billions of dollars sent to oil-exporting nations, many that we do not choose to support, if we had a choice. It's measured in a changing climate, as sea levels rise, and droughts spread, forest burns, and storms rage.

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Obama’s statement shows that he understands the interconnected aspect of human actions and climate chaos, between disasters like the 2010 BP oil spill and global fish habitats, not to mention the relationship between the global economy and the environment. Obama is not the first American president to make these kinds of connections between human action and the environment. After all, the fourth pillar is marginally contained within the NSS under the heading: “Enhancing energy security and clean development.” Here one finds the hint of recognition or at least a concession: “Joined with Australia, China, India, Japan, and the ROK in forming the Asia-Pacific Partnership for Clean Development and Climate to accelerate deployment of clean technologies to enhance energy security, reduce poverty, and reduce pollution.”\(^64\) In this case, the US is willing to work with other states to help keep the environment safe.

Elsewhere, in the section on “East Asia” the NSS states that, “in the context of mutual interests with China, “We will work to increase our cooperation to combat disease pandemics and reverse environmental degradation.”\(^65\) Further on, in the section on “globalization,” one finds the most specific reference to the environment: “Problems of this scope may overwhelm the capacity of local authorities to respond, and may even overtax national militaries, requiring a larger international response.”\(^66\) There is a surprising concession here wherein the Bush administration acknowledges, almost by extension, environmental destruction which “may even overtax national militaries, requiring a larger international response.” This has been more recently confirmed by the National Intelligence


\(^{65}\) Ibid., 41.

\(^{66}\) Ibid., 47.
Council which reported in summer 2009 that: “climate change by itself would have significant geopolitical impacts around the world and would contribute to a host of problems, including poverty, environmental degradation and the weakening of national governments.”\textsuperscript{67}

These kinds of statements should be understood as securitizing speech acts. That they are receiving significant hearing in the mainstream press is indicative not of the changing nature of the threat but rather the emphasis and the author. Bush argued similarly in the NSS but did not expend political capital on it. Whereas today, major voices like Senator John Kerry are placing great emphasis on climate change. Unlike during the Bush era (where one must cull the depths to find references to the environment), the Obama administration clearly states that it wants to comprehensively protect the United States from “the destabilizing effects of a changing climate.”\textsuperscript{68} It remains to be seen whether it will be able to do this.

CONCLUSION

Twenty First century global security in the Era of Obama is potentially less violent than that of George W. Bush. The Bush era ushered in the overt use of force under the rubric of “preemptive war.” Obama seeks to be the reconciler, not the “decider.” Yet, the legacy of the Bush era lives on as US foreign policy continues to frequently use hard power, if less often than Bush. In the context of the four agenda items discussed in this chapter, the Obama era provides an opportunity for grassroots protests to influence American foreign


policy. Thus far in Obama’s administration, there have been gains in the area of nuclear weapons with the signing of START and the convening of an international conference on nuclear weapons and nuclear technology. Obama’s and congress’ response to COP 15 has not solved the problem of enacting environmental policy to address climate chaos but it has at least shown that there is considerable movement. On terrorism, the Obama Era has so far proven to be similar to that of Bush. The rhetoric is often less bellicose, but the use of violence has been continued as more soldiers and predator drones have been deployed in Afghanistan. On the matter of political oppression and democracy, domestically there has been a push by the administration to reduce freedoms in the name of greater security. In one instance the Obama administration has requested what experts call the “public safety exception” to Miranda rights (the right to remain silent). In two high profile cases, the so-called Christmas Bomber and the Time Square Bomber, Miranda rights were ‘delayed.’ Essentially this means that “Information gleaned during questioning under the public safety exception -- in which police ‘ask questions reasonably prompted by a concern for the public safety,’ according to the 1984 Supreme Court case that recognized the exception -- is admissible at trial.” This is an example of what Alan Gilbert has named “anti-democratic feedback.” It is also consistent with the behavior of the previous administration. Along

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71 Gilbert, Must Global Politics Constrain Democracy?
these lines, the US democracy promotion pillar must be understood as “elite” democracy promotion as opposed to popular democracy promotion. Combined with the “war on terror,” elite democracy promotion “has resulted in counter-reaction and a fundamental questioning of US democratic processes at both home and abroad.”

The conclusions drawn from the above are challenges for critical nonviolence. Emancipation stemming from the 21st century security agenda may be more in line with the standard reading of Thomas Hobbes than that of Gandhi or Ken Booth. Specifically, when the United State uses violence it is deemed legitimate but when others use it, those actors are deemed terrorists. This territorial logic results in the promotion of ‘nonviolence’ interpreted as the absolute authority of the (United) State(s). The current trope of the 21st century global security agenda is that of the “war on terror.” The project of a critical nonviolence is to reveal the logical inconsistencies contained within this logic and then to suggest alternative means of creating peace and security. The four pillars of 21st century security should not be allowed to be used simply as opportunities for the United States to project power because they contain emancipatory potential, they should serve as rallying points for political practice on a world political level.

72 Gardner, American Global Strategy and The "War on Terrorism" 165.
Part III
The Four Pillars of Global Security
CHAPTER FOUR:  
Re-framing the “War on Terror”

Just three days removed from these events, Americans do not yet have the distance of history. But our responsibility to history is already clear: to answer these attacks and rid the world of evil. War has been waged against us by stealth and deceit and murder. ~2002 US National Security Strategy

We will always seek to delegitimize the use of terrorism and to isolate those who carry it out. Yet this is not a global war against a tactic—terrorism or a religion—Islam. We are at war with a specific network, al-Qa’ida, and its terrorist affiliates who support efforts to attack the United States, our allies, and partners. ~2010 US National Security Strategy

Does the way the United States thinks about terrorism affect the way it fights terrorism? Put differently, if it thinks about terrorism differently will it fight terrorism differently? With the election of Barack Obama to the office of President, the language about terrorism has changed significantly from the Bush era. Has there been a noticeable change in the way the US fights terrorism? Pillar I specifically addresses what the antiterrorism pillar of the 21st century global security agenda introduced in chapter three. The Obama administration has implicitly and explicitly indicated that the US is no longer fighting a “global war on terrorism.” This rhetorical re-positioning is a major shift from the


3 Ibid.
2002 and 2006 Bush era statements on the United States’ fight against terrorism.\textsuperscript{4} From the perspective of those who wish to reduce the amount of violence in the world, this rhetorical shift should be applauded. While the stated intentions of the Obama administration may differ radically from the previous one in terms of its stated support for restoration of the rule of law, opposition to torture, and willingness to cooperate with allies, the conditions under which Obama took office (two occupations, incursions into Pakistani territory from Afghanistan, drone attacks in Yemen and Somalia, ongoing support for Ethiopia’s 2006 invasion and occupation of Somalia, and global economic meltdown) and the president’s need to “resist the forces that divide us, and instead come together on behalf of our common future”\textsuperscript{5} mean that very little in the way of change should be expected. For example, the statement that the US policy under Obama “denies al-Qa‘ida safe haven” is a logic consistent with that which motivated the US in 2006 to “green light” the Ethiopian invasion of Somalia. Whether it is fighting a “global” war against a tactic does not change the fact that the US is currently waging, directly or by proxy, five acts of aggression including the authorization of expanded use of covert operations throughout the entire Middle East region.\textsuperscript{6}

It appears that there is a link between the conception of a “global war on terror” and US military expansionism. Though the field of terrorism studies and the literature it

\textsuperscript{4} Peter Beinart, "Obama Shrinks the War on Terrorism," \textit{Time} 174, no. 23 (2009).

\textsuperscript{5} The president has been routinely asked whether he would authorize investigations into alleged crimes of the Bush administration. His response: "We have been through a dark and painful chapter in our history," the president said. "But at a time of great challenges and disturbing disunity, nothing will be gained by spending our time and energy laying blame for the past." Barack Obama, "President Obama’s Statement on the Memos," \textit{New York Times}, April 16 2009.

produces was the near-exclusive territory of a few academics, themselves connected in some formal or informal way to the US government, this does not explain the primarily military response to September 11, 2001.⁷ This is because the mainly government funded research of terrorism studies indicates that terrorism is a tactic, not an identity—thus making a “war on terrorism” inherently illogical.⁸ Further, terrorism is theoretically and empirically discussed as a “rational act” usually motivated by specific political goals.⁹ Subsequent research conducted post-September 11 has also shown that the chiefly military response, especially occupations, actually generates, instead of reduces, terrorism. The logical lessons to be drawn from the literature on terrorism and the last decade of US (and other state) responses to terrorism are that terrorism is usually a rational, political act, thus requiring political not military responses, and that violent, military responses and occupations serve only to increase the likelihood of future terrorist events like the one that occurred on September 11, 2001. Combined, these lessons beg the question, what should be done to reduce potential acts of terrorism if military responses serve only to increase the number of individuals who will in the future decide to use terrorist tactics against the United States?

The lessons learned from terrorism studies and United States responses to recent terrorist events suggest an answer outside of military action. Nevertheless, a considerable post-September 11 terrorism literature suggests more not less military force be used to fight terrorism. For example, some have suggested that a “new” terrorism has arisen that differs

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radically from the past forms which were based on rational, political action. This “new” terrorism is irrational and violent and therefore must be dealt with by counter-violence. Others argue that terrorism, though a tactic, must be fought with equally “asymmetric” tactics in order to win the “war on terror.” The sections contained within Pillar I adopt the first of a two tiered approach to the broader issue of 21st century global security. These chapters advocate that the United States adopt nonviolence to defeat and defend against terrorism by way of a critical analysis of the consequences of using force. And though the overall dissertation takes a skeptical view of “strategic nonviolence,” it agrees generally that in order to reduce the absolute amount of violence in the world, strategic uses of nonviolence by the US is preferable to a policy of unrestrained force. After first addressing the lessons learned from terrorism studies and US (and other state) responses to terrorism, the argument concludes by recommending that policy informed by critical nonviolence should focus on ending all United States military occupations and end its drone program.

The distinction between strategic and principled nonviolence should not be viewed as a binary opposition. There is room for both principled and strategic nonviolence in US foreign policy. However, at the intersection of principled and strategic nonviolence there exists a middle way that is grounded or regulated by the principles of nonviolence but

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conscious of the conditioned reality of all political practice. The imperial and violent logic of the “war on terror” has meant that the wielders of state controlled violence see all forms of resistance, violent or nonviolent, as the same. Even all forms of violent resistance are treated as the same.\(^\text{12}\) For example, by convincing elites within the United States to adopt strategic nonviolence in response to terrorism, there might have been very different consequences for protestors at the 2008 Republican National Convention\(^\text{13}\) or the 2009 G-20 meeting in Philadelphia.\(^\text{14}\) If international elites could be similarly convinced to adopt strategic nonviolence, then instances like the Thai government response to protests might also have been seen and responded to differently.\(^\text{15}\) In these examples the protestors were viewed through the lens of the “war on terrorism” and as a result elicited a violent response from the state. Since the state sees all resistance as essentially the same, the state response is essentially the same. By putting on strategic nonviolent lenses, it is possible for the state to respond in less violent ways. The goal is not to put faith in government. Rather, it is to show the state that it is in its self-interest to use nonviolent means. If the state can be guided by regulative nonviolence, then the results will potentially include the preservation of lives.


that otherwise will be destroyed during the suppression of undifferentiated violent and nonviolent resistance to US imperialism.

**FRAMES OF THE “WAR” ON TERROR**

In the 20th century, some chose to appease murderous dictators whose threats were allowed to grow into genocide and global war. In this century, when evil men plot chemical, biological and nuclear terror, a policy of appeasement could bring destruction of a kind never before seen on this earth. Terrorists and terror states do not reveal these threats with fair notice in formal declarations. And responding to such enemies only after they have struck first is not self-defense, it is suicide. ~George Bush addresses the nation March 17, 2003

If a country refuses to negotiate when it is clearly in a position of strength, when will it ever negotiate? ~ Deepak Malhotra

Immediately following the attacks of September 11, 2001, American politicians misunderstood and/or misused their opportunity to frame the American response. For example, President George Bush asserted that the US was attacked because of “our way of life.” He implied in subsequent statements that terrorism is rightly to be considered an ideology (like communism or fascism), followed by those who believe that violence against civilians is an end in itself. He went on to add that the terrorists just do not value life like “we do.” Those listening to President Bush were to conclude that it is unhelpful and even wrong to try to understand the mind of a terrorist because he only understands the language of violence. In contrast, this chapter argues that it is crucial to first understand that terrorism is a rational act because if it is a rational act, then it can be responded to with political means rather than violent ones.

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Unfortunately, the American political elite obscured the issue, not to mention decades of research on terrorist organizations and their members which shows that terrorism is a rational act motivated by political goals. The literature rebuking the President’s assertions quickly flooded the academic and journalistic market. Stephen Zunes’ useful antidote serves as a case in point. As he explained in book form a little over a year after September 11: “self-righteous claims by American leaders that the anger expressed by Arabs and Muslims towards the United States is because of ‘our commitment to freedom’ only exacerbates feelings of ill-will and feeds the rage manifested in anti-American violence and terrorism.”

The American administration’s comments do reflect the history of US intervention in the Middle East, let alone continued support for authoritarian and anti-democratic regimes in the region. In short, a significant amount of terrorism is explained not because ‘they don’t value American freedom’ but because those who use terrorism would like some freedom of their own. One painful lesson of terrorism studies is that military force almost never succeeds in a “war on terror.”

When, on May 27, 2010 the Obama administration released its National Security Strategy document, it appeared that perhaps finally American elites had learned the lesson. It explicitly states that the United States is not fighting a “war on terrorism.” It has even been hailed as looking “beyond military might” and Sandy Berger, former US National Security Advisor to Bill Clinton (1997-2001), describes portions of it as a “dramatic departure” from the Bush administration. Specifically, it does away with the “Bush

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Doctrine” or “preemptive war doctrine”: “The new strategy endorses the principles that have guided administrations for decades: The use of force should be a last resort, should weigh all the costs and benefits and should have as much international support as possible.” With regards to terrorism, the document appears to radically change course, at least rhetorically. As Berger argues: “But the critical difference in the Obama strategy is its rejection of the "global war on terror" lens through which the prior administration viewed the challenge.” To get a sense of how nonviolence can be useful in challenging terrorism it is necessary to develop a more sophisticated understanding of terrorism, beginning with the motives of terrorism.

SECTION I: LESSONS LEARNED FROM TERRORISM STUDIES

This section argues that terrorism is a rational act, that there are different motivations for terrorism, and that brute force is almost never effective against terrorism. It also problematizes the literature on a “new” terrorism and rejects the essentialized view that all or most Muslims are terrorists. It also debunks the “hatred of liberty” thesis said to motivate terrorist acts against the U.S. Finally, it begins the first tier of a two tiered argument about the use of less violent and nonviolent means by state actors. In the “war on terrorism,” employing nonviolent means will significantly reduce the amount of death and destruction perpetrated by the US and other states as they wage war on terrorism and will decrease the instances of vengeance in return.


21 Ibid.
In order to argue for a nonviolent approach to terrorism it is first necessary to examine the assumption that terrorism is irrational. When terrorism is seen as a rational tactic, then nonviolence can be seen as one way of intervening to dissuade actors from using terrorism. In spite of a number of American politicians and academics who assert that terrorism is irrational, this section argues against such a view. It also argues that tactics other than brute force have proven to be successful because they recognized terrorists as strategic actors (and as human beings). In sum, this section raises the threshold over which the US and other states must climb in order to use violence against terrorism.

Terrorism is a rational act

To be sure, what motivates terrorist action is hotly contested. However, there is considerable agreement about one thing: terrorism is a rational act. Martha Crenshaw, writing on the subject of terrorism before 9/11, portrays the tactics of terrorism as politically motivated and rationally chosen. For example, “an organization or a faction of an organization may choose terrorism because other methods are not expected to work or are considered too time-consuming, given the urgency of the situation and the government’s superior resources,” argues Crenshaw. Bruce Hoffman also goes to great lengths to demonstrate that terrorism is a rational action and adds that even state sponsorship of terrorism is based upon rational calculation: “for the state sponsor, much as for the terrorist group itself, terrorism—contrary to popular perception—is not a mindless act of fanatical or

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indiscriminate violence.” Mia Bloom also goes to great pains to explain that terrorists who use the most popularized form of terrorism today, suicide terrorism, use it under “two conditions: when other terrorists or military tactics fail, and when they are in competition with other terrorist groups for popular or financial support.” Robert Pape, extrapolating from his comprehensive data set, adds that suicide terrorists overwhelmingly use suicide terrorism as a means against occupying military forces. More specifically, “foreign occupation by a democratic state, national resistance, and religious difference are the main causal factors leading to the rise of suicide terrorist campaigns.” Pape’s discovery has the most immediate relevance for critical nonviolence. His findings suggest that to stop terrorism, stop occupying foreign countries. The US’s so-called “global war on terror” thus obscures a vast body of research that makes a case for a de-emphasis on military security and a greater emphasis on nonviolent means of defending against terrorism. Instead of following the advice of decades of research, the administration immediately adopted a view consistent with what in the literature is referred to as “new” terrorism and which allowed it to emphasize military security instead of more nonviolent approaches like diplomacy, international law, and policing.

23 Hoffman, Inside Terrorism 267.


The “New” Terrorism

The “new” terrorism amounts to a collection of racial and religious caricatures that lead one to believe that a certain religion (Islam) and a certain race (Arab) kill merely for the joy of killing. By logical extension, the only way to defeat and defend against the “new” terrorism is by killing all those who supposedly follow this belief (variously referred to as Islamic-fascism or Islaomo-fascism). This so-called “new” terrorism is marked by three components: 1) increased degree of fervor; 2) increased ability to implement attacks; and 3) increased ability to cause mass causalities. To a certain extent, I do not disagree with these elements. However, in Rod Thornton’s discussion of the new terrorists he makes a number of assumptions that simply do not add up. First, he argues that “thus with Islamist-inspired terrorism there are strong elements of killing for the sake of killing, with no particular political purpose in mind.” Osama bin Laden’s “jihad against Jews and crusaders” is perhaps the most virulent example of Islamist inspired terrorism and even this example includes a list of political grievances that appear to be more salient than religion. Further, quoting an article dated shortly after September 11, 2001, he argues that “a broad swath of Muslim opinion sees terrorism as now the only way of actually ‘defending’ themselves and of thwarting Western ‘aggressive’ designs.” This data has recently been contradicted by polling data conducted by World Public Opinion. According to this 2006 study, “Strong


28 Ibid. 28.
opposition to terrorism was found among Muslims in seven out of ten countries polled by Pew.

Thornton’s example is further shown to be problematic in the Muslim populations of Indonesia, Pakistan and Turkey, where six in ten or more say that “suicide bombings and other forms of violence against civilian targets” are “never justified.” Further, the report records that “On bin Laden, Pew found that majorities in eight of the ten countries said they had little or no confidence in the al Qaeda leader.” While it may be possible to argue that “broad swaths” should mean some percentage of the population large enough to do damage, it is extremely misleading, especially given polling data available to Thornton. A more recent collection of polling data shows that Muslims feel deeply threatened by the US “war on terrorism”:

A recurring narrative in focus groups and in polls is that the US has put forward the liberal ideals of democracy and national sovereignty and then effectively abandoned those principles by promoting undemocratic governments in the Muslim world. Thus Muslims feel betrayed by the US.  

While US political elites insist that US policy is intended to protect Americans and to make the world safe for democracy, in reality US practices do just the opposite. Though it may be relevant to discuss the possibility of a “new” terrorism, it appears that much of what passes as “new” is simply the ideological orientation of those doing the theorizing.


30 Kull, Muslims and America: Internalizing the Clash of Civilizations ([cited).
**The “New” Terrorism and “Hatred of Liberty” Argument**

The “hatred of liberty” argument also serves to frame terrorist action as antithetical to democracy and thus allows a facile equation of the “war on terrorism” as a war for democracy, women’s rights, human rights, and etc. In conjunction with the “new” terrorism it serves to dehumanize past, present and future terrorists: terrorists hate freedom, those who hate freedom are crazy, crazy people cannot be reasoned with so therefore violence is the only sane way to do deal with terrorists. The US claim that the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 were motivated by hatred of life and liberty also deliberately misdirects attention away from past US policies as well as the stated concerns of those who perpetrated the acts of violence. As Zunes and others show, the claim of “hating liberty” is betrayed by the fact that many of the members of the squad that attacked the US were from Saudi Arabia, an authoritarian monarchy supported now for many years by the United States. US insistence upon democracy rings hollow in the ears of many people around the world, especially those who do in fact want democracy in their countries.\(^{31}\)

Three recent polls on democracy indicate the contradictory nature of US global policy. First, a May 12, 2008 poll found that “In all 19 nations polled majorities agree with the democratic principle that "the will of the people should be the basis for the authority of government" --a principle enunciated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.”\(^{32}\) Second, an August 3, 2007 Poll reveals that “A majority [of Americans] thinks that promoting democracy should be a goal of US foreign policy. However there is a reluctance

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to make democracy promotion a central theme in US foreign policy and an opposition to using military force or the threat of military force to that end.\textsuperscript{33} The third poll is perhaps the most damning of US policy. Steven Kull reports on the tension within Islamic societies over wanting freedom on the one hand and wanting to stay true to something like an authentic core of Islam (specifically shari‘a—which translates as “the path” or “the way” according to God but is commonly understood as the term for “Islamic law”)\textsuperscript{34}:

But looking at polling data and the way that people behave in focus groups, we do see people responding with inconsistencies and apparent stress. Clearly, assimilating liberal values while preserving Islamic identity is difficult for many Muslims. Furthermore, there are strong reasons to believe that this process of integration has been disrupted and subverted by tensions between the Muslim world and the US, as well as tensions between al Qaeda and the US.\textsuperscript{35}

One might conclude that recent and past terrorist and state terrorist violence is motivated not by a hatred of freedom but by a strong desire for freedom. Theorists of the “new” terrorism instead present an ahistorical view that ignores the lived lives of millions who suffer oppression in authoritarian regimes. Finally, the military security response to terrorism has caused Muslims to doubt America’s democratic intentions and question the anti-terrorism pillar of America’s 21\textsuperscript{st} century global security agenda. The past framing of the “war on terror” has lead many Muslims to believe that instead of being desirous of


\textsuperscript{35} Kull, \textit{Muslims and America: Internalizing the Clash of Civilizations} ([cited).
creating security, America is in fact fighting a war against Muslims. This problematic feature of the way America framed its “war on terror” may be explained in part by its confusing terrorism as an identity instead of as a tactic.

_Terrorism as Tactic, not as Identity_ 36

It is not possible to fight a war against a tactic, though this is exactly what American politicians claimed they were going to do immediately after September 11 when they stated that the United States was at war with terrorism; it framed terrorism as an ideology and as an identity, consequently confusing a tactic with an identity. Terrorism is a tactic. Thus, when the US said that it was at war with terrorism it was stating grammatically that it was waging war against a tactic. This had the effect of transforming terrorism into something that it is not: an identity and an ideology. The literature on terrorism reveals the disconnection between, for example, the Bush administration’s language regarding terrorist violence and actual terrorist events, not to mention the contexts within which terrorism occurs. The historical literature on terrorism refers to small groups using dynamite, guns, and other small weapons against variations of sovereign power. Certainly the common understanding of terrorists characterizes them as Thornton does: “terrorists are perhaps the archetypal asymmetric adversaries. They are weak; they lack both numbers and resources.” 37 The rhetoric surrounding the “global war on terrorism” selectively employs an omnipresent threat of terrorism that must be fought in a “long war” while at the same time insisting that terrorist violence is limited to a few cells. If the numbers are small then it is difficult to

36 Special thanks to Isaac Kamola for drawing my attention to this difference.

37 Thornton, _Asymmetric Warfare_ 25.
justify the level of attention paid to terrorists.\textsuperscript{38} If they are, instead, as powerful as much of the language insists, then why is the United States emphasizing a tactic that proves time and again to be a failure? In other words, are terrorists really the threat claimed by the US leaders? 

The rhetoric of a “global war on terror” combined with the overwhelming majority of the actual battles fought on Muslim soil lead to the perception within Muslim communities that the US war on terror is really a war on Islam. Seeing the potential for confusion, the US administration tried to make a distinction between “good Muslims” and terrorists.\textsuperscript{39} For example, then President Bush, in an exclusive interview with Al Arabiya TV, was asked to respond to the criticism that the “war on terror” was a war on Islam, said that: “precisely the message I was trying to send, the war is not a struggle against Muslims, the Muslim religion, it is a struggle of honorable, peaceful people throughout the world against the few who want to impose their vision.”\textsuperscript{40} However, efforts to ensure Muslims that America intended to fight against terrorism and not Muslims failed partly because of this lack of clearly defined terms. Muslims around the world could see that the “war on terror” was being practically applied disproportionately in Muslim countries. The Bush administration went to some lengths to insist that the war on terrorism was not a war between civilizations, but too much of the language used in conversation tended to view terrorism almost entirely as a particularly identity. This has resulted in the rhetorical


\textsuperscript{39} George W. Bush, "In an Exclusive Interview with Alarabiya Tv: Bush Denies He Is An "Enemy of Islam"," in \textit{Al-Arabiya TV} (2007).

\textsuperscript{40} Ibid.
construction of terrorism as a particular identity that often gets equated in conversation with Muslims. As Israel’s ambassador to the U.N., Dan Gillerman, commented that “while it may be politically incorrect and maybe even untrue to say that all Muslims are terrorists, it happens to be very true that nearly all terrorists are Muslim. So this is not just Israel’s war. This is the world’s war.” With opinions like these, it is easy to understand why some Muslims might think that the US lead global war on terrorism is in fact a global war against Islam. More importantly, it helps to show that the way the United States thinks about terrorism affects the way it fights terrorism. Specifically, as long as the United States thinks in terms of a “war on terrorism” it will emphasize military security at the expense of nonviolent security.

There are different motivations for terrorism

In addition to the terrorism literature’s focus on terrorism as a rational act and as a specific tactic, it also shows that there are different motivations for terrorism that the framing of a “war on terrorism” fails to understand. Within the rubric of rational action, there exist numerous subsets of motivation but this framing of a “war on terrorism” excludes discussion of these other motivations. This argument is complicated in part by the fact that terrorist organizations have political motivations while individuals may participate in terrorism for psychological reasons (e.g. revenge). In some cases, the hatred of liberty argument stems from the essentialization of individual cases of terrorist acts being carried out in revenge. In the current context it is important to remember the Confucian recommendation not to judge someone until you have walked a thousand miles in his shoes.

For example, Thomas Mockaitis observes “a profound visceral fear that a group’s entire way of life has come under attack seems to motivate much contemporary terrorism.” Thus it may be worthwhile for Americans in particular to contemplate for a moment exactly how they would feel if they were faced with an occupying military force on their soil. There is a long standing awareness within the global population that the powerful states in the international system maintain a monopoly on sophisticated weapons technology. This monopoly, in turn, places oppressed peoples in the awkward position of suffering at the hands of their more technologically advanced oppressors. This oppression is experienced doubly when those more militarily advanced societies fund authoritarian regimes that then use their newly obtained weapons to maintain control over their populations. Thus, it is more accurate to say that the “new” terrorism is, at the very least, articulated through the language of emancipation and existential threat. Thus, one might want to ask, just how “new” is this “new” terrorism?

Since the US National Security Strategy claims to go beyond the limited focus on the Middle East, the Arab World, and the Muslim community, one should consider the larger history of terrorism inside and outside of these regions. When the last hundred years of terrorism is considered, the range of motivations expands. Germany’s “Red Army Faction”

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for example claimed that it wanted to root out the remnants of Fascism in Germany as well as to fight against what it perceived to be the fascist aspects of capitalism. The United States, during a similar period of history, experienced terrorism at the hands of the “Weather Underground” who saw themselves to be fighting against the injustices of the day including racism, poverty, sexism, and imperialism. Japan suffered several sarin gas attacks at the hands of the Millenialist Aum Shinrikyo (Supreme Truth sect) when their followers released the nerve gas into the Tokyo underground in March of 1995, believing that their actions would bring about a new dawn full of peace and justice. The point is, terrorists choose to use a variety of asymmetric tactics against the state, and groups seen to be able to potentially influence the state, in order to create what they perceive to be a better world.

The framing of terrorism as irrational does more than obscure the very rational motivations for terrorism; it also prevents Americans from understanding that past US actions have real and often violent consequences for them and for those on the receiving end of the blunt force of the American war machine. As Stephen Zunes argues, “though it is easy to portray terrorists as fanatical and irrational, the personal histories of many display an understandable source to their anger, however immoral their subsequent actions may be.” Zunes reveals that in the case of Lebanon, US bombing inside that country in defense of the Fascist Philangists killed numerous civilians. The 1983 US bombing of Beirut

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46 Hoffman, Inside Terrorism 119-27, Lifton, Destroying the World to Save It.


48 Zunes, Tinderbox 186.
murdered family members of one of the future hijackers of the TWA airliner in 1985. And in perhaps the most long lasting case of blowback, Zunes concludes that “this threat from Hizbullah was very much an outgrowth of U.S. and Israeli policy: the group did not even exist until four years after Israel began its occupation of southern Lebanon in 1978.” While individual terrorists may use terrorist violence for revenge (i.e. payback for the murder of a loved one), organizations usually have political goals (ending US/Israeli occupation). One solution to terrorism presents itself: if most terrorist violence has specific political solutions, then the answer to most terrorist violence lays within the framework of negotiation/diplomacy not warfare.

Sadly, the hegemonic ideological forces at work in the “global war on terrorism” obscure this solution to the problem of global terrorism. It is especially true regarding the theorization of the “new” terrorism. Though some variety does exist within the literature on the “new” terrorism, the dominant strain asserts that the “new” terrorism consists almost entirely of Islamic extremists. Further, these studies claim that this new faith driven terrorism, unlike the “old” terrorism, does not contain enough reasonably comprehensible goals to make it eligible for negotiation. Whereas the Irish Republican Army or the Red Brigades had specific political objectives, the new terrorism focuses on a larger but more nebulous battle of good against evil. According to one researcher, “the main threat now is from Islamist terrorists, and is of a completely new order. Their type of terrorism cannot

49 Ibid.


51 The popular incarnation of this literature is represented by: Podhoretz, World War IV.
just be ended by political compromises or limited number of incarcerations.”52 Clearly religious extremists are partially sustained by an averred “higher” force. But this does not mean that the answer to threats from religious extremists is to “round them all up.” As Paul Wilkinson goes on to explain:

we should not overlook the fact that bin Laden’s organization has a definite political agenda. They want to force the United States into withdrawing from Saudi Arabia and the Gulf region generally. They want to overthrow what they regard as collaborationist regimes in the Muslim world, which they accuse of betraying ‘true’ Islam, and they want to unite all Muslims in a pan-Islamic Caliphate that would rule according to the principles of ‘true’ Islam.53

By acknowledging that the terrorist par excellence has a political agenda, it is possible to consider nonviolent means like dialogue, negotiation, and diplomacy in order to defeat terrorism.54 The Gandhian element of nonviolence that focuses on the transformation of the opponent also becomes less farfetched. In spite of American politicians’ effective framing of the “war on terrorism” as a “war” against an identity based on an irrational ideology, the lessons of terrorism studies lead to the unassailable conclusion that brute force is usually not the most effective means of defeating and defending against those who might use the tactic of terrorism.

52 Thornton, Asymmetric Warfare 51.


Brute force is usually not the most effective means of defeating terrorism

As Stephen Zunes aptly states, “high-altitude bombing—even putting the legal and moral arguments aside—is a very blunt and not particularly effective instrument in the fight against terrorism.”55 This appears to be especially true in the case of Iraq where the United States has implemented its “war on terrorism” as a brute force policy. It is estimated that violent civilian deaths in Iraq range rather wildly from 96,813 to over a million since the 2003 US invasion of Iraq.56 The lower number is from the online group iraqbodycount.org which gathers its information from corroborated news sources and thus only records those deaths that are both corroborated and published in the mainstream media. However, even that number is not recognized by the US government—which, according to General Tommy Franks, does not “do body counts.”57 The larger numbers are likely too low because those publishing the survey data aimed for conservative estimates in order to convince their critics. Such a massive death toll does not necessarily produce terrorists. However, the similarity with the US war against Vietnam provides a potential relevant point of comparison. While the United States continued to occupy Vietnam, the Vietnamese used asymmetric tactics that today count as terrorism in Iraq. Yet, once the United States left Vietnam, the Vietnamese did not continue to use such tactics against the US.

On the one hand, the potentially million plus deaths in Iraq since the 2003 invasion has created healthy conditions in which to grow new terrorists. Citing Israeli and Saudi


56 The lowest estimate is from iraqbodycount.org while the higher stems from data gathered both from the *Lancet* as well as British polling data. For a good review of these varying numbers see: <http://www.commondreams.org/news2008/0327-01.htm> (viewed May 7, 2008); Iraq Family Health Survey Study Group, "Violence-Related Mortality in Iraq from 2002 to 2006," *N Engl J Med* 358, no. 5 (2008).

studies, the Editor in Chief of *Al Quds al-Arabi* observes that “the majority of foreign fighters [in Iraq] were not *jihadis* before the Iraq war, but were ‘radicalized by the war itself’.”\(^5^8\) On the other hand, the goal of the insurgency is very clearly to get the US to leave. As has been repeated in the press, the insurgency is not simply limited to a few “dead-enders”, but rather most Iraqis want the US to leave. No amount of aerial bombing is going to change that, and, in fact, it is likely that the more the US uses blunt weapons, the more the Iraqis will want the US to leave (not to mention hold a grudge). The point is that military means are not able to solve the problem of terrorism and in fact serve to create more terrorists. If the United States wants to defeat and defend against future terrorist attacks then it should stop killing innocents and withdraw its forces from foreign soil.

The critical nonviolent solution of withdrawing recognizes the interconnection between the violence perpetrated in the name of military security and the counter-violence perpetrated in the name of resistance to US occupation. If the goal is to defeat terrorism, then any means of accomplishing this goal should be acceptable. Critical nonviolence logic runs afoul of American politicians who successfully reframed the discussion of terrorism apparently by sheer force of repetition of the phrase “war on terror.” In the face of critical nonviolence, the American elite appear to be more irrational than the terrorists who are at least defending their own lands and their own ways of life. In contrast to the reasonableness of the critical nonviolent perspective, the American elite convinced American citizens that it was their way of life, not that of the terrorists, that was threatened.

American political elites combined the views that America’s way of life was threatened, that terrorists are irrational, and the preemptive war doctrine, and by doing so the public was lead to believe that a “war on terror” was best waged through violent means (alone). The list of failed applications of this brute force strategy grows daily. Three obvious cases stand up: Afghanistan, Iraq, and Somalia. The first was seen as the most rational of the three as evidenced by the fact that the international community largely war, even if many viewed it as an expression of rage and vengeance on the part of the recently wounded superpower. The second was nearly universally condemned as illegal, in no small part because it did not have United Nations Security Council approval, not to mention worldwide protests against the potential US-led invasion proved that the world population was opposed. The third, largely ignored, has created yet another training ground for future jihadis while retrenching military rule in Ethiopia.

The policy of brute force is described as a fiasco at worst and a gamble at best. Iraq is now used as a reference point in the way that Vietnam once was. The third war, by proxy, has been referred to as a new Iraq: “by trying to prevent another terrorist haven like Afghanistan from developing, America may have helped create another Iraq, this one in the volatile Horn of Africa.” America’s war by proxy’s stated goal of preventing another Afghanistan was based upon knowledge that the recently created government of Somalia “the Islamic Courts Union” was harboring fewer than a dozen high value Al Qaeda


61 Johnson, "Dilemmas of the Horn."
operatives. Now, with nearly 600,000 refugees and 750,000 internally displaced, it is easy to suspect as was recently reported in *Newsweek* that “Washington was too blinded by its hunt for terrorists to foresee the likely pitfalls in Somalia” when “greenlighting” an Ethiopian invasion of Somalia in 2006.\(^\text{62}\)

In all three cases, negotiation was not tried adequately. In the first case, the Taliban regime was given an ultimatum: give up Osama bin Laden or we will invade. The Taliban replied that they wanted some evidence to back up the claim that bin Laden was responsible. One can also see why the Taliban might want some kind of face saving device like the (at that time) unrecognized International Criminal Court to mediate a solution. There were also reports at the time (now rarely mentioned) of a deal brokered by Pakistani leaders to hand Osama bin Laden over to the Pakistani government. Pervez Musharraf, reportedly under the urging of the US government, killed this deal also. Four weeks after September 11 on October 7 the US began its military campaign against the Taliban.\(^\text{63}\) This example, in particular, shows that even when the United States has a chance to solve a problem through nonviolence it rejects the nonviolent option.

In the case of Iraq, Sadaam was given an ultimatum, disarm or be invaded. When Sadaam disarmed, the United States changed the conditions and demanded regime change and war crimes tribunals. After forcing Sadaam into a no options position, the United States invaded. Such action reinforces the view that the US is more interested in projecting military power than in creating stability in the region or in the world.

\(^{62}\) Ibid.

In the third case, the US pressured Ethiopia to invade. Similarly, negotiation was not seen as a viable option as the Somali government was seen as part of the undifferentiated mass of global terrorists. One member of the ousted Islamic Courts Union recently argued that “it would have been better if the Americans had listened to the Islamic Courts. But the problem is America hears only with one ear.”64 The case of Somalia betrays the lie in much of the rhetoric of recent years.

Though the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review indicates that Washington planners understand that a mixture of tactics/means must be employed in the “long war” against al Qaeda, the strategic logic remains grounded in the preemptive war doctrine. As the US Marines have understood better than most, military options are of limited value when attempting to engage in nation-building. As Patrick Cronin argues, “Effective intervention requires military and civilian resources to address security, governance, and civil society.”65 In contrast, security must be conceived from the perspective of individual lives, not nation-states. As long as security is defined from the referent of the state, the age old debate between order and justice will rage on unabated. If individuals do not feel safe they will be more likely to support those who are most likely to provide them with security. However, alternatives to military force exist. In particular a variety of legal and law enforcement mechanisms may be effective means of defending against and defeating terrorism.

In spite of the supposed newness of terrorism, history may have a lot to offer those looking for genuine and less violent solutions to terrorism. An example from Russia

64 Johnson, "Dilemmas of the Horn," 32.

suggests further nonviolent alternatives to a brute force approach to terrorism. Though the Russians waged a barbarous war against the Chechens for many years which included clearing forests, burning villages, and giving no quarter, they later enacted a policy of “clemency” which Arreguin-Toft reports: “this was a policy the Murids did not expect, and it was one to which they proved powerless to respond.”66 According Arreguin-Toft, the Russian’s nearly 60 year campaign included a variety of tactics all focused on the single goal of conquest. However, the methods used often created the conditions for more resistance. In their use of barbarism, the Russians actually helped to unify a previously fractious region in opposition to Russian imperialism. However, once the Russians began to institute a policy of clemency, the Chechens were persuaded by “magnanimous” Russians in “conquest.”67

Comparisons to the US tactic of buying off insurgents in Afghanistan and Iraq can be made. However, such comparisons might be misleading given that the American policy is meant to arm former opponents and then to pay them to fight and to create security within Iraq. The Russian case also differs in the important way that it was meant to treat former opponents with respect, though not necessarily to arm them to fight along side them. As Arreguin-Toft observes, the philosophy was very different: “unlike all previous strategies, its aim was more to end the war than to win it. Baritinsky [the Russian commander who devised the strategy] was the first commander to treat his enemies as warriors and men instead of bandits and savages. He sought to persuade human beings, rather than destroy


animals. He treated prisoners in accord with European standards, abolished torture and rape, and provided food and clothing to the women and children of his defeated adversaries.\textsuperscript{68} The Russian case is of a conquering army essentially buying off any potential and former resistance fighters. The American invasion of Iraq was conducted under the guise of freeing the Iraqis from an authoritarian dictator and creating a viable Middle Eastern democracy, not conquest. Further, Chechnya has remained throughout history a thorn in the Russian side. Russia’s experience is not an isolated approach to political violence.

The Italian repentance laws exist as an additional example of how legal and law enforcement mechanisms may be effective means of defeating terrorism. In 1979-1980 the Italian state introduced what is commonly referred to as “pentimento.” As described by one researcher, \textit{pentimento} in the Italian legal system “offered a substantial reduction in sentence to anyone charged with crimes of terrorism or subversion who turned state’s evidence.”\textsuperscript{69} By no way a silver bullet against terrorism, and problematic from the standpoint of civil rights, the \textit{pentimento} laws were authored at the same time as draconian laws against political violence. Again, according to David Moss, “the incentive to confess was redoubled by the simultaneous introduction of draconian increases in the penalties for political violence: mandatory arrest, elimination of bail, extension to the maximum permissible duration of pre-trial custody, and harsher sentences.”\textsuperscript{70}

Further, under a broader definition of terrorism, one might also usefully consider a similar policy enacted under President Uribe of Colombia who “persuaded the right-wing

\textsuperscript{68} Arreguín-Toft, \textit{How the Weak Win Wars 64.}

\textsuperscript{69} David Moss, "The Gift of Repentance: A Maussian Perspective on Twenty Years of Pentimento in Italy," \textit{European Journal of Sociology} 42, no. 02 (2002): 300.

\textsuperscript{70} Ibid.: 301.
paramilitaries to give up their weapons. If they gave an account of their crimes, they would be treated more leniently.”71 The paramilitaries that rose up, initially to fight the FARC, in Colombia quickly became as bad, growing coca, killing and kidnapping people. Further, Colombia’s own “war on terror” can in no way be seen as a lighter version of US policy. Under President Uribe and America’s “plan Colombia,” Colombia has waged an often ruthless war against the FARC. The upside of the Colombian version of the repentance laws has in fact overwhelmed the Colombian justice and legal system: “Mario Iguaran, the attorney-general, says that in spite of being voted extra resources from Congress, his investigators are overwhelmed by the numbers. Some 4,000 people are being investigated for crimes against humanity; 800 new murders have come to light as a result of confessions alone.”72 Further, as reported by the Economist, human rights organizations have criticized Colombia’s overall policy, not to mention Plan Colombia. However, one should not be too quick to throw out the baby of increased security with the bathwater of a dirty war on terror. Ultimately, these obviously challenging perspectives are open to critical analysis. These examples of state action that combine violent and nonviolent coercion ought to be considered within the context of critical security studies. As Keith Krause and Michael Williams observe when discussing their critical view of statist security studies, “from a critical perspective, state action is flexible and capable of reorientation, and analyzing state policy


72 Ibid.
need not therefore be tantamount to embracing the statist assumptions of orthodox conceptions.”  

One more example of an alternative strategy must be addressed. According to the 2002 National Security Strategy, “traditional concepts of deterrence will not work against a terrorist enemy.” However, Robert Trager and Dessislava Zagorcheva have persuasively argued that in fact “many terrorists can be deterred from actions that harm targeted states, and deterrence should remain an important weapon in the counterterrorism arsenal.” In their modified version of Glenn Snyder’s now classic discussion of deterrence, they argue that deterrence can work in two different ways: first, deterrence by punishment; and second, deterrence by denial. The first, deterrence by punishment, refers “to the threat of harming something the adversary values if it takes an undesired action.” The second, deterrence by denial, “involves ‘hardening’ targets” and might include new architectural designs for common terrorist targets like embassies and increased security at airports. This approach could be used to increase state terrorism, however, and therefore should be combined with negotiation and diplomacy not more bombing.

Deterrence by punishment obviously holds out the threat of force if terrorists cross a certain line (either a terrorist attack or perhaps something believed to be the precursor to an attack). Though I still include the threat of force as violence, it is further down the

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76 Ibid.: 91.
spectrum. Further, though the emphasis on deterrence by punishment is placed on the threat of force, the potential for no violence should not be underemphasized. The United States’ emphasis upon “preemptive war” and its insistence that deterrence is not an option in the “global war on terrorism,” lowers the threshold over which states must climb in order to use violence. Thus, simply returning deterrence to its place within the toolbox of options may very well go a long way towards reducing violence in global politics. Both versions of deterrence must be combined with strategies of diplomacy and face saving options. Deterrence can be used to enable a stronger power like the US to continue to use violence while deterring others from using violence against it.

Arreguin-Toft’s mantra that ‘brute force” doesn’t win wars against week adversaries is made even clearer in Robert Pape’s surprising study on suicide terrorism. Whereas the US seems to maniacally pursue its interests in spite of the facts, Pape reveals that “nationalism and religious difference between the rebels and a dominant democratic state are the main conditions under which the ‘alien’ occupation of a community’s homeland is likely to lead to a campaign of suicide terrorism.” In the clearest language, he concludes with the following observation based upon his “universe” of suicide terrorist event data:

the longer American combat forces remain in the country, the greater the risk that the Iraqi suicide terrorists will seek to mount operations to kill Americans in the United States.77

For those who believe that the United States fights a war “over there” in order to avoid fighting “over here”, Pape’s conclusions might offer pause. More recently, two law professors have responded to Bush’s “over there” argument by noting in a similar vein as Pape that “Stationing American troops in Baghdad where they can be blown up by suicide

77 Pape, Dying to Win 125.
bombers may have *diverted* some terrorists attacks but can hardly be said to have *prevented* terrorism.”

**SECTION II: LESSONS LEARNED FROM STATE RESPONSES TO TERRORISM**

Imperial states have learned several important lessons relevant for a discussion of nonviolence and terrorism. First, the state’s reliance upon brute force has created the conditions for asymmetric warfare. Second, when states employ similarly indirect approaches as their asymmetric adversaries, the state is usually unable to win the peace. Third, winning hearts and minds may mean relinquishing traditional state monopolies of violence and even taking some violence upon the security forces. Advocates of nonviolence often view the state as a kind of enemy territory where nonviolent ideas are routinely rejected in the name of “reason of state.” However, they may want to take heed of Krause and Williams’ reminder that by ignoring the state “the possibility of influencing what remains the most structurally capable actor in contemporary world politics” is ignored.

States have a wide range of options when responding to terrorist violence. However, since September 11, 2001, it appears that much of the discussion, especially within the United States has focused upon military options. The US lead “global war on terrorism” has employed various tactics. In the language of strategic studies, the US has primarily focused its attention on direct attacks against terrorist capacity to fight. However, as Ivan Arreguin-

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79 From the nonviolence angle, it should be noted that “asymmetric” includes nonviolence as well violence. See: Jonathan Schell, *The Unconquerable World: Power, Nonviolence, and the Will of the People* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2003).

Toft has convincingly argued, when strong actors fight weak actors they must employ similar strategies in order to win. Terrorists by definition focus their attacks indirectly in an attempt to destroy their adversary’s will to fight. Arreguin-Toft refers to his theory as “strategic interaction”. This theory posits that opposite strategic interactions tend to favor weak actors while same-approach interactions favor strong actors.

Asymmetric Warfare

In spite of the considerable and growing literature on the subject of asymmetric warfare, it appears that Arreguin-Toft’s observations have done little to repeal the traditional hubris of a great power like the United States. As Thornton reminds his readers, “the West is in many ways the architect of the asymmetric threats it now faces….One of the problems for the strong powers throughout history has been their hubristic belief that power is a strength and can never be turned into a vulnerability.” The problem is of course that in conflict the weaker party is forced to innovate and good strategists will find ways of turning strengths into vulnerabilities. One might reinterpret former President George Bush’s comments following the September 11 attacks. It’s not that the terrorists “hate our freedoms” rather it’s that the terrorists have figured out a way to turn freedom into vulnerability. The challenge is to avoid succumbing to the desire for absolute security by means of relinquishing our freedom.

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81 Arreguín-Toft, *How the Weak Win Wars* see especially chapter two.

82 The classical cases of state barbarism are the US in the Philippines, the French in Algiers, and the US’s operation Phoenix in Vietnam.

Nonviolence and Asymmetric Warfare

Asymmetric warfare is defined by Thornton as “violent action undertaken by the ‘have-nots’ against the ‘haves’ whereby the have-nots, be they state or sub-state actors, seek to generate profound effects— at all levels of warfare (however defined), from the tactical to the strategic—by employing their own specific relative advantages against the vulnerabilities of much stronger opponents.” Not surprisingly, Thornton’s definition therefore excludes nonviolence from the list. If nonviolence were to be considered along with asymmetric warfare, then it might justify the use of force against nonviolent resistance movements. This could be a setback for advocates of “strategic” nonviolence. However, strategic nonviolence gets its biggest boost from the discipline of strategic studies. After defining asymmetric warfare Thornton, clarifies his study by noting that asymmetric warfare really means that “the weak will use methods that lie outside the ‘norms’ of warfare, methods that are radically different.” Additionally: “a true asymmetric conflict is where the means used are quite different.” It’s difficult to imagine a more “radically different” approach to conflict than Gandhi’s satyagraha campaigns against the British. This is exactly the new held by a number of proponents of strategic nonviolence.

The Vietnam War is representative of asymmetric wars where a strong power is able to win militarily but looses politically. In Arreguin-Toft’s language, the US used a strategy of “barbarism” against the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam’s (NLF) same-

84 Ibid. 1.
85 Ibid. 2.
86 Ibid. 4.
approach strategy of Guerrilla warfare (here specifically Operation Phoenix). The US won the war but lost the peace. Thornton makes a similar point, “the US ‘defeat’ came about not so much through battlefield reverses as through the way that domestic pressure came to be applied on US politicians to bring their troops home.”

In other words, the north Vietnamese and their South Vietnamese allies appealed to the American public’s sense of injustice and propriety in war. Oddly then, both nonviolentists and asymmetric adversaries employ the tactic of appealing to audiences above and beyond their immediate adversary. Both tend to have global or at least international audiences in mind. Significantly, this tactic does not require the use of violence. Advocates of violent resistance to oppression will quickly point out that those who employ violence apparently receive more attention in the media and the academy.

State responses to terrorism include the entire spectrum of tactics and strategies. Some scholars argue that power-sharing or regional autonomy is often an effective response. However, since both of these tactics decrease the power of the state or a dominant political party, these approaches tend to require a significant amount of pressure

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91 The encounter in the movie *The Battle for Algiers* where the leader of the FLN explains why they must switch from a campaign of bombing to one of general strike captures this nicely.

from the international community, insurgents, or the mass of the population. One could hardly imagine Russia granting regional autonomy to Chechnya for example without significant pressure. Similarly, the Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK) has indicated that it wants something more like Iraqi Kurdistan in order to be appeased. Turkey showed, by its invasion of Northern Iraq, that it is loath to grant any power to the Kurds.\(^\text{93}\) These examples do indicate that state perception is also an important factor to consider.

\textit{COIN}

As chapter three’s discussion of 21\textsuperscript{st} century security indicated, states have responded to the US global war on terror by adopting the language to fit their own needs. Thus, instead of recognizing that there are unhappy and oppressed peoples living in their borders, the states mentioned have decided simply to treat them as terrorists and use the US security agenda as justification for violence. In fact, Russia has done a better job of it than the US. In Chechnya, the Russians crushed the resistance and installed a puppet. Chechnya fits the strategy of the US GWOT better than Iraq or Afghanistan. Practically speaking, the Russians seem to be more equipped to establish control and dominance on unruly masses. This, in turn, begs the question of what exactly is the United States doing in Iraq? A new policy of counterinsurgency, based upon lessons learned from Vietnam and other cases, is evolving within the US military establishment. Given the ongoing evolution of this policy, it is conceivable that counterinsurgency (COIN) might have an effect on the evolution of other state responses to conflict around the world. However, as of this writing, there is growing sentiment that “nobody is winning” in Afghanistan, thus putting further in question

\[^{93}\text{“Turkey Invades Northern Iraq,” Economist (February 28, 2008).}\]
the COIN strategy being implemented initially by General McChrystal\textsuperscript{94} and now by General Patraeus.\textsuperscript{95}

The disconnection between stated purposes and actual practice regarding anti-terrorism could be seen in Iraq, when the US attempted to force the Iraqis to sign a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) that would have, among other things, provided amnesty for security contractors and allowed US military presence in Iraq indefinitely. Ultimately, the Iraqis withstood the overtly imperial US policy, signing the least humiliating of US SOFAs in history on November 17, 2008.\textsuperscript{96} Nonetheless, one ought to be cautious of news reports that claim any kind of peace in Iraq as long as US military presence remains.\textsuperscript{97} The August 2010 withdrawal of US forces from Iraq was heralded as Obama keeping his promise to end the war in Iraq even though there remains 50,000 troops and an equally large number of mercenaries in Iraq.

In spite of the May 27, 2010 publication of Obama’s \textit{National Security Strategy}, the United States is still groping for a strategy to fight terrorism and has only barely begun to consider the implications of Pape’s and others criticisms. For example, shortly after he was appointed to the head position in Afghanistan, General McChrystal was quoted as saying:

One of the things we will do is review all of our rules of engagement and all the instructions to our units, with the emphasis that we are fighting for the population

\textsuperscript{94} Patrick Cockburn, "'Nobody Is Winning' Admits McChrystal," \textit{Independent (UK)}, May 16 2010.


and that involves protecting them both from the enemy and from unintended consequences of our operation.  

However, as the next section shows, saying it and making it so are two different things. Making matters worse, there is little indication that better standard operating procedures will change the outcome. The increased use of unmanned aerial vehicles or “drones” has drastically increased the number of civilian casualties.  

The unrestrained application of brute force rarely wins wars and can never win the peace  

Though invasions and occupations may win wars, a purely brute force strategy may lose the peace. The two cases of invasion and occupation that have recently been tried by the United States in its “Global War on Terror” (GWOT) have not succeeded in defeating terrorism. Over six years after the Iraq invasion, Iraq and Afghanistan still serve as the major global recruiting mechanisms of terrorism. As Arreguin-Toft demonstrates, “increasingly, barbarism appears to be stimulating military resistance rather than deterring it.”  

On May 23, 2010, American born Yemeni-American Anwar Al-Awlaki released a video calling for and justifying killing US citizens. His argument? Americans have killed over 1 million Iraqis: “American civilians are to blame, he said, because "the American people, in general, are taking part in this and they elected this administration and they are financing the war.”

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100 Arreguin-Toft, How the Weak Win Wars 222.

These supposedly counter-terrorism operations have not deterred terrorist action nor have they deligitmated the use of terrorism as an anti-imperial tactic. In spite of the well intentioned comments he made during his Cairo speech that resistance through violence does not succeed, terrorism is having a greater impact than other forms of resistance. Peter Gelderloos argues that the violent opposition to the US occupation of Iraq has done more to change US policy in Iraq than the millions of protesters in the United States and around the world: “what nonviolent anti-war activists are unable to realize is that the most important resistance, probably the only significant resistance, to the occupation of Iraq is the resistance being waged by the Iraqi people themselves. On the whole, the Iraqis have chosen armed struggle.”

Gelderloos fails to mention that in the case of Iraq there are both violent forms of resistance and nonviolent forms of resistance at work. Iraqis of all stripes are aided by nonviolent resistance both inside and outside of Iraq. It is easy to agree, for example, with Gelderloos insofar as Muktada al Sadr’s Mahti Army encouraged cautious behavior and some concessions from the Americans (for example, greater freedom regarding who could run in upcoming elections). However, it is also fair to say that the democratic state of Iraq also plays a role when, for example, it refuses to sign an agreement with the US that would effectively validate a long term US military presence in Iraq and prevent private armies from being subject to Iraqi law.

Winning the peace will require more restraint on the part of the world’s sole superpower. This is not just an appeal to conscience. The American elite have

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102 Pape, *Dying to Win*.


much to lose if their current policy of brute force continues to produce new recruits for bin Laden’s war against crusaders.\textsuperscript{105}

**Counterinsurgency succeeds**

If barbarism is employed to achieve military victory, any peace that follows will be fragile and costly at best.~ Ivan Arreguin-Toft\textsuperscript{106}

The strategic principles of counterinsurgency warfare are as follows:

- Political and/or economic reform to “win the hearts and minds” of people;
- closer cooperation between the civil government, the police, and the military;
- the selective use of force to attack the insurgents without causing unnecessary casualties and alienating people in the process;
- decentralization of command and control of operations allowing police, military, and civilians considerable latitude in combating insurgents within their local area of authority.\textsuperscript{107}

It is possible to tease out of this summary a reading of counterinsurgency strategy that is, at least potentially, theoretically less violent than traditional military strategy (either strategies of attrition or overwhelming force). However, counterinsurgency does continue to militarize societies. A number of recent cases indicate that counterinsurgency is a false hope for those wanting to reduce the overall amount of violence in the world and/or create a more stable and peaceful world order. For example, the recent creation of Africa Command worries a number of people about the possibility of not only an increased US military presence in


\textsuperscript{106} Arreguin-Toft, *How the Weak Win Wars* 213.

\textsuperscript{107} Mockaitis, *The "New" Terrorism: Myths and Reality* 113.
Africa, but of the arming and training of more African countries.\textsuperscript{108} As usual, it is difficult to parse the rhetoric of antiterrorism and the reality of the US lead war on terrorism. When reading the web site of the newly created US Africa Command (AFRICOM), one must be impressed by the apparent idealism and recognition of criticisms of a pure military strategy. Under the heading “A Different kind of Command”, one learns that “The designers of U.S. Africa Command clearly understood the relationships between security, development, diplomacy and prosperity in Africa.”\textsuperscript{109} However, it troubles those, like Ken Booth or K. M. Fierke, who see the potential militarization of aid organizations not to mention previously purely aid focused wings of government like USAID. These scholars point to the irony of militarizing traditionally nonviolent institutions when “most critical scholars probably come to the study of security with a desire to improve the lot of those who suffer from military violence.”\textsuperscript{110} The merging of development aid with counterterrorism in Africom is merely the tip of the iceberg.

The US has also been training the Pakistani military in counterinsurgency strategy for the past several years. As the \textit{New York Times} reports, a new effort is underway to increase the level of training to potentially include a time when US soldiers might accompany Pakistanis on patrols or other actions:

\begin{quote}
Pakistan has ruled out allowing American combat troops to fight Qaeda and Taliban militants in the tribal areas. But Pakistani leaders have privately indicated that they would welcome additional American trainers to help teach new skills to Pakistani
\end{quote}

\begin{footnotes}
\textsuperscript{108} This policy does have the benefit of teaching counterinsurgency strategy to state militaries accustomed to fighting traditional wars. However, it is questionable whether the presence of US military truly does the salutary affect that someone like Robert Kaplan asserts. See, Robert D. Kaplan, \textit{Imperial Grunts} (New York: Random House, 2005), Robert D. Kaplan, "Supremacy by Stealth," \textit{Atlantic Monthly} July/August (2003).


\end{footnotes}
soldiers whose army was tailored not for counterinsurgency but to fight a conventional land war against India.  

Robert Kaplan argues in his article “Supremacy by Stealth” that US military training establishments that focus on training foreign military officers, for example the previously named “School of the Americas”, actually serve the interests not just of states but of advocates of human rights because these officers are exposed to pragmatic benefits of protecting human rights. As he writes, “The protestors who perennially chain themselves to the gates of Fort Benning, calling its previously named School of the Americas the "School of Torturers," are implicitly championing the worst possible strategy if they want Latin armies to take human rights seriously—a strategy of isolation, which cuts foreign officers off from American society and values.” The record indicates that Kaplan overstates the value of a US military commander's telephone call to a foreign military commander and understates the disastrous effects of US trained foreign militaries.

Strategic studies focuses attention on the strategy of the opponent and attempts to create a counter strategy that will defeat that strategy. It also focuses on the weaknesses and sources of strength. Ideally, a good strategy is one that formulates a plan of attack that will knock out the opponent’s source of strength. It is conceivable that this can be done without ever firing a shot.


112 Kaplan, "Supremacy by Stealth," 76.

When discussing counter insurgency strategy it should be made clear that most military historians recognize that the longer a conflict lasts the more likely that the weaker party will win. As Arreguín-Toft repeats mantra-like, “In asymmetric conflicts, delay favors the weak.”\textsuperscript{114} Counter insurgency strategies also take into consideration the fact that all indirect forms of defense (terrorism, Guerrilla warfare strategies, and even nonviolent resistance) “typically rely on forces difficult to distinguish from noncombatants when not in actual combat. As a result, an attacker’s forces tend to kill or injure noncombatants during operations, which tends to stimulate weak actor resistance.”\textsuperscript{115}

**Handshakes and Hand grenades: Winning hearts and minds**

Restraint in military operations against weaker opponents is necessary not because of military concerns but for political concerns. Put differently, it does not matter (even from a military perspective) if the war is won if the peace is lost. Arreguín-Toft notes that “in the post-World War II period barbarism was a sound strategy for winning a small war yet losing the subsequent peace.”\textsuperscript{116} The United States Marines’ new field manual recognizes this from a purely strategic perspective. Strategic planners may focus on restraint if they are encouraged to first approach a (potential or oncoming) conflict from the perspective of long-term goals that transcend the immediacy of the war. As Arreguín-Toft states,

\textsuperscript{114} Arreguín-Toft, *How the Weak Win Wars* 39.

\textsuperscript{115} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{116} Ibid. 17, italics in original.
“Democratic states facing insurgencies have another option besides escalating brutality
(barbarism) – an option which historically has been both successful and rare: conciliation.”117

Thornton, though a supporter of a strong military and as someone who sees a lasting
role for militaries in the future, emphasizes that in the struggle for men’s minds, “the ‘enemy’
is not best defeated by technological solutions or by the use of overwhelming firepower.
Rather, they are defeated by political and socio-economic tools backed by focused security
measures.”118 Essentially summarizing the conclusions of a generation of USMC leaders,
Thornton observes that “in insurgency warfare, whichever protagonist gains the support of
the people is the one who will emerge victorious.” This recognition provides a striking
opportunity for military strategists to alter their perception of “victory.” As several accounts
indicate, traditional thinking within the military is premised upon “second generation
warfare.” This is highly linear combat which focuses on how “the increasing wealth of
nations and the ability to engage in mass production enabled large, well-equipped armies to
be deployed in the field and to be supported by copious amounts of supporting
ordnance.”119

The cutting edge thinking, especially within the USMC, focuses on what has been
dubbed “fourth generation warfare,” which suggests that because the military’s supremacy in
the realms of brute force and communications, the new enemies will be asymmetric, low-
tech, and highly maneuverable. Thus, the reasoning goes, fourth generation opponents
would “bypass the military might of the US and go for its soft underbelly.” So far, the

117 Ibid. 17.
119 Ibid. 154.
conversation remains within the traditional violent end of the force spectrum. However, the strategic logic of the opponent now emphasizes “the American will to fight would be undermined by the use of complexly non-linear tactics designed to produce a ‘collapse’ of some sort from within. Thus, whereas the first three generations of warfare were targeted purely at military forces, 4GW looks to target both fielded forces and home populations, with the general aim of creating the most effects in the civilian rear.” The current strategy of using drones to bomb alleged Taliban, al Qaeda, and other terrorists and insurgents produces as unlikely a situation for winning hearts and minds as one can imagine.

In speeches and policy documents, the Obama administration has learned some significant lessons from past administrations’ responses to terrorism. The Obama administration has refrained from uttering the phrase “war on terrorism” and its recent publication of the National Security Strategy explicitly states that it is not fighting a war on terrorism.

In sum, the unrestrained use of force almost never succeeds in counter-insurgency warfare (COIN) and it never wins the peace. Nonviolent means, even strategic ones, will more likely offer up the rewards that the US elites desire: uninterrupted flows of trade and distribution of resources. Winning hearts and minds is impossible when bombing from above. The masses of civilian casualties that the ongoing war/campaign produces will only lead to the production of more terrorists and/or insurgents.

SECTION III: LESSONS LEARNED FROM NONVIOLENCE STUDIES

Any government’s condemnation of terrorism is only credible if it shows itself to be responsive to persistent, reasonable, closely argued, nonviolent dissent. And yet,

120 Ibid. 155-56.
what’s happening is just the opposite. The world over, nonviolent resistance movements are being crushed and broken. If we do not respect and honor them, by default we privilege those who turn to violent means. ~ Arundhati Roy

The lessons learned from nonviolence studies may seem surprising and even contradictory. First, some force may actually be necessary. Second, power is understood as collective action. Third, strategic nonviolence, while ethically vacant, is an effective means of achieving political ends. Subscribing to the view that less violence is an absolute good, this section concludes that each generation works towards the larger, collective project of making the world more peaceful. It does this by combining the insights gained from the regulative ideal of reason and a progressive view of history.

_Some force may be necessary_

Gandhi and King both argued that some force might either be preferable to available alternatives or necessary in various ways. Gandhi’s philosophy and practice of nonviolence is premised first and foremost on resistance to evil (e.g. oppression, injustice). In spite of Gandhi’s theoretical sophistication, he was not as puritanical about nonviolence as he was insistent upon courage. Gandhi’s ultimate goal or _telos_ was Truth and Nonviolence.

However, the following response from Gandhi to his son gets Gandhi’s priorities clear:

"It would be a sign of cowardice if you ran away or did nothing to protect me. If you could not protect me by taking the anger upon yourself, you should undoubtedly do so by attacking the other man. It is any day better to use brute force than to betray cowardice."

Here Gandhi is replying to his son when asked about his obligation to protect his father from an attacker. In so doing, Gandhi also reveals two definitions of cowardice. The worst

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122 Gandhi and Dalton, _Mahatma Gandhi: Selected Political Writings_ 70-71.
form of cowardice is *if you ran away or did nothing*. To run away from an evil or do nothing to stop it is thus understood as the ultimate form of cowardice. The second definition is understood in relationship to the first. He says that brute force is *better* than running away or inaction. Two words help to bring Gandhi’s description of cowardice to light: *better* and *betray*. The word *better* establishes a gradation of cowardice, that one form of cowardice is *better* than another form. The second definition is revealed by the word *betray*. The word itself literally means “to reveal unconsciously (something one would preferably conceal).” Thus, when Gandhi says that *it is any day better to use brute force than to betray cowardice* he is essentially saying that violence (one form of cowardice) is any day better than running away or not acting (the worst form of cowardice). By extension, if cowardice is a sin, then courage is a good. Understanding this aspect of Gandhi’s philosophy further reveals the *telos* of his action: one must fight evil even if it means using violence. If he establishes that running away or inaction is the worst thing a person can do, then what becomes permissible? The answer to this question is “quite a lot.”

Similarly, the Reverend Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. was once asked whether he could consistently be for nonviolence and simultaneously support the US government’s use of National Guard troops to enforce integration of Little Rock schools in the Brown vs. Board of Education Supreme Court case. King replied eloquently that he could. In an interview on NBC’s television program “Look Here,” King reconciled his philosophy of nonviolence with his stance in favor of the use of force to integrate the Little Rock schools. King responded by stating:

*I believe firmly in nonviolence….But at the same time, I am not an anarchist. Now, some pacifists are anarchists, following Tolstoy. But I don’t go that far. I believe in the intelligent use of police force. I think one who believes in nonviolence must recognize the dimensions of evil within human nature, and there is the danger that*
one can indulge in a sort of superficial optimism, thinking man is all good. Man does not only have the greater capacity for goodness, but there is also the potential for evil. And I think of that throughout my whole philosophy, and I try to be realistic at that point. *So that I believe in the intelligent use of police force.* And I think that is all we have in Little Rock. It’s not an army fighting against a nation, or a race of people. *It is just police force, seeking to enforce the law of the land.*

In order to make sense of these seemingly contradictory positions, it is important to remember that most practitioners of nonviolence see violence and nonviolence as two points on ends of a spectrum. Thus, movement in the direction of nonviolence and away from violence represents progress. Purists will of course disagree. The end does not justify the means in any situation. Further, as Gandhi elegantly stated, the means are the seeds that grow into the end. When force is used in the means, then force will be present in the end.

In the context of the United States today, one sees the lingering presence of this violence. Integration has not been achieved in the manner articulated by King, though interracial marriages and births are on the rise. However, the argument being made here remains consistent: less violent means will create a less violent world.

David Cortright also agrees with the “intelligent use of police force” and claims that “most peace advocates accept the use of police force, provided it is constrained, narrowly targeted against known criminals, and conducted within the rule of law.” Cortright goes on to state that “these approaches [policing as opposed to war] stretch but do not contradict the core philosophy of nonviolence, which seeks to preserve peace but also uphold

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123 *PMLK*: vol 4, 293, 278, 279, and 284 for King’s exchange with President Eisenhower and King’s call for nonviolence in Little Rock. Emphasis added.


justice.” Here it may be useful to consider Gandhi’s pronouncement that it is any day better to stand up against violence than to let injustice stand unopposed. If one uses the regulative ideal of reason in this case, then it is also possible to consider that King and Gandhi are describing regulative nonviolence. In contrast to Chief Pritchett’s use of the police to maintain segregation, King is endorsing the use of National Guard troops to enforce desegregation. In this case, there is a big difference between the two uses of the police.

**Power is conceived as collective action**

According to Hannah Arendt, power is defined as collective action: “*Power* corresponds to the human ability not just to act but to act in concert. Power is never the property of an individual; it belongs to a group and remains in existence only so long as the group keeps together.” People acting in-concert, not violence, creates power.

Nonviolence stems from this basic premise. For example, Gandhi uses a Sanskrit word, “*ahimsa*” which translates into English as “non-harming.” However, as Bondurant notes, *abimsa* more specifically entails “action based on the refusal to do harm.” While recognizing that power is other than violence, Gandhi thought that a single person might be able to wield tremendous power. He could conceive this because for Gandhi, power comes from self-suffering. Simply put, “nonviolence in its dynamic condition means conscious

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126 Ibid. 213.

127 Dalton, 70.


suffering.” Of course this does not mean “meek submission to the will of the evil-doer, but it means the pitting of one’s whole soul against the will of the tyrant.” Nonetheless, Gandhi mostly works within the context of nonviolent power defined in terms of collective action.

Kurt Schock makes a similar point about the collective nature of nonviolence versus the vanguard style of terrorist tactics. Specifically: “in fact a major difference between a ‘people’s war’ and a ‘people power,’ on the one hand, and terrorism, on the other, is that the former depend on mass collective action and support, while the latter does not.” In addition, the recent wave of democratic transitions are notable for the use of “people power,” defined similarly in terms of people coming to together in groups to resist. Arendt offers this striking contrast between power and violence: “politically speaking, it is insufficient to say that power and violence are not the same. Power and violence are opposites; where the one rules absolutely, the other is absent. Violence appears where power is in jeopardy, but left to its own course it ends in power’s disappearance.”

Understanding the concept of power as collective action helps policy makers to see that overwhelming force does not work from a theoretical level. In terms of defeating terrorism, then it makes sense to cultivate the power of the people.

**Strategic nonviolence is an effective means**

According to Gandhi there is a line between what he referred to as nonviolence of the weak and nonviolence of the brave. Gandhi argued, for example, that “Passive resistance may be offered side by side with the use of arms. Satyagraha and brute force,

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being each a negation of the other, can never go together.”\textsuperscript{132} In essence, Gandhi argued against “strategic nonviolence”. He believed that the more pure one's nonviolence was, the more powerful it was. Further, Gandhi believed that nonviolence was more pure when, as Bondurant explains, “those who practice it were in a position, as they often were, to use violence effectively but refrained from doing so and invited suffering upon themselves.” For Gandhi, it was not enough for someone to use the tactics of nonviolence, especially when they used those tactics because they did not have access to any other tactics: “nonviolence cannot be taught to a person who fears to die and has no power of resistance.”\textsuperscript{133} However, this stringent version of nonviolence of the brave poses a problem for those who, also following Gandhi, argue that nonviolence is a democratic means. One need not be a trained soldier to participate in anti-oppression campaigns, for example.

Gandhi’s strict version of nonviolence remains a useful concept. However, Gandhi’s version of nonviolence is just that, Gandhi’s version. It should be noted that Gandhi himself recognized a certain kind of evolution within the practice of nonviolence. Responding to a question regarding his personal evolution, Gandhi replied: “people say that I have changed my view, that I say today something different from what I said years ago. The fact of the matter is that conditions have changed. I am the same….There has been a gradual evolution in my environment and I react to it as a Satyagrahi.”\textsuperscript{134} It is important to understand Gandhi’s nonviolence in order to better understand how nonviolence works and does not work; the argument presented in this dissertation does not strictly conform to

\textsuperscript{132} Gandhi as quoted in Bondurant, \textit{Conquest of Violence} 28.

\textsuperscript{133} Gandhi as quoted in Ibid.

\textsuperscript{134} Gandhi as quoted in Ibid. 34-35.
Gandhian principles. As Joan Bondurant notes, “not every movement is *ipso facto* satyagraha merely because it avoids physically violent resistance.”

Logical consistency should not necessarily determine tactics but it may be useful to consider goals, strategies, and tactics more carefully. The goal of US foreign policy is to defeat and defend against terrorism; or, at the very least, to reduce the instances of terrorism. Advocates of strategic nonviolence argue that the best pathway or strategy for achieving this goal is nonviolence. Even in places like Iraq and Palestine it is possible to see nonviolent movements working to win independence through nonviolent means. Most recently, nonviolent struggles have been waged against the Israeli “security fence” with significant success. Further, in Iraq, a town in southern Iraq recently won a small, symbolic victory against the importation of toy guns. The Arabic word for nonviolence is “la onf” and has recently served as an organizing tool for Iraqis who both want independence from US occupation and to live in a less violent world. According to Robert Pape’s research, the best way for the United States to end terrorism in Iraq would be for the United States to leave Iraq. One also imagines that working with or even tolerating groups like La Onf might go a long way towards reducing the amount of terrorist violence in Iraq. More importantly, it would not be imposed from the outside by an imperial power.

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135 Gandhi as quoted in Ibid. 45.


137 It should be noted that La Onf is primarily concerned with what is likely perceived by Iraqis as violence from Americans, predominantly the mistaken shooting of children by American soldiers. Thus, Robert Pape’s argument is doubly important to note because
Conclusion: Defeating Terrorism with Nonviolence

When the former president Bush made his “mission accomplished” speech, he referred to the war in Iraq as a chapter in the war on terror. Though this analytically squishy usage is problematic, it points scholarship in a particular direction. If scholars are to understand the current political situation in the context of the 21st century global security agenda, then they must understand what politicians and other policy officials mean when they speak and write about terrorism. The problem of the politicization of terms may lead to a context wherein it is difficult to contest terms.

The recent 2010 NSS may prove to “desecuritize” elements of the war on terror. Specifically, the rhetoric has changed. As the epigraph to Pillar I notes, the 2010 NSS carefully states that the US is not waging a war against a tactic and it does not equate terrorist with Muslim. However, there is still considerable contradiction between this stated view and the empirical implementation of policy.

When the United States employs the word “terrorism” it refers to violent acts like the September 11 attacks as well as attacks against Americans and their allies in Iraq and Afghanistan that ranges from IEDs, suicide terrorism, and sniper fire directed against the United States. However, it also refers to one off events like 9/11, the London Underground, and the Madrid and Bali bombings. Each type of violence mentioned is also a specific type of means. The Bush administration made clear that Americans should consider anyone who uses such tactics “terrorists.” If the public buys into this particular line of reasoning, then it becomes easier to be convinced that each event is somehow related and

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connected, similar to the manner in which the Cold War pitted Communism against Democracy. Monolithic terrorism replaces monolithic communism in the public psyche. This incongruous speech pattern serves the political purpose of rallying the masses to support government military expenditures and actions. It also confuses the public.¹³⁹

The geographical dimensions of the 21st century global security agenda’s focus on antiterrorism was made clear in chapter three while this chapter has shown that purely violent tactics and strategies do not always succeed. More importantly, it has shown that nonviolent and strategic nonviolent tactics and strategies can succeed in ways that the “preemptive war doctrine” have and will continue to fail. The wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Somalia (as well as aggression against Pakistan, Yemen, and the greater Middle East), show that brute force means fail when strategy fails to consider nonviolent means. Though the task of changing national policy regarding the use of force to achieve political ends remains daunting, “One generation must seek to establish progressive principles and benign conditions for the next, with the hope that if we look after the processes, the structures will look after themselves.”¹⁴⁰ Ken Booth’s conception of the “process utopian” elegantly fits together with the nonviolent approach. It is future oriented and thus rejects the economistic emphasis upon short term thinking associated with much state centric politics. Further, it takes into consideration the realist demand to take seriously the way things are (as well as the way things ought to be).


¹⁴⁰ Booth, Theory of World Security 252.
As Thomas Mockaitis argues, we need a strategy for defeating terrorism that is based on “rational planning derived from understanding, not from paranoia.” States must respond to terrorism and terrorist threats. It is, after all, the purpose of the state to protect its citizens from harm. One of the many important lessons drawn from Gandhi and his heirs is that dialogue and negotiation are fundamental to “winning” in any truly meaningful sense. If states are to protect their citizens, then they must employ the most effective tools. If nonviolence works, then states should try to employ it.

Mockaitis, *The “New” Terrorism: Myths and Reality* 49.
CHAPTER FIVE:
Democracy Promotion and Imperial Nonviolence

“Pillar II” specifically addresses the democracy promotion pillar of the 21st century global security agenda introduced especially in chapter three. The democracy promotion pillar is inextricably tied to a set of academic literature known collectively as the “democratic peace theory.” As chapter three argued, the 2006 *National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (*NSSUSA* 2006) serves as the foundational text for the new global security agenda. Explicitly connecting democracy and security, it asserts that “because free nations tend toward peace, the advance of liberty will make America more secure.”¹ Scholarly research on the “democratic peace theory”² apparently backs up this statement. This theory, which states that democratic states do not go to war with other democratic states, buttresses the correlation made at least by the past four American presidents: if democratic states do not go to war with other democratic states, then a world of democratic states will be a peaceful world. By extension, if we *make* the world democratic or at least fill it with democratic states, then the US will be secure. The current American global security agenda is thus an agenda that *requires* a considerable amount of conflict.

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² There are a number of articles and books on the subject. The following is a good place to start: Brown, Lynn-Jones, and Miller, eds., *Debating the Democratic Peace.*
DEMOCRATIZATION

Combined with the strategy of preventive war, democracy promotion hardly seems peaceful. Further, as a component of US foreign policy, the threshold over which the US must climb in order to use violence has lowered: “to forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively in exercising our inherent right of self-defense.”\(^3\) Since the inauguration of President Barak Obama on January 20, 2009, there has been a significant decline in the rhetoric of democracy promotion. Alan Gilbert has recently gone so far as to refer to Obama as a Brent Scowcroft republican when it comes to foreign policy.\(^4\) But, while the rhetoric has changed slightly, it is not clear that the substance has changed with it.

The four sections that comprise chapter five explore the democracy promotion pillar of the global security agenda in the context of past and present US foreign policy and this dissertation’s core concept: critical nonviolence. Section one will set the stage for a series of questions to be answered in subsequent chapters. It specifically critiques the democratic peace theory in the context of US foreign policy. It argues that in its current application the democratic peace is neither democratic nor peaceful. Section two asks whether a policy of democracy promotion will truly promote global security. Section three asks whether the strategy of preventive war is an effective means of promoting democracy. Section four asks will nonviolence more effectively promote democracy. Finally, section five concludes the discussion of Pillar II.


SECTION I: POLYARCHY, POPULAR NONVIOLENCE, AND DEMOCRATIC PEACE

The popularity of small aggressive wars (Panama, Grenada, Afghanistan, and Iraq) ominously signaled the emptying of democracy. Such wars, with their nostalgic evocations of patriotism and unity, were embraced as fleeting reminders of a common political identity. ~Sheldon Wolin

Several terms will facilitate the critique of the “democracy promotion pillar” in this chapter. These terms are polyarchy, elite democracy, popular democracy, elite nonviolence, popular nonviolence, and the democratic peace theory. Additionally, this section begins the larger critique of the democratic peace theory and its use in US foreign policy, woven through the remaining sections. This section concludes that the practical application of the theory of democratic peace is neither democratic nor peaceful.

Polyarchy

The social theorist William Robinson writes that “Polyarchy as a distinct form of elite rule performs the function of legitimating existing inequalities, and does so more effectively than authoritarianism.” For Robinson, polyarchy is distinct from democracy because its function is to limit not expand the power of the people. He rejects the standard reading of polyarchy in the social sciences as a description of how democracy is actually practiced in real life, especially in the United States. This section contrasts the dominant social science definition of the term “polyarchy” as the form of government practiced by the United States with the definition offered by William Robinson. By comparison, Robinson defines polyarchy as elite rule. Assuming that he is correct, the United States’ foreign policy

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6 Robinson, Promoting Polyarchy 51.
of “democracy promotion” is really the promotion elite rule. Significantly, scholars of the
democratic peace theory are in fact observing the result a highly controlled foreign policy,
not some observable pattern of predictable behavior commonly summarized as ‘democratic
states do not go to war with other democratic states.’

According to Robert Dahl, polyarchy and democracy are practically synonymous.\(^8\) Dahl believed that democracy was an ideal type, whereas polyarchy described actually
existing societies with the highest level of political inclusiveness and political contestation.\(^9\)
However, the term has a normative component and is better understood in terms of its
emphasis upon democratic institutions, specifically elections and the various branches of
government. Joseph Schumpeter writes: “democracy means only that the people have the
opportunity of accepting or refusing the men who are to rule them.”\(^10\) Further,
“democracy has a useful meaning only when it is defined in institutional terms. The key
institution of democracy is the selection of leaders through competitive elections.”\(^11\) In other
words, democracy is defined as the form of government practiced in the United States. The
United States governmental system is composed of procedures and institutions--voting and
Congress. In the words of Joseph Schumpeter: democracy is made up of “institutional
arrangements for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to

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\(^7\) Brown, Lynn-Jones, and Miller, eds., *Debating the Democratic Peace*.

Alan Dahl, *A Preface to Democratic Theory*, Charles R. Walgreen Foundation Lectures ([Chicago]: University of


\(^10\) Joseph Alois Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy*, 2d ed. (New York, London,: Harper & brothers,

decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote.”\textsuperscript{12} Similarly, Benjamin Barber writes that, “\textit{pluralist democracy resolves public conflict in the absence of an independent ground through bargaining and exchange among free and equal individuals and groups, which pursue their private interests in a market setting governed by the social contract.\textsuperscript{13}}” In the United States, pluralist democracy is polyarchy in practice.

In the context of the United States’ democracy pillar and what this dissertation names the 21\textsuperscript{st} century global security agenda, the promotion of polyarchy as democracy is especially troubling. Noam Chomsky writes that “controlling the general population has always been a dominant concern of power and privilege, particularly since the first modern democratic revolution in seventeenth-century England.” Chomsky elaborates this point further, “Abroad, it is Washington’s responsibility to ensure that government is in the hands of ‘the good,’ though but a few.’ At home, it is necessary to safeguard a system of elite decision-making and public ratification—‘polyarchy,’ in the terminology of political science—not democracy.”\textsuperscript{14}

Democracy as “choice” is periodically referred to in the same context as “freedom,” as if choice and freedom were to be understood as synonyms. This is especially appealing in capitalist democracies where the economic system itself elaborates the polyarchic definition of democracy. This should be seen for what it is, a deficiency in the substance of pluralist democracy. According to Barber, “pluralist democracy is deficient because it relies on the

\textsuperscript{12} Joseph Schumpeter, as quoted by William I. Robinson: Ibid. 51.

\textsuperscript{13} Benjamin R. Barber, \textit{Strong Democracy : Participatory Politics for a New Age} (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984) 143, emphasis in the original.

fictions of the free market and the putative freedom and equality of bargaining agents.”
Ironically, “choice” involves a kind of “sleight of hand” insofar as it places the emphasis
upon the individual actor, deemphasizing the community and its requirement for collective
or common goods. Thus, Barber adds that pluralist democracy is deficient “because it
cannot generate public thinking or public ends of any kind”. Finally, democracy defined as
polyarchy is deficient

because it is innocent about the real world of power; and...because it uses the
representative principle and reintroduces into politics a covert independent
ground—namely, the illusions of the free market and the invisible hand and the
simplistic utilitarianism...by which the pursuit of private interests is miraculously
made to yield the public good.”

Robinson, Chomsky, and Barber all agree that polyarchy results in a situation wherein
democracy can exist in form but not in substance.

The above definitions of polyarchy as democracy in practice deemphasize other
more radical definitions of democracy as “direct” or “participatory.” According to William
Robinson, “polyarchy” is best understood, in significant contrast to Dahl and others, as “a
distinct form of elite rule” which “performs the function of legitimating existing inequalities,
and does so more effectively than authoritarianism.” Additionally, “Polyarchy refers to a
system in which a small group actually rules and mass participation in decision-making is
confined to leadership choice in elections carefully managed by competing elites.” To be
clear, polyarchy has been normalized in the social science discourse to such an extent that it

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15 Barber, *Strong Democracy: Participatory Politics for a New Age* 144.
16 Direct democracy stems from the writings of John Dewey.
17 Robinson, *Promoting Polyarchy* 51.
18 Ibid. 49.
is typically unproblematic to exchange the term with democracy in academic and policy circles. However, if polyarchy, understood as elite rule, is what is meant by democracy in the literature on democracy promotion, then what is being exported and/or promoted in US foreign policy has less to do with freedom and more to do with control. This brings a whole new understanding of the democratic peace hypothesis. It problematizes decades of US foreign policy because it purported to advocate freedom when it has instead been increasing its control over other states.

By understanding that when the United States says it is promoting democracy it really means polyarchy, terrorist attacks against the United States acquire a new meaning. The terrorists “hate us because of our freedoms” was the standard refrain after 9/11. Through a discussion of the US policy of promoting polyarchy it can be shown that the terrorists did not attack the United States because of its freedoms but because it has been exporting polyarchy instead of authentic or popular democracy. In using polyarchy as its definition of democracy, US foreign policy also undermines the content of the “peace” created by any successful promotion of “democracy” by the United States.

**Elite and Popular Democracy**

*Elite Democracy*

According to Robinson, “Polyarchy refers to a system in which a small group actually rules and mass participation in decision-making is confined to leadership choice in elections carefully managed by competing elites.” Robinson uses the terms “polyarchy,” “elite democracy” and “low-intensity democracy” interchangeably throughout his writing.

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19 Ibid.
Thus, polyarchy and elite democracy are both systems where a small group rules but with the illusion of mass participation. Elite democracy results in a more stable political order and results in better system maintenance than authoritarianism. Its intent is to protect the status quo. “When US policymakers and organic intellectuals speak of ‘promoting democracy,’ they do not, as a matter of course, mean promoting popular democracy. But more than this, they mean the suppression of popular democracy, in theory and in practice” writes Robinson.20 Elite democracy is further elaborated below in contrast to popular democracy.

**Popular Democracy**

Whereas elite democracy focuses entirely on “process,” for example elections, popular democracy is concerned with both process and “outcome.” According to Robinson, “Popular democracy… posits democracy as both a process and a means to an end—a tool for change, for the resolution of such material problems as housing, health, education, access to land, cultural development, and so forth.”21 By its very nature, popular democracy takes power away from elites. Thus, elite democracy and popular democracy are by their definitions at odds with each other. Popular democracy “entails a dispersal of political power formerly concentrated in the hands of elite minorities”. Popular democracy’s radical policy implications include:

- the redistribution of wealth, the breaking down of the structures of highly concentrated property ownership, and the democratizing access to social and cultural opportunities by severing the link between access and the possession of wealth.22

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20 Ibid. 62.

21 Ibid. 57.

22 Ibid.
Popular democracy therefore rejects the spurious separation between politics and economics. During the Cold War this parceling out of the political and economic spheres allowed for the epithet “communist” to be used against anyone, group or individual, who advocated merging these spheres. The logic was straightforward. According to a prominent group of democracy promotion theorists, democracy “signifies a political system, separate and apart from the economic and social system…Indeed, a distinctive aspect of our approach is to insist that issues of so-called economic and social democracy be separated from the question of governmental structure.”

Robinson distinguishes popular democracy in contrast to elite democracy when he observes a pathological component of elite democracy. Specifically, elite democracy has an “electoral fixation” and therefore “polyarchy not only limits democratic participation to voting in elections, but focuses exclusively on form in elections.” Whether the context is the Cold War or the GWOT and whether the epithet is “communist” or “terrorist,” the political elites continue to separate politics from economics and individuals from the community.

Focusing on the will of the people and a notion of the common good, popular democracy “involves participatory mechanisms for popular sectors to subordinate and utilize the state in pursuit of their interests, with mobilization in civil society as the principle form in which political power is exercised.” To a certain extent, popular democracy has a greater authenticity than elite democracy. Whereas elite democracy stems from the interests of the few, popular democracy stems from the interests of the many. If popular democracy was

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24 Robinson, Promoting Polyarchy 59.

25 Ibid. 58.
the substantive form of the thing promoted by US foreign policy, then it is unlikely that the United States would suffer “blowback” in the form of terrorist violence. However, “popular democratization ultimately depends on international conditions which are beyond the control of individual nations.” Thus, it is unlikely that the United States, or any other state, will be able to export popular democracy. However, the election of Barack Obama has generated considerable optimism that popular democracy will make a comeback. 

In the era of Obama it is indeed tempting to think that perhaps the United States has moved beyond the elite democracy described by Robinson, Chomsky, and Barber. This would be a mistake. The rule of law has been revitalized as all cases of suspected and alleged terrorism (on American soil) have been put squarely in the hands of the justice system instead of military courts. According to a recent National Public Radio report: “Karen Greenberg, who runs the Center on Law and Security at NYU’s School of Law, says what's different about the Obama administration is the lead role given the law enforcement in all terrorism cases.” There are a number of other examples where Obama certainly has appeared to fight for the masses, but at the end of the day it is going to take more strength than even Obama has to completely reform the US practice of democracy. While Obama may be one of the elites, he has brought with him a number of intellectual and practical ideals that speak to real democracy, in the Greek sense of “rule by the people.” However, 

26 Ibid. 61.


one wonders with Robinson whether US democracy promotion will be inspired by these ideals or if it will continue to promote polyarchy at popular democracy’s expense.

**Elite and Popular Nonviolence**

*Elite Nonviolence*

Elite nonviolence is defined as the refusal to cause physical harm in the service of a political or social end that is defined by elites in contrast to the masses. Previously unmentioned in academic literature, elite nonviolence is a term coined by this dissertation. This new concept is derivative of Robinson’s conception of elite democracy and Gene Sharp’s conceptions of strategic nonviolence and civilian-based defense. Nonviolence is not the object of Robinson’s study nor does he specifically discuss it. When he refers to democracy promotion, however, he often describes strategies that are quite similar to nonviolent strategies mentioned in chapter one, including marches, protests, rallies, letter writing campaigns, creating political action parties, and etc. When he discusses these specific tactics, he does so in the context of grassroots movements for social change and the various ways elites co-opt them. The term elite nonviolence is also derivative of Gene Sharp’s “strategic nonviolence.” Recall that strategic nonviolence is also primarily concerned with outcomes (consequentialist) and not morality (deontological). Robert Burrowes, for example, writes that, “Civilian based defense focuses solely on the practical outcomes whereas advocates of social defense weigh the morality of means against practical

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outcomes.” This discussion necessarily requires a set of distinctions, specifically: elite versus popular and strategic versus principled (consequentialist versus deontological).

The distinction between principled and strategic nonviolence lies in the distinction between doing something because it is the right thing to do and doing something because it gets a certain result. What this dissertation has named elite nonviolence is singled out for its consequentialist or strategic applications—specifically as a tool of US foreign policy. As with strategic nonviolence (civilian-based defense fits into this category), elite nonviolence is nonviolence concerned solely with form (i.e. nonviolent tactics) and not substance (transforming the violent structures of a society). In other words, advocates of strategic nonviolence believe that nonviolence is no different from violence and that the only relevant question is ‘which means is more efficient?’

Like principled nonviolence, strategic nonviolence can be used by anyone (the elderly, the young, etc.) but unlike principled nonviolence it can also be used for any purpose (to make a state ungovernable or to overthrow a political leader). Strategic nonviolence is stripped of the Gandhian moral compass. Tactically it is similar to Sharp’s conception of “strategic” nonviolence because it uses the various “tools” of civil disobedience: protests, strikes, fasts, marches, etc. However, in this dissertation, the term “elite nonviolence” names it for what it is. A tool, usually of a particular class; it is for the few, not the many.


31 Ackerman and Kruegler, *Strategic Nonviolent Conflict* 3.

32 Two more nefarious examples include the 1974 Protestant general strike against a unity government in Northern Ireland and the 1979 Iranian revolution. These cases are discussed in Roberts and Garton Ash, *Civil Resistance and Power Politics*. 

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It is also important to add that, like elite democracy, the point of elite nonviolence is also to suppress popular nonviolence. As employed by the US, elite nonviolence is finally transformed into “imperial nonviolence” as it is used to overthrow regimes that are unsympathetic to US national interests and install elites that are. A host of articles have recently been published on the internet and elsewhere drawing attention to this but the academic literature has generally avoided it and few, if any, have named it for what it is: imperial nonviolence. This begs the question of whether there is something inherently unethical about strategic uses of nonviolence. Further, is popular nonviolence, guided by regulative nonviolence, ultimately a better alternative to strategic/elite nonviolence?

**Popular Nonviolence**

Popular nonviolence means genuine, grassroots nonviolence practiced by citizen groups and reflects the interests of people, not manipulated by elites for elite interests. In this category one should include Danish resistance to the Nazis, the Civil Rights Movement under SNCC, CORE, and SCLC, and the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo (among others). These movements are in direct contrast to the movements that led to the overthrow of Marcos, Suharto, Pinochet, and Milosevic among others. This term will be further

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33 Barker, "Democracy or Polyarchy? US-Funded Media Developments in Afghanistan and Iraq Post 9/11."

34 Most of these examples are common knowledge. Easy access to these cases can be found in: Ackerman and Duvall, eds., *A Force More Powerful: A Century of Nonviolent Conflict*. However, they are typically undifferentiated, lumping examples of strategic and principled (not to mention elite versus popular nonviolence) together under the rubric of “nonviolence.”
developed as questions in the proceeding sections are answered. Popular nonviolent movements may result in the installation of regimes that are unfriendly towards the United States (for example, the 1979 Iranian revolution and the 2006 election of Hamas). Popular nonviolence is derivative of the goals of the many not the few.

Once the United States began using nonviolence as a tool of foreign policy, it became necessary to come up with a term to differentiate between nonviolence used for elite purposes and nonviolence used for popular purposes. Much like the term elite nonviolence, popular nonviolence is derivative of Robinson’s term “popular democracy” but, in addition, it combines Robinson’s term with Gandhi’s conception of nonviolence. Like popular democracy, popular nonviolence is for and of the people. Tactically, it may use the same tools as elite nonviolence: strikes, boycotts, fasts, marches, etc. However, it goes deeper than elite nonviolence because it is concerned with the relationship between means and ends. Those who use popular nonviolence are also concerned with transforming the structures of society. Thus, instead of simply overthrowing a dictator who supported the United States in order to install an elite class that supports the policies of the United States, advocates of popular nonviolence seek to create representative structures and institutions that reflect the will of the people, of the many not the few. For this reason, popular nonviolence is derivative of regulative nonviolence.

The Democratic Peace and US Foreign Policy

The terms polyarchy, elite democracy, popular democracy, elite nonviolence, and popular nonviolence help to interpret the US foreign policy of promoting democracy and to problematize the democratic peace theory in the context of US foreign policy. Some further
elaboration and background to the democratic peace theory is necessary to better understand what follows. To reiterate, the democratic peace is the theory that democratic states do not go to war with other democratic states. It has undergone a number of modifications since Immanuel Kant first proposed the foundational idea that republican states would eventually exist in *Perpetual Peace*.\(^{35}\) For the last three decades, US foreign policy has attempted to implement the democratic peace theory into practice. Barker reveals that promoting democracy actually begins under Carter after his administration breathed life back into William Douglas’ previously marginalized idea of “promoting democracy.”\(^{36}\) In the past decade “promoting democracy” has been used to justify two US invasions followed by continuing occupations in Afghanistan and Iraq. In addition, the United States “green lighted” the Ethiopian invasion of, and subsequent occupation of, Somalia (resulting in the current quisling regime). Further, US foreign policy is tied up with the “war on terror” such that, as practiced by the United States, the democratic peace theory actually requires an endless war as the United States continues to expand the use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs or “predator drones”) into Pakistan, Sudan, Somalia, Yemen, and the greater Middle East. As with the theory and practice of nonviolence which has been transformed by US policy from an anti-colonial theory and practice into a tool of empire, the democratic peace theory has been transformed into an ideology of ever expanding war and occupation. Both nonviolence and the democratic peace theory have become strategic devices for imperialism.

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American liberals have long been accused by conservatives of having too much faith in “social engineering projects” (the idea that people can be made to better through the right institutions, education, etc). Thus, when President Bush announced that it was to be the goal of US foreign policy to make the world free he seemed to be confusing one political ideology (liberalism) with another (conservatism). In contrast to the liberal view, the conservative critique cautions against quick transitions to democracy (and by extension the imperial uses of the democratic peace theory). Further, the conservative view of democracy recommends its organic growth from within societies, not imposed from the outside.

Finally, the conservative critique is salient in the contemporary political discourse which saw the rise of a “neo-conservative” during the first six years of the George W. Bush administration. One early critique of democratic transition must be introduced here because it will play a part in the discussion that follows. Edmund Burke once criticized the French revolution for attempting to create a government based on individual rights out of thin air: “The science of constructing a commonwealth, or renovating it, or reforming it, is, like every other experimental science, not to be taught à priori.” For this reason, he concludes that “it is with infinite caution that any man ought to venture upon pulling down an edifice which has answered in any tolerable degree for ages the common purposes of society, or on building it up again, without having models and patterns of approved utility before his eyes.”

Democracy cannot grow out of nothing. Burke’s critique was especially scathing of the revolutionaries’ murder of the monarchical families. Traditions, he argued, must come before self-rule.

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Beginning in the 1990s, when US President Bill Clinton announced a correlation between democracy and peace, the United States adopted a modified, if potentially flawed conception of the democratic peace theory. The “Clinton Doctrine” offered the seemingly humane view that military and political interventions in sovereign nations could be made if human rights were at stake. This is what, in the current discourse, is commonly referred to as “humanitarian intervention” and debated in the UN, policy, and academic circles in terms of the “responsibility to protect.” Perhaps a Democratic president can be expected to argue for such interventions (for example Bosnia, Somalia, and Kosovo), but given the conservative notion that democratic institutions must come before self-rule (not to mention a general antipathy towards “social engineering”), it is surprising that the 43rd US President would adopt such a revolutionary approach to foreign policy, a policy that in practice reenacts the originary violence of the French revolution (but from the top down). The Obama administration uses less democratic rhetoric but appears to be using force to create “democracy” in Iraq and Afghanistan.

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38 This date is highly debatable. 1939 could just as easily be chosen. In this case, Clinton is chosen because his doctrine mirrors what comes under Bush II.

39 The term “social engineering” is the conservative epithet used to disparage typically liberal and social democratic projects like health care, guaranteed education, and other social welfare projects. In slightly more neutral terms, it refers to the efforts of governments to influence popular attitudes and social behaviors. Civil rights legislation is usually an example. Certainly “democracy promotion” ranks as social engineering on a grand scale.

Mansfield and Snyder’s Amendment to the Democratic Peace

More recently, Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder have restated the traditional conservative argument about slow transitions to democracy—democracies must evolve slowly from within a given cultural milieu and slowly over time. They have augmented the more general conservative argument with case studies and statistical analysis of democratic transitions—beginning with the French revolution. While simultaneously supporting the democratic peace theory, Mansfield and Snyder significantly amend the standard approach to democratic peace theory in their book, Electing to Fight. As the authors explain:

Although mature democracies have never fought a war against each other, incomplete transitions from autocracy toward democracy are fraught with the danger of violent conflict in states whose political institutions are weak.41

In other words, Mansfield and Snyder could have told the Bush administration that while democratic states may not go to war with other democratic states, transitional states often do go to war and therefore the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan increased the risk of future wars. Mansfield and Snyder’s contribution to the literature on the democratic peace should have given the Bush administration some pause and, as one reviewer of Electing to Fight explains, “the [Bush] White House got its science wrong, or at least not completely right: the democratic peace theory does not dictate that the United States can or should remake Iraq into a democracy.”42

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The Bush administration took the opportunity of the 2006 edition of the *National Security Strategy* to explain the relationship between democracy promotion and long-term occupation:

Our commitment to the promotion of freedom is a commitment to walk alongside governments and their people as they make the difficult transition to effective democracies. We will not abandon them before the transition is secure because immature democracies can be prone to conflict and vulnerable to exploitation by terrorists. We will not let the challenges of democratic transitions frighten us into clinging to the illusory stability of the authoritarian. 43

The Bush administration’s “commitment to walk alongside governments and their people as they make the difficult transition to effective democracies” is also consistent with Mansfield and Snyder’s analysis of the occupation of Iraq: “Too often, as in Bosnia after the Dayton Accords, elections have come too soon and merely locked in the dominance of illiberal elites who won votes by playing the nationalist card….During the U.S. occupation of Iraq, for example, the French government called for a quick handover of sovereignty to an elected Iraqi government in 2003.” 44 On the surface, Mansfield and Snyder’s argument appears to simply take into consideration the changed context and, thus, though they may not necessarily have advocated the initial invasion, their theoretical framework rejects a quick transition to democracy. This is, of course, consistent with their theory—but, lends credibility to the claim that the democratic peace theory, even in modified form, justifies long term occupation. It is remarkable that while a traditional conservative like Burke will

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44 Mansfield and Snyder, *Electing to Fight* 17.
logically reject quick transitions to democracy (and thus oppose violent overthrows of authoritarianism) a neo-conservative simultaneously demands invasion and occupation.

Mansfield and Snyder seem to carry on the conservative tradition when they write their “general rule” of democracy formation which starts the democratization “process by building the institutions that democracy requires, and then encouraging mass political participation and unfettered electoral competition only after these institutions have begun to take root.” Mansfield and Snyder follow Burke’s conception of an organically grown democracy from the ground up.

The authors also emphasize the role of institutions to prevent regimes, in the midst of transitions to democracy, from waging war. For example, Mansfield and Snyder write:

Generally, the danger is most serious a few years after the transition begins. It is the dynamic of this transition, rather than the steady-state politics of mixed regimes, that causes the problem. The move from autocracy to a mixed regime is most likely to give rise to international war if state institutions are especially weak at the moment of the transition and the fortunes of elites are in flux. Because state institutions are too weak to guarantee elites a soft landing, elites look to their own still-considerable resources to recruit mass allies and manipulate fragile democratic processes. They often do this by provoking nationalist sentiments, and an increased risk of international conflict is a common by-product.45

In the above quotation the authors argue that states that are transitioning to democracy are more prone to wage wars against their neighbors if the conservative warning to create institutions first has not been heeded. Weak institutions do not adequately check the power of insecure elites who are fearful of losing control gained during their state’s transition to democracy. In other words, wars are not caused by transitions to democracy or democracy but rather fearful elites who, out of cowardice, manipulate nationalist sentiments to deflect attention away from themselves and towards an imagined enemy “other” out there. The

45 Ibid.
lesson to be learned is that strong institutions must be developed first and only then should elections occur. These institutions will check the power of elites and prevent wars during the transition to democracy.

Mansfield and Snyder formulate democracy in such a manner that institutions and procedures do most of the “work” within what they call “mature” democracies, but the classical Greek definition of democracy (as government by and for the people) is conspicuously absent from this description of government—consisting primarily of institutions and concerned solely with procedural outcomes. In contrast, a Gandhian view offers a richer perspective. Bhikhu Parekh writes that for Gandhi: “Democracy was not so much an arrangement of offices or a cluster of institutions, rules and procedures as a way of life geared to developing and actualizing popular power.” Whereas Mansfield and Snyder seek to promote institutions, Gandhi strives to create democracy as a way of life that penetrates down into the psyche of each and every citizen.

By contrasting Mansfield and Snyder’s view of democracy with Gandhi’s, it is possible to see how their view actually supports authoritarianism. Mansfield and Snyder must support, in the short term, authoritarian regimes. Mansfield and Snyder write, “such a solution may be distasteful to some advocates of democratization, but tactical accommodations are sometimes unavoidable in order to achieve idealistic goals in the long

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run.”*47 This short-term thinking leads to long-term promotion of authoritarian regimes and/or continued U.S. military presence in potential conflict zones.

Mansfield and Snyder’s conservative approach differs in one other important manner from the nonviolent approach recommended by Gandhi. When they waver in their conservatism in order to rationalize continued elite control and international stability. They state clearly enough that democracy occurs from the ground up. However, by advocating the continued US occupation of Afghanistan and Iraq, they recommend a top down strategy that will not produce authentic, popular democracy in either state. In spite of his frequent failure to live up to his own standard, Gandhi insisted upon a “principled” nonviolence and argued that nonviolence must be in thought, word, and deed. Though Gandhi wanted purity of thought, word, and deed, he often wavered, but his guiding thought was always the long term swaraj. Mansfield and Snyder’s guiding principle is stability and order whereas Gandhi’s was resistance to evil (injustice, tyranny, inequality, etc).

In fact, at various moments in his life, Gandhi laments his own lapses into consequentialist practice. Almost a decade after the famed Salt March in 1930 which initiated the India-wide civil disobedience of 1930-31, Gandhi seemed to recant his instigation of nationalist activism. In his own words:

Today with [this] great realization I would not lead another Dandi March. The breach of the salt laws was a perfect proposition, but violence of the mind had crept in almost from the beginning. All that we had learnt then was that it was expedient to refrain from the use of physical violence. This was the non-violence of the calculating Bania, not of the brave Kshatriya. This non-violence of the calculating

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47 Mansfield and Snyder, *Election to Fight* 18. Here I am not advocating an easy choice between consequentialism and deontology, rather I explore the problems associated with the varying positions. Politics is, after all, often about muddling through.
Bania has not, could not have, carried us far. It could not possibly avail to win and retain swaraj, to win over our opponent who believed in the use of arms.48

This quotation illustrates two points to compare with Mansfield and Syder: on the one hand Gandhi advocates building popular political power from the ground up while Mansfield and Snyder simultaneously advocate organic democratic growth and justify occupation and top-down democratization. Secondly, Mansfield and Snyder’s rationalizations seem more likely to benefit elite maintenance of power whereas Gandhi’s lapses still benefit the masses and empower the many at the expense of the few. It should also be stressed that Gandhi’s position here reflects the category of regulative nonviolence.

Applied in practical terms, the democracy promotion pillar of the US global security agenda and of the National Security Strategy (NSS) is a blueprint for an empire lead by American elites. The foregoing has focused on the elite aspects of the democracy promotion pillar to show that the democratic peace theory is based upon statistical data that has been produced as a result of specific US policy of democracy promotion. It has been shown that the term democracy is commonly used in the context of US foreign policy not in the Greek sense of rule by the people but rather as a form of elite rule, elite democracy. This tension between elite democracy and popular democracy is found in the contrast between what comes out of the mouths of political elites and the practice of foreign policy but also in the academic literature. The discussion of Mansfield and Snyder’s argument in Electing to Fight illustrates the fact that academics themselves are confused by the various uses of the term democracy as something that grows out of the soil, so to speak, and something that is parachuted in from above. One is provoked to ask them which is it? As shown above, the

answer is often “both” as when, for example, Mansfield and Snyder posit their “general rule” and then explain that sometimes dictatorship is preferable. It should be clear from this discussion that the US has no intention of promoting anything like participatory democracy in those states that it democratizes. The discussion of Gandhi and Mansfield and Snyder also indicates that further discussion, comparison, and eventual interpenetration of nonviolence studies with democratization studies may be fruitful and productive in the search for peace and popular democracy.

**Integrating Nonviolence Studies with Democratization Studies**

The fact of the matter is that we do not know our distant goal. It will be determined not by our definitions but by our acts, voluntary and involuntary. If we are wise, we will take care of the present and the future will take care of itself. ~Mohandas K. Gandhi

Gandhi understood democracy’s dark side, where elites ruled at the expense of the masses. For example, Gandhi thought that “modern democracy” was “basically a form of government in which a ‘few men capture power in the name of the people and abuse it’, a ‘game of chess’ between rival parties with the people as ‘pawns’.” Gandhi was primarily concerned with the increased power of the state and noted that democracy, in spite of itself, was simply another form of the Weberian state. However, though he worried about the state’s capacity for violence, Gandhi eventually altered his view of it. According to Parekh, while Gandhi believed that the state “did, no doubt, represent concentrated and organized violence; it was also, however, a vehicle of some of their deepest moral aspirations.”

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49 Gandhi, *The Essential Writings of Mahatma Gandhi* 352.

other words, “it was a soul-less machine; it was also, however, a custodian of the spirit of Indian civilization and a vehicle of justice.”

When Gandhi criticized democracy he was really criticizing the practice of “elite” democracy, not popular democracy.

Through an investigation of the idea of democracy, it is not difficult to arrive at several points in which nonviolence is actually suggestive of democracy and its implementation. For example, as the ancient Greek words (“demos” meaning the many or the people, and “kratos” meaning rule) indicate, democracy means “rule by the people” or “rule by the many.” When those who participate in nonviolent social movements actually begin the process of transforming their societies into democracies, they are actually creating not just future democratic institutions (following Mansfield and Snyder) but democracy as a way of life. Illustratively, “nonviolent struggle tends to favor democratic principles and practices, in part because the technique involves joint collaborative participation of organizations and institutions throughout society.”

Further, “There also exists a growing realization that democratic development consists of more than toppling dictatorships and holding elections.”

In other words, the various political organizing tactics of nonviolent practice including strikes, boycotts, marches, letter writing, and creating independent media are all essentially the vital components of a vibrant democracy. Sadly, “one of the least-studied aspects of nonviolent struggle is its ability to serve as a forerunner and predictor for the development of democratic governance and institutions.”

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51 Parekh, *Gandhi’s Political Philosophy* 120.

52 King, *A Quiet Revolution* 340.


54 King, *A Quiet Revolution* 339.
focus on the ethical, moral, and even practical components of social movements without consciously engaging the democratic peace or liberal international relations theory. This is perhaps largely due to the dim view of elite democracy taken by many political activists for human emancipation. The negative side effects include the continued segregation of the fields. Among the potential rewards of integrating nonviolence and democratization literature is the addition of a critical understanding of democracy into the debates on democratic peace.

Indications of the potential for fruitful interdisciplinary research can already be seen. Former head of the International Center on Nonviolent Conflict, Maria Stephan, asks “what is it about [bottom-up civil resistance] that makes it conducive to removing oppression?” Stephan answers her own question by way of a discussion of power, paraphrased here in Arendtian terms as power defined as collective action. In effect, civil resistance or nonviolence works because “it offers participants hundreds of different tactics” ranging from high to low risk and does not limit its “frontline fighters” to young, able bodied males. Ultimately, Stephan argues, “The systematic withdrawal of consent and cooperation by large numbers of people undermines the opponent’s social, political, economic, and even military sources of power, thereby raising the physical and economic costs of maintaining control.” Stephan fails, however, to answer her own question, instead shifting her answer away from the question why civil resistance works to remove oppression and towards an answer to the question what are the details or sources of power in civil resistance or

55 Stephan, *Civilian Jihad: Nonviolent Struggle, Democratization, and Governance in the Middle East* 3.

56 Ibid. 4.

57 Ibid.
nonviolence. Her answer is essentially agnostic with regards to “oppression” per se; but, by drawing on Gandhi’s theory and practice of nonviolence it is possible to come up with an answer that more closely deals with Stephan’s original question of oppression.

Gandhi sought a means to achieve political goals without using violence. In doing so, Gandhi offered four interrelated critiques of violence as a means for social change. First, Gandhi believed that all human beings were not just equal in the classical liberal sense but that they were truly one. In this manner, Gandhi believed that all human beings were interconnected, as a part of a larger spiritual consciousness. Violence denied this interconnected aspect of life by assuming that when one kills another it has no effect outside of the person whose life has ended. According to Gandhi, violence “denied the fundamental ontological fact that all men were essentially one and that love and goodwill, not hatred and ill-will, were the only valid bases of human relationships.”58 Since violence was premised upon a false conception of existence (that humans and all life are not interconnected) Gandhi thought that violence was based on untruth and therefore could not be used to attain truth.

Secondly, Gandhi believed that if human beings want to know something or wished to understand a concept, they must achieve it through dialogue with others. In a dialogue with others, persuasion and listening are essential to understanding. For example, if someone disagrees with me, then I must seek to persuade her. Certainly, while someone may claim I am right while I am holding a gun to her head, she will not truly believe that I am right in her heart. Gandhi’s account of discussion and persuasion allowed for a novel view of epistemology, where human beings proceed towards truths differently and hold

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58 Parekh, *Gandhi’s Political Philosophy* 147.
seemingly different truths simultaneously. Gandhi therefore argued that “we see truth in fragment and from different angles of vision.” Elsewhere, Gandhi writes of his seemingly situational view of truth:

Does not God Himself appear to different individuals in different aspects? Yet we know that He is one. But Truth is the right designation of God. Hence there is nothing wrong in every man following Truth according to his lights. Indeed it is his duty to do so. Then if there is a mistake on the part of anyone so following Truth, it will be automatically set right….Directly he takes to the wrong path he stumbles, and is thus redirected to the right path.

Gandhi argues that to kill a person is to kill Truth-God. Thus, nonviolence is imperative on the grounds that one must not kill Truth. Therefore, Gandhi’s conception of nonviolence follows from his conception of truth insofar as everything contains truth within it; if everything contains truth, then to kill or even to inflict violence is in essence to do violence to truth. Further, if all things are connected, then to do harm to anything is to do harm to everything.

The consequences of violence are automatically global. Parekh summarizes thusly: “in order to be justified in taking the extreme step of harming or killing someone, one must assume that one is absolutely right, the opponent totally wrong and that violence would definitely achieve the desired result.” Put differently, once you are dead, you are dead. There are no

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59 Ibid.

60 Gandhi, *The Essential Writings of Mahatma Gandhi* 232-33.

61 There is a noticeable similarity between Gandhi’s view summarized here and the Quranic verse found in Surah 5, verse 32: “On that account We ordained for the Children of Isra’il that if any one slew a person - unless it be for murder or for spreading mischief in the land - it would be as if he slew the whole humanity: and if any one saved a life, it would be as if he saved the whole humanity. Then although there came to them Our messengers with clear (guidance), yet, even after that, many of them continued to commit excesses in the land” (5:32).

62 Parekh, *Gandhi’s Political Philosophy* 147.
“do-overs” with violence. Thus, according to Gandhi, nonviolence becomes the only logical way to act because nonviolent actions are not a zero-sum game, nonviolence allows for the possibility of human fallibility. It permits critical reflection. Most important of all, there are do-overs in life, but not in death.

Gandhi’s third critique of violence is that it is morally problematic. Gandhi carefully articulates this critique in a language reminiscent of biblical legal prose. On the legality of violence he writes, “The only thing lawful is non-violence. Violence can never be lawful in the sense meant here, i.e., not according to man-made law but according to the law made by Nature for man.” Interestingly, Gandhi offers in this critique one of his few caveats: “though violence is not lawful, when it is offered in self-defence or for the defence of the defenceless, it is an act of bravery far better than cowardly submission. The latter befits neither man nor woman.”

Though Gandhi was not particularly concerned with systematic arguments, this particular caveat need not be read as contradictory to his approach to nonviolence. Gandhi’s primary goal was to resist evil. He contends that nonviolence is the best method of resisting evil, yet being a coward is an act far worse than employing violence. In light of this approach to cowardice, Parekh interprets Gandhi’s conception of morality and moral behavior in the following manner: “morality consisted in doing what was right because one believed it to be right, and required unity of belief and behaviour. Since the use of violence did not change the opponent’s perception of truth, it compelled him to behave in a manner contrary to his sincerely held beliefs.”

63 Gandhi, The Essential Writings of Mahatma Gandhi 253.

64 Parekh, Gandhi's Political Philosophy 147-48.
violence, and worse, cowardice—reflected by a disconnection between an individual’s firmly held belief in nonviolence and nonviolent action itself.

Finally, Gandhi’s fourth critique of violence is that violence achieves, at best, immediate results, however temporary. For example, the more immediate successes that are accomplished by way of violence, the more people believe that violence is the answer to their problems. From Gandhi’s perspective, the embrace of violence for the sake of immediate results produces a moral breakdown of society, which becomes increasingly incapable of choosing the less violent path. The deterioration of society beholden to violence ultimately results in an anachic state of social existence where “initially throwing a stone might be enough to draw the government’s attention to a grievance; soon the assassination of an officer and later that of several of them became necessary. Every act of violence led to a vicious circle of mutual fears from which neither party was able to extricate himself.” For Gandhi, nonviolence is the way out of chaos and anarchy, and the only means of breaking a cycle of violence. Unfortunately, little serious discussion has ever existed between advocates of violence and their counterparts of nonviolence, leaving the latter to participate in a one-sided debate as they seek to answer the criticisms of nonviolence. The lack of dialogue and debate between these parties serves to amplify the assumption that violence is the only means available for surviving in global politics today.

Ultimately, Gandhi’s critique of violence better answers Stephan’s question about why civil resistance removes oppression. When groups use violence in their resistance they

65 Ibid. 148.

66 Manfred B. Steger has done this by imagining nonviolence on trial: Steger, Judging Nonviolence: The Dispute between Realists and Idealists.
re-create that which they seek to remove. Whereas when groups use nonviolence they instead build that which they seek to create. Stephan is not able to articulate this transformative aspect of nonviolence because she is focused on making nonviolence mainstream. While this goal is admirable insofar as it increases the number of people who may use the tactics of nonviolence, her approach lacks the necessary philosophical grounding. In other words, nonviolence becomes a tool, a tactic to be used for any purpose. Regulative nonviolence does not give up this philosophical connection to Gandhi and it better answers Stephan’s question.

The reason regulative nonviolent resistance is better suited to remove oppression is because when it is philosophically grounded in critical nonviolence it is, by definition, opposed to oppression. Like Stephan’s work, Kurt Schock’s comparative analysis of six nonviolent struggles includes a useful definition of nonviolent action: “nonviolent action is nonviolent—it does not involve physical violence or the threat of physical violence against human beings—and it is active—it involves activity in the collective pursuit of social or political objectives.”67 Schock’s focus is on strategy, on nonviolence as a powerful tool. As he says, he’s interested in sketching “a framework that may be useful to scholars studying unarmed insurrections in nondemocracies.”68 In an attempt to raise nonviolence studies to a higher level in the academy, he posits a “dispassionate social science” account of nonviolent struggle.

Schock begins his study with an account of the Iranian Revolution. He reminds his audience that it was in fact nonviolent and that Ruhollah Khomeini “encouraged resistance,

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67 Schock, Unarmed Insurrections 6.

68 Ibid. xix.
calling for nonviolent civil disobedience.\footnote{Ibid. 2.} Not enough attention has been paid to the fact that the Iranian revolution was an interrupted transition from authoritarianism to democracy.\footnote{Indeed, non-academic forms of storytelling have had greater impact in this area: Marjane Satrapi et al., "Persepolis," (United States: Sony Pictures Classics, 2007), Marjane Satrapi and Marjane Satrapi, The Complete Persepolis, 1st ed. (New York: Pantheon Books, 2007).} To the extent that current discussion of Iran mentions this period of nonviolence and democracy during the revolution, it is to point out that Iran democratically ushered in an era of theocracy which worked to suppress the rights of many of those who supported the revolution. While it is beyond the scope of this section to discuss the Iranian example at length, it is important to remember that there was a moment when Iran could have gone further down the path of democracy. For example, had the United States not given asylum to the Shaw, it is conceivable that the infamous “444 days” would not have occurred nor would the subsequent 30 years of Iranian isolation, the long, bloody war with Iraq, and Iran’s support of Hezbollah and Hamas (and the list goes on).\footnote{Several good books on Iran and international relations include: Arshin Adib-Moghaddam, Iran in World Politics: The Question of the Islamic Republic (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), Stephen Kinzer, All the Shah’s Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror, 2008 ed. (Hoboken, N.J.: John Wiley & Sons, 2008), Trita Parsi, Treacherous Alliance: The Secret Dealings of Israel, Iran, and the United States (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2007). For further reading on the nonviolent aspects of the Iranian revolution see: Ervand Abrahamian, "Mass Protests in the Iranian Revolution, 1977-1979," in Civil Resistance and Power Politics: The Experience of Non-Violent Action from Gandhi to the Present, ed. Adam Roberts and Timothy Garton Ash (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), Sazegara and Stephan, "Iran’s Islamic Revolution and Nonviolent Struggle."} Schock’s work also suggests that strategic nonviolence is not a guarantee for successful transition to democracy. Nonetheless, the Iranian example shows that nonviolence is a powerful force for change because it was used to overthrow the authoritarian regime of the Shaw. Much of the inspiration to overthrow the Shaw came from democracy activists and even the theocrats
used the language of democracy and nonviolence. However, their betrayal does not serve as
evidence of either the failure of democracy or nonviolence.

Whereas Iran's revolution serves as an indicator of things to come, Schock argues
convincingly that the “Third Wave” of democratic transitions has been largely nonviolent in
many parts of the third world.\textsuperscript{72} He explains that “there was a notable change in the modal
manner in which regimes in the third world were successfully challenged in the late twentieth
century: armed guerrilla insurgencies and violent rebellion as methods for successfully
challenging the state declined, while nonviolent strategies for successfully challenging
regimes increased.”\textsuperscript{73}

Shock is realistic about the future prospects for the continuation of this nonviolent
wave of democratic transitions, noting that “it would be a mistake to view this trend as part
of a linear history, since factors that converged in the late twentieth century to facilitate
nonviolent action may diverge in the future.”\textsuperscript{74} This is not to say that he is not hopeful,
rather that he is not a member of the club that thinks nonviolence is inevitable.\textsuperscript{75} Schock
lists “a confluence of structural and normative processes…. as one of the many important
reasons that the number of nonviolent struggles increased. Specifically, the expansion of the
state and the state apparatuses of violence reduced the effectiveness of armed insurrections.
In other words, it became more difficult to man the barricades when they would be swept
away by a tank. Further, communications technology added to the ease with which groups

\textsuperscript{72} For a good critique of the popular nonviolent character of several of these cases see: Robinson, Promoting Polyarchy 117-45.

\textsuperscript{73} Schock, Unarmed Insurrections 17, emphasis in the original.

\textsuperscript{74} Ibid. 23.

\textsuperscript{75} Kurlansky, Nonviolence : Twenty-Five Lessons from the History of a Dangerous Idea, Schell, The Unconquerable World.
and networks were able to communicate and thus “compressed time and space.”76

Ultimately, he sees reason for optimism in the potential opportunities for nonviolence in an increasingly interconnected world where cell phones, the internet, and other social networking and communications devices facilitate organizing for change and the rise of a global civil society.

Through the work of a global civil society, Schock also observes that local issues gain global attention: “transnational social movement organizations, that is, organizations with active members in two or more countries that promote social change through institutional and noninstitutional channels.”77 For Schock, the growing global civil society favors nonviolence and is thus sympathetic to nonviolent movements and the plight of those who suffer unjustly while pressing for their interests nonviolently. Shock reminds his readers that Amnesty International, for example, only draws the world’s attention to those dissidents “who use nonviolent rather than violent methods.”78 Accordingly, Schock presents an array of variables that support nonviolence and make violence less attractive as a means of political protest during the “Third Wave.”

Schock focuses on “noninstitutional” methods of democratic transition.79 He also emphasizes the role of the masses. He concludes that “in most contexts popular insurrection, rather than being an obstacle to democratization, is the only realistic method

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76 Schock, Unarmed Insurrections 19.
77 Ibid.
78 Ibid. 21.
79 Ibid. 24.
for attaining it." Thus, Schock agrees with Robinson that elites (often with US aid) co-opt the radical democratic elements of social unrest to further their interests in elite democracy at the expense of popular democracy. In sum, the democratic transition literature has an anti-popular democratic and pro-polyarchic elite bias. It is specifically this bias that makes regulative nonviolence so important, it can serve as an antidote to the elite bias of the democratic transition and democracy promotion literature.

Moreover, Shock’s argument for nonviolence poses a problem for the dominant strands of democratic peace theory that focus on institutions and especially procedural definitions of democracy that spotlight almost exclusively on elections. Lack of a substantive understanding of democracy, one that includes active citizen involvement in the decision making processes of the society in which one lives leads to confusion, especially in attempts to refine the democratic peace theory. For example, the Bush administration appeared to learn from these and similar criticisms. The Bush strategy of 2006 is conscious of some sophistication within the democratic peace theory as it insists: “We have a responsibility to promote human freedom. Yet freedom cannot be imposed; it must be chosen. The form that freedom and democracy take in any land will reflect the history, culture, and habits unique to its people.” The passage, taken at face value, indicates a refined understanding of democracy consistent with Schock, Robinson, Chomsky, and Barber’s criticisms. There is a fundamental disconnect between the text of the National Security Strategy and the actual practice of US policy in Afghanistan and Iraq. It is possible to read this and similar passages and conclude that the Bush administration had in fact learned

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80 Ibid. 25.
significant lessons from its foreign aggressions. This assumption, however, would be entirely naïve. The US may claim to respect individual freedom, but in practice it routinely violates individual freedom in its quest for absolute security. As one critic writes, “…the most benevolent and effective actors cannot create functioning institutions when state power rests with people hell-bent on abusing it for their own purposes.”

Though the Bush administration appeared to learn it did not. One can imagine a framework of analysis where instead of being forced to learn through massive failure, at significant cost of human life, financial and other resources, the US government learned by applying a regulative nonviolent approach. By emphasizing the critical elements of Gandhi’s thoughts on democracy it is possible to derive action plans that are more consistent with popular democracy, despite the fact that Gandhi was often openly critical of Western institutions and civilization. For example, as Raghavan Iyer notes, Gandhi once referred to the British “Mother of Parliaments” as “a sterile woman and a prostitute.” Combined with Gandhi’s description of the state as a “soul-less machine,” it may seem strange to discuss democracy promotion and Gandhi inspired nonviolence. However, Gandhi’s concept of *swaraj*—which roughly translates as “self-rule”—offers a better “Gandhian” and “critical nonviolent” understanding of democracy and the state. As Gandhi argues:

> True democracy or the *Swaraj* of the masses can never come through untruthful and violent means, for the simple reason that the natural corollary to their use would be

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84 Iyer, *The Moral and Political Thought of Mahatma Gandhi* 27.
to remove all opposition through the suppression or extermination of the antagonists. That does not make for individual freedom. Individual freedom can have the fullest play only under a regime of unadulterated *ahimsa* [nonviolence].

Gandhi indicates here that he was clear about democracy as an agonistic system requiring debate, dialogue, and reason. As he rightly points out, if violence is used to solve disputes, then debate ends and truth is not permitted to prevail, and might would indeed make right.

Aside from the obvious invidious comparison of a sterile woman and its attendant sexism, Gandhi’s point was to reject the form of democracy that would allow the scandalous policies of the British Empire. When he wrote those words he was still in the middle of a long battle with the Empire over rights for Indians in South Africa. Thus, he juxtaposes “true democracy” with the British image. Gandhi also introduced what he referred to as his “constructive programme.” This range of endeavors included prohibition, the making of handspun cloth, and the adoption of a national language. As Bhikhu Parekh notes, some of Gandhi’s suggestions were simple and motivated by a need to include the poor in the project of building the Indian nation (home spun cloth for example).

Much of Gandhi’s constructive program was anti-elitist and meant to increase equality within the highly stratified Indian society. Parekh explains, “the use of Khadi [homespun cloth] was intended to provide a national uniform and create at least a measure of outward equality in a highly unequal society, to generate a sense of solidarity with the poor, to bring economic pressure to bear on the British government, and to reduce foreign imports.” In addition, “The use of regional languages was intended to bridge the vast and widening chasm between the masses and the Westernized elite, ensure cultural continuity, encourage authenticity of thought and action, and to forge indigenous tools of collective self

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85 Ibid. 185.
Gandhi’s constructive programme served another purpose as well. Collective self expression prepares the ground for collective action which reflects Gandhi’s evolved understanding of power.

Gandhi rejects the formal conception of democracy as elite rule while simultaneously practicing what political theorists and practitioners commonly refer to as popular or even direct democracy. That Gandhi attempts this on the vast scale of the Indian subcontinent also offers modern theorists and practitioners of democracy a wealth of insight into how to create and promote social change in large societies. Parekh also draws attention to the democratic aspects of nonviolent practice: “the non-cooperation Movement served notice on the raj and made political independence a widely shared national goal. It radicalized a large number of Indians, drew them into political life, and extended the organizational reach and social basis of the Congress. It also led to a large body of voluntary institutions, greatly expanded civic space, and reduced the moral hold of the colonial state.” In a word: democracy. Gandhi’s nonviolent movement helped create the conditions for the practice of popular democracy.

In contrast, when the United States seeks to promote polyarchy at home and abroad it creates the conditions for elite democracy. Its actions are by definition antithetical to the core meaning of the term democracy. Further, by spreading elite democracy abroad, the United States makes a mockery of an otherwise rich theoretical construct. One scholar’s rather bizarre contortions of logic illustrate the depths of democratic theory: “the principle [democracy] is neither descriptive of nor feasible in any modern state. It makes sense to say


87 Ibid. 18.
that one person rules, or that a few persons do, no matter how large the state; but it makes almost no sense to say that the people rule in any modern state, in any ordinary sense of the word ‘rule.’”\textsuperscript{88} This is after the author clearly states that the Athenian conception of democracy as “rule by the people” should be taken as the starting point for any discussion of democracy. In sum, democracy is defined by people choosing their rulers: “the people, let us repeat, do not and cannot govern; they control the government.”\textsuperscript{89} Today even this stretches credulity. Who rules and what do they rule over? A perennial question for sure, but in an age of globalization an increasingly pertinent one.

Whereas Gandhi believed that nonviolence was his message for the world, the United States’ democracy promotion is an attempt to make the “world after its own image.” The United States seeks to create, promote, and defend a global capitalist system (and has done so at least since 1939-1945. Today, this means an increasingly deterritorialized system controlled by elite social forces. This is not to say that the state is no longer relevant but rather that the nation-state is becoming “decoupled.”\textsuperscript{90} Instead, polyarchy is the byproduct of the capitalist mode of production. Further, whereas capitalism has historically been concentrated in nation states, the era of globalization sees the rise of a global class divide that does not strictly adhere to national boundaries. In this new globalized age, elites of developing countries have similar interests as elites in the developed world. These elites do not share interests or identify with the people of their own national imaginary. Instead they


\textsuperscript{89} Ibid. 59.

\textsuperscript{90} Robinson, \textit{Promoting Polyarchy} 20.
collude with a global “transnational capitalist class” to extract wealth and resources from the local work force:

Fulfilling this function requires, in essence, prostituting a population. Making a national labor force attractive, and thereby ‘marketable,’ means assuring the lowest possible wages and the highest level of docility on the part of labor. State administrators therefore increasingly act as the pimps of global capitalism.91

If elites throughout the world are forming into a “transnational capitalist class” then this new class accordingly shifts power away from nation-states and towards classes. As Robinson argues, “the increasing separation of classes from territoriality and class power from state power involves a dispersal of global decision-making away from specific core states, even though transnational groups continue to filter policies through existing state apparatuses.”92 Instead of national elites sharing at least a modicum of interest with the national masses, globalization has wrought an entire world divided and deteritorialized.93 In this newly conceived power dynamic, the US does not act solely for its own interest, but rather takes on the leadership role for a transnational capitalist class. Democracy promotion is then used as a mechanism of global control whereby people are forced to choose between freedom and security.

On the one hand, the United States espouses “freedom,” while on the other it seeks security at the expense of individual freedom. Think of this as the “freedom agenda” which works in conjunction with a conception of “transformational diplomacy.” As Condoleezza Rice once announced, the US goal is to “work with our many partners around the world to

91 Ibid. 374.

92 Ibid. 20.

build and sustain democratic, well-governed states that will respond to the needs of their people—and conduct themselves responsibly in the international system.”94 She also declared that this will be the policy of the United States for some time to come. She indicated that US insistence upon democracy promotion is directly related to the events of September 11: “This new reality has led us to some significant changes in our policy. We recognize that democratic state building is now an urgent component of our national interest.”95 Rice asserted that US history has always married force with principle as opposed to force making principles: “The United States has long tried to marry power and principle—realism and idealism.” Such insistence makes light of US commitment to military intervention: “A commitment to military intervention as a way to promote American values abroad…..”96 The freedom agenda is fraught with contradiction, hypocrisy, and cynicism.

Rice’s comments, in conjunction with other administration officials and US policy documents, indicate that the US is genuinely in favor of elite democracy promotion through force.97 The fundamental flaw of the democracy promotion pillar is the assumption that people can in fact be “made to be free” and that, once they are free, they will choose to obey the United States. As Robinson explains further, “the purpose of ‘democracy promotion’ is not to suppress but to penetrate and conquer civil society in intervened countries, that is, the complex of ‘private’ organizations such as political parties, trade unions, the media, and so


95 Condoleezza Rice, "Rethinking the National Interest. (Cover Story)," Foreign Affairs 87, no. 4 (2008).


forth, and from therein, integrate subordinate classes and national groups into a hegemonic transnational social order.\footnote{Robinson, Promoting Polyarchy 29, emphasis in original.} Finally, the practical application of “democracy promotion” specifically means that the United States chooses to prop up those “social forces” within civil society that currently do or can be made to ally with the interests of the transnational capitalist class, “dominant groups in the United States and the core regions of the world system.”\footnote{Ibid. 29.} In the hands of the new global elite, democracy promotion is a tool to control the unruly masses around the world. This is done at the expense of actual freedom; it does this by constructing a binary opposition between freedom and security—as if one must always choose one or the other.\footnote{Michael Freeman, Freedom or Security: The Consequences for Democracies Using Emergency Powers to Fight Terrorism (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003), F. Gregory Gause III, "Can Democracy Stop Terrorism?,” Foreign Affairs 84, no. 5 (Sept/Oct 2005), Holmes, Terrorism and Democratic Stability, Gregory Weeks, "Fighting Terrorism While Promoting Democracy: Competing Priorities in U.S. Defense Policy toward Latin America," Journal of Third World Studies 23, no. 2 (2006).} As Ken Waltz famously asserts, “States, like people, are insecure in proportion to the extent of their freedom. If freedom is wanted, insecurity must be accepted….If might decides, then bloody struggles over right can more easily be avoided.”\footnote{Waltz, Theory of International Politics 112.} The inherent tension between freedom/security and right/might is perennial. US foreign policy creates the conditions under which people feel that they must choose between freedom and security?\footnote{According to Barry Buzan, Kenneth Waltz is the only true structural realist: Barry Buzan, Charles Jones, and Richard Little, The Logic of Anarchy: Neorealism to Structural Realism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993).} The result is, as the epigraph to this section states, the “emptying of democracy.”
Summary

This section introduced the key concepts of polyarchy, elite and popular democracy, and elite and popular nonviolence. It began a substantive criticism of the democratic peace theory in the context of US foreign policy and regulative nonviolence. It briefly suggested that an under-theorized element of globalization is the deterritorialization of elite and popular social forces and pointed to the US “freedom agenda” as an important indicator of that deterritorialization process. In conclusion, this section shows that the democratic peace theory, as used by the US democracy pillar, is neither democratic nor peaceful. Finally, the binary opposition created by the freedom versus security trap forces people to unnecessarily choose between freedom and security. The next section continues this line of questioning by asking “will the spread of democracy promote global security?”

SECTION II: WILL THE SPREAD OF ELITE DEMOCRACY PROMOTE GLOBAL SECURITY?

The democratic peace theory is based upon a notion that liberal democracies construct certain constraints on elite behaviors, including, but not limited to, the assumption that the masses will use what power they have to prevent their particular elites from attacking other democratic states (also known as “democratic internationalism”). This, in turn, logically leads to the idea that if the international system is populated by democracies, there will be no more violent conflict between states. Unfortunately, even if the above is taken as a given, the democratic peace theory does not work in the context of US foreign policy due to its thin definition of democracy as polyarchy (aka elite democracy). This section explicates three important problems with the policy of elite “democracy promotion”: 1) democratic peace theory is premised upon states, not on the lives of individuals. Though,
it is likely that more democracies will mean some increased freedom for some individuals.

Democracy, especially elite democracy, is not in and of itself the solution. Democratic peace theory is premised on states as the primary actor, therefore the current practice of “democracy promotion” may mean short-term support for authoritarian regimes.  

Following from the above, the definition of democracy most often applied is polyarchy or elite democracy. The state centric model is partially challenged by the emergence, following Robinson, of a transnational capitalist class. The critique of the democratic peace theory’s state centrism also exposes the discursive function of the stated goals of the new global security agenda as a means of masking or disguising the actual practice of promoting polyarchy. The use of elite nonviolence to promote the imperial ambitions of the U.S. calls into question the absolute goodness of nonviolence often expressed by Gandhi. For this reason it is useful to employ the new terms elite and/or imperial nonviolence to differentiate between those nonviolent practices that are for the many or for the few.

Finally, elite identity changes over time and determines who should be considered friend or enemy. Following Oren, this section explains that national and elite conceptions of self and other are more important than the various “facts” of the democratic peace.

The United States assumes that by spreading democracy the world will become more secure. This policy has been put into practice by force of arms in Afghanistan and Iraq and implemented elsewhere through a combination of “polyarchy” and “elite nonviolence” also. U.S. foreign policy elites mean something very different from “rule by the people” when they employ the term democracy. Thus, when answering the titular question of this section

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it will be important to first determine what definition of democracy is being used. Mansfield and Snyder agree that “well-institutionalized accountability to the median voter and well-institutionalized scrutiny of policy ideas both tend to moderate deliberations about war and peace in mature democracies.”\(^\text{104}\) This combination of accountability to voters and scrutiny of policy ideas does appear ideal for curbing rash decisions, not to mention keeping the general interest in mind. If the US policy is based upon this foundation, then perhaps democracy will promote global security. When one reads certain passages in the US NSS it is easy to assume the best intentions when, for example:

The first pillar is promoting freedom, justice, and human dignity – working to end tyranny, to promote effective democracies, and to extend prosperity through free and fair trade and wise development policies. Free governments are accountable to their people, govern their territory effectively, and pursue economic and political policies that benefit their citizens. Free governments do not oppress their people or attack other free nations. Peace and international stability are most reliably built on a foundation of freedom.\(^\text{105}\)

However, as the recent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the US ‘green lighting’ of the Ethiopian invasion of Somalia, and Drone attacks in Pakistan and Yemen have shown, even in “mature democracies” such checks break down, accountability may even disappear. If by “democracy” it is meant in fact “elite democracy” and by “security” it is meant “state security,” then global security will not be achieved by “promoting democracy.” However, if by “democracy” it is meant “popular democracy” and if by “security” it is meant “nonviolent security,” then it is conceivable that promoting democracy will achieve global security.

\(^{104}\) Mansfield and Snyder, \textit{Electing to Fight} 53.

The Democratic Peace and the problem of State Centrism

The logic of the democratic peace discussed in the previous section is based on the supposed fact that democratic states do not go to war with other democratic states. Thus, the democratic peace theory assumes a systems theory approach to international politics, one that explicitly relies upon the state as the primary actor in international relations. Though a number of authors reject elite notions of democracy, this school of thought focuses less on social movements and transnational actors than on states and standard definitions of the “national interest.” After all, the democratic peace theory focuses on states not going to war with states and less on what constitutes democracy. The problem of state-centrism has been shown to exclude discussion of non-state actors and the extent of their agency within the international system.106 The current global security agenda focuses significant attention precisely on non-state actors—terrorist organizations. In an interesting twist, the state has been significantly strengthened by the rise of non-state terrorist actors as elites use the threat of terrorism to expand the traditional structures of state power, in particular the various security and intelligence services.107

Elite democracy promotion is therefore mutually constituted by the state and the global war on terror. If democracy is going to help create global security, it is first going to have to deal with the problem of state centrism. The so-called “fight against terrorism with a global reach” results in the retrenchment not just of the America state and its democratic

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107 Mazzetti, "U.S. Is Said to Expand Secret Actions in Mideast."
state allies but also of authoritarian regimes.\textsuperscript{108} It follows logically then that, as currently practiced, two of the pillars of the new global security agenda are mutually exclusive--the war on terror does not lead to the spread of democracy. As one researcher notes with regards to Africa, “Although strengthening and extending local state authority and improving governance should contribute to dealing with local and external forms of terrorism, any approach must recognize the danger that the pretext of counterterrorism could subvert domestic democracy.”\textsuperscript{109}

The catch-22 of promoting authentic democracy that empowers people versus the state’s interest in counterterrorism and elite democracy exists both within and beyond the regional context. The logic of “the war on terror” justifies prioritizing some absolute notion of killing or capturing terrorists in conjunction with elite democratization. This also continues the age old logic of the enemy of my enemy is my friend as it unhesitatingly sells arms to those who will side with it in the war on terror.\textsuperscript{110} Thus, a militarized democratization process in the context of the global war on terrorism results in the centralization of state power at the expense of individual freedom. Simultaneously, it is assumed that with less freedom comes more security. In practice, the results are not guaranteed. Zimbabwe’s Robert Mugabe saw the “war on terror” as an opportunity to crack


down on the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) in the guise of fighting terrorism.\textsuperscript{111} The United States’ new global security agenda (as defined by the United States) requires the centralization of power in the hands of those who will fight terrorism at the expense of popular democracy.

Human freedom and security are inextricably linked and mutually constitutive. Few would disagree that security is a necessary condition for freedom, but the necessary balance between security and the conditions necessary for freedom are difficult to work out in practice.\textsuperscript{112} This is because heavy-handed approaches that emphasize military means often err on the side of a strong-man approach to state building. African leaders routinely argue that in order for them to cut down on the incidences of externally and internally motivated terrorism they will require increased funding for coercive state apparatus—specifically the police. As researchers like Mills note, “Most African police forces are in dismal shape.”\textsuperscript{113} More often than not African police are so poorly funded that they spend more time looking for bribes than looking for terrorists. Corruption is not specific to African security services but as Mills indicates, “local police are critical in the fight against terrorism” both for intelligence gathering as well as serving as first responders in the case of a successful attack.\textsuperscript{114} Western states walk a fine line between funding African and other security forces while promoting democracy and human rights as they are often mutually exclusive goals.


\textsuperscript{112} Ironically, the best “liberal” argument along these lines comes from the communitarian Amitai Etzioni: Etzioni, \textit{Security First}.

\textsuperscript{113} Mills, "Africa's New Strategic Significance," 23.

\textsuperscript{114} Ibid.
Advocates of nonviolence are usually very critical of the state, democratic or otherwise. Though Gandhi modified his understanding of the state, he maintained a healthy suspicion of policies that centralized power. He viewed the state as a soul-less machine. Not unlike Alexander Wendt’s discussion of anarchy, Gandhi argued that the state is what individuals make of it.\textsuperscript{115} Gandhi believed that the state was violent in three important ways and in order to change the state a society would need to deal with these three areas of state violence: “namely wars, the punishment of crime, and the exploitative economic system.”\textsuperscript{116}

Gandhi focused much of his attention on systems of violence. Unfortunately, he did not work out a theory of war. He had a fairly classical understanding of the causes of war. As Parekh notes, Gandhi believed that wars were caused by “the desire for wealth, power and ideological domination.”\textsuperscript{117} Modern civilization was the primary cause of the intensification of wars. Earlier eras certainly had their fair share of violence and bloodshed. The British version of civilization served as the basis for Gandhi’s critique of modern civilization and the state. While there is not enough space in this dissertation to detail Gandhi’s dim view of civilization, key elements of his critique are worth mentioning insofar as they bear on the current topic.

Gandhi referred to civilization as a “disease,” something that “hypnotise[s]” people. He writes that “a man labouring under the bane of civilization is like a dreaming man.”


\textsuperscript{116} Parekh, \textit{Gandhi’s Political Philosophy} 130.

\textsuperscript{117} Ibid.
Civilization is an illusion. Its sole premise is “bodily welfare” at the expense of spiritual growth. Civilization is a drug and human beings have become addicted and “intoxicated.” Its technological advances focus on instrumental rationality and cause a variety of human suffering: “now it is possible to take away thousands of lives by one man working behind a gun from a hill. This is civilization.”

In near Marxian terms, Gandhi writes that “thousands of workmen meet together and for the sake of maintenance work in factories or mines. Their condition is worse than that of beasts. They are obliged to work, at the risk of their lives, at most dangerous occupations, for the sake of millionaires. Formerly, men were made slaves under physical compulsion, now they are enslaved by temptation of money and of the luxuries that money can buy.”

Further, civilization twists our ethical standards such that “I have come to the conclusion that immorality is often taught in the name of morality….Civilisation seeks to increase bodily comforts, and it fails miserably even in doing so.” Along these lines, the British used education as a means for enforcing colonial rule. As Parekh reiterates, the British thought of themselves not as “masters but headmasters.” Ultimately, the colonial state was used to dehumanize and devalue the Indian subject which they conceived of as a “moderately talented people who needed to be disciplined, guided and trained in the ways of

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118 Gandhi, *Hind Swaraj and Other Writings* 34-35.
119 Ibid. 36.
120 Ibid.
121 Ibid. 37.
civilisation.”\textsuperscript{122} In sum, Gandhi viewed modern civilization and the modern state to be, at worst, hypocritical, corrupt, and a major causal factor in war and colonialism.

*Critical Nonviolence draws on the ideas of democratic individuality and sovereignty*

Critical nonviolence draws on Gandhi’s analysis of the state. Seeking to move beyond these limitations of the state identified by Gandhi, Alan Gilbert and Matthew Weinert offer a potential way out that also supports critical nonviolence. Alan Gilbert shows that democratic internationalism recognizes that citizens and workers in one state may have more in common with citizens and workers of another state than they have with the elites in their own state.\textsuperscript{123} Gilbert and Weinert’s conceptions of democratic individuality and democratic sovereignty respectively coheres closer to the Greek definition of democracy—“rule by the people”—while recognizing the idea of moral progress empirically shown by the abolition of slavery, universal suffrage, and human rights.\textsuperscript{124} By choosing nonviolence as a means for promoting democracy, a global security agenda would come closer to the ideal of freeing the people and avoid the mainstream IR field’s subservience to national sovereignty.

Weinert’s conception of “democratic sovereignty” offers a genuine alternative to the primacy of national sovereignty as a core concept, not to mention the putative mutual exclusivity of sovereignty and human rights. In fact, he carefully shows that significant misreadings of primary texts have allowed neo-realist scholars like Stephen D. Krasner and Kenneth Waltz to conceive of sovereignty as THE principle organizing factor in the

\textsuperscript{122} Parekh, *Gandhi’s Political Philosophy* 13.


international system or as “organized hypocrisy.” In Weinert’s eloquent prose, “In International Relations (IR), the idea appears in neorealist and postmodern theories of sovereignty as a double maneuver, the command backed by coercion, and in neoliberal ones as elite monopolies of power and authority. People seem to disappear, and if they appear at all, they appear subjugated.”

Finally, Ken Booth and Nicholas Wheeler recently and more hopefully appraised the state centric democratic peace in the following manner: “These architects of the new world orders assumed that if only humans could construct the right structural arrangements, then these structures would do the necessary pushing and shaping to transform human and state behavior.” While Booth and Wheeler did not have high hopes for the prospects of democratic peace, they did praise two aspects, specifically “the centrality of structures and the conviction that a better world is possible.” Ideologically driven attempts to forcefully fill the world with democratic states will most likely result in less not more security. More to the point, attempting to force people to be free will most likely result in its opposite.

The Democratic Peace and the problem of Elite Democracy

The kindest and most historically sensitive interpretations of elite democracy view it as a response to totalitarianism. The apparent “total politicization of human life” that many

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attribute to the French Revolution\textsuperscript{128} resulted in the “all-controlling state” and “mass irrationalism.”\textsuperscript{129} Elite democracy was thus conceived as a response to the horrors of fascism and the gulag.\textsuperscript{130} However, given its emphasis upon de-politicizing the public sphere, it should not be considered democracy at all. Elitism, originally stigmatized as a component of fascism, was given new life after World War II: the masses needed to be lead and “virtually begged for manipulation.” In its more technical reformulation, it strips democracy of its grassroots components and focuses entirely upon running for office and issues of national security. This new “totalitarian democracy” “justified the idea of an attenuated democracy, dissociated from political action and identified instead with protecting individual rights and promoting economic growth.”\textsuperscript{131} The term “elite democracy” is therefore just a cover for something else: oligarchy, and not necessarily the best. Robinson captures the manipulative and anti-democratic aspect the US policy of “promoting democracy”:

> When US policymakers and organic intellectuals speak of ‘promoting democracy,’ they do not, as a matter of course, mean promoting popular democracy. But more than this, they mean the suppression of popular democracy, in theory and in practice.\textsuperscript{132}

The ‘suppression of popular democracy’ is similarly captured by Gilbert’s naming of the US as “an oligarchy with parliamentary forms,”\textsuperscript{133} pointing out that “those oligarchies with


\textsuperscript{129} Wolin, \textit{Politics and Vision} 520.


\textsuperscript{131} Wolin, \textit{Politics and Vision} 521.

\textsuperscript{132} Robinson, \textit{Promoting Polyarchy} 62.

\textsuperscript{133} Gilbert, \textit{Must Global Politics Constrain Democracy?} 171.
parliamentary forms, nonetheless, harm workers and others. Such regimes fail to assure to each person what Rawls calls the ‘fair value’ of liberty.”

This comes as a shock to most Americans as they wonder why the entire world does not immediately rise up and overthrow its oppressive masters.

By tracing US foreign policy history one finds ample evidence to indicate a longer relationship with elite rule at the expense of grassroots, Greek inspired definitions of democracy. For example, Anthony asks whether President Woodrow Wilson’s refrain of democracy was simply a “ruse.” She argues that “the intensity and persistence with which he maintained an interest in the progress of democratic change probably rules this out.”

Though, this may be a too kind reading. One could make the same claim about President Bush. After all, George W. Bush routinely claimed that he was interested in the lives and human rights of Iraqis, Chinese, and Afghans. Anthony adds that “even if we expand our understanding of democratization to include some aspects of authoritarian rule, it is difficult to find a process of political liberalization in Wilson’s interventions.” In other words, even when one provides the most favorable interpretations of Wilson’s so-called democracy project, it would remain devoid of classical notions of liberalism as a project to create and open space for political participation. This is of course beside the point: if one were to

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134 Ibid. 143.


137 Ibid.: 246.
include aspects of authoritarianism into one’s definition of democracy it would indeed be a non-democracy, liberal or otherwise.

Obedience not Democracy

William I. Robinson offers a much less sympathetic though historically rich reading of the U.S. adoption of the polyarchic model: “in its Parsonian-Schumpeterian version, the polyarchic definition of democracy is equated with the stability of the capitalist order.” Robinson is particularly interested in the “essentially contested” nature of the term “democracy.” Charting the transformation of the term from the Greek words which translate clearly into rule by the people to the modern elite form captured by the term “polyarchy,” Robinson convincingly demonstrates that today the term “democracy” is really an empty vessel filled with “polyarchy.” He further explains that “this redefinition gave ‘democratic’ content to the anti-democratic essence of Mosca’s and Pareto’s earlier elitism theories, thus providing for their legitimization.” In other words, the once radical notion of democracy was co-opted in order to placate those who might resist, among other things, the rising capitalist world economy. Robinson attempts to explain the wave of democratization that occurred during the 1980s and 1990s as more appropriately understood in this context of polyarchy. He concludes that “polyarchy as a distinct form of elite rule performs the function of legitimating existing inequalities, and does so more effectively than authoritarianism.”

Noam Chomsky also argues that what the US means when it uses the language of democracy promotion is actually just code for following the United State’s orders. He writes

138 Robinson, Promoting Polyarchy 50-51.
that the US has routinely demonstrated its “contempt” for democracy: “the most extreme stand was taken by Paul Wolfowitz, who berated the Turkish military for permitting the government to abide by the wishes of 95 percent of the population, and demanded that they apologize and recognize that the duty of a democratic state is to help America.”

However, often the US uses means that are less coercive. For example, Joseph Nye discusses the “soft power” means that the US uses to further its national interest. Nye uncritically encourages the US to use more soft power while remaining able and willing to use hard power when necessary. This combination of hard and soft power is then euphemistically named “smart power.” Nye does not discuss the content of democracy while addressing the supposedly nonviolent aspects of soft power. This task is left up to critical theorists like Robinson, who describes, in considerable detail, the transformation of US foreign policy from coercion to consensual hegemony: “the impulse to ‘promote democracy’ is the rearrangement of political systems in the peripheral and semi-peripheral zones of the ‘world system’ so as to secure the underlying objective of maintaining essentially undemocratic societies inserted into an unjust international system.”

Though it is unlikely that the United States will bomb countries that have conformed to the polyarchy model, the logic of the putative democratic peace cannot apply to obedient as opposed democratic states.

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139 Chomsky, *Hegemony or Survival* 247, see also: 61-62.


Robinson’s critique at times seems to reveal a conspiracy and for that reason some reviewers may find his argument suspect. However, his discussion of organizations like the National Endowment for Democracy, Freedom House, Council on the Americas, and not to mention “project democracy” collectively reveal that elite democracy is consciously promoted through various supposedly non-governmental organizations. Ultimately, these groups do indeed “conspire” though not in the same sense that some refer to the Kennedy assassinations. There are, after all, very public organizations responsible for promoting democracy. Robinson points out that, “the goal is to construct a functioning oligarchic model of power and a polyarchic system which links local elites to the transnational elite.”

Disturbing indeed, these “political warfare specialists” employed by the various democracy promotion organizations are not even aligned with one or the other political parties and in fact transcend party lines.

As was discussed in chapter three, a series of controversies have sprung up over the use of nonviolent tactics to promote democracy. Writing for the *Los Angeles Times*, conservative commentator Max Boot writes that the Orange revolution in the Ukraine is proof that democracy promotion is an absolute good:

> These revolutions reveal the hollowness of the cliché that "democracy can't be imposed by outsiders." True, but outsiders can help committed democrats overcome internal obstacles. Sometimes, when dealing with an entrenched dictatorship, this requires military intervention of the kind that occurred in Iraq and Afghanistan. More brittle regimes can be brought down by their own people, but even they often need a little external shove.  

142 Ibid. 97.

Boot’s analysis, from the political right, is similar to the views of many liberals. Indeed, there has been a veritable growth industry in literature on democracy promotion.

The use of democracy promoting Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) has only recently been criticized as a tool of American empire on a wider basis.\(^{144}\) Joan Roelofs, an exceptional example, writes:

> Foundations want to teach democracy, but missing from their lessons is the consideration of whether massive funding and threatening as election techniques have anything to do with ‘government by the consent of the governed.’ Democracy promoters are not very interested in political parties and unions in the United States, but foundations consider them the pure will of the people elsewhere. A leading democracy promoter asserts that United States and Western Europe did a fine job using political parties and elections to overthrow the Yugoslav government; his major concern is that the techniques might not work so well elsewhere.\(^{145}\)

The use of democracy promoting Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) has only recently been criticized as a tool of American empire on a wider basis.\(^{146}\) This may be in part because fewer political left critics wished to attack the practice of using nonviolent democracy promotion given its seemingly salutary impact as compared to the use of force.

Nonetheless, the U.S. government has been overtly supporting democracy promotion since the Reagan era when that president created the National Endowment for Democracy (NED).\(^{147}\) In 2000 the U.S. spent $41 million on anti-Milosevic efforts, in particular on the dissident group Otpor! In the lead up to the 2004 “Orange Revolution” the US spent $65 million, funneled through groups like Freedom House and the NED. Ostensibly these funds go towards training election monitors, strengthening civil society groups and unions,

\(^{144}\) The exception being Robinson, *A Faustian Bargain*, Robinson, *Promoting Polyarchy*.


\(^{146}\) The exception being Robinson, *A Faustian Bargain*, Robinson, *Promoting Polyarchy*.

\(^{147}\) http://www.ned.org/ The mission statement reads: “supporting freedom around the world.”
and social movements that opposed the Kuchma government. Over time, this host of foundations and NGOs have come under growing criticism. As the political scientist Mark Beissinger writes, “fostering democratic revolution has now become an international business….Since the Serbian revolution, for instance, Otpor activists have become, as one Serbian analyst put it, ‘a modern type of mercenary,’ traveling the world, often in the pay of the U.S. government or NGOs, in order to train local groups in how to organize a democratic revolution.”

Some critics worry that this approach is faulty because it does not take into consideration the Burkean strand of democracy development mentioned earlier, that democracy must grow organically and over time from the ground up. As Beissinger writes, “the problem lies in the consequences of packaging, exporting, and spreading democratic revolution like a module across a broad array of settings, irrespective of local circumstances.” From this perspective the problem is not so much that the US is promoting its particular interests through nonviolence and democracy promotion but rather that “failed revolution can in fact be worse for democratic development than the protracted evolution of civil society.” Beissinger concludes with a warning for the United States not fall into the same trap that destroyed the reputation of communism during the Cold War:

The attempt by professional revolutionaries to stimulate global revolution and provide “a little extra shove” to what they envisioned as the march of history, and even to engage in externally induced regime-change through military means, transformed their movement into a tool of state power, perverted its goals and

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149 Ibid.
meaning, generated a series of unstable postrevolutionary regimes, and ultimately unleashed forces that it did not understand and could not control.\footnote{150}{Ibid.}

The United States’ use of nonviolence as a means of promoting empire is thereby transforming a radical and anti-colonial theory and practice into a pro-imperial practice: Imperial nonviolence.

*Imperial Nonviolence*

Imperialism is a difficult term to adequately define and therefore remains highly contested. Chalmers Johnson argues that the United States is an empire. Even he discusses US imperialism in historical and evolving terms. In the post World War II era he uses the term in Stalin’s sense of “whoever occupies a territory also imposes on it his own social system. Everyone imposes his own social system as far as his army has power to do so.” However, Johnson modifies the term: “for the United States it came to include most of the rest of the world—places where the United States assumed responsibility for maintaining some ill-defined ‘favorable’ military environment (what the Pentagon now likes to call ‘stability’) and where we insisted on free access for our multinational corporations and financiers (what our economists now call ‘globalization’).”\footnote{151}{Johnson, *Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of American Empire* 20-21.} Johnson’s definition is useful and gets at some important elements. However, it fails to address the deterritorialization of social forces mentioned earlier. If one removes the national component of Johnson’s definition, then what remains is sufficient.

The construction of elite democracies poses a problem to this dissertation’s argument regarding the use of nonviolence in international politics. To the extent that
nonviolence is used by national and transnational elites to create polyarchic regimes, nonviolence is no more radical or transformative than violent means of change. Those critics of violence, for example, who note that what a social movement wins through force must be maintained by force, may make a moderately convincing argument that at least an elite nonviolence strategy has the benefit of resulting in less violence. This should be viewed as a good thing. Gene Sharp says essentially this in response to an interviewer:

**SPENCER:** Recently we showed the film about Otpor and the overthrow of Milosevic, *Bringing Down a Dictator*. Lots of pro-Milosevic people were present. The real issue for them is, here is the evil US (and most of us do think US policies often are pretty evil) funding this nonviolent resistance. To them that's a cardinal sin. A government cannot fund or sponsor the overthrow of another government!

**SHARP:** Why not?

**SPENCER:** Because the US has interests and it's supposedly immoral to have interests. Nobody is surprised that the US gives guns to people, but the idea that they assisted the Serbs to get rid of Milosevic seems somehow especially evil. To my mind, it is particularly the US, of all countries, that I want to see supporting nonviolence. It would be the greatest thing in the world for the US adopt nonviolence.

**SHARP:** What do they prefer that the US spend the money on?

**SPENCER:** They just shouldn't interfere. No country should interfere in the affairs of another country.

**SHARP:** Like Nazi Germany? That's a clear example. No country should have been upset with the Nazi regime? Whoever is in control of the state apparatus, no matter what they do, should be untouchable? That is gross! I think any superpower has a responsibility to explore other kinds of struggles that might be developed so that frustrated people seeking democracy don't kill thousands of people. Superpowers should devote one or two percent of their military budgets to exploring these other possibilities. That's the least that one could ask for.\(^{152}\)

However, elite democracy maintains systems of inequality and thus remains susceptible to internal divisions. Elites will then continue to implement tactics of social control that may

\(^{152}\) Sharp and Spencer, "Gene Sharp 101."
or may not be “violent” but are unjust or at the very least manipulative. While elite-nonviolence has been used to co-opt popular-nonviolence, it ensures the continuation of power in the hands of an elite class even though it may usher the end of a particular elite’s rule (see Chile’s elite nonviolent overthrow of Pinochet). The Canadian journalist and political blogger Stephen Gowans takes up the problem that Sharp fails to answer in the quotation above: “NVR [nonviolent resistance], as defined by Peter Ackerman, following his docent, Gene Sharp, is a means to an end, not an end itself. The end is taking political power.”

Gowans is concerned about the uses and, more importantly, the misuses, of nonviolence. As he writes, “Successful destabilization campaigns…have invariably led to the strengthening of U.S. financial and corporate interests abroad, and the coming to power of governments oriented to opening doors to US investment and exports. This has been true in Serbia, Georgia and Ukraine.” In addition, Robinson offers this sobering analysis of elite or ‘low intensity’ democracy: “The promotion of ‘low intensity democracy’ is aimed not only at mitigating the social and political tensions produced by elite based and undemocratic status quos, but also at suppressing popular and mass aspirations for more thoroughgoing democratization of social life in the twenty-first century international order.”

A Possible Counter-example: the case of South Africa

Even if nonviolence is being used for imperial purposes, there are counter examples that show that popular nonviolence is still at work in grassroots social movements. In

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154 Gowans, "Nonviolent Warfare: Questioning Ends, Not Means."

155 Robinson, Promoting Polyarchy 6.
contrast to Robinson’s and others’ trenchant critique of polyarchy as nonviolence, Kurt Schock describes the anti-Apartheid movement’s ability to destabilize the state through the dedicated work of a united grassroots movement. He approvingly notes that in spite of the existence of an armed wing of the ANC, the major organizations within the larger movement recognized that the Apartheid state was not actually threatened by violent opposition. Rather, “segments of the opposition realized the strategic virtue of methods of nonviolent action and also realized that state power was more likely to be undermined through nonviolent action than through violence.”156 Schock identifies a number of tactics within the rubric of “nonviolence” that include methods of concentration such as mass demonstrations, protest marches, occupations of public spaces and buildings as well as methods of dispersion such as strikes, boycotts, underground press, and shadow governments.

The South African case is but one of many that showcases the power of grassroots nonviolence to transform oppressive regimes and create the necessary pre-conditions for nonviolence. As Stephen Zunes summarizes, “it practiced one of history’s most elaborate systems of internal colonialism, with a white minority composed of less than one-fifth of the population in absolute control.”157 Apartheid was overthrown as a result of grassroots nonviolence and a democratic black majority government was established in its place. For example, Joshua Paulson writes approvingly about one element of that movement—the 1984-1987 school boycotts throughout South Africa. Student demands were initially small and included the end of administration doctored and manipulated exam scores, “excessive”

156 Schock, *Unarmed Insurrections* 159.

corporal punishment, as well as demands for older students to be allowed to register for classes. In the years leading up to the boycotts in the 1980s, an organization of high school students, the Congress of South African Students (COSAS) formed to help coordinate activities. During the protests, COSAS began to demand the formation of “Student Representative Councils.” This was a classic civil society tool meant to filter demands from the students to the government organizations responsible for enforcing all those hated policies implemented by the Apartheid regime in the schools.

As the police reaction to the boycotts became increasingly violent and the government eventually declared a state of emergency, the students raised the bar. By September of 1984 some 160,000 students were on strike and they were demanding complete withdrawal of Apartheid regime police forces from the townships, the release of those students imprisoned during the boycotts, and the rescinding of the rent increases in the townships. During this time there were also a number of violent clashes with the police. While these activities did not end Apartheid, they did help to create some of the needed civil society organizations associated with democracy or at the very least swaraj in the Gandhian terminology of “self-rule.” Indeed, these activities eventually led to a parallel education system complete with syllabi and new teaching materials. By the peak, some 250,000 students were boycotting. Finally, Joshua Paulson observes, “although these school boycotts did not end the oppression by themselves, they mobilized and organized people to resist and helped to build up the forces that finally led to fundamental change.”¹⁵⁸

The South African case serves to indicate the possibilities of popular nonviolence to aid democratic transitions. It does not entirely solve the problem of elite democracy or the insidiousness of global capitalism as it seeks to create a world after its own image. William Robinson shows that factions among the white elites of South Africa were convinced to choose to side with the anti-Apartheid movement for instrumental reasons. Naomi Klein’s recent critique of the South African economy appears to confirm Robinson’s suspicions. She reveals that those same elites essentially traded political power for economic power. Klein writes:

the de Klerk government had a twofold strategy. First, drawing on the ascendant Washington Consensus that there was now only one way to run an economy, it portrayed key sectors of economic decision making—such as trade policy and the central bank—as “technical” or “administrative.” Then it used a wide range of new policy tools—international trade agreements, innovations in constitutional law and structural adjustment programs—to hand control of those power centers to supposedly impartial experts, economists and officials from the IMF, the World Bank, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the National Party—anyone except the liberation fighters from the ANC. It was a strategy of balkanization, not of the country’s geography (as de Klerk had originally attempted) but of its economy.  

One does not need to slavishly hold on to the notion of moral progress to see that, while flawed, the current government in South Africa is better than the Apartheid era’s racist regime. It does force those who are interested in social change to remember that transformation is an ongoing process and that as long as there is injustice the struggle must go on. As Gene Sharp argues, it is important to prepare for the transition to democracy lest authoritarians cease the moment. Klein is justifiably suspicious of the fact that elite capitalist forces were able to so quickly take control of the South Africa economy.

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160 Sharp and Spencer, “Gene Sharp 101.”
The problem of elite democracy and imperial nonviolence is further compounded by an implicit identity crisis. As the next section will discuss, the democracy promotion pillar fails in part because US democracy in particular is not based upon a static self-understanding. Throughout history, the United States’ elites have reconceived their state’s identity to suit the identity of their friends (and vice versa). With the ongoing fluctuation in U.S. identity, one must wonder: ‘Will the spread of democracy create security?’

**The Democratic Peace and the problem of Self and “Other”**

In order for the democracy promotion pillar to succeed several conditions must be met. The first is a common definition of democracy. Second, states recognized as democratic must be universally recognized as such. In other words, states ought not to change status based upon subjective interpretations of democracy but rather on objective, universalizable criteria. Ido Oren’s critique of the democratic peace is illustrates the depths of this problem. He argues persuasively that the democratic peace is better described as a theory that nation-states do not go to war with nation-states they perceive to be “like us.” As Oren argues, “the democratic peace claim is not about democracies per se as much as it is about countries that are ‘America-like’ or of ‘our kind’.” Oren’s critique is contingent upon one important flaw in the democratic peace literature: “it overlooks the fact that these values have changed over time.”161 For example, Oren observes that the important democratic peace data sets (Polity II) currently code Imperial Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Russia far behind the UK, France and the United States in terms of democracy. However, the political

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scientists and policy makers of 100 years ago thought differently: “to them, Imperial Germany was a member of a select group of states—modern, constitutional, administrative, cohesive national-states—that were politically the most developed on earth.”

Oren bases his argument on the theories of early American political scientists (the founder of the first American graduate program in political science) John Burgess and Woodrow Wilson. His interpretive review of the intellectual and foreign policy history of these early political scientists rejects the very foundation of the democratic peace. He shows how the conception of “democracy” has changed over time and thus how the a-historic model of democracy used by the theorists of the democratic peace is inconsistent. He argues that Americans thought that Germany (or “the united states of Germany”) was a model of excellence, based upon its constitutionalism and republicanism. It was only after some of the relationship between the two began to wane that opinions began to change. Burgess, for his part, remained a Germanophile until he died.

In a more recent account of his argument, Oren provides a number of other examples to buttress his view. For instance, he observes that American Political Science Review printed a favorable review of the English translation of Adolf Hitler’s Mein Kampf. Contemporary Political Science has been whitewashed, “most contemporary political scientists know nothing about the Teutonic theory of the founder of their discipline, are unaware of Woodrow Wilson’s admiration of Prussian municipal self-government and are

\[\text{162} \text{ Oren, } "\text{The Subjectivity of The "Democratic" Peace: Changing U.S. Perceptions of Imperial Germany}," 269.\]

\[\text{163} \text{ Ido Oren, } \text{Our Enemies and US: America's Rivalries and the Making of Political Science} (\text{Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003}) 8, 84.\]
remarkably uncurious about their discipline’s contemporaneous view of Nazism.”\textsuperscript{164} It is worth quoting the specific \textit{American Political Science Review} book review at length in order to understand the height of admiration the reviewer from Oberlin College displays:

> It should be noted that this volume contains only a little more than one-third of the original \textit{Mein Kampf}. But I cannot agree with those who claim that the American edition soft-pedals the original. The very title rather suggests the opposite; for Kampf would better have been translated "struggle" instead of "battle," which gives it a military concept; and Hitler is not here concerned primarily with making the nation a military power, but with giving an account of the rise of the National Socialist movement, his philosophy of state, and his theory of government. Within the limits selected, the translator has given a very fair picture of Hitler in all of his ranges; he has included his worst characteristics, among them his inordinate intolerance of the Jews, and also his most enlightened comments on the theory of the state and the nature of government, such as "human rights are above state rights" and "the best form of state is that which, with natural sureness of hand, raises the best brains of the community to a position of leadership and predominant influence.\textsuperscript{165}

The point is not to make more out of this one review than is merited; rather it is to show, in the context of Woodrow Wilson and John Burgess (founding fathers of the discipline of political science) how the field’s view of democracy has evolved.

Oren also goes into considerable detail on the role of American political scientists’ roles in the US-Vietnam War as well as their historically close ties to the various clandestine services. Oren also asks and answers the following question: “How can we explain the internal inconsistency of the discipline’s self-image?” He responds to this question throughout his book but he answers succinctly with the following: “the constitutive paradox of the discipline—that it is putatively objective but at the same time aligned with democracy—becomes less paradoxical once we recognize that the meanings of both political

\textsuperscript{164} Ibid. 173.

\textsuperscript{165} Karl F. Geiser, "Review of 'Germany Twilight or Dawn?' by Anonymous, and 'My Battle' by Adolph Hitler," \textit{The American Political Science Review} 28, no. 1 (1934): 137-38.
‘science’ and ‘democracy’ have evolved in the context of America’s changing international rivalries.”\textsuperscript{166} If Oren is correct, then spreading democracy will not create security either globally or for the United States.

The infusion of a regulative nonviolent theory into the study and practice of international politics and security may work to assuage the challenges of self and other that Oren presents. For example, the self-other dichotomy reflects both the study and practice of current (and past) international politics. If the perpetual viewing of other regimes as “like us” or “unlike us” were modified to something more along the lines of first asking “what elements of this other regime are ‘like us’?” then it may be possible to reduce the amount of violence at the international level. This would still fall well within the standard Machiavellian social science realism’s “objective truth.” After all, if the US had asked even as late as the mid-1990s “what element of the Iranian moderate government is ‘like-us’?” it is conceivable that Iran might look very different to the United States today than it does. The Gandhian conception of “relative truth” bears restatement: “Where there is honest effort, it will be realized that what appear to be different truths are like the countless and apparently different leaves of the same tree.”\textsuperscript{167} Oren’s own “way out” must also be considered because he specifically addresses it to Political Science.

Though there are several good sources to cite and draw upon to make the case for a critical study and practice of the profession of political science, Oren makes the case for a

\textsuperscript{166} Oren, \textit{Our Enemies and US} 176.

\textsuperscript{167} Gandhi, \textit{The Essential Writings of Mahatma Gandhi} 232.
particularly political science version of critical theory.\textsuperscript{168} He dubs this “reflexivity.” In his words, “a reflexive political science is a science that self-consciously takes into account the historical position of its own scholarship. It is a science that theorizes historical political processes in ways that illuminate the relationship of these processes to the theory itself.” By way of example, Oren refers to his own work analyzing the democratic peace: “a reflexive approach entails viewing democratic peace scholarship as a part of, rather than apart from, the very historical process of international politics on which it purports to shed light. Rather than study ‘the fact of the democratic peace,’ as students of international relations commonly do, reflexivity directs us to inquire into the history of the analytical concepts, including ‘democracy,’ which the discipline uses to measure, classify, and order its ‘facts.’”\textsuperscript{169}

SECTION III: IS THE STRATEGY OF PREVENTIVE WAR AN EFFECTIVE MEANS OF SPREADING DEMOCRACY?

It is becoming ever more evident that democracy cannot be fostered by force of arms, especially not in poorly prepared nations. ~Amitai Etzioni\textsuperscript{170}

The theory that purports to create security can only do so by first creating insecurity. Andrew Bacevich argues that the current US emphasis upon democracy dates as far as back to the presidency of Woodrow Wilson. As Bacevich notes, at the core of Wilson’s vision was a “world remade in America’s image and therefore permanently at peace. This was true

\textsuperscript{168} As opposed to a Frankfurt School or Gramscian/Coxian approach, both of which he feels are too steeped in philosophy

\textsuperscript{169} Oren, Our Enemies and US 178

\textsuperscript{170} Etzioni, Security First 1.
when Wilson first articulated that vision and remains true today.”\textsuperscript{171} Moreover, Bacevich takes special notice of the rise in militarism in American foreign policy as opposed to previous times. He writes, “Mainstream politicians today take as a given that American military supremacy is an unqualified good, evidence of a larger American superiority.”\textsuperscript{172} Based on Bacevich’s observations, the question becomes, ‘Is the strategy of preventative war an effective means of spreading democracy, or is this a negative venture undertaken for the good of the United States that ultimately results in far more costly and negative effects?’

Addressing this question, this section is thematically divided into three central sub-sections that each answer the title question of this section in the negative: 1) Since there is no global social contract between, for example, a world state and a global citizenry, it is illegal to force people to be free. This argument takes as its starting point a reading of Rousseau’s idea of the social contract and his discussion of being “forced to be free.” 2) When the United States says freedom it means something entirely different from popular freedom. With this in mind, even if the US did succeed in imposing democracy from above, it would be an empty victory because in order for the democratic peace theory to function, the world must be comprised of popular democracies. 3) Adding to the discussion in of Anti-terrorism: by failing to impose democracy through preventive war, more terrorists and terrorist activities are created in resistance to US occupation. As such, these realms of


\textsuperscript{172} Ibid. 15.
resistance (e.g. Afghanistan and Iraq) serve as proving grounds and have even featured in recruitment propaganda on Jihadi websites.\textsuperscript{173}

**Forcing people to be free implies some form of social contract**

In order then that the social compact may not be an empty formula, it tacitly includes the undertaking, which alone can give force to the rest, that whoever refuses to obey the general will shall be compelled to do so by the whole body. This means nothing less than that he will be forced to be free; for this is the condition which, by giving each citizen to his country, secures him against all personal dependence. In this lies the key to the working of the political machine; this alone legitimises civil undertakings, which, without it, would be absurd, tyrannical, and liable to the most frightful abuses. ~Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *The Social Contract*\textsuperscript{174}

People everywhere want to be able to speak freely; choose who will govern them; worship as they please; educate their children—male and female; own property; and enjoy the benefits of their labor. These values of freedom are right and true for every person, in every society—and the duty of protecting these values against their enemies is the common calling of freedom-loving people across the globe and across the ages. ~2002 US National Security Strategy\textsuperscript{175}

Rousseau’s conception of the “general will” is softened here by his criticism of “tyrannical” and “frightening abuses.” In an age of globalization, the notion of a “general will” takes on a whole new meaning; with the multiplying of social, political, economic and other human interactions it is possible to imagine a global government or even a world state.\textsuperscript{176} As human beings living on the planet Earth begin conceiving of themselves as part of a global community a frightening possibility may emerge: What if a powerful clique rises to power and decides that outliers in the system need to be, in Rousseau’s words, “forced to

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Paul Reynolds, "Iraq War 'Helped Al-Qaeda Recruit' " *BBC*, October 19 2004.
\item Bush, *US NSS 2002*.
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\end{footnotesize}
be free”? The US and global elites have essentially become that clique and the preventive war doctrine amounts to a violent means of forcing others to be free. Unlike Rousseau’s clear concern for legal equality, the strategy of preventive war pays no respect to conventions, democratic or otherwise. In this context, could the notion of “forced to be free” be used to justify and even inspire something like a world empire? Rousseau notes, for example, in his defense of the social contract that “after the state is constituted, residence implies consent: to inhabit the territory is to submit to the sovereign.”

Given that Rousseau’s writings inspired Robespierre and “the Terror” of the Jacobins and the sansculottes, it is not such a stretch to imagine further terrible applications of an idea such as the general will, which can eventually assume a life beyond the context and intentions of its original author. For example, while the U.S.’s extraterritorial conceptions do indicate a global understanding, it lacks legitimacy and thus acts not even as a tyranny of the majority but as an oligarchy (the rule of the few over the many). It is the stated goal of the US to support democracy everywhere (at least in theory) while in practice it attempts to instead impose obedience.

Rousseau’s work can and should be read differently. Rousseau writes in a footnote:

In Genoa the word Libertas may be seen on the doors of all the prisons and on the fetters of the galleys. This use of the motto is excellent and just. In fact, it is only the malefactors of all states who prevent the citizens from being free. In a country where all such people were in the galleys, the most perfect liberty would be enjoyed.

178 Hobsbawm, *The Age of Revolution 1789-1848*.
To those familiar with the works of George Orwell and/or Aldus Huxley, this passage may produce a chill. However, the potentially disturbing passage in praise of the quotation on the prison door can be read as an endorsement for locking up not just petty criminals but, more inline with norms of universal law, the likes of Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz and others. For, surely they have the greater ability to “prevent the citizens from being free.” As the architects of the GWOT, they have helped to restrict freedom both at home and abroad by authorizing torture, extraordinary rendition, illegal wire-taps of US citizens, and the assassination of enemy leaders. Thus, the substantive difference between the two epigraphs to this section is between Rousseau’s respect for the law and the American administration’s contempt for the law.

Rousseau is also more subtle (or radical) with regard to law. His discussion of the sovereign indicates that he is in favor of law. His concluding footnote to Book I serves to explicitly limit the sovereign even further: “under a bad government, this equality is only an appearance and an illusion; it serves only to keep the poor in their wretchedness and sustain the rich in their usurpation. In truth, laws are always useful to those with possessions and harmful to those who have nothing; from which it follows that the social state is advantageous to men only when all possess something and none has too much.”

Rousseau posits the traditionally conservative argument that “it is what is common to those different which yields the social bond; if there were no point on which separate interests

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coincided, then society could not conceivably exist.” In other words, social cohesion and collective action are socially and politically foundational for mutual recognition. Without the resultant social bond, there would be no community and no democracy. The imposition of democracy from above inherently contradicts the notion of a popular democracy from below, Rousseau’s “general will.” It also buttresses the conservative element of Mansfield and Snyder’s arguments in Electing to Fight: democratic institutions must precede elections.

Two scholars demonstrate the veracity of Mansfield and Snyder’s work (and Rousseau’s theoretical insights) two scholars have recently asked, “What does history tells [sic] us about the prospects for democracy in post-invasion Iraq and Afghanistan?” Andrew J. Enterline and J. Michael Greig go on to show, through historical analysis, that democracy imposed through force does not typically last (thus confirming the point that democratic institutions must precede elections). Enterline and Greig examine 43 cases of “imposed democratic regimes” defined as “democratic governments installed by a foreign power in which the foreign power plays an important role in the establishment, promotion, and maintenance of the institutions of government.” In addition to asserting that promoting democracy by force is an ephemeral and therefore empty venture, these authors also demonstrate that the pre-Iraq invasion information would have shown that imposed democratic regimes usually fail. The two cases used as arguments in favor of imposed democracy by the Bush administration (post-WWII Japan and Germany) were rare

182 Ibid. 69.
184 Ibid.
185 Ibid.: 323.
exceptions to the overwhelming body of evidence. In addition, the chances for democracy are dramatically affected by the actions during the first 10 years of imposition by force. In contrast to arguments made by Mansfield and Snyder (opposing quick transitions to democracy), Enterline and Greig show that quick institutionalization of democratic norms and practices are essential for the survival of newly imposed democracies. Dramatically, the authors conclude: “our analysis of the long-term implications of imposed democratic regimes suggests that historically these exceptions are not borne out. Rather, the likelihood of democracy returning to these two states is significantly lower than had the U.S. and its allies not imposed democratic institutions….If the current efforts at democracy fail, it is unlikely that there will be a second chance at democracy in either state in the foreseeable future.”

For those who advocate a timely and responsible withdrawal from Iraq and Afghanistan, it is not clear from Enterline and Grieg’s work what future policy is best. One could certainly interpret their research as an argument for continued military occupation, though probably organized differently (perhaps looking to the example of the UN nation building project in East Timor/Timor Leste). The logical extension of their argument may be that the US faces a choice between research that shows that long transitions fail and research that shows that states that have experienced failed transitions to democracy almost never become democracies. Though the logic does not appear to offer an easy policy choice, it is likely that it will be used to confirm a more colloquial argument known as the china shop rule: if you break it, you buy it. In other words, though it was a bad idea to begin

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with, the fact that the United States did invade and occupy Afghanistan and Iraq, causing untold suffering on their populations, the United States is duty-bound to continue to attempt to create stable democracies in both countries.

Indeed, this is essentially the moral argument offered up by Seymour Hersh, one of the staunchest critics of the Bush policy. In a recent interview with the Guardian, Hersh speculated about Iraq:

We have a moral obligation to the people of Iraq that goes beyond anything that anyone's talking about. The notion that it's their problem, that we should just leave... I mean, can you believe what we've done to their society? Imagine the psychosis, the insanity, that we've induced.

Hersh’s may also appear similar to the china shop logic. However, it is different in one important way, Hersh does not suggest that a policy of more American troops will work. Rather, Hersh sees a multinational force operating under the auspices of the United Nations. He does not claim that this is a magic wand; rather it is a policy that coheres with our moral obligation. The current debate within the United States with regards to Iraq presents a false dichotomy: either the US keeps troops there to protect the fledgling democracy or it leaves and chaos ensues.

Hersh’s more skeptical view of US intentions towards Afghanistan and Iraq, in turn, help to provide a critical reading of Enterline and Grieg who are too optimistic about the intentions of US policy. Fatima Ayub and Sari Kouvo offer a more sobering account: “despite the fact that the US-led war in Afghanistan was explicitly not a humanitarian intervention, American policy-makers would come to embrace the language and rhetoric of a

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humanitarian cause.” To a certain extent Ayub and Kouvo understate this point. During the initial bombing and subsequent invasion of Afghanistan, the US State Department’s website stated in no uncertain terms the war in Afghanistan was a war for women’s rights. The “surge” in 2007-2008 was also described in similar terms. Anthony Dimaggio writes, for example, that “Editorials and reporting framed the surge as an example of U.S. humanitarianism in action, as the Bush administration was congratulated for its alleged success in limiting Iraq’s sectarian violence.” American’s are once again under the impression that they have been called upon to sacrifice their lives and their treasure to help Afghans who are apparently not very appreciative. The more US leaders insist on re-writing history, the less likely American citizens will be able to make intelligent decisions regarding national and global security policy.

The humanitarian argument for the invasion of Afghanistan is particularly complicated due to the number of people who supported it. Now that the war against Afghanistan has been raging for over eight years and has become the longest US war, Human rights and other international legal experts especially take issue with the use of preventive war to “spread democracy.” In particular they raise the issue of masking raw issues of national interest with the language of human rights and humanitarian intervention. Few deny that preventive wars to spread democracy are illegal. However, as Ayub and Kouvo explain, such maneuvers also damage the concept of humanitarian intervention:


“More is in question than the future of Afghanistan. The disingenuous conflation of a military intervention with a humanitarian one, first in Afghanistan and then more brazenly in Iraq, has raised new difficulties for the paradigm and discourse of humanitarianism and the justifiable use of force to protect vulnerable populations.”

Thus, preventive war does not work to spread democracy because it violates the primary definition of democracy as self-rule, “rule by the people.” One cannot impose freedom without some kind of social contract as indicated both theoretically by Rousseau and empirically by Mansfield and Snyder.

Whereas Rousseau offers a concept of a social contract, one where respect for law is paramount and where law is geared towards protecting all those who respect it, American foreign policy has the opposite effect. Instead of creating a global system where the law is held in esteem, it is creating a system where the United States and those global elites it represents are above the law, punishing only those who resist. The US continues to use the language of democracy, human rights, and freedom and though those words still retain their more theoretically rich meanings, the continued distortion of these words by the US is turning them into symbols rather than signs where democracy means all things to all people—thus becoming meaningless over time. The next section shows that the US notion of freedom is really just a cover for promoting obedience instead of democracy.

**America’s definition of freedom does not cohere with popular freedom**

When an acquired state has been accustomed to living in freedom under its own laws, there are three ways of securing it. The first is to destroy it; the second, to move there oneself; the third, to let it live with its own laws, exacting a tribute and

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191 Ayub and Kouvo, "Righting the Course? Humanitarian Intervention, the War on Terror and the Future of Afghanistan," 648.
creating within it a regime of a selected few who will keep it friendly toward you.

~Machiavelli\textsuperscript{192}

The United States claims that it wants to spread democracy but really it wants only obedience. William Robinson offers the following simple advice for those who want to evaluate US policy: “US foreign policy is not to be analyzed on the basis of what policymakers say they do, but on what they actually do.”\textsuperscript{193} When America says “freedom” it really means obedience. As Robinson implies, ‘actions speak louder than word.’ Even if there is marginal success in imposing democracy through invasion and long-term occupation, the practical application of democracy by the United States is in fact imperial in nature and makes a mockery of the original Greek meaning of the word: “rule by the people.” As Chomsky argues, the United States only uses the rhetoric of democracy. In practice, the United States wants only obedience.\textsuperscript{194} Andrew Bacevich similarly concludes that, “Altruistic concern for the well-being of lesser nations, even the most innocent, does not explain the behavior of great powers, even democratic ones.”\textsuperscript{195} The quotation from Machiavelli at the beginning of this section appears to be more in keeping with US foreign policy as the United States seeks obedience, it does everything in its power to install “a selected few who will keep it friendly toward” it.

US foreign policy practices have been shown to be about social control, not freedom. For example, Robinson argues, “the political project of the transnational elite is


\textsuperscript{193} Robinson, \textit{Promoting Polyarchy} 5.

\textsuperscript{194} Chomsky, \textit{Hegemony or Survival: America’s Quest for Global Dominance}.

\textsuperscript{195} Bacevich, \textit{New American Militarism} 190.
the consolidation of political systems that function through consensual mechanisms of social control.” By taking control of the “consensual mechanisms of social control” Robinson means those “democratic institutions” discussed by Mansfield and Snyder (e.g. elections). Thus, “The new elites in the South have entered into alliances to ‘promote democracy,’ or to develop ‘democratic’ consensual forms of social control in their countries in contrast to the earlier forms of authoritarian or dictatorial control.”\footnote{196} By installing elites in elections as opposed to by force of arms, the US creates the appearance of fairness and respect for the rule of law. It still gets what it wants but it does not have to use the same amount of resources as it would if it were to impose a dictator. Robinson reveals the transformation of previously coercive mechanisms of social control into consensual forms. Specifically, this transformation is from dictatorship to democracy. In the post September 11 world, it would appear that the era of consensual politics was in fact short lived as the US directly and violently imposes its will in Afghanistan and Iraq. Though it does it less directly in Pakistan, Somalia, and Yemen, it is still violent.

The era of democracy promotion is not over and Robinson’s argument is in fact more subtle and interesting than is revealed by the binary opposition between coercive and consensual politics. For example, his discussion of polyarchy as “low-intensity democracy” makes it clear that even in a world of consensual politics, freedom does not factor into the equation. At issue is the means with which polyarchy is promoted. Because, even in the post September 11 world, the stated goal of the 21st century global security agenda is the creation of a world system that benefits a transnational elite, not an egalitarian social system. Having said this, both political candidates for the 2008 presidential election argued that the

\footnote{196 Robinson, Promoting Polyarchy 37.}
United States needed to tone down its rhetoric and its militarism. The evidence indicates that the United States speaks rhetorically when it comes to promoting democracy and only pays lip service to the US Declaration of Independence which clearly states that all men (today read: human beings) are created equal and endowed by their creator with certain inalienable rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Thus while the National Security Strategy (NSS) stresses American military preponderance combined with a will to fight on multiple fronts, it also devotes a considerable amount of rhetorical space to freedom and the support of nonviolent political practice. Following Robinson’s advice that US foreign policy should be judged not on what elites say but rather what they do, emphasis needs to be placed not only on the language of freedom but the contrast between the language of freedom and the practice of regime change. It is possible, then, to see that, practically applied in Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia and elsewhere on the global front, the means of enforcing the new global security agenda are violent and elite nonviolent (and pay little regard to the lives of the soldiers who fight or the citizens who suffer.) American demand for obedience is destructive of the concept of democracy both at home and abroad.

Alan Gilbert provides a possible antidote to America’s demand for obedience. He argues persuasively that democratic states, in order to be legitimate, must promote a common good. Gilbert defines this in part by articulating a conception of what he refers to as “democratic individuality” or specifically, “a regime that furthers individuality—the idea

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197 There is significant tension on this issue. A considerable amount of research has pointed to the inversion of types of casualties in war—whereas historically significantly higher military casualties are now replaced by few military and high civilian casualties. However, a considerable rhetoric has evolved wherein military and political elites make much noise about concern for civilian suffering. Any conflict will do but at the time of this writing, Israeli ground forces have invaded Gaza and the press is filled with articulate demands and assurances that medical and humanitarian supplies will indeed get through to the civilian population. This is all on top of the military discussion of “smart bombs” designed to minimize collateral damage. See also: <http://wikileaks.org/iraq/diarydig> (accessed: October 31, 2010).
that each may pursue a good life, revising her conception in the light of experience as she sees fit, so long as she does not harm others." Explicit within Gilbert’s view is the notion of moral progress contained within the combined ideas of free will and democratic internationalism. Thus, even though the elite or oligarchic power holders may define freedom as obedience, the notion of democratic individuality provides an alternative lens through which to analyze and critique policy. Moral progress, inspired in part by democratic individuality, is in fact better realized through popular nonviolent practice which encourages solidarity with others who are oppressed. Thus, the contradiction between George W. Bush’s hollow phrase, “freedom is on the march” and the lived lives of those who have been “liberated” by the US occupation forces in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere.

In his 2004 Republican National Convention speech for example, then President George W. Bush said that “The terrorists are fighting freedom with all their cunning and cruelty because freedom is their greatest fear -- and they should be afraid, because freedom is on the march.” He went on to describe his rationale for democracy promotion:

I believe in the transformational power of liberty: The wisest use of American strength is to advance freedom. As the citizens of Afghanistan and Iraq seize the moment, their example will send a message of hope throughout a vital region. Palestinians will hear the message that democracy and reform are within their reach, and so is peace with our good friend, Israel. (Applause.) Young women across the Middle East will hear the message that their day of equality and justice is coming. Young men will hear the message that national progress and dignity are found in liberty, not tyranny and terror. Reformers, and political prisoners, and exiles will hear the message that their dream of freedom cannot be denied forever. And as freedom

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advances -- heart by heart, and nation by nation -- America will be more secure and the world more peaceful.\textsuperscript{200}

In order to successfully resist imperialism, there must be concrete social forces of resistance. Gilbert suggests in his various writings that a tradition of resistance exists in a combination of abolitionist, feminist, civil rights, radical, and Marxian movements in US history.\textsuperscript{201} In his \textit{Must Global Politics Constrain Democracy?} Gilbert follows Thucydides to show that great power realism’s cursory use of political theory has avoided some obvious lessons for the current political world. In his words, “Neorealists, thus, gesture at the original Thucydidean insight that democratic zeal to conquer others ultimately undermines a common good at home and leads, over time, to tyranny.”\textsuperscript{202} The U.S. thus conceives of freedom as a rhetorical device to justify foreign domination. A different kind of realism may serve as the much needed antidote to this view. As Henry Kissinger recently predicted in the \textit{Economist’s} special edition \textit{The World in 2009}, “America will have to learn that world order depends on a structure that participants support because they helped bring it about.”\textsuperscript{203} These words are sobering coming from someone who’s own “zealous hunger for power” inspired a variety of U.S. interventions including the overthrow of Salvador Allende.\textsuperscript{204}

\textsuperscript{200} Ibid.([cited]).

\textsuperscript{201} This appears most clearly in Gilbert, \textit{Must Global Politics Constrain Democracy?} However, this line of reasoning informs his other major works as well: Gilbert, \textit{Democratic Individuality}, Alan Gilbert, \textit{Marx’s Politics: Communists and Citizens} (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1981).

\textsuperscript{202} Gilbert, \textit{Must Global Politics Constrain Democracy?} 150.


\textsuperscript{204} See in particular: Christopher Hitchens, \textit{The Trial of Henry Kissinger} (New York: Verso, 2001).
Preventive war merely breeds new terrorists

Preventive war is not an effective means of promoting democracy, it actually breeds new terrorists. And yet, democratic states often respond very harshly to acts of terrorism. The use of force and the murder of civilians as collateral damage serve to justify and escalate violent responses from resistance fighters. Tom Parker explains, for example, that, “the Brazilian communist Carlos Marighela explicitly encouraged terrorist groups to mount attacks designed to provoke state authorities into overreaction. Marighela theorized that a repressive state response would alienate the government from its population and generate support for the terrorists, that declining governmental legitimacy would strengthen the terrorist cause.”

Parker’s conclusion is that it is more likely that a “measured response” will generate the desired result of security. When democracies use overwhelming force or “shock and awe” in response to terrorism, they only ‘prove’ the terrorists were correct. For example, Osama bin Laden sends a message to his idealized global umma (community of believers) that the United States is not fighting a war on terror but rather a war against Islam. When the United States occupies the Muslim holy land (Mecca and Medina) between the first and second Iraq wars, attacks Muslim warlords in Somalia, apparently causes the deaths of nearly a million Iraqis through sanctions (between the first and second Iraq wars), invades the majority Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, invades Iraq, sponsors the

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206 On bin Laden’s global community of believers, see: Steger, Rise of the Global Imaginary 224.
207 This was the official name of Afghanistan during the Taliban rule from 1996-2001. Today its official title is “Islamic Republic of Afghanistan.” This information was gathered from the CIA’s “World Fact Book”: <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/af.html> (accessed: July 5, 2010).
Ethiopian invasion of Somalia, and backs Israeli oppression of Sunni Muslims in Palestine\textsuperscript{208} it is conceivable that Muslims who may not agree with bin Laden on principle, may agree with his analysis.\textsuperscript{209}

Even if the occupation of Iraq allows for some degree of “low-intensity democracy” or “polyarchy,” the damage will have been done. Once the destruction of the war and the subsequent occupation of Iraq are combined with the more than decade long sanctions regime against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, several million deaths and many more millions of refugees and internally displaced will have resulted. There is of course no direct causal relationship between these variables and terrorism or even insurgent warfare. However, given the vocal minority of what Manfred Steger has dubbed “Jihadist Globalists,” it is clear that a new ideology of resistance to neoliberal globalization has risen.\textsuperscript{210} Parker’s response is also worth bearing in mind: “Stay the course. Focus on the criminal element and treat terrorism as a law enforcement problem.”\textsuperscript{211} Parker, like Enterline and Grieg, may be too

\textsuperscript{208} Bin Laden has said: “You attacked us in Palestine: Palestine, which has sunk under military oppression for more than 80 years. The British handed over Palestine, with your help and with your support, to the Jews, who have occupied it for more than 50 years: years overflowing with oppression, tyranny, crimes, killing, expulsion, destruction and devastation. The creation and continuation of Israel is one of the greatest crimes, and you are the leaders of the criminals…The creation of Israel is a crime which must be erased. Each and every person whose hands have become polluted in the contribution towards this crime must pay its price and pay for it heavily[…]” Osama bin Laden, \emph{Letter to America} (Guardian.co.uk, 2002 [cited July 5, 2010]); available from http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2002/nov/24/theobserver.


\textsuperscript{210} Steger, \emph{Rise of the Global Imaginary} See chapter 6 in particular.

\textsuperscript{211} Parker, "Fighting an Antaean Enemy," 173.
optimistic about US intentions as he places unwarranted emphasis upon the “legitimacy” of the US position in Afghanistan and Iraq.

The 2006 U.S. backed Ethiopian invasion of Somalia is a case in point where instead of working with a stable if unfriendly regime, the United States opted for regime change instead of treating terrorism as a “law enforcement problem.” The Islamic Courts Union (ICU) was an avowedly Islamist regime that implemented a theocratic state. After the invasion the most radical elements of the Union, Al-Shabab (roughly translated as “youth”), broke away from the ICU. This group has recently seen significant gains in its insurgent and guerilla war against the Ethiopian backed puppet regime set up in occupied Ethiopia. Given the rise of interest in pirates in the Gulf of Aden it is also worth noting that under the rule of the ICU pirates were dealt with severely, now the waters off of the coast of Somalia have also become seemingly infested with impressively successful pirates. Nevertheless, Al-Shabab remains the primary beneficiary of the U.S.-Ethiopian invasion and occupation. Ethiopia’s overthrow of the ICU destroyed the stability that the ICU had created and severed the ties between the ICU and al-Shabab. Unrestrained by the ICU, al-Shabab has risen to preeminence within Somalia. Al Jazeera reports that one of al-Shabab’s leaders is even mouthing Osama bin Laden’s rhetoric of global jihad: “We will establish Islamic rule from Alaska and Chile to South Africa, Japan, Russia, the Solomon Islands and all the way to Iceland, be warned, we are coming.”

In a twist on the notion that the local is global and vice versa, Al Jazeera reports, “Abu Mansoor said that al-Shabab's ranks had been bolstered by foreign fighters and urged others to join, saying that a core principle of the group was

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that all Muslims are citizens of Somalia.” To remove any doubt about this, al-Shabab’s Abu Mansoor welcomes Muslims from the world over with the following invitation: “We shall welcome any Muslim from any part of the world who wants to join us. We will allow him to wed our daughters and share our farms.” Representing a flowering of the global imaginary’s “jihadist globalism,” this empirical example clearly shows that the policy of preventive war fails on its own criteria.

Piki Ish-Shalom’s titular analysis of U.S. democracy promotion, “The Civilization of Clashes: Misapplying the Democratic Peace in the Middle East” offers further sobering details. In particular, his article summarizes the main neoconservative uses of the democratic peace thesis, with the primary outcome being the invasion and occupation of Iraq. However, U.S. embrace of democracy promotion under neoconservative tutelage results in a variety of interventions in violation of national sovereignty, international law, and ultimately preventive war: “if democratizing other countries is a vital U.S. interest, drawing them into the zone of peace, then this interest has to be attained even against severe resistance.”213 As chapter four showed, resistance is almost guaranteed as a result of what Ish-Shalom refers to as “an endless military crusade designed as a democratizing project.”214 A policy of democracy promotion implemented through preventive war reveals the internal contradiction between the democratic peace thesis and the 21st century global security agenda. Preventive war does not effectively spread democracy; rather it creates, at best, low intensity democracy and insecurity.

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214 Ibid.: 549.
In contrast to the strategy of preventive war which relies on coercion, it is a principle insight of nonviolent strategy that rulers rule only by the cooperation of the ruled. Gandhi writes in his only sustained work of political theory, for example, that the British did not conquer India but rather that Indians gave India to the British: “The English have not taken India; we have given it to them. They are not in India because of their strength, but because we keep them.” \(^{215}\) Unlike the Rousseauian notion of consent, \(^{216}\) Gandhi conceived of the state as “an agency of action, co-operation with it consisted in rendering specific services such as carrying out its orders, paying taxes, fighting wars and obeying laws.” \(^{217}\) Gandhi’s conception of power works to give agency to those historically disempowered. In fact, contrary to the archetypal revolutionary conception of power as violent force, Gandhi concludes that rulers who use violence betray their lack of power. Similarly, Robinson writes: “all social orders in class society, and all historic blocs, involve in their genesis and reproduction an ongoing combination of consent and coercion. The problematic nature of its rule is revealed to the extent that an historic bloc—or dominant groups attempting to construct such a bloc—must rely more on direct domination or coercion as opposed to consent in securing its rule.” \(^{218}\) In other words, when a ruling order must employ violence, then its legitimacy is called into question. Iraq, Afghanistan, and Somalia exemplify not the

\(^{215}\) Gandhi, *Hind Swaraj and Other Writings* 39.

\(^{216}\) Compare for example: “After the state is instituted, residence implies consent: to inhabit the territory is to submit to the sovereign.” Rousseau, *The Social Contract* 153.


success of a new global security strategy but its failure. Further, the more force the United States and its allies exert, the more resistance is generated.

**SECTION IV: WILL NONVIOLENCE MORE EFFECTIVELY PROMOTE DEMOCRACY?**

This section will demonstrate the productive effects of nonviolence on democracy promotion. It addresses three major issues relating to US foreign policy by answering the title question of section IV in the affirmative but with three caveats: 1) the problem of dealing with authoritarian regimes, both in terms of the difficulty of the monopoly of violence and the legacy of US support for dictators; 2) the problem of nation building, both in terms of pragmatic challenges and during the transition phase; and finally 3) the consequences of blowback and antidemocratic feedback from U.S. foreign policy.

**Nonviolent means of Regime Change**

To protect our Nation and honor our values, the United States seeks to extend freedom across the globe by leading an international effort to end tyranny and to promote effective democracy. ~2002 US National Security Strategy

It is cliché to argue that nonviolence as a means is not effective against authoritarian regimes. There is a growing literature that demonstrates the power of nonviolence against dictatorship. Kurt Schock, for example, reveals that often the dictator’s use of violence against a sustained nonviolent campaign has the opposite effect. As Shock shows, “martyrdom is a potent catalyst for the political jujitsu dynamic; that is, the murder of unarmed activists highlights the brutality of the regime and encourages previously

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uncommitted persons to join the cause in a manner that the murder of a violent activist would not.”

This phenomenon referred to originally by Richard Gregg as “moral jiujitsu” and later modified by Gene Sharp as “political jiujitsu” partially accounts for the surprising success of peoples’ power campaigns throughout the world. According to Sharp,

Political ji-juitsu is one of the special processes by which nonviolent action deals with violent repression. By combining nonviolent discipline with solidarity and persistence in struggle, the nonviolent actionists cause the violence of the opponent’s repression to be exposed in the worst possible light. This, in turn, may lead to shifts in opinion and then to shifts in power relationships favorable to the nonviolent group. These shifts result from withdrawal of support for the opponent and the grant of support to the nonviolent actionists.

Schock examines two cases that on the surface appear to negate of the political jiujitsu argument: the Tiananmen movement in China (1989) and the democracy movement in Burma (1988). In both cases the movements for social change experienced two periods of extreme repression. Initially the governments of both states experienced the odd phenomenon of using force only to have it, jiujitsu-like, turned against them. Similarly, both regimes later used violent force against those same movements for social change with their intended consequences: the disintegration of the movement and regime consolidation.

Schock explains that on the surface it appeared that violence was used to effectively counter

221 Schock, Unarmed Insurrections 89.


224 Schock, Unarmed Insurrections see especially chapter 3.


226 Schock, Unarmed Insurrections chapter four “People Power Suppressed”.

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nonviolent movements. This superficial view leads to the common misperception that nonviolence is only successful against democracies and/or governments where there are sufficient checks on the government’s use of force. However, Schock adds an important caveat: “repression effectively suppressed the movements, but this was due to a combination of broader political configurations and the attributes of the movements themselves as much as to the intensity of the repression.”\textsuperscript{227} In the final analysis, it is not clear that violence is always effective against nonviolence.\textsuperscript{228}

\textit{Popular Democracy and Nonviolence in Burma: a counter example}

For reasons of time and space, this section will discuss only the Burmese case. To briefly sum up the case, Burma has been a military dictatorship since General Ne Win overthrew the democratically elected government of U Nu in March of 1962. The Burma Socialist Program Party (BSPP) was created in the same year as a means of mass mobilization and indoctrination. According to Schock, “Burma subsequently attempted to disengage from the world economy and pursued an autarkic economic policy. The result of the military-run economy was gross inefficiency, rampant corruption, and economic decline, leading to widespread grievances throughout the population.”\textsuperscript{229} The “democracy movement” in Burma traces its roots back to its independence (the now famous leader of the Burmese movement Aung San Suu Kyi is the daughter of the independence leader

\textsuperscript{227} Ibid. 119.

\textsuperscript{228} Brian Martin’s work analyzing cases of nonviolent actions that achieve little or no apparent success is another source for good counter examples. It also offers opportunities to learn from and improve both the theory and practice of nonviolence. Brian Martin, Wendy Varney, and Adrian Vickers, "Political Jiu-Jitsu against Indonesian Repression: Studying Lower-Profile Nonviolent Resistance," \textit{Global Change, Peace & Security} 13, no. 2 (2001).

\textsuperscript{229} Schock, \textit{Unarmed Insurrections} 92-93.
General Aung San). Fresh political and some guerrilla movements rose up after the coup. This occurred in part after the military killed approximately one hundred students at Rangoon University. The government razed the student union building, shut down the university for four months, and arrested student leaders. This was to be the first in a series of protests leading up to the 1988-1990 democracy movement that garners most of the coverage in the mainstream media.

The 1988 movement began with renewed force after a student from the Rangoon Institute of Technology was killed. The murderer had ties to the BSPP and was therefore not punished. Fresh protests erupted and the dreaded riot police, the Lon Htein, were called in to put down the disruption. Again university students were at the center of the protests; several were killed and many more were jailed in the subsequent clashes. By August 8 the protests had become fully national with major demonstrations taking place in most major and even minor cities throughout Burma. The government response was brutal. One instance is illustrative, according to Schock, on the night of August 8, 1988 the military fired on protestors in Rangoon with machine guns. Between 1,000 and 3,000 citizens were killed in the hail of bullets. The citizen response to the massacre was not entirely nonviolent as several government buildings were attacked and three policemen were beheaded by angry citizens.²³⁰

The government then made two concessions to the protestors. The first was on August 12 when it announced that the hated General Sein Lwin (formerly head of the also hated riot police) resigned and later announced that the moderate civilian, Dr. Maung Maung was to take his place as president of Burma and chairman of the BSPP. As Schock writes, 

²³⁰ Ibid. 95.
“the unarmed insurrection forced General Sein Lwin from office” despite the carnage.\textsuperscript{231} The movement response was more massive protest and a nationwide general strike; it also demanded disbanding the government and full transition to democracy. At which point the government responded with a second concession and lifted martial law and withdrew the military from the cities. Millions came out to demonstrate. By August 26 over 500,000 gathered to hear Aung San Suu Kyi speak about nonviolent action and democracy near the Shwedagon Pagoda in Rangoon. Schock writes that “the general strike crippled the regime, and for a while it seemed as if the government would topple.”\textsuperscript{232}

Then on September 18 the government orchestrated another coup, a “sui coup” where essentially the military government replaced itself with another military government, and formed the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) and formed a new government under the newly minted National Unity Party (NUP). Ostensibly, this new organization was tasked with facilitating Burma’s transition to democracy by organizing elections in 1990. In order to restore “law and order” the new government reinstated martial law, declared illegal gatherings of over five people, placed restrictions on speeches, implemented a curfew, punished those who spoke out against the regime, and ordered all strikers back to work: “Collective action ground to a halt, and the regime reorganized and consolidated its power.”\textsuperscript{233} Several factors account for this. Prominently, the student response to the government was to leave the cities for the countryside or to neighboring

\textsuperscript{231} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{232} Ibid. 96.

\textsuperscript{233} Ibid. 97.
Thailand. Thus, the movement lost many if not most of those who had the organizing skills to continue the protests.

On May 27, 1990 elections were held and deemed to be “relatively free and fair.” Indeed, the reincarnation of the BSPP, now the National Unity Party (NUP), garnered only 21.2 percent of the vote while the major opposition party, National League for Democracy (NLD), won 59.9 percent. The stunned NUP refused to honor the results. The democracy movement, having by this time been thoroughly disrupted by the regime and seemingly abandoned by the students, was no longer able to mount a sustained response. In conclusion, the noncooperation and democracy movement managed to oust Sein Lwin and force the government to hold multiparty elections. However, it was unable to topple the military regime.  

The Burmese case is illustrative of the success and eventual failure of nonviolent resistance. The post SLORC student response is crucial for understanding this case. Tens of thousands of students, feeling defeated by the government response, fled to the jungle to join the guerilla war being waged there against the Burmese Tatmadaw military. Christina Fink argues that “the military regime was eager for the students to move out of the cities, recognizing that as successful as the students had been in organizing people in urban areas, they were no match for the battle hardened Tatmadaw troops in the jungle.” In tactical terms, the military understood its comparative advantage in fighting against guerilla forces versus the street protests (the political jiujitsu mentioned above does not apply to armed

234 Ibid. 97-98.

resisters). The students did not understand this. Schock agrees that it was reasonable that the students would flee, after all, they were being hunted down in the streets, arrested, and tortured: "the consequence, however, was the decreased resilience and leverage of the mass movement and a shifting of the battle against the government to strategies in which the government had a decided advantage."236 As pointed out in the discussion of Gene Sharp’s "civilian based defense," even failed instances of nonviolence illustrate the surprising power of nonviolence. The Burmese case achieved significant success before it failed. One wonders how things would have turned out differently if, for example, those tens of thousands of students had not changed their strategy to fight a guerrilla war.

Bringing down dictators as US foreign policy: rhetoric versus reality in the case of the Philippines

US foreign policy under President Bush was especially focused on “bringing down” dictators.237 While much of the research on this policy has been critical, similar work on the strategic use of nonviolence has been largely laudatory, uncritical studies in praise of “a force more powerful.” US foreign policy, as shown by Robinson, has shifted since the early 1980s to a strategy of nonviolent or “soft coups.” For example, the downfall of the Marcos regime was influenced to a large degree by the US. The US had supported him since his rise to power over 20 years prior to his 1986 exit. Marcos came to power in 1972 in an anti-communist coup. He declared martial law ostensibly to fight communist insurrectionaries though it is more accurate to say that he did it to stave off on upcoming election in which he

236 Schock, Unarmed Insurrections 104.

237 I have mentioned a number of texts but here are several important places to search for summaries as well as in depth reviews: Bouvard, Revolutionizing Motherhood: The Mothers of the Plaza De Mayo. Ackerman and Duvall, eds., A Force More Powerful: A Century of Nonviolent Conflict. Ackerman and Kruegler, Strategic Nonviolent Conflict. Zunes, Kurtz, and Asher, Nonviolent Social Movements.
was predicted to lose against Benigno Aquino. The Marcos regime epitomizes the leader who treats his state as personal property: “Through state monopolies he subcontracted to his relatives and friends important areas of the economy for plunder.” Similar to the Burmese case, segments of the dissenting population went into exile or to the jungle to fight a guerilla war first against the elite democratic government (1968) and then against Marcos (after 1972). Marcos abdicated in February of 1986 after a decade and a half of corrupt, authoritarian rule.

The popular conception of the downfall of Marcos is that a “people’s power” movement essentially took to the streets and overthrew the dictator. For example, the CIA World Fact Book summarizes thusly: “The 20-year rule of Ferdinand MARCOS ended in 1986, when a "people power" movement in Manila ("EDSA 1") forced him into exile and installed Corazon AQUINO as president.” Indeed, advocates of nonviolence often cite the overthrow of Marcos as an example of the power of nonviolence. However, one analyst of nonviolence, Joshua Paulson, reports an oddly top down organization of “people power.” After Marcos rigged the 1986 “snap” election, Corazon Aquino, rejected Marcos’ treachery and, “refused to concede, and on February 13 she met with 350 opposition leaders to discuss their next moves. Aquino firmly rejected all suggestions to turn to violence, and proposed instead to launch a lengthy campaign using strictly nonviolent methods and what she termed

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238 Schock, Unarmed Insurrections 68.


240 Widow of former presidential candidate and opposition leader Benigno Aquino who had been assassinated, by Marcos’ military escort, on August 21, 1983.
‘people power’.”241 The result: Aquino won the election and Marcos was forced from power. Democracy was reinstated.

However, Joshua Paulson’s sketch is usefully contrasted with Robert Burrowes’ analysis: “while the elite managers of the postrevolutionary state structure were different, and the structures themselves underwent some changes, the latter remained largely inaccessible to ordinary people and quite inappropriate for implementing the profound changes that are necessary if human needs are to be met.”242 While one focuses on the strictly nonviolent nature of the people power movement, the other observes that because the process was flawed and new structures were not ready to be put into practice once the dictator fell. The result is the “emergence of new versions of the old structures rather than new and more appropriate structures.”243 The CIA backs up this criticism by adding to the above summary that: “Her presidency was hampered by several coup attempts, which prevented a return to full political stability and economic development.”244 In other words, transnational elite management of democratic transition in the Philippines resulted in democracy that was not responsive to the people.

Robinson offers the following caveat to his cutting analysis of US democracy promotion: “‘people power,’ it should be stressed, was not a creation of US political intervention; to the contrary, it was what Washington had hoped to avoid.” By “people power” Robinson means here genuine popular nonviolence and popular democratic social


242 Burrowes, Strategy of Nonviolent Defense 166.

243 Ibid.

movement. Having said that, it should also be noted that Washington did attempt and largely succeeded in shaping the course of the movement: “faced with the inevitability of a mass, popular uprising, US actions sought at all times to control its development and minimize its effects, and to bolster simultaneously the positions of those institutions and leaders most allied to US interests.”

Perhaps even more to the point, Robinson reveals that:

> US intervention was decisive in shaping the contours of the anti-Marcos movement and in establishing the terms and conditions under which Philippine social and political struggles would unfold in the post-Marcos period.

The Philippine case reveals that as a tool of US foreign policy, nonviolence is likely to be less destructive than, say, the overthrow of Sadaam Hussein. However, it also illustrates the difference between a genuinely grassroots movement and one coopted by the US. This is especially true given that it is not an isolated event. By showing how “US intervention in the transition was crucial in limiting the extent of popular democratization in the post-Marcos era,” one sees that “nonviolence” per se is not to blame for the subsequent “low-intensity democracy” that ensued.

Rather, as Stephen Gowans has argued, “the critical question is: What is it used for?”

Ultimately, the literature indicates that nonviolence is often “a force more powerful.” However, critical scholars provide grounds for legitimate suspicion of purity of the nonviolent movements that have been successful. There is justified concern that these elite

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246 Ibid. 129, italics in the original.

247 Ibid. 129.

248 Gowans, "Nonviolent Warfare: Questioning Ends, Not Means."
managed nonviolent movements do considerable damage to both nonviolence and democracy. Mark Beissinger, in particular, shows that regimes fearing similar nonviolent overthrows in their country have used more violent force to stop them. He also adds that “a strategy of external encouragement … does not promote stability or predictability in the democratic evolution of postrevolutionary governments.”

In terms of US foreign policy, authoritarian regimes are passé. Today they are the enemy and are accused of housing or promoting terrorism. While the Cold War raged, the rhetoric of fighting for democracy could be sidestepped when necessary, replaced with the rhetoric of “the enemy of my enemy is my friend.” This is the less colorful version of the apocryphal comment regarding any given dictator or political opponent who for convenience sake has become an ally: ‘he’s a son of a bitch, but at least he’s our son of a bitch.’ Today, the “war on terrorism” encourages not a sidestep but a full throated attack on dictatorship. While the United States does still support authoritarian regimes, its rhetoric and its policy cohere more accurately with the strategy of promoting polyarchy. The new approach is clearly stated in the NSS: “All tyrannies threaten the world’s interest in freedom’s expansion, and some tyrannies, in their pursuit of WMD or sponsorship of terrorism, threaten our immediate security interests as well.” Thus, the war on terrorism is also a war for “democracy.” However, only those who side with US are defined as “democratic.” “US policymakers claim that they are interested in process (free and fair

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249 Beissinger, "Promoting Democracy: Is Exporting Revolution a Constructive Strategy?"

250 Quoted in: Ambrose and Brinkley, Rise to Globalism.

elections) and not *outcome* (the results of these elections); in reality, the principal concern is outcome.\textsuperscript{252}

The concern with dictators and authoritarianism reflects, in practice, a policy of overthrowing them. It is logical then that US foreign policy is also concerned with dealing with the consequences of overthrowing dictators. In other words, what happens after the dictator leaves or is forced to leave. The next section deals with building up nations or “nation building.”

**Nonviolent means of Nation Building**

In its simplest formulation, nonviolent nation building occurs during the process that leads to the overthrow of the dictator. Thus, as in the case of the Philippines, the political and social organizing that occurred in the lead up to the eventual abdication of Marcos helped to create the nascent institutions for democracy. From the US perspective, the primary institutions are elections, multiple parties, trade unions, and a free press. It is assumed that with these comes democracy. However, nation building as a policy of US and 21\textsuperscript{st} century security includes transitions from dictatorship to democracy, post-conflict reconstruction, and turning failed states back into stable states.

In his recent scholarship, Lael Brainard records that one of the lessons from September 11 was that small, poor countries matter: “the destruction of the World Trade Center in New York was followed quickly by the destruction of the comfortable myth that dysfunctional states abroad were of little concern to the United States.”\textsuperscript{253} The United

\textsuperscript{252} Robinson, *Promoting Polyarchy* 111.

\textsuperscript{253} Brainard, ed., *Security by Other Means* 15.
States has had a long history of “nation building.” In each case the goal has been the creation of elite ruled states who follow orders from Washington. Critics will quickly point out that polyarchy is at least better than authoritarian rule and that “low-intensity nonviolence” is at least a step in the right direction. Indeed, Oren reviews a number of American scholars who defended their elite conceptions of democracy by citing the Cold War and the threats from “unstable” or “morbific” regimes. He quotes Robert Dahl (the intellectual “father” of polyarchy) at length:

‘instability’ is not cabinet changes nor even piddling differences in regime but the possibility of democratic failures eventuating in brutal dictatorships in comparison to which even the worst polyarchy will seem like the promised land.254

The evidence correlating a US policy of propping up dictators with blowback and massive human suffering is astounding.255 Thus, Dahl’s point is well founded. However, this newer strategy of promoting polyarchy remains precarious. The primary difference between then (propping up dictators) and now (promoting polyarchy) according to Robinson is that “these earlier efforts focused exclusively on achieving accommodation among elites in political society, while masses were either ignored or repressed outright by occupying US marines. In contrast, the current strategy focuses on achieving—parallel to elite accommodation—the organization of the popular sectors in civil society and their incorporation into hegemonic blocs.”256 Building nations according to polyarchy means that popular concerns are nominally address through mass elections, though the choices of leadership and the political

254 Oren, Our Enemies and US 96.


256 Robinson, Promoting Polyarchy 207.
debate is limited to elite interests. The consequences are that the “general will” is still not reflected though elections are free and fair. Whereas during the Cold War this policy of regime change and nation building was limited to the ideological struggle between communism and capitalist democracy, today small states matter because they may provide safe haven for terrorists.

One must also question Brainard’s assertion that small states matter when it is matched up against numerous examples of U.S. direct involvement in “small countries.” It would be more accurate to say that after September 11, 2001, the United States expanded its view of its strategic interest. Whereas a small country like Nicaragua fell into the orbit of US strategic interest before 9/11 because of its location in the US backyard, after 9/11 countries like Somalia become centers of concern as hiding places for terrorists or other ideological sources of resistance to US hegemony. Returning to the special analogy, after 9/11 America perceived its “backyard” to include places like Somalia. More importantly, it now had a better story to tell to justify its expanded conception of national interest: spreading and building democracy will create a peaceful world.

Nation Building is Implicated in Imperialism

Additionally, the US is beginning to rethink its approach to working with foreign countries. Historically, its policy has included aiding countries that do not cohere with the newly termed “freedom agenda.” As Brainard notes, this has lead to “a paradox that is prompting a major rethinking of the traditional approach to security and strategic assistance.”257 Indeed, as Robinson shows, “promoting polyarchy had become a long-term

and institutionalized aspect of foreign policy, but one which would be synchronized with, rather than replace, US military intervention.\textsuperscript{258} Thus, as several academics have argued, the great transformation in US foreign policy after 9/11 was more hot air than practice. The reality was simply more of the same, just less covert. Now instead of sending in the CIA to fund opposition groups and “destabilize” the society in attempts to create the conditions for conservative or authoritarian control, the US now sends the National Endowment for Democracy and other similar groups to participate in so-called “political interventions.”

It appears that these political interventions are in fact the new means of colonizing the less developed world, though one question remains: who are the colonizers? Historically, imperial regimes originating from centralized power structures expanded outward, forming empires and colonies. There was an obvious hierarchy. Today, the colonizers are more diffuse. While a number of mainstream scholars and policy analysts have studied the network structure of terrorist organizations, less mainstream scholars have noted the diffuse nature of modern imperialism.\textsuperscript{259} In the context of the so-called war on terror and the new global security agenda, nation building also reveals the contradiction between the notion of “national interest” and what Manfred Steger refers to as the “global imaginary.” Steger summarizes what he means by the “rise of the global imaginary” in the following passage: “[globalization] extends deep into the core of the self and its dispositions, facilitating the creation of new identities nurtured by the intensifying relations between the

\textsuperscript{258} Robinson, \textit{Promoting Polyarchy} 100.

\textsuperscript{259} For these accounts see: Thornton, \textit{Asymmetric Warfare}. Alternatively, see: Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, \textit{Empire} (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000).
individual and the globe.” Steger’s work follows upon earlier research on the ideological dimensions of globalization yet it opens the door for a discussion of power in a globalized world. Though published before Steger’s book, Robinson’s research makes more sense after we understand Steger’s text. If the national as a form of social imaginary is giving way to the global (even if unwillingly or in fits and starts), then it is crucial to understand these changing identities. Specifically, if the global imaginary truly is on the rise, then what does democracy promotion look like in the age of globalization?

Robinson draws attention to one of these globalized identities: a global capitalist class. Robinson indicates that while low-intensity democracy is constructed in former authoritarian client regimes, global capitalist elites acquire more wealth as those budding democracies are brought into the democratic fold. But these elites are not specifically tied to one nationality. This, in turn, leads to further confusion regarding the classical realist notion of the “national interest.” A putative “American hegemony” implies that US foreign policy is designed solely for the benefit of US citizens—though presumably with beneficial side-effects for the global community. Robinson provocatively argues that “instead of a ‘new US empire’, the current epoch is best understood as a new transnational phase in the ongoing evolution of world capitalism, characterized in particular by the rise of truly

transnational capital, globalized circuits of accumulation, and transnational state apparatuses.”

Whereas nation building may come after the destruction of a previously existing state, democracy promotion alludes to a persuasive relationship. Yet, nation building is usually equated with democracy promotion in the aftermath of war or some other cataclysm. In this case, the current global security agenda is more than a subterfuge. Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri have provocatively described the age of globalization as age of empire differently than past incarnations: “in order to maintain itself Empire must create a network form of power that does not isolate a center of control and excludes no outside lands or productive forces. As Empire forms, in other words, geopolitics ceases to function.”

Thus, nation building as democracy promotion becomes an all-encompassing imperial strategy that neither strengthens the national nor promotes popular democracy. It swallows the world.

Returning to the earlier theme within the debate over democracy creation and promotion, it is relevant to re-consider the role of social norms as forces of social control. The W. Bush administration’s institutionalization of preventive war, and the concurrent lowering of the bar against violence, has had at least one positive effect: the global community has witnessed the failure of coercion. As Amitai Etzioni argues,

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to nurture “freedom” requires much more than free speech, free and fair elections, and the other typical features of liberal democracy. It also requires that the citizenry share a core of basic values, a broad toleration for a variety of different political and religious opinions, an opposition to unwarranted discrimination, and an abhorrence of the speedy resort to violence to solve problems.\textsuperscript{266}

If Etzioni is correct, then we may be living through a turning point. Perhaps the so-called preemptive war doctrine will further chasten those who might wish to use unbridled force in the future and as more of the global citizenry sees the aftermath of the policy and acts to constrain their leaders. This potential for increased awareness as Americans in particular begin to see the actions perpetrated in their name will, as the next section argues, reduce the chances for future instances of blowback.

**Blowback and Antidemocratic Feedback**

The democracy promotion pillar of the new global security agenda is sharply limited by its actual application. Thus, regardless of any theoretically coherent arguments that may exist in defense of democracy promotion, the current application of the agenda does more harm than good. Two final criticisms explain why the democracy promotion pillar must be implemented with regulative nonviolence: blowback and anti-democratic feedback.

**Blowback**

Military regimes and highly unpopular dictatorships, such as Somoza in Nicaragua, the Shah in Iran, Marcos in the Philippines, the Duvaliers in Haiti, and Pinochet in Chile, defended US and local elite interests. But they also engendered mass-based opposition movements that sought outcomes, beyond the mere removal of dictatorships, of popular democratization. These movements became transnational in their significance as globalization proceeded and threatened core and local elite interest. \textasciitilde{}William Robinson\textsuperscript{267}

\textsuperscript{266} Etzioni, *Security First* 158.

\textsuperscript{267} Robinson, *Promoting Polyarchy* 66-67.
 Shortly before 11 September 2001, Chalmers Johnson and Alan Gilbert both wrote books that argued, among other things, that Blowback and Antidemocratic feedback was, is, and will continue to result from American imperial activities. Chalmers Johnson’s concept of Blowback was originally a term used internally by the American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to describe the consequences of its more nefarious activities abroad (that were kept secret from the US public). After 11 September 2001, Johnson was seen as quite prophetic. While George W. Bush argued that the terrorists simply hated our freedoms, Johnson argued that the terrorist attacks were directly related to 50 years of US interventions abroad. The American public, largely unaware of US covert operations to prop up military dictators and overthrow democratically elected governments, were left only with the words of a wartime president “the deliberate and deadly attacks…were acts of war.”

Stripped from the historical context of 50 plus years of US meddling in the affairs of other sovereign nations, the American public was subjected to a dizzying array of securitizing speech acts. Thus, instead of creating the space for critical national self-reflection, September 11 was used to justify further interventions and the spread of a US empire of bases. Karin Fierke explains the securitizing speech acts in context: “an American president has more legitimacy and authority to make a securitizing move than, for instance, a mayor or average citizen; nonetheless, this speech act must be negotiated with an audience which ultimately consents to a change in the rules.”

Thus, in the inverted Alice in Wonderland of the Bush Doctrine, President Bush’s ideological simplifications of reality carry more

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269 George W. Bush, Speech on September 12, 2001

270 Fierke, Critical Approaches to International Security 107.
weight than the sophisticated critical insights of a former Cold War analyst turned critic. How can nonviolent approaches to security hope to deal with the challenges presented by secretive and shadowy government security structures?

To compare the dynamic of a nonviolent approach to political change with the Bush Doctrine is to highlight the dramatic flaws, potential dangers, and major security risks that arise through policies of secrecy and violent force. Gene Sharp simply and coherently explains how openness prevents many of the problems associated with blowback. As he writes, “secrecy, deception, and underground conspiracy pose difficult problems for a movement using nonviolent struggle.” Take for example a simple observation: “advance knowledge by the opponents of planned demonstrations, for example, will give the opponents time to consider how to respond. This may reduce the chances of massive brutalities and killings by police and troops who have not received specific instructions on how to act.” Extrapolated from this movement scenario, one can imagine that a government run similarly will avoid the problems of blowback articulated by Johnson. The state routinely keeps things secret from the public as a result of the theoretical understanding of polyarchy discussed previously. Thus, adding a nonviolent dimension will reduce the future likelihood of blowback. There is also the added advantage that behaving as free people has the effect of making a people free. Thus, in Sharp’s paraphrasing of Gandhi’s famous dictum, “in a struggle to attain freedom, it is necessary to behave like free people.”

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Anti-Democratic Feedback

Alan Gilbert’s pre September 11 critique stems from a close reading of both the history of political thought as well as the history of US interventions. He argues that states tend to treat people similarly, regardless of their citizenship. Thus, when states act upon their imperial urges and use force to bend others to their will, states treat their own citizens not as citizens but as potential threats to sovereignty.\(^{272}\)

Gilbert refers to this as “antidemocratic feedback.”\(^{273}\) Though there are a number of historical accounts to draw upon, it is relevant to note that the current war on terrorism has been implemented along similar lines. The Los Angeles Times reports, for example, that, “An undercover Maryland State Police trooper infiltrated nonviolent groups and labeled dozens of people as terrorists.”\(^{274}\) The relationship between foreign policy and domestic policy may, as Gilbert acknowledges, get lost in “a high level of abstraction.” Yet, as he explains, “such radical claims have two features: an insistence that an elite benefits from current practices, and a sociological and (implied) psychological view about why some ordinary people adopt the ideas of their oppressors.”\(^{275}\) Thus, Gilbert’s thesis serves to buttress Robinson’s analysis of the United States’ promotion of low-intensity democracy, especially from 1979 through

\(^{272}\)The current hysteria over immigration is a case in point. Out of all proportion to their putative threat, the Arizona legislature has authorized police to stop anyone they deem to be potentially “illegal” and demand their identification papers. The result is a violation of a host of international laws and agreements signed by the United States: see, Eliane Engeler, “Arizona Immigration Law Violates Human Rights, Say UN Experts,” Associated Press, (May 11, 2010), <http://www.commondreams.org/headline/2010/05/11> (accessed: May 28, 2010).

\(^{273}\)Alan Gilbert, "Must Global Politics Constrain Democracy? Realism, Regimes, and Democratic Internationalism," Political Theory 20, no. 1 (February 1992), Gilbert, Must Global Politics Constrain Democracy?


\(^{275}\)Gilbert, ""What Then?" The Irrepressible Radicalism of Democracy," 182-83.
2001—by low-intensity nonviolent means. Gilbert argues based upon his “antidemocratic feedback thesis” that “since conquest abroad leads to tyranny at home, citizens should oppose expansion.” A Gandhi informed critical nonviolence policy that recognizes a shared humanity regardless of nation of origin would avoid the tragedy and wasted life associated with imperial wars and the antidemocratic feedback they cause.

Gilbert praises elements of Michael Doyle’s path breaking work on the democratic peace. He notes Doyle’s emphasis upon the role of citizens who may be difficult to convince to go to war for what Immanuel Kant disdainfully referred to as an elite “pleasure party” of war. Gilbert sharply undermines this (low-intensity) democratic peace thesis when he notes that it cannot explain “U.S. covert interventions against parliamentary regimes—for instance, against Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala, Cheddi Jagan in Guiana, Juan Bosch in the Dominican Republic, and Salvador Allende in Chile” and others. Gilbert himself is extremely amenable to the idea of nonviolent civil disobedience as a means for promoting democracy. He goes so far as to say that, “in fact, given the advantages of the powerful, a decent regime might expect—and not discourage—civil disobedience.” Gilbert’s assessment of liberalism’s radical roots reveals the best policy recommendation for those seeking to promote democracy and avoid anti-democratic feedback: promote genuine debate at the citizen level and thereby promote popular democracy.

276 Gilbert, Must Global Politics Constrain Democracy? 27.


278 Ibid.

279 Ibid., 180.
Karin Fierke indirectly elaborates this concept further in the context of post-9-11:

“the problem, given the war is fought at home, is how to isolate those who are abusing these freedoms from ordinary citizens….The USA Patriot Act….dramatically expanded the ability of states and the federal government to conduct surveillance of American citizens, was not limited to terrorism but could include any individuals convicted of ‘any crime of violence’, allowed foreign and domestic intelligence agencies to spy on Americans, reduced government accountability, and authorized the use of ‘sneak and peek’ search warrants in connection with any federal crime.”

Critical theorists of international politics argue that it is precisely this lack of a critical lens that inhibited Americans from resisting the passage and subsequent reauthorization of the Patriot act.

A critical nonviolent approach to international politics reduces the possibility of antidemocratic feedback. If states treat outside others as individuals worthy of respect, they will be more likely to treat inside others with dignity and respect. Though this dissertation has been critical of Sharp’s stripping nonviolence of its ethical core, he offers important insight into this issue. He observes that “nonviolent resisters should attempt continually to increase their strength (numerical and otherwise), not only among their usual supporters and third parties, but even among the opponents.” Thus, when nonviolent campaigners are planning their struggles they should, among other things, recognize that “specific acts within a nonviolent struggle may have wide and significant repercussions on the power of each side. Each proposed particular resistance action, even a limited one, therefore needs to be selected

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280 Fierke, Critical Approaches to International Security 106-07.

281 Ibid. 15.
and evaluated based on its potential wider influences on the overall conflict.” In a sense, Sharp’s thinking comes full circle back to Gandhi’s conception of an interconnected universe. Sharp is here making an instrumental argument for a deontological end.

This advice also serves advocates of any action, nonviolent or otherwise. Military planners certainly understand the Clausewitzian concept of the center of gravity. The term gives conceptual form to the source of the opponent’s strength. Thus, even political planners of military operations are advised to consider how their own populations will respond to their actions. As Gilbert shows, the US war against Vietnam gave rise to a powerful anti-war movement. Because the Johnson and especially the Nixon administrations viewed the anti-war movement as “enemy territory,” they used increasingly harsh methods to deal with the enemy without and the enemy within. Failing to understand the concept of center of gravity, Johnson and later Nixon, attacked their own center of gravity (the American people), thus proving that they did not have US interests at heart.

Though the public uses different language, the problem of anti-democratic feedback, especially with regards to Iraq, is not entirely obscured. In the United States, for example, there is even discussion among the mainstream political parties about the wisdom of continuing to occupy Iraq. The Iraqis have, to a certain extent, settled this debate by demanding a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) that significantly reduces US power in


283 Gilbert, Must Global Politics Constrain Democracy? See 5-6 & 66-118 for extensive discussion of the relationship between imperial war and antidemocratic feedback.

Iraq (as compared to other countries that have signed SOFAs with the U.S.) and calls for a timeline for U.S. troop withdrawal. The election of Obama has thus combined with the Iraqi SOFA to explain US statements concerning a withdrawal deadline. However, there is almost near consensus that increased troop presence in Afghanistan is necessary.

Furthermore, the Bush administration and both major political parties have essentially agreed that Al Qaeda and remnant Taliban forces are hiding in “safe havens” in the Northwest Frontier Province and bordering areas between Afghanistan and Pakistan. This agreement has resulted in Presidential authorization of strikes inside Pakistani territory. Two known disasters have already occurred, the first on Wednesday 2 September, 2008 in South Waziristan and the second on Monday 8 September 2008 in the Northwest Frontier Province. In both cases civilian casualty numbers are disputed, with the United States insisting that few civilians were harmed or killed. According to Human Rights Watch:

As a result of [Operation Enduring Freedom] OEF and [International Security Assistance Force] ISAF airstrikes in 2006, 116 Afghan civilians were killed in 13 bombings. In 2007, Afghan civilian deaths were nearly three times higher: 321 Afghan civilians were killed in 22 bombings, while hundreds more were injured. In 2007, more Afghan civilians were killed by airstrikes than by US and NATO ground fire. In the first seven months of 2008, the latest period for which data is available, at least 119 Afghan civilians were killed in 12 airstrikes.

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These authorizations of expanded uses of force into Pakistan, Yemen, and now the greater
Middle East have continued unabated (in fact have increased) under Obama. Though it
should go without saying, these and other acts of seeming indiscriminate violence only add
fuel to the fire that is raging against the United States around the world. In the small scale
the results are disturbing: “They have also had significant political impact, outraging public
opinion in Afghanistan and undermining public confidence in both the Afghan government
and its international backers.” On the large scale, the impact of US policies border on the
seemingly bizarre: “A new WorldPublicOpinion.org poll of 17 nations finds that majorities
in only nine of them believe that al Qaeda was behind the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the
United States.” Further, “In no country does a majority agree on another possible
perpetrator, but in most countries significant minorities cite the US government itself and, in
a few countries, Israel.” These and other examples of the continued blowback from US
policies should indicate that the 21st century global security strategy is failing. As the
Economist reports, “abroad, even though troops are dying in two countries, the cack-handed
way in which George Bush has prosecuted his war on terror has left America less feared by
its enemies and less admired by its friends than it once was.” It logically follows that:
“Stability in the emergent global society…enjoys a correlation not with polyarchy but with
popular democracy.”

288 Mazzetti, "U.S. Is Said to Expand Secret Actions in Mideast."

289 Human Rights Watch, "Troops in Contact." 3.

(accessed on September 11, 2008).


292 Robinson, Promoting Polyarchy 345.
CHAPTER SIX: Conclusion

In an age of globalization, elite democracy needs to be transformed into popular democracy. Regulative nonviolence is the most effective means of doing this. It insures that democracy grows organically from within populations. Preemptive war, on the other hand, insures that populations remain humiliated, subservient, and resentful. Neither guarantees long term peace and security with and between the United States. However, states that undergo nonviolent transitions will likely be more stable because they will have worked on their institutions while they fought for independence, thus avoiding the criticisms of the democratic peace argument presented by Mansfield and Snyder.

Preventive war does not promote democracy. Rather, “the resulting practice has the potential to reproduce historical relationships of power. A more effective approach to building democracy and, subsequently, human security needs to identify and analyse the processes by which human insecurity is reproduced.”¹ If the global south views the United States’ implementation of the global security agenda as racist, imperial, and crusading, it is likely to create insecurity and provide the empirical grounds to fuel radical ideologies that employ violence against the US and its allies.

International Relations, especially those who write from within the mainstream, often chide those who write from a critical perspective for writing in too esoteric a fashion.

The ideal writing style is typified by John Mearsheimer's very clear prose. However, Mearsheimer's prose, which makes ready use of phrases like "in international relations God helps those who help themselves," is one sided in its clarity. Gandhi's invocation to "be the change you wish to see" is equally straightforward yet it too easily gets rejected as "idealism." By introducing a regulative nonviolence into IR it is hoped that Gandhian and other less violent recommendations will not be so easily dismissed in the future.

The ongoing debates over the strategic use of nonviolence merit further study. In particular Gene Sharp's Albert Einstein Institute and other institutions designed to promote "nonviolent struggle" or "nonviolent conflict" deserve academic scrutiny. Some criticism seems especially hyperbolic. Even so, there are good reasons to be suspicious of US support of nonviolent social movements. This dissertation has elaborated on these reasons for suspicion. Assuming that these charges are fallacious, one can imagine that victims of US policy have reason to be skeptical given the history of "democracy promotion" and US

2 Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics.


inspired nonviolent coups. One is forced finally to question the supposed US support of nonviolent social movements given the high probability that any nonviolent social movement the US is likely to support will be of the “elite nonviolence” variety and thus a product of “Imperial Nonviolence.” As Zunes affirms, “The United States has done for the cause of democracy what the Soviet Union did for the cause of socialism.”

Given recent history, it does not look likely that the US will any time soon switch its foreign policy to a significant extent with regards to democracy promotion. After all, one hardly imagines the US supporting any group that wishes to nationalize its industry, redistribute its wealth in more egalitarian ways, or otherwise opposes US global interests.

While there remains considerable debate over the extent and nature of US imperialism, the 21st century global security agenda lends credibility to the argument that contemporary imperialism is governed by a transnational capitalist class as opposed to a more traditional national empire. There is a significant difference, for example, between the argument that the ‘US military system is used to defend US interests by promoting low-intensity democracy’ and ‘a transnational elite uses the US military system to defend and promote its global interests.’ Robinson, for example, observes forcefully that, “The beneficiaries of US military action around the world are not “US” but transnational capitalist

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7 Kinzer, Overthrow.

groups.” A case in point: “the US occupation force [in Iraq] did not establish any special advantage for ‘US’ capital, for ‘its own markets’.”

In conclusion, low-intensity nonviolence promotes a particular type of democracy that creates global security for elite interests. Alternatively, the adoption of regulative nonviolence would very likely lead to global security for popular democratic interests. If democratization is to be a part of the global security agenda, then popular nonviolence must be the primary means of democracy's promotion. In an age of globalization, democracy needs to be reconceived as popular democracy not elite democracy. In Robinson’s own final comments on polyarchy, he observes that the challenge is to “democratize global society.” This process is best done through regulative nonviolence.

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