1-1-2009

Japan's Preventive Strategy: Secure the World - The National Defense Program Guidelines in and after FY 2010 -

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Japan’s Preventive Strategy: Secure the World
– The National Defense Program Guidelines in and after FY 2010 –

A Thesis

Presented to

the Faculty of Arts and Humanities

University of Denver

In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree

Master of Arts in International Security

by

Tadashi Watanabe

June 2009

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Anthony Hayter, Ph.D.

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ABSTRACT

The Japanese government is now reviewing the National Defense Program Guideline in and after FY 2005 (NDPG 04), and this review will be completed by the end of this year. Even though NDPG 04 provides Japan’s security and defense policy vision to FY 2014, the government nevertheless has decided to change it completely. The purpose of this thesis is to know the reason why the Japanese government has decided to change NDPG 04 completely, the likely contents of NDPG 09, and NDPG 09’s effect on the US-Japan alliance.

The globalizing international society and threats have been increasingly diversified and multi-polarized since the end of the Cold War, and Japan cannot deal with them alone. The fiscal crisis and scandals within the ministry of defense (MOD) and the Japan Self Defense Force (JSDF) have led to a renewed discussion of the security of Japan and the US-Japan security arrangement, particularly given the present five-year review of NDPG 04 now underway. The Japanese political environment on national security changed dramatically during the Koizumi administration (2001-06), which allowed for calm discussion of Japan’s security policy not just among Japan’s leaders, but also among the general population.

More recently, governmental policymakers have recognized that it is impossible for Japan to deal with these international and domestic security issues under NDPG 04
and with the present security and defense system. Therefore they have decided to
strengthen Japan’s security system in the forthcoming NDPG 09 while still remaining
compliant with Article 9 of the Japan’s Constitution. Whichever party or party coalition
wins the next general election later this year, the new leadership likely will see Japan’s
cooporation not only with the United States, but also with other countries both bilaterally
and multilaterally in international organizations as essential to preventing diversified
threats from reaching Japan. In this regard, a Sun Tzu style preventive strategy appears
to be the best way to secure Japan and contribute to global security.

This thesis represents the views of its author, not those of the Japan Maritime
Self Defense Force to which its author belongs, or any other agency of the Japanese
government.
The highest excellence is to subdue the enemy’s army without fighting at all.

– Sun Tzu
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

First, I would like to thank Dr. Paul Viotti as a supervisor/chair of my thesis for his kind guidance of a foreign student. Second, I owe a special debt to my outside chair, Dr. Anthony Hayter for improving my work at my oral defense. I have acquired a debt of gratitude to Col Thomas A. Drohan as a reader of my thesis, whose patience, intellectual and personal support was of great value.

In addition, the grammatical support of Ms. Joyce Sinclair and Ms. Kathy Frey were really helpful and inevitable for an ESL Japanese.
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<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ADIZ</td>
<td>Air Defense Identification Zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APEC</td>
<td>Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASDF</td>
<td>Air Self Defense Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBRN</td>
<td>Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear</td>
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<tr>
<td>CEFP</td>
<td>Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPO</td>
<td>Central Procurement Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSF</td>
<td>Coastal Safety Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>C4ISR</td>
<td>Command/Control/Communications/Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPJ</td>
<td>Democratic Party of Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPRK</td>
<td>Democratic People's Republic of Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EEZ</td>
<td>Economic Exclusive Zone</td>
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<tr>
<td>FY</td>
<td>Fiscal Year</td>
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<td>GSDF</td>
<td>Ground Self Defense Force</td>
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<td>GSOMIA</td>
<td>General Security of Military Information Agreement</td>
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<td>IAEA</td>
<td>International Atomic Energy Agency</td>
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<td>ICBM</td>
<td>Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile</td>
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<td>IT</td>
<td>Information Technology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JCG</td>
<td>Japan Coast Guard</td>
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<td>JCS</td>
<td>Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
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<td>JDA</td>
<td>Japan Defense Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>JSO</td>
<td>Joint Staff Office</td>
</tr>
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<td>LDP</td>
<td>Liberal Democratic Party</td>
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<td>MBT</td>
<td>Main Battle Tank</td>
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<td>MD</td>
<td>Missile Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>MEF</td>
<td>Marine Expeditionary Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>MIO</td>
<td>Maritime Interdiction Operation</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOD</td>
<td>Ministry of Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOOTW</td>
<td>Military Operations other than War</td>
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<tr>
<td>MSA</td>
<td>Maritime Safety Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>MSDF</td>
<td>Maritime Self Defense Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>NDPG</td>
<td>National Defense Program Guidelines</td>
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<td>NDPO</td>
<td>National Defense Program Outline</td>
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<td>NDS</td>
<td>National Defense Strategy</td>
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<td>NM</td>
<td>Nautical Miles</td>
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<td>NMS</td>
<td>National Military Strategy</td>
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<td>NPR</td>
<td>National Police Reserve</td>
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<td>NPT</td>
<td>Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSA</td>
<td>National Safety Agency</td>
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<td>NSC</td>
<td>National Security Council</td>
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<td>NSF</td>
<td>National Safety Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSS</td>
<td>National Security Strategy</td>
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<tr>
<td>ODA</td>
<td>Official Development Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacific Reach</td>
<td>Western Pacific Submarine Rescue Exercise</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
PDCA Plan – Do – Check – Act
PKO Peace Keeping Operation
PLAN People’s Liberation Army Navy
QDR Quadrennial Defense Review
R&D Research and Development
ReCAAP Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia
SACO Special Action Committee on Okinawa
SARS Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome
SCAP Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers
SCO Shanghai Cooperation Organization
SCC Security Consultative Committee
SDF Self Defense Forces
SLOC Sea Lines of Communication
TICAD Tokyo International Conference on African Development
TRDI Technical Research and Development Institute
UNCLOS UN Convention on the Law of the Sea
UNMISET UN Mission of Support in East Timor
UNSCR United Nations Security Council Resolution
US United States
WHO World Health Organization
WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction
Introduction: Purpose of This Thesis

According to the Office of the Prime Minister of Japan, the Japanese government plans to review and revise the present National Defense Program Guidelines in and after FY 2005 (NDPG 04) by the end of this year.\(^1\) The government is considering changing them completely.\(^2\) The purpose of this thesis is to investigate why the Japanese government decided to change the NDPG completely, the likely contents of NDPG 09, and NDPG 09’s likely effect on the US-Japan alliance. This thesis presents the hypothesis that both the domestic political environment and the international security environment have affected the Japanese government’s decision to completely change NDPG.

Regardless of which party or coalition wins the next general election, the date of which is at present not yet set, but which will be held by this September, in addition to sustaining the US-Japan Security Arrangement, it will be essential for Japan to cooperate bilaterally and multilaterally in international organizations to prevent diverse threats from reaching Japan. The Sun Tzu style crisis-prevention strategy is likely the best way to secure Japan and the world.

President Barack Obama said on Feb 24, 2009 when he met Japanese Prime Minister Taro Aso in the White House, "The alliance that we have is the cornerstone of security in East Asia."\(^3\) In Asia, there is no effective regional security organization for the

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US like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Bilateral security arrangements especially with Japan are important to protect the US interest and secure peace in this region. Therefore the US must understand Japan’s willingness to change its defense policy.

As of May 2009, the reviewing process of NDPG 04 is in progress. In this essay, I attempt to deal with the latest topic, so I have had to utilize much on-line information. If we wait until this December, we can know the final result of this review. I chose this topic for my master’s thesis because I believe that knowing about the progress of the process of making NDPG 09 is very beneficial for US scholars researching politics in Japan.
Chapter 1: Characteristics of NDPG

In this chapter, I would like to show characteristics of NDPG 04 through explaining Japan’s securitydefense history after World War II, NDPG 04 itself, and the legal basis of Japan’s securitydefense policy. Even though the Japanese Constitution prohibits Japan from possessing a military force, Japan now possesses the Self Defense Force. In order to understand such a complex reality, we have to know its history affected by the US. We also need to understand the function of NDPG to compare it with US securitydefense strategy documents. And we cannot understand NDPG’s contents without knowing the unique legal basis of Japanese securitydefense policy in detail.

History of Japan’s SecurityDefense and Relationship with the US

Constitution of Japan

In the end of the Second World War, on August 14, 1945, the Japanese government decided to accept the Potsdam Declaration in order to save its state from destruction. On September 2, Japan was occupied by the Allied Powers, and Japanese governmental authority was made subject to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP). On October 11, the SCAP, US General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, ordered Prime Minister Sidehara to make a democratic constitution in

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accordance with the Potsdam Declaration.\(^6\) The Japanese people also wanted to make a
democratic and peaceful constitution at the time, so the new constitution was made and
promulgated quickly on November 3, 1946 under the strong influence of the SCAP. The
Constitution of Japan stipulates renunciation of war as an exercise of its sovereign right.

\textbf{Article 9.} Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order,
the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and
the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.
\(2\) In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air
forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of
belligerency of the state will not be recognized.\(^7\)

In Article 9, Section 2, the Constitution also limits the government’s possession of
military power. Since its promulgation, the Japanese people have not yet changed their
constitution for 63 years.

\textit{Establishment of the National Police Reserve}

On June 25, 1950, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) started the
Korean War. At the time, most of the Allied Powers in Japan consisted of the US Armed
Council Resolution (UNSCR) 84, adopted on July 7, 1950, recommended member states
militarily support the Republic of Korea.\(^8\) Therefore the Allied Powers in Japan moved to
the Korean Peninsula as the United Nations Command to battle against the DPRK troops.

\(^6\) National Diet Library, "Meeting on October 11 between MacArthur and Shidehara," National
March 19, 2009); and National Diet Library, "Potsdam Declaration," National Diet Library, July 26, 1945,

\(^7\) National Diet Library, "The Constitution of Japan," National Diet Library, November 3, 1946,

(accessed March 19, 2009).
The SCAP and the US government decided on a Reverse Course, namely, that Japan should rearm to protect itself from the threat of communist states in spite of the Potsdam Declaration. On July 8, 1950, MacArthur ordered Prime Minister Yoshida to establish the National Police Reserve (NPR) composed of 75,000 men, and to strengthen the Maritime Safety Agency (MSA) of the Ministry of Transport in order to maintain public order without the Allied Powers being stationed in Japan. By the Cabinet Order concerning the NPR given on August 10, 1950, and its related suborders, the NPR was organized militarily. It belonged directly to the Cabinet Office. By October 1951, the NPR was equipped with carbines, machine guns, infantry mortars and rocket launchers. According to Kuzuhara, the SCAP regarded the NPR as a defense force. On April 26, 1952, the Coastal Safety Force (CSF), composed of about 6,000 sailors, was established within the MSA. This was a maritime emergency readiness force similar to the NPR. The government explained that the NPR and the CSF were just police reserves intended to maintain public order and not military forces.

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The Treaty of San Francisco and Rearmament: not Military Force but Self Defense Force

Japan and 49 allied states signed the Treaty of Peace with Japan on September 8, 1951 in San Francisco.\(^{13}\) As a result, on April 28, 1952, Japan regained its sovereignty. At the same time, Japan and the US agreed to a Security Treaty between Japan and the United States of America.

According to this treaty, the US expressed its hope in the preamble as follows:

The United States of America, in the interest of peace and security, is presently willing to maintain certain of its armed forces in and about Japan, in the expectation, however, that Japan will itself increasingly assume responsibility for its own defense against direct and indirect aggression, always avoiding any armament which could be an offensive threat or serve other than to promote peace and security in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter.\(^{14}\)

Both the Japanese and the US governments agreed that Japan would rearm suitably to protect itself from direct and indirect aggression in the Cold War era. On July 31, 1952, the Japanese government promulgated the National Safety Agency (NSA) Act, the NSA was established and the NPR was changed into the National Safety Force (NSF). The CSF moved from the MSA to the NSA. According to the NSA Act, the NSF and the CSF were no longer police reserves but units equipped with tanks and combatant ships. The NSF consisted of 110,000 men, and the CSF consisted of 7,590 sailors. The NSA was an external organ of the Cabinet Office. According to Minister of State Ohashi, the


NSA, the NSF and the CSF were organized to maintain peace and public order, and to make operations more efficient.\textsuperscript{15}

On March 8, 1954, U.S. and Japan concluded the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement. In Article 8, both governments agreed that Japan would attempt to develop its defense capacities.

The Government of Japan, reaffirming its determination to join in promoting international understanding and good will, and maintaining world peace, to take such action as may be mutually agreed upon to eliminate causes of international tension, and to fulfill the military obligations which the Government of Japan has assumed under the Security Treaty between the United States of America and Japan, will make, consistent with the political and economic stability of Japan, the full contribution permitted by its manpower, resources, facilities and general economic condition to the development and maintenance of its own defensive strength and the defensive strength of the free world, take all reasonable measures which may be needed to develop its defense capacities, and take appropriate steps to ensure the effective utilization of any assistance provided by the Government of the United States of America.\textsuperscript{16}

And Japan decided to build its defense force. On July 1, 1954, the Self Defense Forces (SDF) Act was enforced and the NSA was changed into the Japan Defense Agency (JDA) of the Cabinet Office.\textsuperscript{17} The NSF and the CSF were changed into the Ground SDF (GSDF) and the Maritime SDF (MSDF), and the Air SDF (ASDF) was established. At that time, the GSDF consisted of 139,000 men, the MSDF consisted of 16,000 sailors and 58,000 tonnages of ships, and the ASDF consisted of 6,700 men and


150 airplanes.\textsuperscript{18} The purpose of the JSDF is to defend Japan from direct and indirect invasion, to maintain the peace, independence and security of Japan, and to maintain public order if necessary.

\textit{Defense Build-up Plans from 1957 to 1976 and related issues}

At the San Francisco conference in 1952, the Soviet Union representatives attended, but did not sign the San Francisco treaty, because they opposed China’s absence. Japan tried to have diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, and finally, on October 19, 1956, Japan and the Soviet Union agreed on the Joint Declaration between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan. As a result, Japan was able to become a member of the United Nations on December 18, 1956 without obstacles. However, international tensions between the East and the West in East Asia became serious because of the First Indochina War and nuclear testing.

On July 2, 1956, the government established the National Defense Council to discuss defense matters politically.\textsuperscript{19} In the beginning, all the JSDF equipment consisted of weapons the US provided. After the establishment of the JDA, the Government of Japan attempted to develop defense industries and equip the JSDF with domestically produced weapons. Japan needed to make a plan to develop its defense capability. On May 20, 1957, the Basic Guidelines for National Defense were approved by the National Defense Council and the Cabinet. This, as I will mention later, was a principle of Japan’s defense policy. Based on the Guidelines, from 1957 to 1976, the Japanese government


made four Defense Build-up Plans to indicate the purposes of the Japanese midterm defense policy and the goals of the JSDF units every three or five years.

The First Defense Build-up Plan was issued on June 14, 1957. According to the First Defense Build-up Plan, the JDA tried to strengthen the GSDF troops to 180,000 men, the MSDF ships and airplanes to 124,000 tonnages and about 200 airplanes, the ASDF airplanes to 1300. This three years plan was in effect from Fiscal Year (FY) 1958 to FY 1960. This plan was to build the minimum defense force necessary for Japan to defend itself.

On January 19, 1960, Japan and the US signed the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan to revise the former alliance treaty of 1952, because the former one was unilateral. When both governments signed the treaty of 1952, Japan did not possess its own defense force. Therefore the US had the unilateral responsibility to protect Japan, and Japan provided bases for the US Armed Forces in Japan. Japan and the US agreed that the US Armed Forces and the JSDF should mutually protect Japanese territory and US bases in Japan.

**ARTICLE V.** Each Party recognizes that an armed attack against either Party in the territories under the administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional provisions and processes. Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

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21 In Japan, FY starts on April 1, and ends on next year’s March 31.

On July 18, 1961, the Japanese government approved the Second Defense Build-up Plan. Because of the new alliance treaty, this plan was made to establish the minimum defense capability for dealing with conventional limited warfare. According to this five year plan, the GSDF troops was to be 180,000, the MSDF was to be 140,000 tonnages of ships, and the ASDF was to be 1,000 planes plus 4 anti-air missile artillery units by the end of FY 1966.23

On November 29, 1966, the Outline of Third Defense Build-up Plan was adopted by the National Defense Council and the Cabinet. In addition, on March 13, 1967, key matters for inclusion in the Third Defense Build-up Plan were agreed upon. According to these, the GSDF was to maintain its quota as 180,000, and the JSDF was to improve its equipment.24 This plan was in effect from FY 1967 to FY 1971. The purpose of this plan was almost the same as the former one. By the time this plan ended, the JSDF’s basis was established.

The Outline of 4th Five-Year Defense Build-up Plan was approved on February 7, 1972. On October 9, 1972, key matters for inclusion in the Fourth Defense Build-up Plan were approved, among which was equipping the JSDF with 160 tanks, 54 ships and 46 F-4EJs.25 At the same time, the National Defense Council and the Cabinet showed clearly


that Japan’s defense capability was intended to effectively prevent invasion. Japan had to depend on US nuclear deterrence capability against threats of nuclear attack, and Japan would have attempted to repulse an enemy’s indirect or small invasion by itself, or to repulse a larger invasion in collaboration with the US Armed Forces under the US-Japan security arrangement.26

National Defense Program Outline and Related Issues

By FY 1976, four Defense Build-up Plans had contributed to the building up of Japan’s basic defense capability. After it was built up, the Japanese government decided to make not a new Defense Build-up Plan but rather a National Defense Program Outline (NDPO 76) to show people the posture of national defense considering domestic budgetary and personnel limitations and the international situation.27 In addition, in the NDPO 76, Japan developed the Basic Defense Force Concept to improve its defense capability for the future.

The concept is designed to enable Japan to maintain the minimum necessary basic defense capability as an independent state so as not to turn into a power vacuum and become a destabilizing factor in the region, rather than preparing to directly counter military threats.28

The government attached a table to show the ideal posture and strength of the JSDF as the goal of the NDPO 76. The NDPO 76 stipulated that the GSDF should have 180,000 men, the MSDF should have 60 destroyers, and the ASDF should have 400

26 The Oil Shock made the government minimize this plan.


operational airplanes. On the same day as its approval, the Miki administration decided that the government would try to program and execute the defense budget within 1% of the GNP every year. Japan’s defense policy was led by this new ideology.

On November 27, 1978, Japan and the US agreed on the Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation. With this agreement, both states tried to develop a mutual defense plan for Japan based on Article 5, the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan. However they could not come to an agreement on dealing with situations in areas surrounding Japan. The Japanese government has tried to develop its defense force to deal with a limited conventional invasion by itself and to collaborate with the US Armed Forces for a large scale invasion against Japan since this agreement.

From FY 1977 to 1979, the JDA improved the JSDF through single-year plans within the NDPO 76. However a multiple-FY plan was more convenient for the JDA, because defense equipment was so expensive that the government could not buy it all at once. Therefore, in July 1979, the JDA made an internal Mid-Term Defense Estimate for FY 1980 – FY 1982 within the NDPO 76. The Second Mid-Term Defense Estimate was announced on July 23, 1982, for FY 1983 to FY 1987. These Mid-Term Defense Estimates were made not by the National Defense Council and the whole Cabinet as a


30 Ibid.

political decision but by the JDA as a bureaucratic decision as the government wanted to share the responsibility for making a defense plan with policymakers.

On September 18, 1985, the National Defense Council and the Cabinet approved the Mid-Term Defense Program to achieve the defense capability stipulated by the NDPO 76.

On July 1, 1986, the Nakasone administration made a change in the Security Council Establishment Law and established the Security Council. On December 30, 1986, the Chief Cabinet Secretary announced that the defense budget would exceed 1% of the GNP in FY 1987. Still, the government respected the defense budget rule of staying within 1% of the GNP.32

On August 2, 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait. In accordance with UNSCR 678, on January 17, 1991, allied forces mainly led by the US started to free Kuwait from Iraq’s invasion. The allied forces’ Operation Desert Storm successfully freed Kuwait and Iraq and on April 11, in accordance with UNSCR 687, the allied forces ceased fire. Because of its Constitution, Japan could not militarily support Kuwait and Operation Desert Storm. However the Japanese government tried to support it not only fiscally but also politically. Therefore, on April 26, 1991 it ordered the MSDF to send a minesweeper to the Persian Gulf to minesweep. This operation, called Operation Dawn of the Gulf, was the first

experience of JSDF troops deploying to a foreign state in an actual mission and it was successfully completed.\textsuperscript{33}

On December 20, 1990, the government approved the Mid-Term Defense Program for from FY 1991 to FY 1995. Based on the recognition that because of the former Mid-Term Defense Program the JSDF had suitable strength as stipulated by NDPO 76, the purpose of this program was to modernize the JSDF’s equipment and balance frontline equipment with logistics.

On January 29, 1992, the Law Concerning the Dispatch of International Disaster Relief Teams was revised, and it became possible for the JSDF to participate in international disaster relief operations. Until now, the JSDF has sent its troops to do 8 disaster relief operations including providing relief during the 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake.

On August 10, 1992, the International Peace Cooperation Law was enforced and the JSDF sent its Peace Keeping Operation (PKO) troops to the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia. Since this 1992 PKO, the JSDF has participated in 10 PKOs total.

Additionally, the Cold War ended around 1990. Because of the Revolutions of 1989 in Eastern Europe, the Eastern Block disappeared. The Soviet Union collapsed on December 25, 1991, as Russian society became disordered. Japan lost the northern threat, so the time to renew the NDPO had come.

On November 28, 1995, the Security Council and the Cabinet approved the National Defense Program Outline for FY 1996 and beyond (NDPO 95). The purpose of NDPO 95 was to show the defense posture needed to deal with disaster relief operations and international peace cooperation needed to stabilize international society, and to provide basic national defense.\footnote{Japan Defense Agency, "National Defense Program Outline in and after FY 1996," Defense of Japan 2002, November 28, 1995, http://www.clearing.mod.go.jp/hakusho_data/2002/siryo/frame/dg140200500.htm (accessed March 20, 2009).} NDPO 95 stipulated that the GSDF should have 160,000 men and 900 tanks, the MSDF should have 50 destroyers, and the ASDF should have 300 fighters. In NDPO 95, the government maintained the Basic Defense Force Concept and recognized the importance of the US-Japan security arrangement to stabilize international society, especially in East Asia.

Defense Cooperation.\textsuperscript{37} Because of these guidelines, both governments started to strengthen their mutual relationship in order to deal with situations in areas surrounding Japan as well as an armed attack against Japan. In accordance with the guidelines, on August 25, 1999, the Japanese government enforced the Law Concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan to support the US armed forces, relieve refugees, conduct ship inspections, and execute search and rescue activities in rear areas.\textsuperscript{38}

On December 15, 2000, the government approved the Mid-Term Defense Program from FY 2001 to FY2005 to strengthen anti-WMD and anti-guerrilla capability, network centric warfare capability and disaster relief capability.\textsuperscript{39} However this program was stopped in FY 2004 because of the September 11 attack in the US, the War in Afghanistan that has been ongoing since 2001, the Second Gulf War, and the technological development of the Missile Defense (MD) system.


The government approved the Preparation of Ballistic Missile Defense System, and on December 19, 2003, it decided to equip the JSDF with MD system, and renew the NDPO and the Mid-Term Defense Program from FY 2005.\(^{40}\)

In his policy statement in the National Diet in February 2002, Prime Minister Koizumi announced that, because of the September 11 attack, Japan needed the legislation in order to better respond to emergency situations.\(^{41}\) Politicians had not discussed legislation for responding to emergency situations for a long time, because the Japanese people had a strong antipathy to the military. In the period spanning 2003 to 2004 the government passed the Armed Attack Situation Response Law, the Civil Protection Law, the US Military Actions Related Law, the Maritime Transportation Restriction Law, the Prisoners of War Law, the Law Concerning Punishment of Grave Breaches of the International Humanitarian Law, and other related laws. Each law was in response to specific threatening events. On November 2, 2001, Premier Koizumi enforced the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law allowing him to send the MSDF’s replenishment tankers to the Indian Ocean to support a coalition fleet battling terrorists. On June 26, 2003, after the cease fire of the Second Gulf War, he also passed the Law Concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian Assistance in Iraq allowing Japan to dispatch GSDF and ASDF units to assist the Iraqi people, and to logistically support the coalition forces in Iraq.


National Defense Program Guidelines in and after FY 2005 and Related Issues

On December 10, 2004, the Security Council and the Cabinet approved the National Defense Program Guidelines for in and after FY 2005 (NDPG 04) and the Mid-Term Defense Program for from 2005 to 2009. NDPG 04 stipulated that the GSDF should have 155,000 men and 600 tanks, the MSDF should have 47 destroyers, and the ASDF should have 260 fighters. On February 19, 2005, Japan and the US announced a joint statement on regional and global Common Strategic Objectives. This statement was an epoch-making event to show and confirm each other’s strategic goals.

On January 9, 2007, the JDA was changed to the Japan ministry of defense (MOD) to “improve defense policy-making/planning functions, to enhance and strengthen responses to emergency situations, and to develop a structure that allows for proactive efforts for the peace and stability of the international community.” On March 13, 2009, the Minister of Defense ordered the MSDF to send two destroyers to protect merchant vessels related to Japan from Somali pirates in the Gulf of Aden.

National Defense Program Guidelines in and after FY 2005

NDPG 04 consisted of six parts: purpose, security environment surrounding Japan, basic principles of Japan’s security policy, future defense forces, additional elements for consideration, and attached table.

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Composition and Contents

Purpose

NDPG 04 was created to show the future posture of Japan’s security and defense capability in accordance with the Preparation of Ballistic Missile Defense System. The Preparation of Ballistic Missile Defense System explained why the government needed to review NDPO 95, as follows:

Regarding the security environment surrounding Japan, while large-scale invasion by a third country into Japan has become less likely, measures against the increasing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, activities of international terrorist groups and other types of new forms of threats as well as diverse contingencies that are likely to have a negative impact on the peace and security of the nation (hereinafter “the new threats, etc.”) has been urgently needed for the international community. For the peace and stability of the nation and the international community, Japan also needs to take all possible measures against such new threats, etc. through comprehensive and prompt responses under the organic coordination of diplomatic effort promotion, effective operation of defense forces and other measures, while firmly maintaining the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements. When such new security environment and the introduction of the BMD system are considered, we come to a conclusion that the whole defense capacities of Japan need to be reviewed.

The government declared that NDPO 95 was out of date, so it wanted to keep pace with the security fashion at the time to renew NDPO 95.

Security Environment Surrounding Japan

Japan perceived the security environment surrounding Japan to be as follows:

1) The international community is facing urgent new threats and diverse situations to peace and security, including the proliferation of WMD and ballistic missiles, as well as international terrorist activities (hereinafter “new threats and diverse situations”).

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2) The use of military force now plays a broader role in the international community than simply deterring or responding to armed conflict.
3) Although Russia has drastically reduced its armed forces in the Far East since the end of the Cold War, massive military might, including nuclear arsenals, continue to exist in the region.
4) The situation on the Korean Peninsula is unpredictable and cross-Taiwan Strait relations remain uncertain.
5) Military activities by North Korea constitute a major destabilizing factor to regional and international security, and are a serious challenge to international non-proliferation efforts.
6) China, which has a major impact on regional security, continues to modernize its nuclear forces and missile capabilities as well as its naval and air forces.
7) The close and cooperative relationship between Japan and the United States, based on the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, continues to play an important role for the security of Japan as well as for peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region.\(^{46}\)

Basic Principles of Japan’s Security Policy

Because of the security environment surrounding Japan, as stated above, NDPG 04 has two objectives, as follows:

1) To prevent any threat from reaching Japan and, in the event that it does, repel it and minimize any damage.
2) To improve the international security environment so as to reduce the chances that any threat will reach Japan in the first place.\(^{47}\)

In order to achieve these two objectives, Japan tries to utilize three approaches: Japan’s own efforts, Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, and cooperation with the international community.

Japan’s own efforts consist of three measures: diplomatic and other activities to improve the international security environment, Japan’s integrated response bringing together all relevant organizations and promoting mutual cooperation between the central and local governments, future defense forces capable of effectively responding to new

\(^{46}\) Ibid., 396-397.

\(^{47}\) Ibid., 397.
threats and diverse situations while maintaining those elements of the Basic Defense Force Concept that remain valid.48

In order to strengthen Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, Japan decided to promote the following measures: intelligence exchange, operational cooperation, cooperation on MD equipment and technology exchange, and efforts to make the stationing of U.S. forces in Japan smoother and more efficient.49

To cooperate with the international community, Japan decided to promote the following measures: diplomatic efforts including the strategic use of Official Development Assistance (ODA) and PKOs, reformation of the UN to make it more effective and reliable, and promotion of a stable security environment in the Asia-Pacific region, especially the Arc of Instability that affects Japan’s sea lines of communication.50

Future Defense Forces

As a defense program, NDPG mentioned the future posture of defense forces. The Japanese government changed its defense paradigm from the Basic Defense Force Concept to the concept of future defense forces capable of effectively responding to new threats and diverse situations, because there was little possibility of a Russian invasion of Hokkaido. In other words, Japan is trying to change from the strategy based on a serious view of the northern front to the strategy of a multirole JSDF to promote the following capabilities: MD capability, anti-guerrilla/special forces capability, capability against the invasion of Japan’s offshore islands, patrol and surveillance capability in the sea and

48 Ibid., 398.

49 Ibid., 399.

50 Ibid., 399.
airspace surrounding Japan to respond to violations of Japan’s airspace and the intrusion of armed special-purpose ships and other similar vessels, disaster relief capability, and PKO capability.  

In order to develop a multirole JSDF, the government is trying to enhance joint operations capability by the establishment of the Joint Staff Office (JSO) and more intelligence capability, and more efficient use of information technology and human resources.

Additional Elements for Consideration

In fulfilling NDPG, the Japanese government considered four elements: the impact of severe fiscal conditions on the defense budget, revision of procurement and research and development (R&D), maintenance of close relationships with local governments located near defense facilities, and revision of NDPG 04 itself.

Attached table

NDPG 04 laid out the future JSDF posture. The main topics of Japan’s future defense in NDPG 04 are as follows.

First, the GSDF tried to establish the Central Readiness Force for responses to diverse situations and international missions, to change the normal eight divisions and six brigades to 3 modernized comprehensive division/brigades in Hokkaido and 11 modernized readiness divisions/brigades in other islands, and to shift from the conventional anti-tank warfare-oriented policy to the manpower-oriented policy for

\[51\] Ibid., 400-401.

\[52\] Ibid., 401.
multi-missions. Second, the MSDF attempted to reorganize the Fleet Escort Force, the Fleet Submarine Force, and the Fleet Air Wing within the Self Defense Fleet to provide units for the Commander in Chief of the Self Defense Fleet as an effective force user. Third, the ASDF attempted to modernize and reorganize fighter units by the abolishment of the definition of fighter supporters and fighter interceptors, and the possession of aerial refueling cargo-tankers. Finally, the JSDF attempted to establish the JSO and equip it with a joint MD system by FY 2011. (See APPENDIX C)

Relationship with the Mid-Term Defense Program

NDPG 04 provided a 10-year vision of Japan’s security. In order to achieve the NDPG’s goal step-by-step, the Japanese government planned to make Mid-Term Defense Programs every five years. For example, the MSDF had to reduce its destroyers from 50 to 47, but it was difficult to do so in five years. In the Mid-Term Defense Program, the MSDF made a plan to reduce the number temporarily to 48. In the program, the government showed more specifics than the NDPG with respect to how many and what kind of equipment it would procure during the term. The total amount of defense-related expenditures was limited to about 24.24 trillion yen in FY 2005 prices.

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53 Ibid., 130-131.
54 Ibid., 131-132.
55 Ibid., 132.
56 Ibid., 133, 186.
57 Ibid., 402.
58 Ibid., 403-409.
Characteristics and Comparison with US strategies/QDR

Japan does not have formal National Security/Defense/Military Strategy documents such as the US, but this does not mean that Japan has not developed programs to achieve its goals. Actually, in NDPO 76 and NDPO 95, the government wrote its objectives in terms of defense policy only. In NDPG 04, Japan attempted to make a whole governmental effort to clarify its security goals for a decade. The actual description related to its security policy was minimal, but the description was still a great leap for Japan’s security policy. On December 10, 2004, just after the approval of NDPG 04, the Chief Cabinet Secretary announced, “The new NDPG spells out both Japan’s vision for future defense forces as well as the basic principles of its security policy which underlie that vision.”

The NDPG was a fairly short document, just a few thousands words. In order to achieve the goal, supplemental documents had to be developed. The Mid-Term Defense Program supplemented the NDPG’s defense policy, but no other documents supplemented other parts of Japan’s security policy related to the NDPG. Japan’s security policy has not been coordinated across the government yet. This remains a huge problem in the present NDPG system.

Each state should have a way of developing strategies to secure itself. In order to highlight the NDPG’s shortcomings, I would like to review US strategies which are relatively rational and structured. They also influence Japan’s security policy.

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59 Ibid., 409.
US National Security Strategy

On March 16, 2006, the White House issued the National Security Strategy (NSS) of the United States of America. It stated, “The goal of our statecraft is to help create a world of democratic, well-governed states that can meet the needs of their citizens and conduct themselves responsibly in the international system. This is the best way to provide enduring security for the American people.”60 In order to achieve this goal, the US has outlined broad objectives:

1) Champion aspirations for human dignity;
2) Strengthen alliances to defeat global terrorism and work to prevent attacks against us and our friends;
3) Work with others to defuse regional conflicts;
4) Prevent our enemies from threatening us, our allies, and our friends with weapons of mass destruction;
5) Ignite a new era of global economic growth through free markets and free trade;
6) Expand the circle of development by opening societies and building the infrastructure of democracy;
7) Develop agendas for cooperative action with other main centers of global power;
8) Transform America’s national security institutions to meet the challenges and opportunities of the 21st century; and
9) Engage the opportunities and confront the challenges of globalization.

After explaining the international situation, the NSS stressed the importance of international cooperation, because it is difficult for the US to achieve the goal by itself even though it is the strongest military power in the world.

Japan has a similar strategic goal: to provide enduring security for the Japanese people, as stated in the Basic Policy for National Defense which was approved on May 20, 1957. The Basic Policy for National Defense said, “The aim of national defense is to prevent direct and indirect aggression and to repel any such aggression with the aim of

protecting Japan’s independence and peace, which are founded on democracy.”So In order to achieve this goal, Japan proposes to achieve the following objectives:

- To support the UN activities and promote international cooperation to achieve world peace.
- To stabilize the livelihood of the people, promote their patriotism, and establish the foundations required for national security.
- Within the limits required for self-defense, to progressively establish efficient defense capabilities in accordance with the nation’s strength and situation.
- To deal with external act of aggression based on the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, until the UN can provide sufficient functions to effectively prevent such acts in the future.

This was adopted by the National Defense Council and approved by the Cabinet.

This document is dated, but it is still in effect in its unrevised form. NDPG 04 has a strategic role to play in fulfilling the Basic Policy for National Defense, which states, “Japan will utilize all appropriate means to prevent any threat from reaching the country. In addition, based on the principle of acting closely with the international community and its alliance partner—the US—. Japan will engage in diplomatic and other activities to improve the international security environment so as to prevent the emergence of any new threats.” So In NDPG 04, Japan declared that not only the JSDF’s effort, but also a government-wide effort are key to securing Japan. In this sense, Japan’s national security strategy essentially consists of the national’s goals as outlined in the Basic Policy for National Defense, and the means to achieve them, NDPG 04.63

61 Ibid., 395.
62 Ibid., 398.
US National Defense Strategy

In June 2008, the 2008 National Defense Strategy (NDS) of the United States was published by the US Department of Defense (DOD). This supports the NSS in providing security for the American people.

In the NDS, the DOD outlines five key objectives: defend the homeland, win the long war, promise security, deter conflict, and win the nation’s war. In order to achieve these objectives, the DOD presented five approaches: shaping the choice of key states, preventing adversaries from acquiring or using WMD, strengthening and expanding alliances and partnerships, securing US strategic access and retaining freedom of action, and integrating and unifying our efforts.

In the “basic principles of Japan’s security policy” of NDPG 04, the Japanese government outlined two objectives and three approaches, as mentioned above. The MOD and other governmental organizations have attempted to achieve these objectives using the three basic approaches, but the MOD has the largest role. Similarly, the “basic principles of Japan’s security policy” are embedded as goals in the National Defense Strategy.

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66 Japan Ministry of Defense. Defense of Japan 2008. 397-399. Two objectives are to prevent any threat from reaching Japan and, in the event that it does, repel it and minimize any damage, and to improve the international security environment so as to reduce the chances that any threat will reach Japan in the first place. Three approaches are Japan’s own efforts, Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, and cooperation with the international community.
US National Military Strategy and Quadrennial Defense Review

The National Military Strategy (NMS) of the United States of America, published by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), supports the NSS’ and NDS’s goals and objectives. In spite of the fact the newest NMS is older than the present NDS published in 2008, I will compare the NMS with NDPG 04 to highlight the layered US strategic structure from the NSS to the NMS.

In the NMS, the JCS outlined three military objectives: to protect the US, to prevent conflict and surprise attack, and to prevail against adversaries. In order to achieve these objectives, the JCS presented desired attributes, capabilities and functions. The US Armed Forces should be fully integrated, expeditionary, networked, decentralized and adaptable, and have decision superiority and lethality. And the JCS presented the 1-4-2-1 force-sizing concept to defend the homeland, operate four forward regions, and defeat two regional adversaries and achieve a result in one of them.

The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Report of February 6, 2006 is a document periodically issued by the DOD to achieve the objectives of the NDS. In accordance with the Section 118, Title 10 of the US Code,

The Secretary of Defense shall every four years, during a year following a year evenly divisible by four, conduct a comprehensive examination (to be known as a "quadrennial defense review") of the national defense strategy, force structure,

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force modernization plans, infrastructure, budget plan, and other elements of the defense program and policies of the United States with a view toward determining and expressing the defense strategy of the United States and establishing a defense program for the next 20 years.\(^69\)

The QDR proposed four focus areas: defeating terrorist networks, defending the homeland in depth, shaping the choices of countries at strategic crossroads, and preventing hostile states and non-state actors from acquiring or using WMD.\(^70\) These four areas comprise Force Planning Construct to defend the homeland, prevail in the War on Terror and conduct irregular operations, and conduct and win conventional campaigns.\(^71\) This Force Planning Construct departed from the 1-4-2-1 force-sizing concept. The QDR also provided a barometer of defense budget limitations and equipment to possess in four years.\(^72\)

In NDPG 04, the government defined Japan’s defense forces as “the ultimate guarantee of its national security, representing Japan’s will and ability to repel any threat that might reach its shores.”\(^73\) That was the JSDF’s intermediate objective. In order to achieve this objective, NDPG 04 established three measures: effective response to the new threat and diverse situations, preparations to deal with full-scale invasion, and proactive efforts to improve the international environment. An attached table indicated


the JSDF’s future size more concretely than the NMS. Because NDPG 04 described the
JSDF’s intermediate objectives and appropriate size, it is similar to the NMS and the
QDR. Japan also has the Mid-Term Defense Program as a five-year plan to improve the
JSDF to achieve the NDPG’s force objectives. This program is more concrete than the
NDPG, so the NDPG and the Mid-Term Defense Program are somewhat similar to the
QDR’s role.

In conclusion, NDPG 04 contains elements of the NSS, NDS, NMS and QDR.
Because of its name, the National Defense Program Guidelines, it appears to play a role
most similar to the NDS. On the other hand, it was made by the Cabinet, so that it has a
broader security role to the NSS. Except for the MOD, ministries having responsibility
for the national security do not seriously regard NDPG 04 as supporting the NSS,
because of its defense label, in spite of its contents. NDPG functions not so much to
fulfill broad goals such as NSS establishes, but at the level of the NDS, NMS and QDR
goals and objectives.

Legal Basis of Japan’s Security and Defense Policy

This section explains the layered structure of Japan’s security/defense policy and
the NDPG’s place in it.

Constitution and the Governmental View on its Article 9

In accordance with Article 9 of the Constitution of Japan, Japan will never
possess “land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential,” and renounces war and
the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. However the

74 “Article 9. Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese
people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of
settling international disputes. (2) In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and
Japanese government considers that Article 9 does not negate a sovereign power’s inherent right of self-defense, so Japan possesses the JSDF at “the minimum level of armed force needed to exercise the right.”

Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations also admits the inherent right of self-defense.

Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.

On December 16, 1959, the Supreme Court of Japan, using its power of judicial review, passed judgment on a case of Violation of the Special Criminal Law. This law was enacted as a result of the Administrative Agreement under Article III of the Security Treaty between Japan and the United States of America. In this case, the constitutionality of the right of self-defense and the US-Japan alliance were recognized as follows:

This Article renounces the so-called war and prohibits the maintenance of the so-called war potential, but certainly there is nothing in it which would deny the right of self-defense inherent in our nation as a sovereign power. The pacifism advocated in our Constitution was never intended to mean defenselessness or nonresistance... It is needless to say that we are free to choose whatever method or means deemed appropriate to accomplish our objectives in the light of the actual international situation, as long as such measures are for the purpose of preserving the peace and security of our country. Article 9 of the Constitution does not at all

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prohibit our country from seeking a guarantee from another country in order to maintain the peace and security of the country.\textsuperscript{77}

The Japanese government considers that Japan possesses the inherent right of collective self-defense but that it should not be exercised because it could exceed the minimum level authorized by Article 9 of the Constitution. Therefore according to the US-Japan Security Treaty of 1960, both states’ common defense actions can only deal with an armed attack against either party in the territories under the administration of Japan.\textsuperscript{78}

\textit{SDF Act and Related Regulations}

The SDF Act stipulates that the JSDF mission is to defend Japan from a direct or indirect invasion, to maintain public order, to deal with “a situation occurring in areas surrounding Japan that may severely affect the peace and security of Japan,” and to maintain the peace and security of the international society.\textsuperscript{79} Article 7 of the SDF Act says that the Prime Minister has the supreme power of command and supervises the JSDF.\textsuperscript{80} In addition to the SDF Act, there are several other laws created to provide the domestic legal basis for SDF actions: the International Peace Cooperation Law to attend UN PKOs; the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law to send fleet replenishment tankers to the Indian Ocean since fall 2001; the Law Concerning the Dispatch of International Disaster-Relief Teams to conduct international disaster relief operations such as the large


\textsuperscript{78} "Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America."


scale earthquake off Indonesia’s Sumatra Island and consequent tsunami in the Indian Ocean; and legislation for responses to situations such as the Armed Attack Situation Response Law, the Civil Protection Law, the US Military Actions Related Measures Law, the Maritime Transportation Restriction Law, the Law Regarding the Use of Specific Public Facilities, the Prisoners of War Law, the Law Concerning Punishment of Grave Breaches of the International Humanitarian Law, the Ship Inspection Operations Law and the Law Concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan. In addition, Japan has ratified the Biological Weapons Convention, the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, the Convention on Cluster Munitions, the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and other arms control and humanitarian treaties.

Basic Policy for National Defense and Other Basic Principles

The National Defense Council adopted and the Cabinet approved the Basic Policy for National Defense in 1957. This is the basic foundation of Japan’s security and defense policy. In addition, there are other basic principles: exclusive defense-oriented policy; not becoming a military power; the three non-nuclear principles; and ensuring civilian control.

Exclusive Defense-oriented Policy

According to the Governmental Written Answer on November 5, 1985, regarding Councilor Hata’s Question on Basic Defense Policy “The exclusively defense-oriented policy means that Japan will not employ a defensive force unless and until an armed attack is mounted on Japan by another country, and even in such a case, only the minimum force necessary to defend itself may be used. Furthermore, only the minimum defense forces necessary for self-defense should be retained and used. This exclusively defense-oriented policy is a passive defense strategy that is consistent with the spirit of the Constitution.”

In Japan, the term “strategic defensive” means the same as “exclusive defense-oriented policy.” Under this policy, the JSDF will repulse an enemy’s attack not in the enemy’s territory, but around or in Japan. Japan will not carry out a preemptive strike, the government refrains from possessing Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), long-range strategic bombers, attack aircraft carriers, or long-range ground attack cruise missiles, because possessing these offensive weapons which can cause mass destruction exceeds the minimum level of individual self-defense.

Not Becoming a Military Power

According to the MOD, “There is no established definition for the term ‘military power.’ However, not becoming a military power that could threaten the security of other countries means that Japan will not possess more military force than is necessary for self-

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defense and that could pose a threat to other countries.”

This policy strongly takes into consideration neighboring states’ fears that Japan will be a military power again. For example, the Korean newspaper *JoongAng Ilbo* expressed the fear, “North Korea’s missile launch will provide decisive support to Japanese right-wing forces who want their country to become a military powerhouse.”

Three Non-nuclear Principles

Japan is the only state which has been bombed by atomic weapons, so the Japanese people have a strong antipathy toward nuclear weapons. On December 11, 1967, at the Budget Committee in the House of Representatives, Prime Minister Sato said, “My responsibility is to achieve and maintain safety in Japan under the Three Non-Nuclear Principles of not possessing, not producing and not permitting the introduction of nuclear weapons, in line with Japan's Peace Constitution.”

Simultaneously, Japan relies on the US nuclear deterrent against the nuclear threat, according to NDPG 04. Japan also attempts to contribute to the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty System and the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Ensuring Civilian Control

Historically, the Empire of Japan, led by the military, started the World War II in the Pacific because the Prime Minister and the Imperial Diet could not control the

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prerogative of supreme command executed by the Imperial Japanese Army/Navy General Staff Office.\textsuperscript{88} Because of this, Japan decided to utilize a civilian control system under the present Constitution. The Japanese style of civilian control is as follows:

1) The Japanese people are represented by civilians in the Diet, which makes legislative and budgetary decisions on matters such as the authorized number of SDF Regular Personnel and principal institutions of the SDF. It also approves defense operations.

2) As part of its general administrative functions, the Cabinet has entire authority related to defense.

3) The Constitution requires the Prime Minister and other Ministers of State in the Cabinet to be civilians. The Prime Minister, acting on behalf of the Cabinet, is the supreme commander of the SDF. The Minister of Defense, who is exclusively in charge of national defense, exercises general control over SDF activities.

4) The Security Council of Japan within the Cabinet discusses important defense matters.

5) At the Ministry of Defense, the Minister of Defense is in charge of administrative work related to national defense and controls the SDF. The Minister of Defense is assisted in planning political measures and administration by the Senior Vice-Minister and two Parliamentary Secretaries.\textsuperscript{89}

\textsuperscript{88} Hanover College, Department of History, "The Constitution of the Empire of Japan," \textit{Hanover Historical Texts Project}, November 3, 1889, http://history.hanover.edu/texts/1889con.html (accessed March 25, 2009); and Shigenobu Tamura and Yoshio Suginoo, \textit{Textbook: National Security of Japan} (Bunkyo, Tokyo: Fuyou Syuppan Inc., 2004), 40. According to the Constitution of the Empire of Japan, the Emperor had every sovereign right. The legislature, the administration, the judiciary, and the Military did not have real power but executed Emperor’s prerogatives. So the Diet and the Cabinet could not check and control the Military. In addition, the Emperor did not use his political power actually and only gave approvals for his subjects’ policy, because he had to be a British-style constitutional monarchy.

Article 4. The Emperor is the head of the Empire, combining in Himself the rights of sovereignty, and exercises them, according to the provisions of the present Constitution.

Article 5. The Emperor exercises the legislative power with the consent of the Imperial Diet.

Article 11. The Emperor has the supreme command of the Army and Navy.

Article 55. The respective Ministers of State shall give their advice to the Emperor, and be responsible for it.

MOD’s Annual White Paper: Defense of Japan

According to the Vice-Minister’s Meeting Agreement of October 24, 1963, white papers are defined as government publications edited by Japanese government offices to show citizens the actual condition of Japanese politics, society, and economy. The MOD’s annual white paper “Defense of Japan” is designed to deepen citizens’ and international society’s recognition of Japan’s basic defense policy. This paper makes known the MOD and the JSDF’s official position on the security environment surrounding Japan, the basics of Japan’s defense policy and the build-up of its defense capability, and the measures of the defense of Japan.

US-Japan Security Arrangements

In the Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee issued by Secretary of State Rice, Secretary of Defense Gates, Minister for Foreign Affairs Aso, and Minister of Defense Kyuma on May 1, 2007, Japan and the US confirmed, “The U.S.-Japan security relationship is the bedrock of Japan's defense and the keystone of peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region.” There are three reasons. First, an enemy’s attack against Japan will prompt a confrontation with the US because of Article 5 of the US-Japan Security Treaty. This arrangement is a strong deterrence to potential attacks. Second, Article 6 of the treaty said, “For the purpose of contributing to the security of

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Japan and the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East, the United States of America is granted the use by its land, air and naval forces of facilities and areas in Japan.” This means that the US-Japan Security Arrangements can contribute to international stability. 93 Third, Article 2 said, “The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between them.” 94 This treaty is a basis not only of mutual security but also of a mutual economic, political and social relationship. This US-Japan Security Arrangement is a guarantee to allow economic prosperity and political legitimacy in the world. This recognition was reconfirmed by President Obama on February 24, 2009, when he met Prime Minister Aso in the White House, “The alliance that we have is the cornerstone of security in East Asia.” 95

Arms Export Policy

On April 21, 1967, at the National Diet, Prime Minister Sato declared the Three Principles on Arms Export, as follows:

The Principles provide that arms export to the following countries shall not be permitted:

1) Communist Bloc countries;
2) Countries to which arms export is prohibited under the U.N. resolutions; or

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93 "Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America."
94 Ibid.
3) Countries which are actually involved or likely to become involved in international conflicts.\(^{96}\)

On February 27, 1976, Prime Minister Miki provided additional principles as follows:

With regard to the export of “arms,” the government, from the standpoint of Japan as a pacifist country, has always dealt with cautiously with the problem of arms exports to avoid the escalation of international conflict. The Government will continue to deal with such matters pursuant to the following policy and will not promote arms exports.

i) The export of “arms” to the areas subject to the Three Principles shall not be permitted.

ii) The export of “arms” to area other than the areas subject to the Three Principles, shall be restrained in line with the spirit of the Constitution and the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law.\(^{97}\)

According these principles, Japan restrains itself from exporting arms not only to Communist Bloc states but also to any other states except the US.\(^{98}\) These arms export policies have contributed to the non-proliferation of armed conflict in the world. On the other hand, the policy causes issues with respect to Japan’s attempts to develop weapons of its own. These principles increase the costs of weapons produced in Japan, which in turn inflates the defense budget. The relatively small amount of domestic weapons production makes the defense industry inefficient. Japan cannot provide weapons to some developing states which need to build a system of national security. Therefore some


\(^{97}\) Ibid.

politicians of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the Japan Business Federation have insisted on reviewing these policies to relax exporting weapons.\textsuperscript{99}

\textit{Security Council of Japan}

The Security Council of Japan established in the Cabinet discusses important matters of defense and emergency situations.\textsuperscript{100} The Prime Minister has to inquire about matters such as the following:

1) The Basic Policy of National Defense
2) The National Defense Program Guidelines
3) Industrial management plans related to the NDPG
4) Basic policies and matters on responses to armed attack situations, situations in areas surrounding Japan, the JSDF actions to contribute to the international security, etc.

Members of this council are the Prime Minister as the chairman, the Chief Cabinet Secretary, the Minister for Internal Affairs and Communications, the Minister of Finance, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry, the Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism, the Minister of Defense, and the Chairman of the National Public Safety Commission. The Assistant Chief Cabinet


Secretary for Security and Crisis Management of the Cabinet Secretariat is in charge of administrative works of this council.\textsuperscript{101}

In general, members of this council except the Prime Minister, the Chief Cabinet Secretary, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and the Minister of Defense are not actively involved. The council adopted NDPG 04 and deliberated on the Mid-Term Defense Program, but it has not discussed other supplemental documents related to the NDPG such as industrial management plans. Japan’s actual security policy is managed by complex dynamics among the Prime Minister, the Chief Cabinet Secretary, LDP defense lawmakers, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Finance and the MOD.

Prime Minister Abe attempted to change the Security Council to the US-style National Security Council (NSC) in 2007 to strengthen his cabinet’s security management capability by establishing an Executive Office. However his attempt was suspended because he resigned. His successor, Fukuda, was not interested in the establishment of the National Security Council.\textsuperscript{102} The LDP defense lawmakers still suggest establishing the National Security Council.\textsuperscript{103}


Chapter 2: The Process of Making NDPG 04

In this chapter, I would like to show the process of making NDPG 04 in order to examine the process of making NDPG 09. The Japanese government is reviewing NDPG 04 to make NDPG 09, so it is necessary to know what factors affected making NDPG 04 to estimate NDPG 09’s contents.

Outline

According to Defense of Japan 2007, the Japanese government took three main steps in examining NDPG 04, which was approved on December 10, 2004; the Defense Posture Review Board within the JDA examined it from September 2001 to December 2004; the Council on Security and Defense Capabilities set up under the Prime Minister examined it from April to October 2004; and the Security Council of Japan examined it from October to December 2004. These actors considered the international and domestic situations and concluded by establishing the future posture of Japan’s security and defense.

New Threats and Diverse Situations

NDPG 04 said that the JSDF had to possess the capability to respond effectively to the new threats and diverse situations, to prepare for a full-scale invasion, and to proactively improve the international security environment.

New Threats and Diverse Situations

In particular, the JSDF decided to strengthen capability in the following situations: response to ballistic missile attacks, response to guerilla and special operations forces attacks, response to the invasion of Japan’s offshore islands, patrol and

104 Japan Ministry of Defense. Defense of Japan 2007. 120.
surveillance in the sea and airspace surrounding Japan and response to the violation of Japan’s airspace and the intrusion of armed special-purpose ships and other similar vessels, and response to large-scale and/or special-type (nuclear, biological, chemical, and radiological) disasters.\textsuperscript{105}

Ballistic Missile Proliferation

Ballistic missiles are weapons which are vertically launched by rocket engines, follow an inertial parabolic trajectory after burning out their rocket fuel, and reach far targets.\textsuperscript{106} Ballistic missiles have strong destructive power by themselves because of the kinetic energy of a rapidly falling object. In addition, most ballistic missiles can carry WMD warheads. Because of the speed involved, it is difficult to shoot down or destroy ballistic missiles and their warheads in flight.

On August 31, 1998, North Korea launched something. On September 4, 1998, the Korean Central News Agency said, “The rocket was launched in the direction of 86 degrees at a launching station in Musudan-ri, Hwadae county, North Hamgyong Province at 12:07 August 31, Juche 87 (1998) and correctly put the satellite into orbit at 12 hours 11 minutes 53 seconds in four minutes 53 seconds.”\textsuperscript{107} North Korea officially called the satellite “Kwangmyongsong No. 1.”\textsuperscript{108}

\textsuperscript{105} Ibid., 400.


The Japanese government had been attempting to gather information on this launch since the middle of August. After the North Korean launch and the intelligence analysis of it, the Japanese government announced its judgment:

1) The flying object was Taep’o-dong 1 classified by the US, and it was a two-stage solid fuel rocket.
2) This launch could not insert any payload into orbit.
3) There is high possibility that the launch was a ballistic missile launch.
4) This missile ranges 1500km or more. North Korea acquired technology to produce ballistic missiles capable of ranging all of Japan.\textsuperscript{109}

According to the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, North Korea already had 200 or more Nodong medium-range ballistic missiles which could strike Japan. Japan was worried about this North Korean missile threat. Therefore the government started to examine the feasibility of possessing a MD system and a satellite information gathering system.\textsuperscript{110}

Threats of Guerilla and Special Operations Forces Attacks

On September 17, 2002, Prime Minister Koizumi visited North Korean National Defense Commission Chairman Kim Jong II in Pyongyang to establish “a fruitful political, economic and cultural relationship”. They agreed on the Japan-DPRK Pyongyang Declaration. During the discussions about the declaration, Mr. Kim admitted

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that, from the 1970’s to the 1980’s, North Korea had abducted some Japanese citizens.\textsuperscript{111} According to the Japanese government, 17 Japanese citizens were abducted by North Korea.\textsuperscript{112}

These abductions were conducted by North Korean special agents who infiltrated Japan using armed special-purpose ships including midget submarines. This meant that North Korea had and likely still has enough capability to covertly send its agents and special forces to Japan to conduct illegal operations such as sabotage. This remains a present danger to Japanese society and infrastructure. The JDA recognized the importance of cooperating with the National Police Agency to deal with guerilla and special operations forces attacks, and in 2000 it amended the Agreement on the Maintenance of Public Order in the Public Security Operations between the JDA and the National Public Safety Commission.\textsuperscript{113}

Possibility of the Invasion of Japan’s Offshore Islands

Japan consists of 6,800 or more islands. The Nansei Islands in particular are numerous. The Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea belong to the Nansei Islands and Japan has effectively possessed and controlled them since 1895. The Ministry of Foreign


Affairs of Japan has presented Japan’s basic view on its sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands as follows:

It was confirmed that the Senkaku Islands had been uninhabited and showed no trace of having been under the control of China. Based on this confirmation, the Government of Japan made a Cabinet Decision on 14 January 1895 to erect a marker on the Islands to formally incorporate the Senkaku Islands into the territory of Japan. Since then, the Senkaku Islands have continuously remained as an integral part of the Nansei Shoto Islands which are the territory of Japan. These islands were neither part of Taiwan nor part of the Pescadores Islands which were ceded to Japan from the Qing Dynasty of China in accordance with Article II of the Treaty of Shimonoseki which came into effect in May of 1895. Accordingly, the Senkaku Islands are not included in the territory which Japan renounced under Article II of the San Francisco Peace Treaty. The Senkaku Islands have been placed under the administration of the United States of America as part of the Nansei Shoto Islands, in accordance with Article III of the said treaty, and are included in the area, the administrative rights over which were reverted to Japan in accordance with the Agreement Between Japan and the United States of America Concerning the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands signed on 17 June 1971. The facts outlined herein clearly indicate the status of the Senkaku Islands being part of the territory of Japan.  

However, in 1971, based on the UN Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East’s research that suggested huge seabed resources exist in the area, China and Taiwan started to claim sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands. On February 25, 1992, the Chinese government enacted the Law on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, and officially claimed the Senkaku Islands as Chinese territory named Diaoyu Island.

**Article 2.** The PRC's territorial sea refers to the waters adjacent to its territorial land. The PRC's territorial land includes the mainland and its offshore islands, Taiwan and the various affiliated islands including Diaoyu Island, Penghu Islands, Dongsha Islands, Xisha Islands, Nansha (Spratly) Islands and other islands that belong to the People's Republic of China.  

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In March 2004, 7 Chinese activists illegally landed on Uotsuri Island, which is the main island of the Senkaku Islands.\footnote{Japan Coast Guard, "Coast Guard of the Senkaku Islands," Japan Coast Guard Annual Report 2005, 2005, http://www.kaiho.mlit.go.jp/info/books/report2005/tokushu/p018.html (accessed April 1, 2009).} There is high probability that this activity was supported by the Chinese government. In addition, China has attempted to strengthen its naval power to protect such maritime national interests. The US Department of Defense has estimated that China is trying to control the Senkaku Islands.

The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is developing forces to support its strategy of “offshore defense,” which includes developing the capability to protect China’s island and maritime claims, including Taiwan and the Spratly and Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands.\footnote{Department of Defense. Annual report on the military power of the People's Republic of China. (Arlington, Virginia: Department of Defense, 2004), 23-24.}


Violations of Japan’s Airspace and Intrusion of Armed Special-purpose Ships

The US Air Force established the Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) around Japan during the American occupation of Japan. After the San Francisco Treaty and the return of Okinawa to Japan, the ASDF assumed control of this ADIZ. The ADIZ is an area established in the vicinity of territorial airspace boundaries to “facilitate early
aircraft identification of all aircraft.”\textsuperscript{119} If an unidentified aircraft enters into the ADIZ and is suspected of violating Japan’s territorial airspace, the ASDF scrambles fighters to monitor and warn away the offending aircraft. From 1996 to 2004, there were about 1570 ASDF scrambles, about 1110 of which were caused by Russian aircraft intrusions.\textsuperscript{120} There was less Russian military activity in the period of NDPO 96 than in the Cold War era, but the ASDF was continuously put into tense situations.


On 18 September a military submarine had been found grounded in shallow water near the coastal city of Kangnung, one of the major ports on the eastern coast of the Republic of Korea. Based upon the accumulation of concrete evidence, including arms and ammunition made in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, the team had determined that the submarine belonged to the armed forces of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and that the occupants of the submarine were all officers of the regular army of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. It had also been determined that all of them had gone ashore, infiltrating the territory of the Republic of Korea.\textsuperscript{121}

The Government of Japan worried about these incidents because there was high possibility that foreign submarines had infiltrated Japanese territorial waters. On December 24, 1996, the Security Council of Japan and the Cabinet established the Response Regarding Foreign Submarines Navigating Underwater in Territorial and Inland Waters of Japan. The MSDF conducted patrols to detect such submarines.


Not only submarines but also ships carrying special agents became serious threats to Japan’s security. On the morning of March 23, 1999, a MSDF P-3C patrol aircraft found three suspicious ships in Japanese waters near the Noto Peninsula and Sadogashima Island. MSDF destroyers and P-3Cs attempted to stop them with warning shots and bombings, but they fled to the northwest. Destroyers and P-3Cs chased them to the end of Japan’s ADIZ. The three suspicious ships were presumed to enter a North Korean port. On December 22, 2001, a MSDF P-3C found a suspicious ship in the East China Sea, which was the same type of ship as in the 1999 incident. Japan Coast Guard (JCG) and MSDF ships attempted to stop it, but it fled in the direction of China. JCG ships fired warning shots; then the suspicious ship launched a counterattack and damaged the JCG ships and crews. The JCG ships fired in self-defense, and the suspicious ship lost the capability to escape. The ship then blew itself up and sank. On September 11, 2002, the JCG salvaged the ship and confirmed that it was a special agent ship of North Korea used to send agents to Japan. The Japanese government decided to strengthen the capabilities of the JCG and the MSDF to deal with armed special-purpose ships. In 1999, the JDA and the JCG made a joint response guideline, the Manual on Joint Strategies concerning Unidentified Vessels.

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Large-scale and/or Special-type (Nuclear, Biological, Chemical, and Radiological) Disasters

The Japanese Archipelago is located on the Pacific “ring of fire.” Besides active volcanoes, centers of seismic activity and faults, there are many trenches in and around Japan. Historically, every decade an earthquake registering a magnitude of 7 on the Richter scale hits Japan. Japan also has many interlacing shorelines easily damaged by tsunamis. In addition, many typhoons hit the Japanese Islands every year. The Japanese people are living in a natural disaster zone.

For example, Miyakejima Island, located 110 miles south of Tokyo, is a huge volcano. On July 8, 2000, the volcano started to erupt. This eruption was so active and dangerous that the Japanese government decided to evacuate all the islanders to Tokyo, because this island’s village belonged to the Metropolis of Tokyo. The JSDF dispatched troops, ships and airplanes to reconnoiter the volcano and the damage, transport people and vehicles, and support people’s daily lives.126

In addition to natural disasters, Japan has to prepare for special-type artificial disasters. For example, on September 30, 1999, a critical nuclear accident occurred at a uranium processing plant operated by JCO Co., Ltd., in Tokai Village, Ibaraki Prefecture. According to the Nuclear Safety Commission of Japan, JCO workers ignored a government-approved procedure and caused a nuclear criticality at 10:35 am. The Nuclear Safety Commission determined, “They seem(ed) to have fed seven batches of


uranyl nitrate solution (work unit: about 16.6 kgU) into the precipitation tank which was
designed to limit the mass to 1 batch (2.4 kgU), using a 5-liter stainless steel bucket and a
funnel."  At 6:15 am on the next day, this accident was terminated by workers’
desperate actions to drain the cooling water of the precipitation tank, which stopped the
chain reaction. Two workers were killed by radiation exposure. The GSDF sent the 101
Nuclear Biological Chemical Weapon Defense Unit to Tokai Village to decontaminate
the village. At the time, the Unit’s chemical/radiological/nuclear reconnaissance vehicle
did not have the capability to block neutron beams, so that it was difficult to support this
critical termination operation. After this incident, the JDA decided to give neutron beam-
shield capability to the vehicle, and by authority of the Special Law on Nuclear Disaster
Countermeasures, created procedures to dispatch units.  

In March 1995, members of a cult spread sarin on the Tokyo subway and killed 12 people.  On September 11, 2001, Islamic jihadists attacked the World Trade Center
in New York and killed thousands of people. Japan and the international society are
facing threats of large-scale and special-type disasters. The Government of Japan has
seriously examined how to possess the capability to deal with such disasters.

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Investigation Committee, Nuclear Safety Commission," U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, December


129 US Army Training and Doctrine Command. Terror Operations: Case Studies in
Terrorism( Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: US Army Training and Doctrine Command, 2007), 1-5.
Possibility of Full-Scale Invasion

The Japanese government has thought, “The likelihood of full-scale invasion of Japan has declined and is expected to remain modest in the foreseeable future.” In the period of NDPO 96, we never did see signs of a full-scale invasion. However, “because the original role of our defense force is to cope with full-scale invasion and reconstructing these forces cannot be accomplished in a short period of time,” Japan has decided to keep its minimum level capability against full-scale invasion.131

International Security Environment and JSDF activities

The most serious impacts on the international security environment in the period of NDPO 96 were the September 11 attack and the Global War on Terror including the Second Gulf War and the War in Afghanistan. The MOD recognized these situations as follows:

The activities of non-state actors, including international terrorist organizations, present a serious threat. Acts of terrorism are occurring in every region of the world. The United States and other countries are continuing efforts in the fight against terrorism and have achieved some success, but have confronted severe challenges presented in Iraq and Afghanistan – which are regarded by the United States as front lines in this fight – and a crunch in the numbers of deployable troops to missions overseas is becoming a significant issue… Accordingly, each state continues to enhance its military capabilities in line with its resources and circumstances, and pursue international cooperation and partnership in security areas.132

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131 Ibid., 400-401.
132 Ibid., 2.
The Japanese government thought the best way to reduce the chances that any threat would reach Japan was to improve international security in the first place.\textsuperscript{133} Japan reached this conclusion by observing international activities from 1997 to 2005.

Anti-Terrorism Operation in the Indian Ocean

As a result of Prime Minister Koizumi’s enthusiasm, the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law was enacted on November 2, 2001, only one month after its presentation to the National Diet. He expressed that Japan would contribute to fighting international terrorism.

I myself and the people of Japan are together with President George W. Bush and the people of the United States in that we shall never forget the September 11 tragedy and our common resolve to fight against terrorism. Japan is resolved to continue to stand by the United States in its determined fight against terrorism, and to contribute actively, on its own initiative, to the efforts of the international community, in order to prevent and eradicate international terrorism and to ensure that such terrorist acts will never be repeated.\textsuperscript{134}

In accordance with the law, the MSDF dispatched fleet replenishment tankers to the Indian Ocean to provide diesel fuel, fuel for helicopters and water for combatant ships of the Maritime Interdiction Operation (MIO). The law expired on November 1, 2007, but on January 16, 2008, the Japanese government enacted a new Replenishment Support Special Measures Law. This MSDF fleet replenishment operation has been conducted since November 2001 except for a three-month hiatus. This operation strongly

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{133} Ibid., 397.

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contributes to the MIO, because MIO ships save time otherwise needed to refuel at ports and can conduct operations more effectively.\textsuperscript{135}

JSDF Iraq Reconstruction and Support Operation

In order to assist Iraqi’s self-help efforts to stabilize their society and establish a democratic government after the collapse of the Hussein administration, Japan decided to conduct humanitarian and reconstruction support in Iraq in accordance with UNSCR 1483. On August 1, 2003, the Koizumi administration enacted the Law Concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance and Support Activities for Ensuring Security in Iraq, allowing Japan to dispatch GSDF troops to the Al Muthanna Governorate, Iraq, and ASDF C-130 transport aircrafts to Kuwait to support the UN and coalitional operations. From February 2004 to July 2006, GSDF troops conducted medical, water supply and infrastructure reconstructing operations.\textsuperscript{136} ASDF finished its operation at the end of 2008, because of “the judgment that the objective of the ASDF’s mission had now been fulfilled.”\textsuperscript{137}

Continuous dispatches of JSDF troops to the Middle East are the largest operations Japan has conducted to contribute to international society. As the second largest economic power in the world, Japan has learned precious lessons through these operations and has recognized the need to strengthen cooperative activities to support international peace.


\textsuperscript{136} Ibid., 273.

Peace Keeping Operations

In accordance with the International Peace Cooperation Law passed in 1992, Japan can participate in UN PKOs if the following five conditions are met. These ensure Japanese PKOs are conducted within constitutional limitations.

1. Warring parties must reach a ceasefire accord,
2. Warring parties, including those from the countries in which the U.N. peacekeeping force are to operate, must consent to the U.N. force’s operations and Japan’s participation in the operations of the U.N. force,
3. The U.N. peacekeeping force must take a neutral stance; they should not side with any particular warring party,
4. Japan must ensure that the SDF can withdraw from operations of the U.N. peacekeeping force if either one of the three principles stated above is not met, and
5. The use of weapons by SDF members participating in operations of the U.N. peacekeeping force should be limited as much as possible to situations that are conceivably necessary to protect the members’ lives.\(^{138}\)

From 2002 to 2004, Japan dispatched a GSDF Engineer Group and some headquarters personnel to provide logistical support to the UN Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET).\(^{139}\) The total number of troops and personnel was approximately 2,300, which made it the largest PKO in Japan’s history. In particular, GSDF engineers repaired many social infrastructures such as roads and bridges. At the end of this mission, the GSDF Engineer Group donated construction machines to East Timor and taught people how to operate them. This kind of support of East Timor by Japan was acclaimed by the United Nations as being “uniquely Japanese.”\(^{140}\)


International Disaster Relief Operations

In October 1998, a strong hurricane hit Honduras, and the Honduran government requested the Japanese government to dispatch a JSDF medical team. In accordance with the amended International Disaster Relief Law passed in 1992, the JSDF sent its medical team and air transportation unit there from November to December 1998.\(^{141}\) This was the first international disaster relief operation for the JSDF. It was difficult to maintain logistics lines from Japan to Honduras, but the unit decontaminated 33,000 square meters and treated about 4,000 citizens. The JDA regarded this operation as a great success to contribute to international society, and decided to attend more international disaster relief operations.

Confidence Building Measures and Security/Defense Exchanges

After the Cold War, Japan and the international society recognized that it was very important to establish trustworthy relationships through defense exchanges and joint exercises to prevent unexpected disputes and arms races. Not only the Ministry of Foreign Affairs but also the JDA/JSDF started to establish such defense relationships with neighbor states.

Bi/multilateral security and defense dialogues are easy and good ways for states to understand each other. In the period of NDPO 96, Japan had bilateral dialogues with Korea, Russia, China, Australia, the UK, and other Rim-Pacific states, and attended some multinational security conferences such as the ASEAN Regional Forum. Japan also hosted some multinational security/defense forums such as the Tokyo Defense Forum and the Asia Pacific Naval College Seminar in which I joined in the planning. For

example, in October 1998, Japanese Premier Obuchi and Korean President Kim agreed to strengthen their defense relationship as follows:

The two leaders welcomed the security dialogue as well as the defense exchanges at various levels between the two countries and decided to further strengthen them. The leaders also shared the view on the importance of both countries to steadfastly maintain their security arrangements with the United States while at the same time further strengthen efforts on multilateral dialogue for the peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region.\textsuperscript{142}

The JDA thought that bilateral joint exercises strengthened trust and relationships established by dialogues. For example, the MSDF had the first joint search and rescue exercises with Russia in 1998 and with Korea in 1999. The JSDF also recognized that multinational exercises are good opportunities to strengthen mutual relationships. So, in the 2000’s, Japan increased its participation from not only attending them to also hosting them. For example, in 2002 the MSDF hosted the Second Western Pacific Submarine Rescue Exercise (Pacific Reach). This was the first multilateral exercise hosted by Japan. This Pacific Reach exercise has been held every two or three years, and I joined Pacific Reach 04 in Korea as a Weapons Officer in the Japanese submarine Sachishio. In October 2004, the government also hosted the Proliferation Security Initiative Exercise for MIO.\textsuperscript{143}

Arms Controls

Japan believes that arms control contributes to world peace for the following reasons:


Firstly, Japan should vigorously promote disarmament and non-proliferation based on the philosophy of peace on which Japan stands, as a state which has responsibility for demonstrating the devastation of nuclear weapons as the only state that has suffered the horrific effects of atomic bombs. Secondly, in order to stabilize the security environment of the region surrounding Japan from the viewpoint of ensuring peace and security in Japan, it is important to prevent weapons of mass destruction from proliferation... Thirdly, in reaction to the accelerated aggravation of the misery of war due to an increase in the destructive and killing power of weapons, there has become an increasing need to work on disarmament and non-proliferation through a humanitarian approach. Fourthly, disarmament and non-proliferation have significance in realizing “human security.”

Therefore Japan has ratified the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Biological Weapons Convention, the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation, the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, the Convention on the Prohibition of Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction, and the Restriction on Illegal Transactions of Small Arms and Light Weapons. In addition, Japan has joined some export control systems for non-proliferation such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the System of the UN Register of Conventional Arms, the Wassenaar Arrangement for the prevention of certain conventional weapons and technologies, the Australia Group for the prevention of biochemical weapon proliferation, the Missile Technology Control Regime, and the Proliferation Security Initiative.

US-Japan Security Arrangement

In September 1997, the Japanese and the US governments agreed upon the Guidelines for US-Japan Defense Cooperation. This is the second such guideline to


concretize the purpose of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the
United States and Japan, and deals with the international situation after the Cold War.
The aim of the guideline is to strengthen “more effective and credible Japan-US
cooperation under normal conditions, in case of an armed attack against Japan, and in
situations in areas surrounding Japan” than the 1978 Guideline.\textsuperscript{146} In accordance with this
guideline, Japan has to prepare for situations in areas surrounding Japan as follows:

1) The concept, situations in areas surrounding Japan, is not geographic, but
situational.
2) The two governments will take appropriate measures, to include preventing
further deterioration of situations.
3) Cooperative activities initiated by either government are
   a. Relief activities and measures to deal with refugees
   b. Search and rescue,
   c. Noncombatant evacuation operations
   d. Activities for ensuring the effectiveness of economic sanctions
4) Japan’s supports for US forces activities are
   a. Use of facilities
   b. Rear area support
5) The JSDF will conduct such activities as intelligence gathering, surveillance,
to protect lives and property and ensure navigational safety. US forces will
conduct operations to restore the peace and security.

In 1999, the Japanese government enacted the Law Concerning Measures to
Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan, and in
2001 it enacted the Ship Inspection Operations Law to embody and help implement the
new Guidelines. These agreements and laws have strengthened the bilateral defense
relationship. Importantly, the JSDF has acquired a legal basis for approved actions in
situations in areas surrounding Japan.

In accordance with Article 6 of the US-Japan Security Treaty, Japan provides
bases for US armed forces and the huge Host Nation Support to maintain the US bases.

\textsuperscript{146} Ibid., 477.
As of January 1, 2008, there are 85 areas and facilities for the US Forces Japan, and their total area is 308.825 square kilometers. However 74 percent of US bases in Japan are concentrated in Okinawa. Unfortunately, some serious crimes and accidents have been caused by US soldiers stationed in Okinawa. Therefore, in April 1996, Prime Minister Hashimoto and President Clinton reconfirmed “their determination to carry out steps to consolidate, realign, and reduce U.S. facilities and areas” in Okinawa. In November 1995, Japan and the US established the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO). On December 2, 1996, SACO issued its final report to “reduce the burden on the people of Okinawa and strengthen the Japan-US alliance.” According to the final report, the US Forces Japan would return 50 square kilometers of bases in Okinawa including the total lands return of US Marine Corps Futenma Air Station, which was located in the center of Ginowan city.

Legislation for Responses to Emergency Situations

The Constitution of Japan renounces war. So the Japanese people thought that it was not necessary to consider emergency situations and responses to them. However at the turn of this century, Japan faced threats of North Korean missiles and agent ships, terrorist activities such as the September 11 attack, and international instability such as

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151 Ibid., 488.
the Afghanistan War and the Second Gulf War. In 2003, politicians started to discuss the necessity of passing legislation in order to better respond to emergency situations within the limitations of the Constitution. On June 6, 2003, the National Diet enacted the Armed Attack Situation Response Law to ensure national independence and security as well as to ensure the safety of the people in times of emergency. The law stipulates the basic principles, the basic policies, the procedures and the responsibilities of national and local governments when an emergency situation occurs. According to the law, the Japanese government has to obey the following principles: appropriate measures must be taken by designated public institutions, national and local governments including the JSDF, with the people’s cooperation; respect must be given for citizens’ freedom and rights as guaranteed by the Constitution; appropriate information must be provided to the people; and there must be close cooperation with the US and the UN.\footnote{Ibid., 152.} In accordance with this law, the government enacted additional emergency legislation such as the Civil Protection Law and the US Military Actions Law to minimize social damage by armed attack, to protect civilians, to smooth the JSDF and US armed force actions, and to obey the international humanitarian laws. These legal frameworks, constructed within constitutional constraints and proper civil-military relations, were epoch-making events to strengthen Japan’s security.

Technological Development and Procurement

In June 2001, the JDA issued the Guidelines for Defense Research and Development. The purpose of the Guidelines is to strengthen the defense technological and industrial infrastructure, and improve the defense capability of Japan through
appropriate research and development of the JSDF equipment.\textsuperscript{153} According to the Guidelines, the following fields should be a priority because these technologies will definitely affect the outcome of a battle in the future and they are difficult to import from foreign states: information technology, unmanned vehicle technology, precision guiding technology, engine technology for jet planes, and avionics technology.

The JSDF was particularly interested in information technology. In December 2000, the JDA published the Outline for Comprehensive Programs by the Defense Agency and the SDF to Adapt to the Information Technology Revolution (IT Outline) with the aim of pursuing information superiority and building an organized information network to conduct smooth operations. There are three elements of the IT outline: advanced network equipment and systems such as the Defense Information Infrastructure and the Common Operating Environment, command and control equipment and systems such as the Central Command System, and the achievement of information security to protect the JSDF information systems against cyber attacks.\textsuperscript{154} Through this type of research and development, the JDA and the JSDF have attempted to conduct a Revolution in Military Affairs to acquire the capability for network-centric operation.

From 1954 to 2001, the Central Procurement Office (CPO) of the JDA was responsible for procuring the main equipment (firearms, guided weapons, telecommunications instruments, ships, aircraft, vehicles, machinery, ammunition, food, \hfill


fuel, textiles, and other necessary materials) as a “central procurement” function.\(^{155}\) Central procurement accounted for a quarter of each year’s defense budget, which was about 4.93 trillion yen from FY 1996 to FY 2003 on average.\(^{156}\) Central procurement depended not on competitive contracts but rather on sole source contracts because of unique weapon specifications and technologies restricted by Japanese laws and patents.\(^{157}\) According to the Japanese Communist Party, 91 percent of the central procurement from FY 2001 to FY 2006 was based on sole source contracts.\(^{158}\) In addition, because of Japan’s arms export policy, the defense industry in Japan cannot export weapons to foreign states. Such a procurement system and arms export policy has caused a rise in both equipment costs and corruption. The F-2 fighter jet was a multirole fighter jet developed from the US F-16 Fighting Falcon. The price of the F-2 was 13.2 billion yen in FY1999.\(^{159}\) The price of the F-16 C/D was 18.8 million dollars in FY1998 (2.27 billion yen: The exchange rate for trade in January 1999 was 121 yen/dollar).\(^{160}\) The F-2 was six times as expensive as the F-16 C/D. In 1999, the former director general and the former


\(^{157}\) Japan Ministry of Defense, Equipment Procurement and Construction Office, "Introduction of EPCO."


vice-director general of the CPO were arrested for malfeasances such as padded billing of defense procurement. Because of such procurement problems, the JDA has attempted to reform the procurement system as follows: strengthen cost accounting capability, create auditor reporting requirements, clarify a unified policy on padded billing, abolish the CPO and replace it with a new procurement institution, and institute a check on related producers by a third party.

The Process of Making NDPG 04

*Defense Posture Review Board within the JDA*

In response to the situations mentioned above, from September 2001 to December 2004, with the aim of reviewing NDPO 95, the JDA established the Defense Posture Review Board, which consisted of the minister of state for defense as the chairman, the senior vice-minister for defense, two parliamentary secretaries for defense, the administrative vice-minister of defense, the director-general of the secretariat and directors-general of bureaus as the defense counselors, the chairman of the Joint Staff Council, and the chiefs of staff of the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF. NDPO 95 did not stipulate a reviewing, but Minister of State for Defense Nakatani ordered a review not only due to the procurement reform but also for a variety of other reasons: perceived capability gap, changes in the international situation, development of the US-Japan security arrangement, legislative discussions about how to respond to emergency situations, advances in military technology, Japan’s huge fiscal debt, and Japan’s demographic challenges occasioned by low birth rates. The board, however, did not adopt a whole governmental effort toward national security. Instead, the board focused on the future defense posture to be executed by the JDA and the JSDF and finally offered
opinions on dealing with estimated future situations as follows: responses to new threats and diverse situations, preparations to deal with a full-scale invasion which threatens the existence of Japan, and proactive efforts to improve the international security environment. These future defense postures offered by the board were eventually adopted as one part of a “Future defense force” of NDPG 04.

Cabinet Approval “Preparation of a Ballistic Missile Defense System”

In December 2003, at a cabinet meeting, the Koizumi administration approved the preparation of a ballistic missile defense system, decided to equip an MD system, and agreed to review NDPO 95 by the end of 2004, on the Defense Posture Review Board’s advice.\(^\text{161}\) There were four topics in this approval.

First, because there was a high technical possibility of the establishment of a successful MD system, based on many test results, Japan recognized it as an absolute defensive requirement to protect the Japanese people and their property. Second, due to this decision to introduce an MD system and in light of the international situation at the time, it was necessary to review Japan’s defense capability. Japan’s future defense capability was to include the following: a joint operations staff to support the defense minister, reorganized and streamlined major JSDF units, improved functions, organizations and equipment to support activities that contribute to international peace and security, and new post Cold War capabilities to respond to new threats. Third, although the MD system and future defense capabilities required much money, the government had to reduce overall defense costs because of Japan’s huge fiscal deficit. Therefore, the government attempted to improve defense efficiency and stay within the

total defense budget limitation in a new Mid-Term Defense Program by the end of 2004. Fourth, in order to develop a new Mid-Term Defense Program that included the MD system and future defense capabilities, the government would develop a new NDPG.\footnote{Japan Ministry of Defense, *Defense of Japan 2008*, 426-427.}

*Liberal Democratic Party’s Proposal*

The dominant political party in Japan is the LDP. Established in 1955, the LDP has led administrations for more than 40 years except for three years (1993 to 1996).\footnote{Liberal Democratic Party of Japan, “Period of President Kono's Leadership,” Liberal Democratic Party of Japan, 2009, http://www.jimin.jp/jimin/english/history/chap16.html (accessed April 8, 2009).} This party is “a liberal political party that advocates democracy and basic human rights,” so it is generally regarded as a conservative and pro-US party in the Japanese political context.\footnote{Liberal Democratic Party of Japan, "Preamble," Constitution of LDP, January 17, 2008, http://www.jimin.jp/jimin/english/e-Rule/e-Ru-pre.html (accessed April 8, 2009).} On November 9, 2003, just before the approval of NDPG 04, a general election took place in which the LDP and its allies, the New Komeito Party and the New Conservative Party, received 57.3% of the 480 seats in the House of Representatives.\footnote{Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, Local Administration Bureau, Election Department, *Result of the General Election of the House of Representatives and Electoral Review of Supreme Court Judges* (Chiyoda, Tokyo: Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, Local Administration Bureau, Election Department, 2003), 13.} Therefore the LDP under President Koizumi’s leadership thought it had a mandate to review NDPO 95 without any of the opposition parties (the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), the Japanese Communist Party, and the Social Democratic Party).

The LDP has strong policy planning and implementation capability because it possesses effective internal administrative organs. The information research bureau was established under the secretary-general of the LDP, who assists the president in carrying
out party affairs. In addition, in order to strengthen and unify its organizational activities, the LDP established a party organization headquarters and some interest group policy divisions including the Committee on Organizations Involved with National Security. Many Japanese entrepreneurs of large enterprises support the LDP and its security/defense policy. Therefore the LDP can gather enough information to build a national security/defense policy.\textsuperscript{166} Diet members of the LDP have to belong to the Policy Research Council for the purpose of studying, researching and planning LDP policies. The Policy Research Council has separate divisions including the National Defense Division and its related research commissions and special committees.\textsuperscript{167} This National Defense Division sometimes announces security/defense proposals.\textsuperscript{168}

On March 30, 2004, the Subcommittee on Defense Policy in the National Defense Division of the LDP Policy Research Council announced “the Proposal: Japan’s New Defense Policy.” The proposal recommended 13 security/defense policies: change Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution to possess military force, execute a collective self-defense right, transition from the JSA to the ministry of defense, establish the National Defense Basic Law, strengthen governmental crisis management capability, complete legislation to respond to emergency situations, establish the International Cooperation Basic Law, reorganize and strengthen the SDF Act, change NDPO 95, strengthen the US-Japan security arrangement, strengthen support capability to the minister of state for defense,


strengthen intelligence capability, and change the Three Principles of Arms Export.\textsuperscript{169} In particular, related to NDPO 95, the LDP proposed reviewing the Basic Defense Force Concept to deal with new threats, expanding the role of Japan’s defense capability to both Japan’s national defense and international cooperation, strengthening joint operation capability, legislating support for the MD system, and discussing capabilities to attack an enemy’s base. On March 12, 2003, members of this committee conducted a hearing to preview the discussion of the JDA’s Defense Posture Review Board.\textsuperscript{170} Actually, the Defense Posture Review Board and the Special Committee on Defense Policies exchanged information on each other’s issues.

\textit{Council on Security and Defense Capabilities}

Because of the preparation of a ballistic missile defense system, Prime Minister Koizumi established the Council on Security and Defense Capabilities inside his prime minister’s office from April to October 2004 to discuss future national security and defense from a wide field of view. He appointed Hiroshi Araki, advisor of Tokyo Electric Power Company, as the chairman, and Fujio Cho, president of Toyota Motor Corporation, as the deputy chairman. This council consisted of 10 members including the chair and the deputy chair, and had 13 meetings.


Table 1. Discussions at the Council on Security and Defense Capabilities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Topic</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st</td>
<td>April 27, 2004 Administrative issues, Framework of Japan’s security policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>2nd</td>
<td>May 18, 2004 Security issues, Threats to Japan</td>
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<tr>
<td>3rd</td>
<td>June 1, 2004 Responses to threats</td>
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<tr>
<td>5th</td>
<td>June 29, 2004 Security environment and initiatives in Asia-Pacific region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th</td>
<td>July 13, 2004 Present condition and issues of the JSDF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th</td>
<td>July 27, 2004 Free discussion on topics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8th</td>
<td>August 31, 2004 Japan’s future defense force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9th</td>
<td>September 6, 2004 Governmental security policy making process and interagency cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10th</td>
<td>September 15, 2004 Arrangement of arguing points</td>
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<tr>
<td>11th</td>
<td>September 17, 2004 Arrangement of arguing points</td>
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<tr>
<td>12th</td>
<td>September 30, 2004 Collation of arguing points</td>
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<tr>
<td>13th</td>
<td>October 4, 2004 Submission of the report to the Prime Minister</td>
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In October 2004 the council finally announced and submitted the Council on Security and Defense Capabilities Report – Japan’s Visions for Future Security and Defense Capabilities – to Premier Koizumi. In this report, the council pointed out that in a new NDPG it was important to express not only the future defense posture but also a new security strategy.

During the détente period and after the end of the Cold War, it (NDPO 95) served to enhance people’s understanding of the purpose and dimensions of Japan’s defense force. However, public attention tended to focus on the number of force units and equipment listed in its attached table and how quickly the designated force level was achieved, rather than its substance. Taking into consideration the changes in security environment since 1995, the Council on Security and Defense Capabilities has examined what kind of issues that the new NDPO should address. As this report has indicated, the new NDPO should spell out measures that Japan has to take to implement the Integrated Security Strategy as well as the roles that the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) has to play and the functions and structure that the SDF must assume in the future.172

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Therefore the council’s opinion covered broad topics related to security and defense which should be contained in a new NDPG. In 1957, the Japanese government had established the Basic Policy for National Defense. This was actually not a basic defense policy but a basic security policy. And in NDPO 95, the government mentioned the security policy in a few sentences. The Basic Policy for National Defense and NDPO 95 presented only an idea of national security. The council’s report recommended to the government that a new NDPG should express a Japanese security policy that is clear and concrete. This was an epoch-making event for Japan’s security. This council, led by excellent entrepreneurs, encouraged the government to reform Japan’s security and defense capability completely, as follows: “The government has to painstakingly prioritize different requirements and streamline organizations and weapon systems like the private enterprises did and are still doing, and do so under the political leadership that will make the entire process accountable to the Japanese citizens.”

Based on the international situations after NDPO 95, the report presented two goals of an integrated security strategy Japan should possess: defense of Japan and prevention of the emergence of threats by improving the international security environment. To achieve these goals, the council recommended three approaches: Japan’s own efforts, cooperation with an alliance partner, and cooperation with the international community. In addition, the council mentioned some policy measures to support these approaches: building a flexible multi-functional defense force, strengthening intelligence capabilities, substantially reinforcing security council functions, maintaining and

173 Ibid., 24.

174 Ibid., 5.
strengthening the Japan-U.S. alliance, developing the infrastructure for international peace cooperation, streamlining the defense industry, reviewing the Three Principles on Arms Export, and enhancing the efficiency of procurement and R&D. In particular, the report stressed, “Only an integrated system can ensure security. It is necessary to eliminate the baneful effects of stove-piped organizational structures and develop a mechanism that allows swift and effective decision-making.”

Discussion at Security Council

From October to December 2004, 6 Security Council meetings were held to develop a conclusion. The members were Premier Koizumi, as a chair, Chief Cabinet Secretary Hosoda, Minister for Internal Affairs and Communications Aso, Minister of Finance Tanigaki, Minister for Foreign Affairs Machimura, Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry Nakagawa, Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism Kitagawa, Minister of State for Defense Ono, and Chairman of the National Public Safety Commission Murata. All members except Kitagawa, who was a New Komeito Party representative, were Diet members of the LDP. At this stage, tough political and interagency negotiations between the LDP and the New Komeito Party, and the ministry of finance and the JDA were held.

Political Negotiations

The LDP’s mate, the New Komeito Party, is a religion-based party. The New Komeito Party admitted the fact as follows: “the Soka Gakkai (the Buddhist organization)

\[175\] Ibid., 14.
is a constituency that has provided electoral endorsement to the party until today.”

According to the official Soka Gakkai webpage, 8.27 million households in Japan support the Soka Gakkai. Therefore the New Komeito Party and its ally the LDP can potentially organize support from millions of members. This relationship between politics and religion is very controversial, but the New Komeito Party is the third largest party in Japan next to the DPJ, and the strong alliance between the LDP and the New Komeito Party has helped sustain administrations since 1999.

The Soka Gakkai’s philosophy is based on Buddhism: “This Buddhist practice leads to empowerment and inner transformation or "human revolution" which enables individuals to take responsibility for their lives and contribute to building a world where people of diverse cultures and faiths can live in peace.” So the New Komeito Party’s security/defense policy is based on pacifism. Therefore even though the LDP wants to “normalize” Japan’s security policy, it is hard to do so with the New Komeito Party.

On April 20, 2004, to review NDPO 95, the New Komeito Party established the Review Committee on Defense Posture in the 21st Century. On October 31, 2004, the New Komeito Party National Convention announced its declaration reflecting the committee’s arguments. In the declaration, the New Komeito Party decided to maintain Section 1 and 2 of Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, and examine whether to add

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Section 3 to specify what the JSDF could do. This stipulation would allow international peace cooperation as a primary mission of the JSDF, because the New Komeito Party recognized such proactive efforts to improve the international security environment were very important.\(^{180}\) At the same time, the New Komeito Party proposed to not abandon the Three Principles of Arms Export but rather to relax MD-related weapons exports.\(^{181}\) The New Komeito Party also strongly opposed offensive capabilities and demanded that the JDA abandon a research plan for a long-range precision guided ground attack missile in the Mid-Term Defense Program from FY 2005 to FY 2009.\(^{182}\)

These defense policies were a little bit different from the LDP’s, but the LDP could not ignore the New Komeito Party’s opinion. NDPG 04 did not contain differences between the two parties’ defense policies such as discussion about attack capability on an enemy’s base and complete reviewing the Three Principles of Arms Export.

As governmental parties, the LDP and the New Komeito Party have a conference of responsible persons of policy to negotiate and agree on a common policy. Because of this conference, the LDP and the New Komeito Party do not express different policies and opinions during the National Diet deliberations and at other governmental meetings.

Interagency Fiscal Negotiations

The budget is very important in limiting policy. Therefore policy making is very close to the budgetary process. Because the cabinet approval of the preparation of a


ballistic missile system stipulated that “a new Mid-Term Defense Program will determine the limit of the total amount,” the battle between the ministry of finance and the JDA was tense during the development of NDPG 04.¹⁸³

I have to mention the annual budgetary process, because it affects and is affected by the budgetary process of the Mid-Term Defense Program and the NDPG. Japan’s FY starts on April 1, and the annual defense budget process starts 14 months before this, the February of the previous FY. First, bureaus of the JDA (MOD) and the JSDF staff offices make annual operation and budget plans from February to June. Second, they submit their budget plans to the JDA administration bureau (at present the MOD bureau of finance & equipment) in June or July.¹⁸⁴ In July or August, the Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy (CEFP), which is a consultative organ placed within the Cabinet Office and chaired by the prime minister, presents the budget overview, which clarifies estimated annual expenditures and budget allocation to priority areas, and the Guidelines for the FY budget requests.¹⁸⁵ Third, based on these two documents, the Administration Bureau adjusts budgetary requests within the JDA and submits the JDA’s budget request to the Ministry of Finance Budget Bureau by the end of August. For example, the JDA


requested 4.96 trillion yen as the FY 2005 budget request. Fourth, from September to December, the ministry of finance budget bureau balances the JDA budget request with the Guidelines, other ministries budget requests and the administration’s prior budgets. Then this budget bureau cuts the request, because the JDA request usually exceeds the Guideline’s request. Fifth, negotiations between the ministry of finance and each ministry and the JDA are held to restore deleted items from requests to budgets in the end of December. Sixth, after negotiations, the Cabinet approves the next FY’s budget bill made by the ministry of finance without amendment, submits it to the House of Representatives first, and tries to pass it there by the end of February. The FY 2005 total governmental budget bill (expenditure) was 82.18 trillion yen and the FY 2005 defense budget bill was 4.86 trillion yen. The bill is sent to the House of Councilor next. If the House of Councilor passes it, the bill will be enacted. If the Upper House rejects it, the decision of the Lower House will be the decision of the Diet, and the bill will be enacted. The FY 2005 Budget Bill passed the Diet as drafted. Through every budgetary process, nemawashi (“root-binding”) Japanese-style semi-formal prior consultations are held to minimize budget cuts among bureaucrats and politicians. The governmental budget bills are usually passed by the National Diet without amendment, so the interagency

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188 National Diet Library, "The Constitution of Japan." The Constitution says as follows: Article 60. The budget must first be submitted to the House of Representatives. (2) Upon consideration of the budget, when the House of Councillors makes a decision different from that of the House of Representatives, and when no agreement can be reached even through a joint committee of both Houses, provided for by law, or in the case of failure by the House of Councillors to take final action within thirty (30) days, the period of recess excluded, after the receipt of the budget passed by the House of Representatives, the decision of the House of Representatives shall be the decision of the Diet.
negotiation between the ministry of finance and the JDA is the most important. According to the Debt Management Report 2004, the amount of the Japanese government debt including government bonds, financing bills and borrowings totaled 703 trillion yen.\(^{189}\) This budget process helps explain why Japanese government debt reached 165.5% of the GDP as of FY 2004.\(^{190}\) Japan’s fiscal crisis was the worst among the G8 states. Therefore the Koizumi administration decided to reform expenditures, and restricted the issuance of government bonds as much as possible. The CEFP under Koizumi’s leadership drew up the Basic Policies for Economic and Fiscal Management and Structural Reform 2004, and the Cabinet approved it on June 4, 2004.\(^{191}\) Based on the basic policies, the Japanese government attempted to ensure that the ratio of general government expenditures to the GDP in FY 2005 and FY 2006 did not exceed the FY 2002 level. And the government aimed to achieve a surplus in the primary balance of the central and local governments combined in the early 2010’s by continuing the same level of effort as before to improve the fiscal balance. He also planned to boldly cut expenses, even obligatory expenses, and restrain total government personnel expenses. Related to the defense budget, the Basic Policies for Economic and Fiscal Management and Structural Reform 2004 said, “The government attempts to develop the JSDF posture to deal with new threats effectively, and review/improve the JSDF organization and


equipment efficiency radically.” Premier Koizumi stated at the MSDF Fleet Review on October 26, 2003, “We cannot leave the defense budget reform in the hands of the uniforms and have to halve their budget request.”

There are 11 budget examiners in the budget bureau to make the budget bill. Each examiner is in charge of each policy area’s budget planning. At the time of planning the new NDPG, the defense budget examiner was Ms. Katayama. She was proud of her job as a final guardian of civilian control. Because of the administration’s budgetary policy, she attempted to minimize the five-year defense budget of the new Mid-Term Defense Program and simultaneously cut the FY 2005 defense budget which was the first annual budget of a new Mid-Term Defense Program, and so faced strong JDA opposition.

First, the JDA wanted to increase the defense budget to equip the MD system and maintain the minimum defense level, even though Japan faced a fiscal crisis, because the total MD system’s cost would be 1.0 trillion yen for eight years. Therefore on October 21, 2004, the JDA decided to informally request 25.5 trillion yen as a new Mid-Term Defense Program budget which was 0.49 trillion yen above the then current Mid-Term

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192 Ibid., 27.

193 The Yomiuri Shimbun, “Present danger and the new NDPG,” The Yomiuri Shimbun, March 16, 2004, http://plus.yomiuri.co.jp/article/words/%E7%AC%AC%EF%BC%92%E9%83%A8%E3%83%BB%E3%81%9D%E3%81%AB%E3%81%82%E3%81%8B%E8%84%85%E5%A8%81%EF%BC%88%EF%BC%98%EF%BC%89%E6%B0%89%96%8B%E8%A1%9B%E5%A4%A7%E7%B6%B1 (accessed April 13, 2009).


However, Ms. Katayama attempted to restrain the new Mid-Term Defense Program budget to within 24.0 trillion yen.\footnote{Kyodo News, “Financial Minister's policy on Mid-Term Defense Program: Restraint of defense budget,” Kyodo News, November 2, 2004, http://www.47news.jp/CN/200411/CN2004110201000873.html (accessed April 13, 2009).} In addition, in October 2004, she decided to cut personnel numbers from 160,000 GSDF troops to 140,000.\footnote{Katayama, "Necessity of JSDF's structural reform," 156.}

There was a huge difference between the ministry of finance and the JDA. Both sides leaked their information to the media and utilized their connections with LDP Diet members to achieve their goals. On December 8, after tough negotiations among both sides’ bureaucrats and politicians, Minister of Finance Tanigaki and Minister of State for Defense Ono agreed that the limit of the total amount of defense budget of the new Mid-Term Defense Program would be 24.24 trillion yen and the total authorized personnel of the GSDF would be 155,000.\footnote{Ministry of Finance, Fiscal System Council, Fiscal Reform Subcommittee, "Fiscal Reform Subcommittee's minutes."}
On December 9, 2004, the LDP and the New Komeito Party approved the draft of NDPG 04 and the Mid-Term Defense Program FY 2005- FY 2009. And then, on December 10, the Security Council of Japan and the Cabinet approved them officially.

Chapter 3: The Reason to Rewrite the NDPG

In this chapter, I would like to examine the reason to rewrite NDPG 04. There are some differences between the NDPO 95 period situations and the NDPG 04 period situations. The main purpose of this chapter is to show which factors impacted Japan’s security/defense environment in the NDPG 04 period. And then we can understand that the NDPG 04 system cannot deal with diversified threats and prevent them from reaching Japan. You will realize clearly that not only the international situations but also the domestic political environment are the motives for rewriting NDPG 04.

On January 8, 2009, Chief Cabinet Secretary Kawamura announced, “NDPG 04 stipulated that the government would review it in the end of this year. The Japanese government thinks it necessary to investigate Japan’s future security and defense posture synthetically at this best moment.” Actually, NDPG 04 said, “These National Defense Program Guidelines provide the vision for our defense force for the next decade. However, five years from now or in case there is a significant change in the international situation, we will review and, if necessary, revise the Guidelines in light of the security environment, technological progress, and other relevant factors at the time.” It is not necessary to change it completely, but the Japanese government is attempting not to modify NDPG 04, but to create a new NDPG.

In the past, Japan had two NDPOs: NDPO 76 and NDPO 95. The interval between NDPO 76 and 95 was 19 years. The interval between NDPO 95 and NDPG 04 was 9 years. If the government makes a new NDPG, the interval between NDPG 04 and

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202 Cabinet Secretariat of Japan, Cabinet Public Relations Office, “Announcement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary about Council on Security and Defense Capabilities.”

it will be 5 years. Actually, the intervals have been gradually becoming shorter. However the NDPG is one of the most important basic principles of Japan’s security policy. So it is not easy to change it. Why did the Japanese government decide to renew the important NDPG? According to sentences in the NDPG, we must suppose that Japan is confronted with difficulties in the international society. However is the reason to renew it only based on such difficulties? We have to examine the international and domestic situations after the approval of NDPG 04 to know the true reason.

The Process of Making NDPG 09

There is no additional official document such as the Preparation of Ballistic Missile Defense System to make the government review NDPG 04, there is only the NDPG 04 stipulation itself. It is instead the political atmosphere that has led to reviewing it. The interval between the approval of NDPG 04 and its reviewing is only five years. Therefore the government cannot afford to accumulate discussions. Now MOD’s Defense Posture Review Board, LDP’s Subcommittee on Defense Policy, and the Cabinet’s Council on Security and Defense Capabilities are reviewing the NDPG simultaneously.204 The MOD the LDP, and the Cabinet had to deal with the MOD Reform in 2008 because of the MOD/JSDF scandals I will mention later. Therefore active discussions on reviewing were started this January.

Discussions at the MOD are not active. On the other hand, discussions at the LDP and the Cabinet are very active. In my opinion, the MOD concentrates on providing enough information to policy makers. In addition, the LDP and the Cabinet are sharing

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204 New Komeito, “Meetings on April 8,” New Komeito, April 8, 2009, http://www.komei.or.jp/about/gathering/090408.html (accessed April 23, 2009). The New Komeito Party has also some study meetings on reviewing the NDPG 04, but less active than the LDP, and better than the Opposition.
topics well. Both discussions invite many witnesses from not only the MOD but also the ministry of foreign affairs, and other governmental organizations. In particular the LDP is dealing with broad topics related to security and defense policy. I sense that the LDP has an enthusiastic desire to improve Japan’s security/defense strategy.

Table 2. Discussions at MOD’s new Defense Posture Review Board

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Topic</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st</td>
<td>September 17, 2008</td>
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<tr>
<td>2nd</td>
<td>January 9, 2009</td>
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<td>3rd</td>
<td>February 24, 2009</td>
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Table 3. Discussions at LDP’s Subcommittee on Defense Policy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Topic</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>January 28, 2009</td>
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<td>3rd</td>
<td>January 29, 2009</td>
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<td>15th</td>
<td>April 10, 2009</td>
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<td>16th</td>
<td>April 16, 2009</td>
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206 Source: Data from Masahisa Sato, "Activities." Councilor Masahisa Sato, April 23, 2009, http://www.hige-sato.jp/ (accessed April 23, 2009). LDP’s discussions were almost finished. In 17th and later meetings, members will attempt to finalize their arguments.
Table 4. Discussions at Cabinet’s Council on Security and Defense Capabilities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Topic</th>
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<tr>
<td>1st</td>
<td>January 9, 2009 Administrative issues, opinion exchange</td>
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<tr>
<td>2nd</td>
<td>January 26, 2009 International security environment</td>
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<tr>
<td>3rd</td>
<td>February 12, 2009 Issues and responses of the international society</td>
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<tr>
<td>4th</td>
<td>February 24, 2009 Intelligence and decision making</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th</td>
<td>March 3, 2009 US-Japan Security Arrangements and PKOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th</td>
<td>March 26, 2009 Defense technology and industry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th</td>
<td>April 9, 2009 JSDF stationing and its relationship with local governments</td>
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Politically, there is one big difference between the NDPG 04 reviewing and the NDPO 95 reviewing. It is that the governmental parties are not in the majority in the Upper House. On September 11, 2005, the 44th general election for the Lower House seats was held. As a result, the LDP and the New Komeito Party have 334 seats of the 480 seats as of April 7, 2009. However governmental parties lost the Upper House election to the Opposition on July 29, 2007. So the LDP and the New Komeito Party only have 103 seats of the 242 seats as of April 22, 2009. The House of Representatives is superior to the House of Councilors in some points. Now governmental parties can

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207 Source: Data from Assistant Chief Cabinet Secretary for Security and Crisis Management, "Meetings." This Council attempts to conclude discussions to review the NDPG 04 by the end of June.


210 National Diet Library, "The Constitution of Japan." The Constitution says as follows: Article 59. A bill becomes a law on passage by both Houses, except as otherwise provided by the Constitution.

(2) A bill which is passed by the House of Representatives, and upon which the House of Councillors makes a decision different from that of the House of Representatives, becomes a law when passed a second time by the House of Representatives by a majority of two-thirds or more of the members present.

(3) The provision of the preceding paragraph does not preclude the House of Representatives from calling for the meeting of a joint committee of both Houses, provided for by law.

(4) Failure by the House of Councillors to take final action within sixty (60) days after receipt of a bill passed by the House of Representatives, time in recess excepted, may be determined by the House of Representatives to constitute a rejection of the said bill by the House of Councillors.
manage their administration somehow because they are an absolutely safe majority in the Lower House. If they lose the next general election and not become an absolutely safe majority, it will be very difficult to stabilize Japanese politics. Anyway, not the Opposition but governmental parties are enthusiastic to review NDPG 04. Nongovernmental parties have not yet discussed its reviewing and may not do so.

International Situations

Now the new Council on Security and Defense Capabilities is discussing Japan’s future security and defense policy again. On January 26 and February 12, 2009, the Council discussed the international situations which affected Japan’s security after the approval of NDPG 04. So we can know what Japan regards as security issues and threats to Japan through the Council’s discussions. In the discussions, the Council considered the following topics: situations of neighboring states, international terrorism, pirate activities on Japanese SLOC, major disasters, climate change and its effects, WMD proliferation, and the space development race. I will also consider these issues in addition to the financial crisis after the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers on September 15, 2007, and the international pandemic.

211 Assistant Chief Cabinet Secretary for Security and Crisis Management. "Meetings."

Neighboring States

China

China’s GDP in 2007 was 25.73 trillion yuan. This means it became the third largest economy in the world. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) tries to expand its power, in order to ensure “the protection of national sovereignty, security, territorial integrity, safeguarding of the interests of national development, and the interests of the Chinese people.” The MOD showed its concerns over Chinese dubious military intentions.

The current military modernization efforts are believed to be undertakings that will thoroughly improve the military’s capabilities. Nevertheless, China does not show a clear, specific future vision. From this perspective, there is concern about how China’s military strength will impact the regional situation and Japanese security which is to be carefully analyzed.

For example, China plans to build aircraft carriers. When Minister of Defense Hamada visited National Defense Minister Liang on March 23, 2009 in Beijing, Liang officially stated China’s intention to possess aircraft carriers as follows: “Among the big nations, only China does not have an aircraft carrier. China cannot be without an aircraft carrier forever… China’s navy is currently rather weak. We need to develop an aircraft

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According to Chinese Major General Zhang, “Even when the navy has its aircraft carriers one day, our national defense strategy will remain purely defensive,” Chinese military expansion is no threat to others. However there is no doubt that Chinese naval expansion will affect Japanese Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC), which is the same as the oil road extending from the Persian Gulf to the Japanese Islands.

In addition, the PLA has provoked the JSDF. For example, on November 10, 2004, just before the approval of NDPG 04, a submerged Han-class nuclear submarine illegally entered Japanese territorial water near Ishigakijima Island of Okinawa Prefecture. According to Article 20 of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) which Japan and China had already ratified, “In the territorial sea, submarines and other underwater vehicles are required to navigate on the surface and to

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show their flag.”

It is necessary for submarines to know the sea bed terrain well, as they pass a small strait near Ishigaki Island when submerging.

This submarine incident is strongly related to the PLAN’s strategy. In 2004, the Chinese government conducted at least 34 oceanographic researches within a 200 nautical mile (NM) circle of Okinotorishima Island, located between Okinawa and Guam in the Pacific Ocean, without the approval of the Japanese government. On April 22, 2004, China claimed the Japanese Okinotorishima Island was an islet and did not have an Economic Exclusive Zone (EEZ) stipulated by the UNCLOS. According to the


**Article 56. Rights, jurisdiction and duties of the coastal State in the exclusive economic zone:**
1. In the exclusive economic zone (EEZ), the coastal State has:
   (a) sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources, whether living or non-living, of the waters superjacent to the seabed and of the seabed and its subsoil, and with regard to other activities for the economic exploitation and exploration of the zone, such as the production of energy from the water, currents and winds;
   (b) jurisdiction as provided for in the relevant provisions of this Convention with regard to:
      (i) the establishment and use of artificial islands, installations and structures;
      (ii) marine scientific research;
      (iii) the protection and preservation of the marine environment;
      (c) other rights and duties provided for in this Convention.
**Article 57. Breadth of the exclusive economic zone:**
The exclusive economic zone shall not extend beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured.
**Article 248. Duty to provide information to the coastal State**
States and competent international organizations which intend to undertake marine scientific research in the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) or on the continental shelf of a coastal State shall, not less than six months in advance of the expected starting date of the marine scientific research project, provide that State with a full description of:
   (a) the nature and objectives of the project;
UNCLOS, rocks do not have the EEZ. China said that, as it was a rock, marine research from 12NM to 200NM off Okinotorishima was a sovereign right for China.\textsuperscript{224} The Japanese government applied to the UN that Japan had established the EEZ around Okinotorishima Island in 1997. Seven years after this application was made by Japan to the UN, China started to oppose Japan’s EEZ around Okinotorishima Island. The Okinotorishima Island area has huge sea bed resources such as cobalt-rich crusts.\textsuperscript{225} If Japan loses EEZ right around Okinotorishima Island, it will be a big economic loss. On February 18, 2005, Press Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Chiba answered a question about the Japanese governmental opinion on this issue as follows:

A question was asked earlier today concerning Okinotorishima. The island, under the Tokyo Municipal Government, has been known as an island under Japanese jurisdiction since 1931, long before the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea came into existence. Having ratified the Convention in 1996, Japan registered its domestic laws concerning its territorial waters, in which Okinotorishima is included as an island, to the Secretary-General of the UN in 1997. Seven years passed without a single claim. As recently as in 2004, a research vessel of a certain country, having violated Japan’s Exclusive Economic

\begin{itemize}
  \item[(b)] the method and means to be used, including name, tonnage, type and class of vessels and a description of scientific equipment;
  \item[(c)] the precise geographical areas in which the project is to be conducted;
  \item[(d)] the expected date of first appearance and final departure of the research vessels, or deployment of the equipment and its removal, as appropriate;
  \item[(e)] the name of the sponsoring institution, its director, and the person in charge of the project; and
  \item[(f)] the extent to which it is considered that the coastal State should be able to participate or to be represented in the project.
\end{itemize}

\textsuperscript{224} Ibid. The Convention says as follows:

\begin{enumerate}
  \item An island is a naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is above water at high tide.
  \item Except as provided for in paragraph 3, the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf of an island are determined in accordance with the provisions of this Convention applicable to other land territory.
  \item Rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own shall have no exclusive economic zone or continental shelf.
\end{enumerate}

Zone (EEZ) by ignoring necessary procedures, was asked why it took the liberty
to do so. It justified its trespassing on grounds that they construed Okinotorishima
defines that "an island is a naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water,
which is above water at high tide." This is exactly what Okinotorishima is. In the
same Article, there is a paragraph stating that "rocks which cannot sustain human
habitation or economic life of their own shall have no EEZ or continental shelf."
This paragraph talks about a rock which is inhabitable and does not define what
an island is. The definition of an island is spelled out in Paragraph 1, and there is
no room for lay interpretation and this does not serve as a pretext for arbitrary
intrusion. Vessels of a single country have been repeatedly trespassing, 18 times
in the Pacific and as often as nine times around Okinotorishima alone, by defining
the nature of foreign soil at their discretion.\textsuperscript{226}

Why did China research this area without Japan’s approval? If it wants to get
oceanographic data, it should get Japan’s approval to do research or get oceanographic
data from Japan peacefully. But China did not do so, because it wanted to secretly use the
data for submarine warfare.

Okinotorishima, located at a latitude of 20 degree 20’ north and a longitude of
136 degree 05’ east, or roughly 1,100 miles (1,700km) south of Tokyo, is situated
midway between Taiwan and Guam. The American fleet could well pass the area
en route from Guam in the event of military engagement in the Taiwan straits. In
such a case, the PRC would wish to exercise naval, including submarine, control
of the area. For this purpose, the PRC Navy would require a seabed map for use
by its submarines in the area.\textsuperscript{227}

According to Singaporean scholar Ji, the PLAN is trying to establish a layered
defense: coastal line defense and sea denial.

Sea denial constitutes the second layer of maritime defense for the PLAN, which
is in addition to the first layer of coastal line defense needed for sea control. In
other words, sea denial, whether in defense or offence, provides the outer shield
for China’s coastal cities and maritime security. Geographically, this shield is
largely within the first island chain which the PLAN regards as crucial for it to
secure its vital interests…There are two island chains which the PLAN regards as

\textsuperscript{226} Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Press Conference 18 February 2005," Press Conference by The
(accessed April 13, 2009).

\textsuperscript{227} Yoshikawa, “The US-Japan-China Mistrust Spiral and Okinotorishima.”
traditional U.S. ocean barriers for the containment of China. The first chain begins in Japan, passes through the Liuqu (Ryukyu) Islands to Taiwan, and then to the Philippines; and is the vanguard of a discernible threat to the PRC. The second chain stretches from Japan’s Ogasawara-gunto Islands through to the Iotetro Islands, and from there to the Mariana Islands.\(^{228}\)

According to government sources in Tokyo, a Han-class submarine left Qingdao Naval base in mid-October 2004, passed the Nansei Islands between Okinawa Island and Miyakojima Island, into the Pacific in late October, reached and circled Guam in early November, and then on November 10, covertly attempted to pass through Japanese territorial water to go back to Qingdao.\(^{229}\) But it was chased by MSDF destroyers and patrol aircrafts. I suppose, as a Japanese submariner, that it aimed to learn the capability of the Japanese anti-submarine patrol system, practice covertly passing the first island chain, collect area navigational data, and check on US military bases in Guam. For this operation, oceanographic research data around Okinotorishima Island was well utilized.

Not only Okinotorishima Island but also the East China Sea is an arena of dispute. China claims that its EEZ in the East China Sea extends from its coast to the Okinawa Trough. On the other hand, Japan claims its EEZ from its coast to the median line between each country's coasts.\(^{230}\) In addition, China started to drill for oil and gas near


the median line, and took a firm attitude to dispatch combatant ships to protect its oil/gas rig as follows:

China has embarked on exploration and drilling of oil and gas fields as well as building facilities and surveying for such facilities in the East China Sea and South China Sea. This includes the building of drilling facilities in the oil and gas field, whose geographical structure runs to the eastern side of the intermediate line between Japan and China. It is believed that naval vessels’ operation near the drilling facilities in September 2005 aimed to flaunt the capabilities to acquire, maintain, and protect maritime rights and interests.\(^\text{231}\)

Both governments attempted to solve the issue peacefully with “a win-win deal.”\(^\text{232}\) On June 18, 2008, Japan and China agreed to the joint gas development projects in the East China Sea.\(^\text{233}\) However there is still a huge difference between both sides’ opinions. Japanese Foreign Minister Koumura said, “It is in fact correct that there are several oil and gas fields that have been the focus of issues until now, but regarding Shirakaba, although the development that will take place is on the Chinese side of the median line that Japan claims, given the straw effect, there is the possibility that some of the reserves on the Japanese side are also being taken out and that was the largest problem. We decided to solve that largest problem and also I would like everyone to understand that we have separately stipulated a new joint development region which will be a new symbol of that as a "Sea of Peace, Cooperation and Friendship."\(^\text{234}\)


\(^{234}\) Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Joint Press Conference by Minister for Foreign Affairs Masahiko Koumura and Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry Akira Amari (Regarding Cooperation between
2004, Chinese Foreign Minister Yang said, “On the East China sea delimitation, China has never and will not recognize the so-called "median line" as advocated by Japan. China upholds the principle of natural prolongation to solve the delimitation issue of East China Sea continental shelf.”

Not only naval/maritime issues but also other issues caused by China distressed the Japanese government. For example, in 2005, ASDF fighters had to scramble against about 110 PLA planes which had entered the Japanese ADIZ. The number was the same as the number of scrambles against Russia. Japan’s ADIZ borders on the Northern Territories, which are administrated by Russia and whose sovereignty is claimed by Japan. However, the Japanese ADIZ border in the East China Sea is far from the Chinese coast line. The number of scrambles against China in 2005 was a surprising figure.

On March 14, 2005, the Third Session of the Tenth National People's Congress enacted the Anti-Secession Law. In accordance with this law, China justified the military option to prevent Taiwan’s “independence”. Article 8 says as follows:

Article 8. In the event that the "Taiwan independence" secessionist forces should act under any name or by any means to cause the fact of Taiwan's secession from China, or that major incidents entailing Taiwan's secession from China should occur, or that possibilities for a peaceful reunification should be completely

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236 Japan Ministry of Defense, Defense of Japan 2008, 182. Scrambles against China in 2007 were about 40. The total amount of scrambles in 2007 was 310. 250 scrambles against Russia were the largest figures of scrambles in 2007.
exhausted, the state shall employ non-peaceful means and other necessary measures to protect China's sovereignty and territorial integrity.\textsuperscript{237} The Japanese governmental stance is, “the issue surrounding Taiwan will be resolved peacefully by direct dialogue between the parties concerned on the Taiwan Straits, and the Japanese government cannot support any unilateral attempt by either side to change the status quo.”\textsuperscript{238} Therefore the government seriously worried that the law would have a bad influence upon international security in East Asia.

On June 15, 2001, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan established the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). According to the SCO, its objectives are “strengthening mutual confidence and good-neighbourly relations among the member countries; promoting effective cooperation in politics, trade and economy, science and technology, culture as well as education, energy, transportation, tourism, environmental protection and other fields; making joint efforts to maintain and ensure peace, security and stability in the region, moving towards the establishment of a new, democratic, just and rational political and economic international order.”\textsuperscript{239} In spite of what it says, some analysts such as Tannock of the Guardian regard the SCO as a counter-balance against US-led security systems, “There is little doubt that the SCO is an instrument for Russia and China to make the case for a multi-polar world based on


regional security blocs that counterbalance American strategic hegemony.\textsuperscript{240} In August 2005, China and Russia had a joint exercise “Peace Mission 2005” in the Shandong Peninsula, China.

"Peace Mission 2005", the first joint military exercise launched yesterday by China and Russia, is not the innocent peacekeeping drill its name suggests. It represents a significant deepening of the military relationship between a former superpower and an emerging one, and therefore will be closely watched by the only current superpower, the US…If these war games were really about peacekeeping, they would not require the mock amphibious assaults, attack submarines and Russian long-range strategic bombers that military analysts say are involved. Xinhua, the Chinese news agency, said the exercises would help strengthen the capability for joint strikes against "international terrorism, extremism and separatism". The use of the word "separatism" suggests that one Chinese aim is to train for an invasion of Taiwan, the island seen in Beijing as a renegade province, or at least to demonstrate that China is serious about enforcing its claim.\textsuperscript{241}

Because of Chinese military expansion and its strong military relationship with Russia, the MOD analyzed, “the military balance between China and Taiwan is changing to the advantage of China.”\textsuperscript{242}

However Japan attempts to strengthen its military relationship with China to know each other and to deal with common threats. On November 28, 2007, Japan welcomed the Chinese destroyer Shenzhen to Tokyo.\textsuperscript{243} On June 24, 2008, China welcomed to Zhanjiang the Japanese destroyer Sazanami that was loaded with “blankets,


medical supplies and other relief goods” for victims of the 2008 Sichuan earthquake.\textsuperscript{244}

These visits were the first time after the Second World War that each state had sent a naval vessel to the other. Both states are dispatching fleets to escort merchant vessels to the Gulf of Aden, and they have agreed to information sharing in anti-piracy operations.\textsuperscript{245}

North Korea

The international society has attempted to compel North Korea to abandon WMDs, but it has not yet abandoned them. On the contrary, on July 5, 2006, it tested ballistic missile launching as a “part of the routine military exercises staged by the Korean People’s Army to increase the nation's military capacity for self-defense”.\textsuperscript{246} On July 15, 2006, UNSCR 1695, condemned “the multiple launches by the DPRK of ballistic missiles on 5 July 2006,” demanded, “the DPRK suspend all activities related to its ballistic missile program, and in this context re-establish its pre-existing commitments to a moratorium on missile launching”, and urged “the DPRK to return immediately to the Six-Party Talks without precondition, to work towards the expeditious implementation of 19 September 2005 Joint Statement, in particular to abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs, and to return at an early date to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and International Atomic Energy Agency.


safeguards.”

Even though North Korea was a member state of the UN, it ignored UNSCR 1695 and conducted an underground nuclear test on October 9, 2006. UNSCR 1718, on October 14, 2006, demanded North Korean not conduct any other nuclear tests or ballistic missile launches, and decided “the DPRK shall suspend all activities related to its ballistic missile programme and in this context re-establish its pre-existing commitments to a moratorium on missile launching.”

However, the international society’s wish was not fulfilled. On April 5, 2009, North Korea launched the “Unha-2” rocket to send what it claimed was the satellite “Kwangmyongsong-2” into orbit. It flew over the Tohoku district of Japan, and the Japanese people became frightened. I know that every state, even North Korea, has the right to launch satellites, but North Korea has not attempted to clear up doubts on its nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles development programs, which do not contribute to world peace. So it was very difficult for the international society to believe that the launch was a satellite launch and not a Taepodong-2 ballistic missile launch. Therefore, on April 13, the UNSC announced the Statement by the President of the Security Council, 2009, stating that “The Security Council condemns the 5 April 2009 (local time) launch

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by the DPRK, which is in contravention of Security Council resolution 1718 (2006).”

The launch, which was a Taepodong-2 ballistic missile which can reach Alaska, failed, and “no object entered orbit,” according to the North American Aerospace Defense Command.\(^{252}\)

The Japan-DPRK Pyongyang Declaration of 2002 has been completely outlived. As shown by these North Korean actions, it is clear that North Korea possesses enough ballistic missile technology to attack Japan.\(^{253}\) According to the International Crisis Group, reporting on March 31, 2009, there is high possibility that North Korea already possesses 320 Nodong medium-range ballistic missiles and a “Nodong missile can already carry a nuclear warhead as far as Tokyo.”\(^{254}\) Even if Japan develops its MD system, it would be very difficult to shoot all of them down. The reality as it exists now is that not Taepodong-2 but Nodongs are serious threats to Japan’s security, and there is low possibility that the threats will be lightened in the future.


\(^{253}\) Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Japan-DPRK Pyongyang Declaration." According to the Japan-DPRK Pyongyang Declaration, “Both sides confirmed that, for an overall resolution of the nuclear issues on the Korean Peninsula, they would comply with all related international agreements. Both sides also confirmed the necessity of resolving security problems including nuclear and missile issues by promoting dialogues among countries concerned. The DPRK side expressed its intention that, pursuant to the spirit of this Declaration, it would further maintain the moratorium on missile launching in and after 2003.”

Russia

Because of the dramatic rise in oil prices and former president Putin’s strong leadership, Russian society has recovered from the stagnation caused by the fall of the Soviet Union. The armed forces of the Russian Federation have also recovered, and it is trying to modernize its troops. Japan faces its lively military activities again. On August 17, 2007, then President Putin announced that Russia had resumed cold-war-style long-range flights of strategic bombers. The ASDF has to deal with Russian “Tokyo Expresses” again.

Russian military operations seem to be increasingly more active in the vicinity of Japan, including exercises and training, in association with the recovery of troop skill levels… In July 2007, Tu-95MS Bears flew near Guam, and on February 9, 2008, Tu-95MS Bears entered into Japanese territorial airspace (above Sofugan Island in the southern Izu Islands).

Other International Factors

International terrorism

The MOD regards international terrorism as follows: “The activities of non-state actors, including international terrorist organizations, present a serious threat. Acts of terrorism are occurring in every region of the world.” For example, in November 2008, terrorists, who were 10 Pakistani nationals belonging to the Lashkar-e-Toiba, attacked Mumbai, India, and killed about 164 people. Fortunately, terrorist incidents have not

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257 Ibid., 2

yet occurred since the sarin gas attack on the Tokyo subway system in March 20, 1995 in Japan. However, if Japan ignores the threat of terrorism as an issue unrelated to it, Japan will meet with serious terrorism in the future. In particular, the Mumbai incident was caused by Pakistani terrorists, so Afghanistan and Pakistan are very important areas in which to prevent the proliferation of terrorism. On March 27, 2009, US President Obama announced a comprehensive, new strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan and expressed his recognition that Afghanistan and Pakistan are keys to securing the international society.

Al Qaeda and its allies -- the terrorists who planned and supported the 9/11 attacks -- are in Pakistan and Afghanistan… The future of Afghanistan is inextricably linked to the future of its neighbor, Pakistan… Terrorist attacks in London and Bali were tied to al Qaeda and its allies in Pakistan, as were attacks in North Africa and the Middle East, in Islamabad and in Kabul. If there is a major attack on an Asian, European, or African city, it, too, is likely to have ties to al Qaeda's leadership in Pakistan. The safety of people around the world is at stake.259

In January 2002, Japan hosted the first International Conference on Reconstruction Assistance to Afghanistan (Tokyo Conference), and it has donated 1.46 billion US dollars to the financial assistance of Afghanistan and it has sent 140 experts for development assistance.260 In addition, on April 17, 2009, Japan hosted the Pakistan Donors Conference and Friends of Democratic Pakistan Group Ministerial Meeting in


Tokyo, and finalized a 5 billion US dollars assistance plan for the next two years.\textsuperscript{261} The MSDF is still dispatching its fleet replenishment tankers to the Indian Ocean to support the MIO. The global war on terror is also a long war for Japan.

Pirate activities on Japanese SLOC

Ninety-eight percent of Japanese trade depends on maritime transportation.\textsuperscript{262} Ninety-nine point eight percent of oil consumed in Japan is imported from other states, and Japan imports 90 percent of oil from the Middle East.\textsuperscript{263} The Japanese oil road is drawn from the Middle East to Japan, but recently pirates have attacked Japanese ships on oil SLOC, especially in the Gulf of Aden, the Indian Ocean. For example, on April 21, 2008, the Japanese oil tanker Takayama was shot at by Somali pirates in the Gulf of Aden. No one was injured, but the pirates made a hole in the stern.\textsuperscript{264} The German frigate Emden and its helicopter fended off the pirates, so the Takayama could run away from the pirate’s attack.\textsuperscript{265} Because of this incident, the Japanese government attempted to protect SLOC and merchant vessels from pirates’ attacks. First, Japan became a

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cosponsor of UNSCR 1816 to “deter acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea” and approved subsequent UNSCRs as a nonpermanent member of the UNSC.\textsuperscript{266} Second, in March 2009, based on the governmental interpretation of the SDF Act, the MSDF sent two destroyers to the Gulf of Aden to protect vessels related to Japan.\textsuperscript{267} Third, the government is planning to send two P-3C patrol aircrafts to the area this May, and it plans to pass the anti-piracy bill in this session of the National Diet, to protect any other nationalities’ vessels.\textsuperscript{268}

Japan has contributed to the building of an anti-piracy mechanism in East Asia for a long time. Pirates have attacked merchant vessels not only in the Gulf of Aden but also in the Strait of Malacca. Compared with Somalia, coastal states of the Malacca Strait have enough capabilities to maintain maritime public order. Under the Koizumi administration’s strong leadership, Japan promoted international collaboration through the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP), which was enacted on September 4, 2006.\textsuperscript{269} On November 29, 2006, ReCAAP member states established an information sharing center in Singapore.\textsuperscript{270}


The JCG has sent some staff members to the information sharing center.\textsuperscript{271} In 2006, the Japanese government also provided a grant aid to Indonesia so it could build three patrol vessels.\textsuperscript{272} Such maritime police efforts are very effective in East Asia. However, according to Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism Kaneko, speaking at the Special Committee on anti-piracy and anti-terrorism, the House of Representative, on April 15, 2009, it is very difficult for the JCG to deal with pirates in the Gulf of Aden because of the distance from Japan, the weapons possessed by pirates, and the international naval coalition in the area.\textsuperscript{273} So Japan should change the way it deals with pirates, depending on the situation. Maintenance of maritime public order is important, not only for the Japanese economy, but also for world trade.

Major Disasters, Climate Change and Its Effects

On December 26, 2004, the second largest earthquake after 1900, next to the Chilean earthquake of 1960, occurred off the west coast of Northern Sumatra, and caused huge tsunamis to hit the Indian Rim.\textsuperscript{274} The quake was 9.1 on the Richter scale. Not less


than 225,000 were killed. More than 220,000 Indonesians were killed or missing as of January 2005, “95,000 and 100,000 bodies had now been found and buried in Aceh and northern Sumatra,” in particular. Because of Thai and Indonesian governmental disaster relief requests, the Japanese government dispatched joint JSDF units including 1 C-130H, 5 vessels, 10 helicopters, 2 air-cushioned landing crafts, to around northern Sumatra from December 2004 to March 2005. This was the first joint international disaster relief mission for the JSDF. A magnitude 7.9 earthquake hit Sichuan province, China on May 12, 2008. Casualties of the earthquake There were more than 70,000 casualties of the earthquake. In response to a Chinese governmental disaster relief request, the Japanese government dispatched the Japan Disaster Relief Rescue Team and the Japan Disaster Relief Medical Team in May 2008. The Japanese government has had to deal not only with international disasters but also with domestic disasters such as the magnitude 6.9 Noto Peninsula earthquake in 2007, which killed one person; the magnitude 6.8 Chuetsu offshore earthquake in 2007, which killed 15 people; the


277 Japan Defense Agency, Defense of Japan 2005, 63-64


magnitude 7.2 Iwate-Miyagi Nairiku earthquake in 2008, which killed 13 people; the tremendous snowfall of 2005-2006, which killed 152 people; the torrential rain in July 2006, which killed 25 people; and the torrential rain in the end of August 2008, which killed 3 people.\textsuperscript{281} The JSDF conducted disaster relief operations at all the domestic disasters I mentioned above.

Recently, global warming has been causing some disasters and climate change. For example, increasing the temperature of the sea surface gives hurricanes, typhoons and cyclones such as Hurricane Katrina in 2005 more power: “More-frequent hurricanes are part of most global warming models, and as mean temperatures rise worldwide, it’s hard not to make a connection between the two.”\textsuperscript{282} In addition, sea level rise caused by climate change erodes the coasts of islands, and some island-states such as Tuvalu will disappear in the near future, meaning that residents will have to find someplace else to live, as Tuvalu Deputy Premier Tavau Teii said: “If the time comes we should leave the islands, there is no other choice but to leave.”\textsuperscript{283} Natural disasters related to global warming and climate change are serious threats to the international society. The more serious disasters become, the more difficult it is for each state to deal with them by itself.


WMD proliferation

Not only North Korea but also Iran attempts to possess nuclear weapons, even though they are ratified states of the NPT. They also have ballistic missiles to carry them. Every state has a right to “develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination,” and has to explain that its nuclear program is not related to a military nuclear dimension.\textsuperscript{284} However both states have not yet fulfilled their duty. On February 19, 2009, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reported Iran’s present nuclear project as follows:

The Agency has verified that, as of 17 November 2008, 9956 kg of UF6 had been fed into the cascades since February 2007, and a total of 839 kg of low enriched UF6 had been produced. The results also showed that the enrichment level of this low enriched UF6 product verified by the Agency was 3.49% U-235. Iran has estimated that, between 18 November 2008 and 31 January 2009, it produced an additional 171 kg of low enriched UF6… Iran has not suspended its enrichment related activities or its work on heavy water-related projects, including the construction of the heavy water moderated research reactor, IR-40, and the production of fuel for that reactor.\textsuperscript{285}

Japan has maintained friendly diplomatic relations with Iran for 80 years. Even so, “Mr. Nakasone pointed out the seriousness of the five United Nations Security Council Resolutions and the importance of continuous cooperation with IAEA. He also stated that Iran should take its own steps, including the suspension of enrichment-related activities, in order to win the trust of the international community,” because Iran’s nuclear issue


collaboration to reach a final declaration at the 6th conference. Finally, the 6th Review Convention announced the final declaration and decided to establish the Implementation Support Unit within the Geneva branch of the United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs. 291

Space Development Race

After its first manned space craft Shenzhou 5 was launched on October 15, 2003, China continuously launched manned space crafts in October 2005 and September 2008 based on the Shenzhou program. The final purpose of the Shenzhou project is to “build a permanent space laboratory and a space engineering system.” 292 In addition, China is strongly promoting the Chinese lunar exploration program, and on October 24, 2007, it launched the Chang'e 1 spacecraft to explore the Moon. The Chang'e project consists of three parts: orbiting the moon, landing on the moon, and returning samples from the moon. 293 Therefore the next step is to land a lunar rover on the Moon softly, and to research its surface automatically. On January 11, 2007, China tested its anti-satellite system to destroy an old weather satellite, and Japanese Prime Minister Abe expressed his concern about China’s misuse of space. 294


India also has a lunar exploration program. The first Indian lunar orbiter, Chandrayaan 1, was launched on October 22, 2008 to “prepare a three-dimensional atlas of the Moon and conduct chemical and mineralogical mapping of the entire lunar surface.” Chandrayaan 2 will be launched in 2012 to send a lander to research the lunar surface.

Most space projects are peaceful, but these technologies are strongly related to military ones. Japan has to develop its space project to maintain some technological space superiority and get into the future market related to space development, because of rivals’ projects.

The Financial Crisis

Depressions have caused many wars in the world’s history. For example, the Great Depression after 1929 divided the world into bloc economies, and finally caused the Second World War. Depression sometimes invites nationalism and economic protectionism to slumping states. According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the present financial crisis resembles the Great Depression in some points as follows:

The current downturn is highly synchronized and is associated with a deep financial crisis, a rare combination in the postwar period. Accordingly, the downturn is likely to be unusually severe, and the recovery is expected to be sluggish. It is not surprising, therefore, that many commentators looking for historical parallels for the current episode focus on the Great Depression of the 1930s, by far the deepest and longest recession in the history of most advanced economies…An important common feature is that the U.S. economy is the epicenter of both crises. Given its weight, a downturn in the United


States has all but guaranteed a global impact. This sets the current crisis and the
Great Depression apart from many other financial crises, which have typically
occurred in smaller economies and had more limited global impact.²⁹⁷

On January 28, 2009, Prime Minister Aso said at the Diet, “The current financial
crisis is said to be a once-in-a-century occurrence.”²⁹⁸ In this current once-in-a-century
depression, along with G20 members, Japan is attempting to stabilize the international
society in order to prevent a reoccurrence of the tragedy which occurred after the Great
Depression. For this purpose it is attempting to:

1) restore confidence, growth, and jobs;
2) repair the financial system to restore lending;
3) strengthen financial regulation to rebuild trust;
4) fund and reform our international financial institutions to overcome this crisis
   and prevent future ones;
5) promote global trade and investment and reject protectionism, to underpin
   prosperity; and
6) build an inclusive, green, and sustainable recovery.²⁹⁹

Japan recognizes that providing economic support to the international society is
the best way to secure Japan. In order to achieve these objectives, Japan, which has a
huge fiscal deficit, has decided to

1) Implement economic stimulus packages at a scale of 75 trillion yen in total
2) Expand Official Development Assistance to Asia: a total amount of 2.0 trillion
   yen
3) Additional assistance to trade finance: a total amount of 22 billion US dollars
   in 2 years in addition to 90 billion US dollars per annum on average
4) Provide a loan of a maximum of 100 billion US dollars to the IMF

²⁹⁷ International Monetary Fund. World Economic Outlook -- Crisis and Recovery April 2009

²⁹⁸ Cabinet Secretariat of Japan, Cabinet Public Relations Office, “Policy Speech by Prime
   Minister Taro Aso to the Hundred and Seventy-first Session of the Diet,” Cabinet Secretariat of Japan,
   Cabinet Public Relations Office, January 28, 2009,

²⁹⁹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "London Summit : Leaders' Statement," Summit on Financial
   Markets and the World Economy, April 2, 2009,
5) Make efforts towards early agreement on tripling (+200%) the capital of the Asia Development Bank
6) Establish a fund to recapitalize banks in developing countries
7) Provide assistance to provide liquidity in each region
8) Double Japan's ODA to Africa by 2012
9) Promote investment to future environment
10) Respond to a rise in protectionism
11) Strengthen the financial system in terms of regulation and supervision, and
12) Reform international financial institutions including the IMF, the World Bank. 300

International Pandemic

According to the World Health Organization (WHO), from 2002 to 2003, Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) spread all over the world, especially in Asia, and killed 774 people. 301 Now we are facing a more serious threat than SARS: Bird flu or new flu. In the near future, Bird flu will change to human flu and cause a pandemic. The Inter-ministerial Avian Influenza Committee estimated the casualties in Japan will be as follows.

Using the upper limit, 25 million, the numbers of moderate and severe cases of new influenza were estimated, based on the classification of Asian flu etc. as moderate (fatality: 0.53%), and Spanish flu as severe (fatality: 2%). Based on the fatality for moderate and severe cases, the upper limits of inpatients and deaths were estimated 530 thousands and 170 thousands respectively for moderate cases, while 2 million and 640 thousands for severe cases. 302

It is impossible to prevent a new influenza pandemic, so the Japanese government is attempting to “avoid socioeconomic collapse by preventing the onset of new influenza


as far as possible through promoting collaboration with domestic animal sanitation divisions, by containing it at the early stage by public health intervention, as well as by minimizing the spread of infection and health hazard in pandemic period.” In addition, international collaboration to minimize the damage of a new influenza is very important. Japan hosted the Japan-WHO Joint Meeting on Early Response to Potential Influenza Pandemic in December 2006 and has provided 195 million US dollars to support international anti-flu projects. Without appropriate measures, a new flu pandemic will seriously damage Japanese society and the world.

Many serious diseases such as Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome, Ebola hemorrhagic fever and Marburg hemorrhagic fever are originated from Africa. Therefore research on these African origin diseases is very important for all human beings. The Japanese government established the Hideyo Noguchi Africa Prize in July 2006 to support medical study and medical services in Africa. Japan hosted the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD) in 1993, 1998, 2003 and 2008. The first Hideyo Noguchi Africa Prize ceremony was held in the 4th TICAD. Both are strongly related to each other. Development aid contributes not only to the economy but also to public health to prevent serious diseases.

303 Ibid., 4.
304 World Health Organization, “Summary of probable SARS cases with onset of illness from 1 November 2002 to 31 July 2003.”
The Domestic Situation

Fiscal Crisis

Japan has a serious financial deficit.

The government debt is expected to reach about 150.4% of GDP in FY2009. As a whole, Japan’s fiscal situation is one of the most severe among major advanced countries with a structure that shifts the burden to future generations.\(^{307}\)

The Koizumi administration decided, “Under the strained state of public finance, the Government of Japan shall make efforts in more drastic rationalization and streamlining of defense-related expenses to implement an efficient defense program, in line with the efforts of the government as a whole in cost-cutting and rationalization.”\(^{308}\)

Therefore according to the Basic Policies for Economic and Fiscal Management and Structural Reform 2006, the Japanese government is trying to allocate the same amount for the defense budget for the next five years in spite of providing fiscal support for the realignment of the US Force Japan and the missile defense project.\(^{309}\)

The first stage of the MD system development is almost budgeted; however, the second stage of development will require new budgeting. The next main fiscal issue related to the defense budget is the realignment of the US Force Japan. The United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation on May 1, 2006 said as follows:

Approximately 8,000 III Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) personnel and their approximately 9,000 dependents will relocate from Okinawa to Guam by 2014, in a manner that maintains unit integrity... Of the estimated $10.27 billion cost of the

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facilities and infrastructure development costs for the III MEF relocation to Guam, Japan will provide $6.09 billion (in U.S. FY 2008 dollars), including $2.8 billion in direct cash contributions, to develop facilities and infrastructure on Guam to enable the III MEF relocation, recognizing the strong desire of Okinawa residents that such force relocation be realized rapidly.\(^{310}\)

On February 17, 2009 in Tokyo, to materialize the roadmap, Foreign Minister Nakasone and State Secretary Clinton signed the Agreement between the Government of Japan and The Government of the United States of America Concerning the Implementation of the Relocation of III Marine Expeditionary Force Personnel and Their Dependents from Okinawa to Guam. Now both governments are ratifying it.

**Article 1.** The Government of Japan shall make cash contributions up to the amount of two billion, eight hundred million United States dollars ($2,800,000,000) (in U.S. Fiscal Year 2008 dollars) to the Government of the United States of America as a part of expenditures for the relocation of approximately 8,000 III MEF personnel and their approximately 9,000 dependents from Okinawa to Guam (hereinafter referred to as “the Relocation”) subject to paragraph 1. of Article 9 of this Agreement.\(^{311}\)

In accordance with this agreement, from FY 2010 to FY 2014, the Japanese government will expense 2.8 billion US dollars for direct cash contributions, and will make a Japan Bank for International Cooperation fund and loan to build housing and infrastructures for marines in Guam totaling 6.09 billion US dollars.\(^{312}\)

The defense budget consists of three categories in classification by expenses: personnel and food provisions expenses, obligatory outlay expenses “which are paid


under contracts concluded in previous fiscal years,” and general material expenses.313 The FY 2008 defense budget was 4742.6 billion yen in total. In FY 2008, personnel and food provisions expenses were 2094.0 billion yen (44.2%), obligatory outlay expenses were 1722.4 billion yen (36.3%), and general material expenses were 926.2 billion yen (19.5%).314 Personnel/food provisions expenses and obligatory outlay expenses are mandatory expenses, and some general material expenses such as equipment maintenance cost, education/training cost, and the cost for SACO-related projects are also mandatory (See Appendix D).315 The discretionary budget is very small. In addition, US Force realignment-related costs will strain the defense budget. The MOD attempted to budget for the relocation of III MEF from the defense budget to a special budget, and negotiated for this with the ministry of finance.316 However 34.6 billion yen was budgeted for the relocation within the FY 2009 defense budget, because of the Basic Policies for Economic and Fiscal Management and Structural Reform 2006.317 The JSDF is facing a serious fiscal crisis similar to that of the Japanese government. Therefore it is required to modernize and downsize to maintain its capability within a limited and reducing defense budget.

313 Ibid., 144.
314 Ibid., 145
315 Ibid., 144
Scandals in the MOD and the JSDF and Their Reform

Scandals

In a few years, scandals hit the MOD and the JSDF.

First, the head of the defense plans and program division of the MSDF staff office provided incorrect information to senior officers, the minister and the chief cabinet secretary on the amount of fuel provided to the US Navy in the Indian Ocean by MSDF fleet replenishment tanker Tokiwa. Even though he learned later that the information was incorrect, he did not report this fact to his seniors. His dereliction was regarded as “a lack of professionalism and a denial of civilian control” as follows:

1) Work-processing mistakes within the Ministry of Defense, including a report with inaccurate figures and the failure to correct the report, demonstrated that the Ministry of Defense failed to appropriately assist the Minister of Defense, who is a core of civilian control.
2) Responses based on the inaccurate figures were made at the Diet, which demonstrates that the Ministry of Defense and Self-Defense Forces will not be appropriately controlled by the Diet, which is responsible for final civilian control.
3) At the same time, the fact that inaccurate information was given directly to the people through press conferences is a grave situation that may cause damage to the basis of the issue of civilian control.

Second, “in February 2006, an incident of leakage of classified information on the destroyer Asayuki from a privately owned personal computer through file-sharing software came to light.” In addition, there were other information leakages. These incidents were caused by the fact that the JSDF security system could not keep up with

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319 Ibid., 365, 369.
320 Ibid., 371.
the information technology revolution and personnel did not have a correct understanding of classified information.\footnote{Ibid., 371.}

Third, “in January 2007 it was discovered that a crew member of the destroyer Shirane had saved information that was thought to be classified on an external hard disk at the crew member’s home, and as a result of investigations, in December 2007, an MSDF officer was arrested on suspicion of leaking special defense secrets concerning the Aegis system, and four other MSDF officers were sent to the prosecutor.”\footnote{Ibid., 371.} According to the investigation, no special defense secrets concerning the Aegis system were leaked to outside the JSDF.\footnote{Ibid., 371.} However if the information had been leaked to outside, this incident would have impacted the Japan-U.S. security arrangements and other friendly countries.

Fourth, on November 27, 2007, former vice minister of defense Moriya was arrested for violating the Self-Defense Forces Personnel Ethics Act and the Criminal Code. He was suspected of accepting monetary gifts such as free golfing and offered special favors for choosing procurement from two defense trading companies, Yamada Corporation and Nihon Mirise Corporation.\footnote{The Japan Times, "Fukuda, Machimura, Nukaga rue Moriya's bribery arrest," The Japan Times, November 29, 2007, http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20071129b3.html (accessed April 21, 2009).} In addition, it became clear in December 2007 that Yamada Corporation billed the MOD excessively for two pieces of imported
equipment. So the Japanese people had a strong doubt of procurement system of the MOD.

Fifth, on February 19, 2008, MSDF Aegis destroyer Atago collided with the fishing boat Seitokumaru near the Bousou peninsula, Chiba Prefecture. Because of this collision, two fishermen were lost. According to the Yokohama Regional Marine Accident Tribunal, the Atago’s failure to prevent the collision with the Seitokumaru crossing the Atago’s wake from right to left was caused mainly by the Atago’s neglect in watching, and secondarily because the Seitokumaru did not sound warning signals and conduct corporative action to avoid a collision. In addition, it took 1.5 hours to report this accident to the minister of defense and 2 hours to report it to the prime minister. The MOD and the JSDF were criticized that it should have taken less time to report this accident. Because of this accident, the Japanese people worried about governmental crisis management capability and MSDF seamanship.

Reform of the MOD and the JSDF

These incidents made the government decide to reform the MOD and the JSDF. The Council for Reforming the Ministry of Defense was established by the prime minister’s office.

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Table 5. Discussions at the Council for Reforming the Ministry of Defense

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Topic</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st December 3, 2007</td>
<td>General exchange of opinions on issues concerning the MOD and the SDF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd December 17, 2007</td>
<td>Ensuring civilian control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd January 9, 2008</td>
<td>Establishing a rigorous information security system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th February 1, 2008</td>
<td>Ensuring civilian control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th February 13, 2008</td>
<td>Ensuring civilian control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th March 3, 2008</td>
<td>1) Issues related to the system of communicating information following the incident involving the Aegis-equipped destroyer Atago 2) Points of previous discussions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th April 7, 2008</td>
<td>In the Project Team for Promoting Comprehensive Acquisition Reform Report (Defense Ministry Report)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8th May 8, 2008</td>
<td>Points of previous discussions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9th May 21, 2008</td>
<td>Studying the ideal structure and organization of the Ministry of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10th June 19, 2008</td>
<td>General rearrangement of the points of previous discussions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11th July 15, 2008</td>
<td>Finalizing of the “Report”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Council announced the Report of the Council for Reforming the Ministry of Defense on July 15, 2008. In this report, the Council pointed out how to reform the MOD and the JSDF as follows:

**Reform Proposal 1: Reform of the Consciousness of Personnel and Organizational Culture**

1) Principles of Reform

The Reform Council, based on consideration and analysis of the incidents of misconduct proposes the following principles for reform: (A) Thorough adherence to rules and regulations, (B) Establishment of professionalism (professional awareness), and (C) Establishment of a management of works that prioritizes execution of duties, with the aim of total optimization.

2) Thorough Adherence to Rules and Regulations

It is necessary to ensure that awareness of adherence to the rules and regulations prevails in an organizational climate. In addition, it is necessary to organize these rules in a manner that clarifies what needs to be observed.

3) Establishment of Professionalism (Professional Awareness)

Senior personnel with thorough professionalism should take leadership to instill a high degree of ethics and a sense of mission throughout the entire organization.

4) Establishment of a Management of Works that Prioritizes Execution of Duties, with the Aim of Total Optimization

In addition to reform of the consciousness of individual personnel and units, it is necessary to create an organizational culture that aims at total optimization of the organization, focusing on the execution of duties.

**Reform Proposal 2: Organizational Reforms for Modern Civilian Control**

1) Necessity of Organizational Reform

In order that the Ministry of Defense and Self-Defense Forces can implement the above-mentioned three principles of reform steadily and effectively, organizational reform is required.

2) Strategic Level: Strengthening Command Functions of the Prime Minister’s Office
The Reform Council proposes that the Prime Minister’s Office should utilize the Security Council and other ministerial councils to strengthen the command functions by actively and comprehensively discussing the critical items for security.

3) Organizational Reform to Strengthen Command Functions at the Ministry of Defense
The Reform Council proposes that while maintaining the current organization of the Ministry of Defense basically through drastic reforms and restructuring of the various functions and responsibilities, a structure should be created so as to prevent recurrence of incidents of misconduct, enable civilian control to function, and enable the implementation of more effective defense policies.

In addition to the Council, the MOD established the ministry of defense reform promotion team in February 2008 to review itself. After the announcement of the report, the MOD changed the team to the ministry of defense reform head office to materialize reform proposals recommended by the Council.

In FY 2008, the MOD conducted the following measures:

**Thorough adherence to rules and regulations**
1) Senior personnel understand the necessity of rules and regulations and take the initiative in obeying them
2) Workplace training for staff members on regulations focused more on necessity than formality
3) Thorough enforcement of rules and regulations related to preservation of classified information and strict disciplinary action for violation
4) Clarification of responsibilities for securing transparency in defense procurement, as well as preparing and releasing records of meetings
5) Strengthening inspection and observation including inspections without notice
6) Revision and examination of necessities of rules and regulations

**Establishment of professionalism**

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329 Ibid., 364-366.
330 Ibid., 361.
331 Ibid., 367.
1) Review of educational programs and administrative experience in order to foster staff members with broad views
2) Expanding basic workplace education, while reviewing the balance of workload and workforce within each section of the SDF, as well as reducing excessive workload in the workplace
3) Development of professionalism involving information communication and security, which is significant to the present security

Establishment of a management of works that prioritizes execution of duties, with the aim of total optimization
1) Establishment of cooperation structure based on a sense of unity between civilian and uniformed staff, and between the ASDF, GSDF, and MSDF
2) Establishment of voluntary PDCA (Plan – Do – Check – Act) cycle
3) While taking into account the “Best Practices” of the private sector, common efforts for improvement should be made by subordinates and commanders who lead an SDF unit, the basic unit to the Ministry of Defense
4) Mobile response to issues related to the policy plan by the Integrated Project Team (IPT) method
5) Full-scale introduction of IPT method in defense procurement
6) Further promotion of joint operations posture centered on the Joint Staff
7) In order to maintain the trust of the Japanese people, implementation of various press conferences and integrated public relations activities by units and central organizations

In FY 2009, the MOD budgeted two main measures for the second stage reform as follows:

2) Explicitly establish the Defense Council by law, and advise the Minister of Defense on policy decision-making and responses to emergency situations through deliberation by politicians such as the Senior Vice-Minister and Parliamentary Secretary for Defense, and civilian officials such as the Vice-Minister of Defense, and uniformed officials such as the Chief of Staff, JSO.

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In FY 2010, the MOD attempts to reform itself as the third stage based on the new NDPG as follows:

1) In order to reinforce the Bureau of Defense Policy functionally, attempt to improve the system of planning, drafting and implementing defense policies. Also, plan functional reinforcement that takes the actual situation into account in terms of operation by appointing SDF personnel. In particular, work to improve intelligence-analysis capabilities, and drafting projects such as international peace cooperation activities.

2) In order to reinforce Joint Staff Office functionally, abolish Bureau of Operational Policy and ensure the execution of operations under the Chief of Staff, Joint Staff, who receives orders from the Minister. Concerning important matters such as unit mobilization and operational planning, submit the matter for approval to the Minister of Defense, after obtaining suggestions from the Defense Council through the Bureau of Defense Policy.

3) In order to ensure optimization of defense capability build-up, arrange and realign the defense capabilities build-up sections of the Internal Bureau and the three Staff Offices of the ASDF, GSDF and MSDF. Then establish a defense capability build-up department that unitarily engages in build-up projects, and study how the department should specifically be. Concerning important matters, the defense capability build-up department of the Ministry of Defense will prepare options, gain approval by the Minister of Defense via the Internal Bureau through discussion at the Defense Conference.

4) In order to strengthen personnel divisions, actively appoint SDF personnel familiar with the actual conditions of the unit while aiming at utmost integration. The ASDF, GSDF and MSDF Staff Offices will bear responsibility for issues related to personnel, education and training of the SDF. However, the internal Bureau will assist the Minister of Defense in terms of system and policies.  

The LDP also attempted to reform the MOD. The LDP established the Subcommittee for Reforming the Ministry of Defense in the Research Commission on Security of the LDP Policy Research Council on March 19, 2008, and this met for discussions 11 times. At last, the subcommittee announced “the Proposal: Reform of the Defense Ministry” on April 24, 2008.

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Table 6. Discussions at LDP’s Subcommittee for Reforming the Ministry of Defense

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Topic</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1\textsuperscript{st} March 19, 2008</td>
<td>General exchange of opinions on issues concerning the MOD and the SDF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2\textsuperscript{nd} March 26, 2008</td>
<td>General exchange of opinions on issues concerning the MOD and the SDF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3\textsuperscript{rd} March 27, 2008</td>
<td>General exchange of opinions on issues concerning the MOD and the SDF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4\textsuperscript{th} April 2, 2008</td>
<td>Past scandals and measures</td>
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<td>5\textsuperscript{th} April 3, 2008</td>
<td>Assistance systems for Defense Minister in other states</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6\textsuperscript{th} April 8, 2008</td>
<td>SDF Act and MOD Establishment Law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7\textsuperscript{th} April 10, 2008</td>
<td>General rearrangement of the points of previous discussions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8\textsuperscript{th} April 16, 2008</td>
<td>Points of previous discussions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9\textsuperscript{th} April 17, 2008</td>
<td>Points of previous discussions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10\textsuperscript{th} April 23, 2008</td>
<td>Making of the draft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11\textsuperscript{th} April 24, 2008</td>
<td>Finalizing of the “Report”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the Proposal, the LDP required the Japanese government to reform not only the MOD but also the governmental security system itself as follows:

1) National security and crisis management
   a. Establishment of the National Security Council
   b. Increasing the staff of the Cabinet Secretariat for security and crisis management
   c. Establishment of the Premier Adjutant
   d. More minister-level simulation exercises for security and crisis management

2) Civilian Control and structure of the MOD
   a. Abolition of the Civilian Defense Counselors and Establishment of the Aides to the Defense Minister
   b. Reinforcement of the Joint Staff Office and abolition of the Bureau of Operational Policy
   c. Establishment of the permanent joint operation headquarter
   d. Establishment of the MOD Information Gathering and Operation Center
   e. Establishment of the Defense Council by law
   f. Utilization uniforms to explain the defense policy at the Diet
   g. Mixing civilians and uniforms in the internal Bureaus of the MOD

3) Morale-building Measures
   a. Improvement of the rate of capacity utilization
   b. Improvement of salary and allowance system
   c. Appointment of Chief of Staff, Joint Staff by the Emperor’s attestation
   d. Improvement of training and education system
   e. Improvement of Public Relations
   f. Improvement of mental health consultation system\textsuperscript{336}

\textsuperscript{335} Source: Data from Liberal Democratic Party of Japan, Proposal: Reform of the Defense Ministry, 4.
However the proposal emphasized that the most important policy to reform the MOD was an amendment of the Japanese Constitution to stipulate the JSDF and establish a court-martial system.\(^{\text{337}}\) In this point, the LDP’s proposal is completely different from the Council’s report.

According to Defense Minister Hamada, “former ASDF Chief of Staff Tamogami expressed his views in a paper which deviates from the Government's position represented by the statement of August 15, 1995 by then Prime Minister Murayama.”\(^{\text{338}}\) He fired General Tamogami on December 3, 2008 because he regarded Tamogami’s expression as a violation of the civilian control concept.\(^{\text{339}}\)

Politicians and taxpayers wanted to reform them completely. These scandals have exerted enough pressures to cause NDPG 04 to be re-written completely.

\(^{\text{336}}\) Ibid., 1-3.

\(^{\text{337}}\) Ibid., 1.


\(^{\text{339}}\) Reiji Yoshida and Jun Hongo, "Tamogami — history again retold: Ousted ASDF chief's contentious spin on war not the first — nor the first to stretch facts," The Japan Times, November 11, 2008, http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20081111a4.html (accessed April 21, 2009). On the other hand, General (ret.) Tamogami wrote, ‘Japan was never an ‘aggressor nation.’ The army advanced into China and what is now South Korea because Japan stationed its military in those areas based on accords and treaties, and Japan was ‘a victim’ that was ‘drawn into the Sino-Japanese War’ with repeated terrorist acts and provocations by Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist government.”
Security Arguments in Japan

After NDPG 04, governmental politicians have argued about Japan’s security more than ever before, and have tried to strengthen the legal background of the Japanese security system, which had been trivialized by the Constitution of Japan. In order to contribute to the international society as the second largest economic power, Japan has to join more PKOs, strengthen the US-Japan alliance, and maximize the JSDF’s capability within the political limitation set by the Constitution. In line with this policy, governmental parties composed of the LDP and the New Komeito Party have legislated for strengthening the legal basis of the Japanese security system.

Transition of the Defense Agency to the Ministry of Defense

On December 15, 2006, the Partial Amendment of the Defense Agency Establishment Law and Other Related Laws was passed by the National Diet, and on January 9, 2007 the JDA was changed to the MOD. Before then, the JDA was one of the extra-ministerial bureaus, “agencies,” of the Cabinet Office, which was a ministry of the Cabinet and whose minister in charge was the prime minister. The actual head of the JDA was the minister of state for defense, but organizationally the minister in charge of national defense was the Premier. This structure was not effective, for the following reasons:

1) Only the head of the ministry can request to the Prime Minister to call Cabinet meetings for enactment and amendment of laws and ministry ordinances, making decisions on implementation of important activities of the JSDF. The Minister of State for Defense was a member of Cabinet meetings, but could

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not do so because he was not the head of his ministry. So it was hard for the
JDA to respond diverse emergency situations immediately.

2) This agency status potentially invited misunderstandings by other parties
during defense talks, international dialogue and the JSDF activities conducted
overseas in cooperation with other countries because the JDA may not have
been deemed an administrative organ equivalent to those in charge of national
defense in other countries.  

At the same time, the SDF Act was amended, and the government added
international peace cooperation operations such as international disaster relief operations,
activities in situations in areas surrounding Japan, and fleet replenishment activities in the
Indian Ocean to the first priority mission of the JSDF, “defense of Japan against direct
and indirect invasions.”

The amendment was passed not only by governmental parties, but also by the
Opposition, and by more than 90 % of the members of the National Diet. Fifty-two
years have passed since the JDA was established. Sixty-one years after the Second World
War the Japanese people recognize the importance of the MOD/JSDF and that “we have
to share not only costs but also risks to stabilize the international society” even though
the pacific Constitution still exists.

Japan-Australia/India Security Declaration

On March 1, 2007, in Tokyo, Prime Minister Abe and Australian Premier Howard
announced the Japan-Australia Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation. This

342 Ibid., 174-178.
343 Ibid., 182-184.
344 Ibid., 182.
345 Youhei Sasagawa, "Opinion: Lead Anti-Somali Pirate PKO," The Sankei Shimbun, April 16,
2009).
declaration was quite historical, because Japan has not made such a security relationship with any other state except the US. Both states agreed on mutual security cooperation based on “their respective alliance relationships with the US” in the following areas:

1) Law enforcement on combating transnational crime, including trafficking in illegal narcotics and precursors, people smuggling and trafficking, counterfeiting currency and arms smuggling;
2) Border security;
3) Counter-terrorism;
4) Disarmament and counter-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery;
5) Peace operations;
6) Exchange of strategic assessments and related information;
7) Maritime and aviation security;
8) Humanitarian relief operations, including disaster relief;
9) Contingency planning, including for pandemics

This declaration was based on common recognition of a need for a preventive defense policy, that is “the future security and prosperity of both Japan and Australia is linked to the secure future of the Asia-Pacific region and beyond.” The Japan-Australian security relationship is strengthened by efforts such as cooperation between GSDF troops and the Australian Army in Iraq and East Timor, and the Japan-Australia Joint Foreign and Defense Ministerial Consultations.

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347 Ibid.

On October 22, 2008, in Tokyo, Prime Minister Aso and Indian Premier Singh announced the Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation between Japan and India. Both states agreed mutual cooperation within following areas:

1) Information exchange and policy coordination on regional affairs in the Asia Pacific region and on long-term strategic and global issues.
2) Bilateral cooperation within multilateral frameworks in Asia, in particular the East Asia Summit, ASEAN Regional Forum and ReCAAP processes.
3) Defense dialogue and cooperation within the framework of the Joint Statement signed in May 2006 between the two Defense Ministries.
4) Cooperation between Coast Guards
5) Safety of transport
6) Fight against terrorism and transnational crimes
7) Sharing of experiences in peacekeeping and peace building
8) Disaster management
9) Disarmament and non-proliferation

This declaration was based on “their deep respect for each other’s contribution in promoting peace, stability and development in Asia and beyond.”

The security relationship was just started last year, but both are starting some projects such as sending an MSDF officer to the Indian National Defense College.

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350 Ibid.

Why did Japan choose Australia and India as security partners? Both states share a “common commitment to democracy, open society, human rights and the rule of law” with Japan.\textsuperscript{352} And they are regional powers to stabilize areas which are strongly related to Japan’s interest. They are preventive strategic partners for Japan.

Basic Act on Ocean Policy and Basic Space Law

Because of the Basic Act on Ocean Policy enacted on July 20, 2007, Japan established the Headquarters for Ocean Policy within the Cabinet to promote inter-agency collaboration including the MOD to protect Japan’s maritime interest:

The purpose of this Act is…to promote measures with regard to the oceans comprehensively and systematically, through contributing to the sound development of the economy and society of our State and to improve the stability of the lives of citizenry as well as to contribute to the coexistence of the oceans and mankind…under the international cooperation, as our State surrounded by the oceans, based on the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and other international agreements as well as on the international efforts on the realization of the sustainable development and use of the oceans.\textsuperscript{353}

According to the Basic Plan on Ocean Policy, the headquarters manages total maritime policy such as harmonization of the development and use of the sea with the preservation of the marine environment, securement of the safety and security of the sea, enhancement of scientific knowledge of the sea, sound development of marine industries, comprehensive governance of the sea, and international partnership with regard to the sea.\textsuperscript{354} Japan is facing some serious maritime issues such as territorial and EEZ disputes,

\textsuperscript{352} Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation between Japan and India."

\textsuperscript{353} Headquarters for Ocean Policy, Basic Act on Ocean Policy (Chiyoda, Tokyo: Headquarters for Ocean Policy, 2007), 1.

pirate threats and international terrorist activities on the sea. By means of international laws and rules, through international organizations such as the International Court of Justice and the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, and through the international community, the government is attempting to solve these maritime issues and prevent threats from reaching Japan via the sea.\textsuperscript{355}

Superficially Japan had not been able to utilize space militarily until 2008, because of the House of Representatives Resolution on Basic Policy for Space Development and Utilization on May 9, 1969, which stated that Japan’s space development should be limited to peaceful purposes.\textsuperscript{356} Under this restriction, the Japanese government had, at the most, attempted to utilize satellites. For example, the Cabinet Satellite Intelligence Center has operated three information gathering satellites for reconnaissance. The Basic Space Law enacted on May 28, 2008 allowed Japan to utilize space militarily. Due to its bitter experience of the North Korean launch in April 2009, the MOD is considering putting an early warning satellite into orbit to detect boosted ballistic missiles.\textsuperscript{357} The Strategic Headquarter for Space Development in the Cabinet is attempting to make a basic plan on space by the end of this May. The plan will say that electronic intelligence gathering satellites and early warning satellites should be

\textsuperscript{355} Ibid., 1-2.


immediately possessed to prevent threats from reaching Japan, but the decision should be
made under NDPG 09 and the new Mid-Term Defense Program.358

Arguing the Establishment of the American style National Security Council

Prime Minister Abe made the Council on the Strengthening of the Function of the Prime Minister’s Office Regarding National Security in November 2006 within his Cabinet, and submitted the bill on the Partial Amendment of the Security Council Establishment Law to the National Diet in April 2007 to establish the NSC of Japan.359 However the bill was shelved and the Council’s final report on February 27, 2009 was ignored, because Abe’s successor, Fukada, was not interested in the NSC.360 The report recommended establishing the special advisor of the premier for security and crisis management in the NSC, composed of the prime minister, the chief Cabinet secretary, the minister of foreign affairs, and the minister of defense and its secretariat to deliberate on the basic inter-agency policy on national security and diplomacy, and on the response policy in emergency situations.361

LDP policy makers knew the importance of NSC’s establishment, so they stated again the necessity of NSC’s establishment in LDP’s “Proposal: Reform of the Defense Ministry” in April 2008.362 Because of North Korean missile launch in April 2009, LDP


360 Reuters, “Japan gives up NSC by Fukuda's direction.”


policy maker Koike stated at LDP’s Subcommitte on Defense Policy on April 10 that Japan should immediately establish the NSC to deal with emergencies.363

Act on Procedures for Amendment of the Constitution of Japan

Section 1 of Article 96, the Constitution of Japan stipulates, “Amendments to this Constitution shall be initiated by the Diet, through a concurring vote of two-thirds or more of all the members of each House and shall thereupon be submitted to the people for ratification, which shall require the affirmative vote of a majority of all votes cast thereon, at a special referendum or at such election as the Diet shall specify.”364 However, amendments had not been made to the Constitution for 60 years. Therefore governmental parties attempted to materialize the concept of Article 96, and submitted the Bill on Procedures for Amendment of the Constitution of Japan in 2006 to the National Diet. Even though there was some opposition, especially from the Social Democratic Party, to any political effort to amend the Constitution, the bill was passed on May 14, 2007.365 It is still hard to amend the Constitution because the Upper House is occupied by nongovernmental parties strongly opposing its amendment, but Japan has the legal basis to amend it in Section 2 of Article 9. This means that Japan has gradually “normalized” to overcome military antipathy and has accepted the JSDF as an important means of contributing to international society.


US-Japan Security Arrangement

The US and Japan have various levels of security policy consultations such as the Security Consultative Committee (SCC) held by the secretary of state and the secretary of defense, and the minister of foreign affairs and the minister of defense. The SCC is the highest consultation of US-Japan security arrangement framework based on letters exchanged between the Japanese premier and the US secretary of state on January 19, 1960.\textsuperscript{366} The SCC has announced important joint statements to strengthen the US-Japan security arrangement. On May 1, 2007, the SCC announced the Joint Statement of the US-Japan Security Consultative Committee, and made clear their common strategic objectives as follows:

1) Achieving denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula through the Six-Party Talks;
2) Further encouraging China to conduct itself as a responsible international stakeholder, improve transparency in its military affairs, and maintain consistency between its stated policies and actions;
3) Increasing cooperation to strengthen the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum as the preeminent regional economic forum;
4) Supporting efforts made by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to promote democratic values, good governance, the rule of law, human rights, fundamental freedoms, and a unified market economy in Southeast Asia;
5) Further strengthening trilateral cooperation among Japan, the United States and Australia in the region and around the world, including in the areas of security and defense;
6) Continuing to build upon partnerships with India;
7) Ensuring Afghanistan’s successful economic reconstruction and political stabilization;
8) Contributing to the reconstruction of a unified and democratic Iraq;
9) Achieving swift, full implementation of UNSCR 1737 and 1747, aimed at bringing Iran into full compliance with its IAEA requirements; and
10) Achieving broader Japan-NATO cooperation.\textsuperscript{367}


\textsuperscript{367} Ibid., 221.
In order to achieve these objectives, following measures were required:

1) The redefinition of the SDF’s primary mission to include international peacekeeping operations, international disaster relief operations, and responses to situations in areas surrounding Japan;

2) Sustained progress in developing more specific planning to reflect the evolving security environment and to better posture the forces of the two countries to operate together in a regional crisis;

3) Substantive agreement between the two governments concerning security measures for the protection of classified military information, also known as a General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA);

4) Establishment of a bilateral Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Defense Working Group;

5) Establishment of a flexible, bilateral interagency coordination mechanism to coordinate policy, operational, intelligence, and public affairs positions before and during crisis situations; and

6) Execution of joint, bilateral training exercises to strengthen interoperability and advance alliance roles, missions, and capabilities.

Based on these objectives and measures, both governments attempt to strengthen the US-Japan security arrangement. In addition to efforts based on the present US-Japan Joint Declaration on Security in 1996, Defense Minister Hamada suggested making a new joint declaration to State Secretary Clinton this February to develop the arrangement dramatically.\(^{368}\) Their common concept was to stabilize the international society to prevent threats from reaching the US and Japan.

**Comparison between Japan and Germany**

Japan and Germany were Axis states in World War II, and both states’ people have strong anti-militarism sentiments now because of their “catastrophic defeat.”\(^{369}\) However both states are attempting to enlarge their military roles in the international


\(^{369}\) Thomas U. Berger, *Cultures of antimilitarism: national security in Germany and Japan* (Baltimore, Maryland: JHU Press, 1998), x.
society to secure the world, particularly in the post September 11 attack period. According to Katzenstein, “Compared with Germany, the response of the Japanese government was less insistent and less fraught with risk.”

Why?

Because of each geopolitical location and situation in the Cold War era, each state enacted an original constitution or basic law. Japan, surrounded and protected by the sea in the Far East, enacted its Constitution in 1947. The Constitution has renounced war and abandoned a military force. Although the Self Defense Force was established in 1954, Japan has had no impediment to this for 55 years even without the amendment of the Constitution because of the constitutional interpretation: the SDF is not a military force. Therefore the SDF’s role is limited by the constitutional interpretation. And amending the Constitution is very difficult. On the other hand, Germany, which was divided into East and West Germany in 1949, was a front line of the Cold War. Germany’s rearmament was accepted and it joined NATO in 1955, and added the following articles to the Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany:

**Article 24**

(2) With a view to maintaining peace, the Federation may enter into a system of mutual collective security; in doing so it shall consent to such limitations upon its sovereign powers as will bring about and secure a lasting peace in Europe and among the nations of the world.

**Article 87 a**

(1) The Federation shall establish Armed Forces for purposes of defence. Their numerical strength and general organisational structure must be shown in the budget.

(2) Apart from defence, the Armed Forces may be employed only to the extent expressly permitted by this Basic Law.

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371 German Bundestag, Public Relations Division, "Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany," German Bundestag, 2008,
This amendment was only carried by two thirds of the members of the Bundestag (Federal Diet) and two thirds of the votes of the Bundesrat (Federal Council). Germany could possess a military force for its defense. Compared with Japan, Germany could decide to send its troops overseas because of the stipulation in the Basic Law and the Federal Constitutional Court’s decision after the end of the Cold War.

On 12 July 1994 the Federal Constitutional Court settles the dispute that was fought across all political parties over Bundeswehr (Federal Defense Force) operations abroad. The second senate of Germany’s supreme court under the presidency of Jutta Limbach dismisses three complaints of unconstitutionality. The ruling confirms the legitimacy of Bundeswehr operations that were conducted abroad in accordance with the German Basic Law... On the basis of Article 24, paragraph 2 of the German Basic Law, this ruling also covers combat missions. However, each combat mission is subject to the approval of the German Bundestag on a case-by-case basis.\(^{372}\)

Such clear legislative and judicial bases made it easier for Germany to conduct overseas military cooperation than for Japan, which had to depend on the constitutional interpretation.

Reasons to Change NDPG 04 Completely

Because of the present globalization, Japan has to recognize that the possibility of direct invasion has declined and it is difficult for Japan, acting alone, to prevent diverse international threats from reaching Japan. The best way to minimize diverse international

\(^{372}\) Federal Ministry of Defense, "The Federal Constitutional Court Provides Clarity on Bundeswehr Operations Abroad," Federal Ministry of Defense, May 6, 2009, http://www.bmvg.de/portal/a/bmvg/kxml/04_Sj9SPykssy0xPLMnMz0vM0Y_QizKLD4k38Q4ASYGZbu b6kTAXx4_83FT9oNQ8fW_9AP2C31Hy0R0dFROQBDxsuR/delta/base64xml/L2dJQSEvUUt3QS80SVVFzZfRF80S1A!?yw_contentURL=%2FC1256F1200608B1B%2FN26ZXABK565INFOEN%2Fcontent.jsp (accessed May 10, 2009).
threats is to cooperate and stabilize the international society. The answer is preventive defense through securing the world.

Before the Koizumi administration, Japan had many political limitations such as lack of legislation for responding to emergency situations and lack of effective schemes for the US-Japan security arrangement, and the pacific political atmosphere. Because of Koizumi’s and his successors’ efforts, the Japanese political environment on national security was dramatically changed, and it became possible to discuss security policy calmly.

In addition, Japan has to reform the MOD and the JSDF because of their structural faults and fiscal pressure. Now Japan is facing the necessity of reforming the security and defense systems, and has nice political conditions. This is the reason why the Japanese government has decided to rewrite NDPG 04 completely. I suppose that NDPG 04 cannot be adapted to the changes in the international and domestic political environments any more. The new NDPG has to provide guidelines to reform Japan’s security system and defense structures in order to secure Japan and the world.
Chapter 4: The Likely Contents of NDPG 09

In this chapter, I would like to present the likely contents of NDPG 09. We can estimate them by examining NDPG 04’s deficiencies and the need for its improvement as discussed in chapter 3. The contents will likely consist of the following parts: security environment in Japan and the world, a new NSS, a new NDS, a new NMS or defense review, and an attached table to show the future defense force. Japan cannot by itself prevent diversified threats from reaching Japan, and international cooperation will be the best way to secure Japan in the future.

Security Environment

Because of globalization, the world will be multi-polarized and more diversified. New members of the G20 are getting more economic and military power. In the 21st century, the US is still the largest power politically, economically, and militarily, but its superiority will be relatively declined because of multi-polarization. International threats such as the proliferation of WMDs, terrorism and pirate activities will be more diversified. For Japan, the rise of China, WMDs of North Korea, and the revival of Russia are major security issues. In relation to security issues, we must consider three factors. First, the Japanese government cannot increase its budget related to national security and defense, in spite of the increasing unit cost of military equipment based on technological development and the difficulty of recruiting soldiers because of the declining birthrate. Second, the possibility of direct invasion has declined, and it is difficult for Japan, working alone, to prevent diverse international threats from reaching Japan. Third, the US-Japan security arrangement is still vital and a basis for Japan’s national security and defense, and for stability in East Asia. However, it is impossible for only the ministry of
foreign affairs, the MOD and the US-Japan security arrangement to protect Japan
anymore. Japan’s security and defense efforts have to be diversified.

New Security and Defense Strategy

Sun Tzu said, “The highest excellence is to subdue the enemy’s army without
fighting at all.” This means that it is effective and inexpensive not to react to crises as
they are occurring but to prevent threats in advance. This Sun Tzu style of crisis
prevention strategy based on international cooperation will be a mainstream in each state
including Japan, because each state alone does not have enough power to prevent diverse
threats. And such a strategy to pursue its interests without fighting is the best way for
pacific Japan, which wants to prevent bloodshed.

NDPG 09 should be not only an NDS, an NMS and a defense review but also a
true NSS to gather together all the governmental security efforts and cooperate with the
international society to achieve the same two objectives as NDPG 04: the prevention of
threats from reaching Japan and the improvement of the international security
environment. Japan has to deepen its security relationship with other states which share a
common political and economic background in such as democracy, the concept of basic
human rights and an open fair market mechanism.

Whole Governmental Security Efforts

Because of the strict budgetary limitation and the diverse international threats, it
is necessary for Japan to review and reform not only the MOD/JSDF but also its old-
fashioned security/defense policies such as bureaucratic sectionalism, the Basic Policy
for National Defense, the Three Principles on Arms Export, and the Security Council of
Japan, to secure Japan and the world effectively. Even though some policy makers
possessed of high principles are attempting to amend Article 9 of the Constitution, the framework of NDPG 09 will be based on it. Inter-agency security cooperation such as the new NSC, the Headquarters for Ocean Policy and the Strategic Headquarters for Space Development will be more important to fiscally and politically improve governmental business efficiency. In addition, Japan will attempt to establish national intelligence gathering and analysis systems to provide information appropriately and immediately to policy makers.

_Japan’s Defense Force_

Even though inter-agency effort will be important, the JSDF is “the ultimate guarantee of Japan’s national security.” The MOD and the JSDF now have serious problems, and their structure should be reformed. The JSDF capability is still based on the Cold-War style one to deal with an enemy’s invasion, and its capability should be changed into one oriented to dealing with military operations other than war (MOOTW) to conduct international cooperation operations. The JSDF must possess more overseas operation capability. Japan does not have to protect itself from an enemy in its homeland, it has to prevent crises overseas.

_US-Japan Security Arrangement_

In East Asia, the Cold War structure still exists between US-Japan-South Korea-Taiwan and Russia-North Korea-China. The existence of the US Force Japan is vitally important as a balancer to stabilize this area. Japan needs to assist in the US Force Japan’s realignment and relocation to improve its capability and to reduce the burdens of local areas where US bases are located, based on the roadmap and the guidelines between

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both states. MD cooperation is the key to strengthen this arrangement, and the US and Japan need to improve its reliability. In order to develop the JSDF overseas operation capability, US Forces’ support is very helpful. Both forces should deepen their interoperability more.

*International Collaboration*

Japan will deepen Japan-Australia/India security relations. There is the possibility that Japan will strengthen its security relationships with the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and New Zealand, because these states share a common political and economic background with Japan and they have a strong military relationship with the US near Japan. Japan will utilize international security frameworks such as the UN, the IAEA, ReCAAP, and the ASEAN Regional Forum to stabilize the international society. Japan may increase PKOs in the next NDPG period. Japan’s developmental assistance and its framework such as the TICAD will be increased because nation building is the best way to stabilize the area surrounding failed states such as Somalia and Afghanistan.

*New Military Strategy and Appropriate Force in an Attached Table*

The Japanese government will review the fixed defense budget distribution to the GSDF, the MSDF and the ASDF. Their present budget ratio is four-three-three. The GSDF has an important role of PKOs, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations, and is a final goalkeeper against an enemy’s invasion. However it needs huge personnel expenses and land warfare equipment, especially an armored division. I estimate that the new NDPG may try to downsize it and distribute its surplus among the MSDF and the ASDF. The GSDF units will be made more movable and inexpensive. There is a high possibility that the MOD will abolish regional armies, change divisions to
brigades, and establish a state-wide ground defense command. The MSDF and the ASDF have the capabilities to stop an enemy’s invasion outside of Japan’s homeland. In addition, it is easier for them to attend international operations. They will be invested in more than the GSDF. However, a joint operation is a current trend. Therefore these three armed services will be integrated to establish a permanent joint headquarters, and will be utilized in the MOOTW as a joint force. The MOD will try to launch more military satellites such as an early warning satellite to gather information and communicate, but has to consider the cost-benefit analysis because satellite development requires much money.\(^\text{374}\) Because of the Basic Act on Ocean Policy, Japan will establish inter-agency collaboration to protect Japan’s maritime interest. The MSDF may play the key role with the JCG to support the economic activities of the ministry of economy, trade and industry to produce actual territorial/EEZ control results. The MD system was almost equipped. In the period of the new NDPG, the JSDF will try to verse itself in the system. Because of the vice minister’s procurement corruption, a reform of the procurement system will be conducted, and the MOD will consider the realignment of the defense industry.

The GSDF will start to procure new main battle tanks (MBTs) to replace Type 74 MBTs in FY 2010.\(^\text{375}\) Simultaneously, the GSDF and MOD’s Technical Research and Development Institute (TRDI) are developing a wheeled tank destroyer that looks like an Italian Centauro or a US Stryker mobil gun system for overseas and anti-


terrorism/commando operations. Because of fiscal pressure by the ministry of finance, in 2007 the MOD once agreed that the total number of MBTs and wheeled tank destroyers would be within 600, which was shown as the maximum number of tanks in an attached table of NDPG 04. This meant that the ministry of finance wanted to reduce the number of expensive MBTs. However, for the GSDF, the MBT is the main equipment with which to strike an enemy’s armored force; its function cannot be replaced by a wheeled tank destroyer even if a wheeled tank destroyer armors well. The GSDF will attempt to budget for wheeled tank destroyers separately from the MBT budget and maintain NDPG 04’s number of MBTs in the new NDPG discussion.

In addition to building two Hyuga class flattop helicopter destroyers (DDHs) in this Mid-Term Defense Program, the MSDF plans to build two more flattop DDHs to replace two Shirane class DDHs in FY2010 and FY 2012. These DDHs have capabilities of well Command/Control/Communications/Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) as flag ships and for transportation much as the US Iwo Jima class amphibious assault ships. Because of the new DDHs, the MSDF will improve its overseas operation capability. The MSDF and the TRDI are developing maritime patrol aircraft XP-1s (Its former name was P-X) to replace the P-3Cs. The MSDF budgeted for 4 XP-1s in FY 2008.

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will promote the replacement of P-3Cs by XP-1s to protect Japan’s maritime interest in peacetime and to battle against submarines in wartime.

In spite of finishing F-22 production in the US, the new fighter jets will be selected in the NDPG 09 period to replace F-4EJs which will reach the limit of endurance.\(^{379}\) The ASDF has to choose new fighter jets from among F-15FX, F/A-18E/F, F-35 and Eurofighter Typhoons to maintain air superiority in East Asia and defense industry which has produced Japanese fighters under license or originally.\(^{380}\) The ASDF and the TRDI are developing transport aircraft C-Xs to replace C-1s. C-X development is a joint project with XP-1 development.\(^{381}\) Although XP-1 development is going well, C-X has not yet flown because of structural design error.\(^{382}\) The ASDF wants to procure C-Xs in the NDPG 09 period to improve its overseas operation capability dramatically.

The total amount of the defense budget in the NDPG 09 period will be smaller than NDPG 04’s, so the total strength of the JSDF in the attached table will be decreased slightly. NDPG 09 will provide the vision for Japan’s security and defense policy for the next, not ten years but five years, so there is high possibility that the next Mid-Term Defense Program will be assimilated into NDPG 09.


Furthermore

NDPG 09 will be based on Article 9 of the Constitution and present a constitutional interpretation. If Japan wants to share not only costs but also risks in international cooperation to secure the world, discussing the amendment of Article 9 of the Constitution and accepting an interpretation of the collective self-defense right as the LDP proposed will be inevitable because it is very difficult to conduct international operations without coalitional efforts and multilateral military cooperation. In my estimate, such discussions will be developed in the period of NDPG 09. The principle of Section 1 of Article 9 is an established pacifism based on the UN Charter and the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928. Therefore the amendment of Section 2 of Article 9 to stipulate the SDF will be the focus for discussion. Now Japan is attempting to enact an anti-piracy bill. This will provide the SDF with the authority to protect not only Japanese citizens but also foreign citizens by using weapons beyond legal defense and defense out of necessity if the pirates do not obey directions and stop their ships. This will be an epoch making act to step out of self defense. To protect all people attacked by pirates is the duty of all states, especially those which are ratified states of the UNCLOS. An era in which Japan is reluctant to share risks in the international society due to Article 9 of the Constitution and the interpretation of the Constitution will end in the near future.

383 Formal name of the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928 was the Treaty between the United States and other Powers providing for the renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy.

384 Article 98, 100, 105, 107 and 110 of the UNCLOS stipulate duties of ratified states to protect people attacked by pirates and repress piracy in the high seas.
Chapter 5: NDPG 09 and the US-Japan Alliance

In this chapter, I would like to mention the ambiguous future of Japan’s political environment and its influence on the US-Japan security arrangement. There is the possibility that the next general election, which will be held by this September, will destabilize Japan’s politics. Whichever party becomes the ruling governmental party, it will choose a preventive strategy to prevent threats from reaching Japan from overseas based on the US-Japan security arrangement. However the US-Japan security arrangement will be felt to be uncomfortable, if the DPJ wins the election.

Now MOD’s Defense Posture Review Board, the LDP’s Subcommittee on Defense Policy, and the Cabinet’s Council on Security and Defense Capabilities are simultaneously reviewing and rewriting NDPG 04. Their common understanding is that the US-Japan alliance is vital for Japan’s security and that it should be strengthened in the future.

However, Japanese politics has been plunged into chaos. The public approval rating for the Aso administration is low. It was 24 percent in the end of March, and the “disapproval rating for the current Cabinet remained high at 56 percent.”

There is the possibility that the present ruling governmental parties will lose to the DPJ in the next general election or find it difficult to maintain an absolute safe majority in the Lower House. If so, what will happen? Ozawa, the last president of the DPJ, the largest opposition party, said, “As there is a large element of instability in Southeast Asia, a US presence is required, but generally speaking, I think the 7th Fleet is sufficient. As the

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scale of the US military presence in Japan decreases, Japan can simply take on responsibility for national security and defense issues that affect us.”

This means that Ozawa intends to minimize the US Forces Japan and substitute the JSDF for it. It may be that the US-Japan alliance will be changed in quality and quantity. Will Ozawa and his successor Hatoyama be able to do so?

Although he has said so, it will be difficult for the DPJ to conduct their defense policy. The DPJ consists of politicians who have various kinds of political ideologies from the Right to the Left. It has not yet even started to review NDPG 04 in spite of the possibility it will become the ruling governmental party after the next general election, because they cannot decide on their security/defense policy. In the end, the DPJ will agree that a Sun Tzu style crisis preventive strategy based on international cooperation is the best way to prevent threats in advance. In addition, it is impossible for Japan to increase the defense budget to substitute the JSDF for the US Force Japan.

If the LDP wins the next general election and maintains an absolute majority in the House of Representatives, NDPG 09 will be naturally approved this December according to the plan based on the MOD, the LDP, and the Cabinet Office’s reports. If the DPJ wins, what will happen? There are two possibilities. First, the DPJ will try to draft it from their political point of view as a governmental party. However, the DPJ has not yet argued it, so NDPG 09’s approval will be postponed and NDPG 04 will be used until the next NDPG. In the end, the DPJ’s NDPG will be similar to the LDP’s NDPG because using a preventive strategy to secure the world is the most inexpensive, pacific

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and effective way for Japan. Second, the DPJ cannot decide on their defense policy, and it will approve the draft of NDPG 09 reviewed by the LDP administration. I suppose the former possibility is higher than the latter, but the approval will come too late. In short, the DPJ and other opposition parties are less capable of accomplishing policies than the LDP and the New Komeito Party.

In the end, NDPG 09 will be based on a preventive strategy. However, it is possible that the DPJ’s Japan and Obama’s US will have an uncomfortable relationship because of the DPJ’s motley ideology.
Conclusion

The globalizing international society has been increasingly more diversified and multi-polarized since the end of the Cold War, and particularly after the September 11, 2001 attack in the United States. Threats are now very diverse, and each state cannot deal with them alone.

Japan is facing international pressures such as the rise of China, North Korean and worldwide WMD proliferation, the revival of Russia, international terrorism, pirate activities on Japanese SLOC, major disasters, climate change and its effects, the financial crisis, the space-development race, and threats of international pandemics. The present review of NDPG 04 comes in the wake of a fiscal crisis and scandals in the MOD/JSDF that have opened the way for a broader discussion of Japan’s security and the US-Japan security arrangement. Prior to the Koizumi administration (2001-06), Japan had many political limitations such as an absence of legislation on responses to emergency situations, a lack of effective mechanisms under the US-Japan security arrangement, and the pacific atmosphere that pervaded the mainstream of Japanese politics. Because of Koizumi’s and his three successors’ efforts, however, the Japanese political environment on national security has changed dramatically, making it possible to discuss security policy calmly.

Policymakers within the LDP and the New Komeito Party have recognized that it is impossible for Japan to deal with these international and domestic security issues under the present NDPG 04 and Japan’s existing security and defense system. Therefore they have decided to revise NDPG 04, with the new NDPG 09 strengthening Japan’s security
and defense system while at the same time assuring continued compliance with Article 9 of the Constitution.

They also have a consensus that in addition to strengthening the existing US-Japan security arrangement, it is essential for Japan to bilaterally and multilaterally cooperate with other countries in international organizations to prevent diverse threats from reaching Japan. Based on this international cooperation, the Sun Tzu style crisis-prevention strategy likely will be effective and relatively inexpensive for Japan as it faces future challenges to its security. Japan’s answer to the security dilemma in NDPG 09 likely will be framed as a preventive strategy, not just for Japan’s own sake, but also for security throughout the world.
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APPENDIX A

Geographical Conditions 1
APPENDIX B

Geographical Conditions 2
### APPENDIX C

**Comparison of Attached Tables**

of the NDPO/NDPG and the present Mid-Term Defense Program

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>NDPO 76</th>
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**Abbreviations**

APPENDIX D

Japanese Governmental Long-term Debt Outstanding and GDP


Japanese Governmental General Expenditures and Defense Budget on General Account

Note: Annual Expenditures on General Account consist of Local Allocation Tax Grants, National Debt Service, and General Annual Expenditures including National Defense Budget.
### Japanese Governmental Annual Expenditures and Breakdowns

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Note: General Annual Expenditures (See the previous page) consist of all expenditures except Local Allocation Tax Grants and National Debt Service.

Composition of National Defense Budget (FY 2008)

Total: 4.7796 trillion yen

Personnel and Food Provisions: 2.094 trillion yen

Obligatory Outlay Expenses & General Material Expenses: 2.6856 trillion yen

# APPENDIX E

## Time Line of Japan’s Security and Defense Policy After WWII

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<td>Oct. 11</td>
<td>MacArthur-Shidehara meeting</td>
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<td>Jul. 7</td>
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<td>Nov. 10</td>
<td>PLAN Submarine enters Japanese waters</td>
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<td>Dec. 10</td>
<td>Approval of NDPG 04</td>
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<td>2005</td>
<td>Feb. 19</td>
<td>Announcement of US-Japan common strategic objectives</td>
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<td>Mar. 14</td>
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<td>Aug. 18</td>
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<td>2006</td>
<td>Feb. 14</td>
<td>Hosting BWC Tokyo Seminar</td>
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<td>May 1</td>
<td>Agreement of the US-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation</td>
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<td>Sep. 4</td>
<td>Enactment of the ReCAAP</td>
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<td>Establishment of the ReCAAP ISC</td>
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<td>Enactment of the Act on Procedures for Amendment of the Constitution</td>
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<td>Enactment of the Basic Act on Ocean Policy</td>
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<td>2007</td>
<td>Nov. 27</td>
<td>Arrest of Vice-Minister of Defense Moriya</td>
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<td>Nov. 28</td>
<td>PLAN destroyer visits Tokyo</td>
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<td>2008</td>
<td>Feb. 9</td>
<td>Russian TU-95 enters Japanese air space</td>
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<td>Feb. 19</td>
<td>Collision between the destroyer Atago and the fishing boat the Seitokumaru</td>
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<td>Apr. 21</td>
<td>Somali pirate’s attack on the Japanese tanker Takayama</td>
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<td>May 28</td>
<td>Hosting TICAD IV</td>
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<td>2008</td>
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<td>Enactment of the Basic Space Law</td>
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<td>Jun. 2</td>
<td>MSDF destroyer visits Zhanjing</td>
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<td>Announcement of the MOD reform</td>
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<td>Dec. 3</td>
<td>Signing of the Convention on Cluster Munitions</td>
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<td>Feb. 17</td>
<td>Agreement of US-Japan on the relocation of III MEF</td>
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<td>Mar. 14</td>
<td>Dispatch of 2 MSDF destroyers to the Gulf of Aden</td>
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<td>Apr. 5</td>
<td>DPRK launch of Taepodong-2</td>
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