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Political Islam in Jordan and Morocco: Changing Tides?

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Dedicated to BCK
ABSTRACT

This study seeks to assess if the 2007 electoral failures of the Islamic Action Front (IAF) in Jordan, and the Justice and Development Party (PJD) in Morocco, represent a weakening of power, or merely a minor diversion in the quest of Islamists to attain greater political voice in both countries.
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INTRODUCTION

Throughout the past decade both the Jordanian and Moroccan monarchies have confronted an increasingly organized Islamist opposition within their borders. These groups have emerged out of public frustration with government malaise and corruption, as a response to harsh authoritarian rule and restricted political freedoms, and finally as part of a growing trend of Islamism in the Middle East. In Jordan Islamist politics are dominated by the Islamic Action Front (IAF) and in Morocco by the Justice and Development Party (PJD).

In Jordan and Morocco, Islamist parties seem to be at a crossroads, as the IAF and PJD suffered significant 2007 electoral losses. In Jordan municipal elections were held in the summer of 2007, and parliamentary elections were held in the fall. Likewise, Morocco also held parliamentary elections in the fall of 2007. In both instances the IAF and PJD performed worse than expected. Prior to the elections, the IAF held 17 of 110 seats within the Jordanian Parliament, yet this number dwindled to only six seats in November 2007 (Hassan). In Morocco, the PJD had high expectations for the elections and the party leadership expressed confidence that 70 to 80 seats were within reach, yet they only secured four additional seats, from 42 seats in 2002 to 46 seats in 2007 (Hamzaway). These defeats elicited harsh responses of vote fraud and allegations of tampering from both parties. IAF spokesperson Jamil Abu Bakr called for a revote and decried the election as an “electoral massacre” that would have “harmful repercussions on the country’s political progress” (“Jordanian Islamists claim poll fraud”). In Morocco the
PJD also claimed vote fraud, and blamed their electoral disappointment on record-low voter turnout of 41% (“Opinion Islamists Claim”).

This study seeks to assess if the 2007 failure of the IAF and PJD at the polls represents a weakening of Islamist power in Morocco and Jordan, or merely a minor diversion in the quest of Islamists to attain power in both countries. We will consider the relationship between the monarchy and Islamist politicians in both countries, the role of socioeconomic factors upon the popularity of the IAF and PJD, the political history of both parties, and finally forecast the evolution of both parties in the coming decade.

**Morocco and Jordan, Shared Paths**

Relations between the IAF and the PJD, and the Jordanian and Moroccan monarchies have become increasingly complicated as the popularity of these parties has grown, while frustration among the populace in both countries over socioeconomic malaise continues to fester. Morocco and Jordan have been chosen for this study as they share similar political histories, both are important allies to the United States, and finally both countries share similar systems of governance.

A key factor that has allowed both regimes to maintain their power despite internal disaccord is their resilience and ability to adapt to domestic and foreign pressure. This resilience has been maintained through the political structure of both monarchies, and their flexibility in relation to domestic political and socioeconomic challenges.
In Jordan, King Abdullah is the head of the state and functions as an absolute monarchy. Under Abdullah is the Prime Minister (Marouf Suleiman al-Bakhit), appointed by the King, who selects a Council of Ministers. The Council serves as the highest executive arm of the government below the King, and is charged with administering all affairs of the state. Within the legislative branch, power is held in a bicameral National Assembly made up of the Senate, and the House of Representatives. Members of the Senate are selected by the King, usually from among former ministers of government, retired army officers, and other prominent loyalists. The House of Representatives is elected via popular ballot (CIA World Factbook: Jordan).

Morocco’s government has a similar political structure, as it too is ruled by an absolute monarchy led by King Mohammed IV. Similar to Jordan, the King appoints a Prime Minister (Driss Jettou) who chooses a Council of Ministers, which is also approved by the King. Outside the executive branch is the bicameral legislative branch, composed of an elected 325 member lower House of Representative, and a 270-seat upper Chamber of Advisers which is indirectly elected by an electoral college. (CIA World Factbook: Morocco).

Both monarchies share their relative youth. King Mohammed VI became Morocco’s monarch in 1999 following the death of his father King Hassan II (CIA World Factbook: Morocco), and Jordan’s King Abdullah also took the throne in 1999 following the death of his father King Hussein (CIA World Factbook: Jordan). As will be explored both Abdullah and Mohammed inherited complicated political fortunes from their fathers, and
restive populations that have sought more freedom and improved socioeconomic conditions.

Morocco and Jordan also share close relations with the United States and other Western powers, and are often championed as beacons for democratic change in the Middle East. American officials have characterized King Abdullah of Jordan as a “champion of reform and tolerance” (Kessler). In a 2002 UN Arab Development Report, Morocco was lauded as a bright spot in a otherwise bleak political landscape-described as “modern and pro-Western,” in its attempts to blend “traditional Islamic culture with the needs of secular society” (Entelis).

Relations between Jordan and the United States have historically been influenced by mutual policy concerns, including Iraq, and peace between Israel and Palestine. During the first Gulf War, Jordan allied with Iraq despite protests from the United States. However, since peace accords between Israel and Jordan were signed in the 1990’s the kingdom has proven itself a reliable partner in the region including its role in negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority (PA), support of the 2003 US invasion of Iraq, and finally is an important ally in the war on terror.

Morocco has also had a historically close relationship with the United States. It was the first country to seek diplomatic relations with the US in 1777, and remains one of its oldest and closest allies in North Africa (Wells). Both King Hassan II and his predecessors maintained strong relations with multiple US administrations. Like Jordan,
Morocco has also been an important ally in the war on terror, and plays an important role in the Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Initiative (Quigley). It was recently lauded by Bush administration as “a model for the Arab and wider Islamic communities throughout the world for its efforts at democratic reform” (“The partnership between US & Morocco”).

The relationship between the United States and both countries can be described as mutually advantageous. With global approval for the United States at historical lows, and alliances in the Middle East severely strained, the US will need moderate allies such as Morocco and Jordan to help restore its image. Moreover, from the perspective of both countries close relations with the United States is advantageous, as it provides economic assistance programs, military hardware purchases, and robust development programs.

Both countries are also threatened by the specter of terrorism, and both have recently suffered devastating terrorist attacks. In May 2003, 41 people were killed and over 100 injured in suicide attacks in Casablanca that targeted a Jewish community center, a Spanish restaurant, and the Belgian consulate (Terror blasts rock Casablanca”). In November 2005, suicide bombers linked to Al-Qaeda in Iraq targeted three Amman hotels killing 60 people and injuring over 115 (“Amman hotel bombings”). Since these attacks both countries have become ardent supporters of the war on terror, and have sought to counter extremist movements within their own borders.
Islam and Democracy

Before discussing the specifics of political Islamism in Jordan and Morocco it is necessary consider broad debates related to the topic. Soon after 9/11 a lack of democracy in the Middle East was tied to extremism. The solution, the Bush administration argued, was democracy in the Arab world. The war in Iraq marked a shift of nearly six decades of American foreign policy with the pre-emptive ousting of Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein, coupled with promotion of democracy in the region. The grand hope was that after Iraq other nations would follow, and the result would be fundamental democratic change in the Middle East.

In a November 2003 speech President Bush stated that “as long as the Middle East remains a place where freedom does not flourish, it will remain a place of stagnation, resentment, and violence ready for export” (Hardy). In 2005 he argued that “the best antidote to radicalism and terror is the tolerance kindled in free societies." Moreover, he stated that "the chances of democratic progress in the broader Middle East have seemed frozen in place for decades. Yet at last, clearly and suddenly, the thaw has begun” (VandeHei). Yet now, over seven years since the 9/11 attacks, it is far from certain if that “thaw” has truly begun. If it has begun, then Iraq, Lebanon, and Palestine are not encouraging examples of the democratization process. Inverse to Bush’s logic it would seem that with the “thaw,” the pace of reform in the region has not increased but slowed, and has further complicated political dynamics in an already complicated region.
If the United States is truly interested in democratic reform in the Middle East it will be faced with difficult questions, chief among them: Who is friend and who is foe? When does a difference of opinion on US foreign policy in the region represent a disagreement, and when is it a threat? Does the United States support opposition groups? If so, does it support opposition that is only secular, or do does it accept the Islamic character that these groups may take on? What qualifies a party as moderate, and what qualifies it as extremist? If the US supports these groups, how does it do so without upsetting regimes in the region, nor indirectly promoting a group’s violent marginalization by these same regimes? However difficult it is to respond to these questions, the answers may be a matter of perspective, as the West maneuvers the political changes that result from their own policies to enact change, and the natural evolution of politics in the region. In either scenario the West will need to manage a new perspective in how it approaches Islamist political parties.

Islamist scholar Graham Fuller argues that most non-Muslims would define a moderate Muslim as someone that “believes in democracy, tolerance, a nonviolent approach to politics, and equitable treatment of women at the legal and social levels.” He stipulates that the American government adds to the definition of a moderate as someone that “does not oppose US strategic and geopolitical ambitions in the world, accepts American interests and preferences within the world order, believes that Islam has no role in politics, and avoids any confrontation—even political—with Israel.” Yet a moderate Muslim Fuller states would take a different approach, broadly eschewing “violence as a means of settling political issues but still not (willing to) condemn all aspects of political
violence against state authorities who occupy Muslim lands by force… (he/she) would be open to cooperation with the West and the United States, but not at the expense of their own independence and sovereignty” (Khan 37).

The complexity of promoting democracy in the Arab world is illustrated in Fuller’s definitions. From a Western perspective a necessary litmus test for a moderate Muslim is acceptance of Israel, yet many Muslims disagree with American and European foreign policy towards Palestine. Equally problematic is that democratic change equates unknown variables, and therefore among Western powers the status-quo seems a more preferable option than any kind of seismic political shift. Consequently, these conflicting challenges have resulted in an anemic approach towards democratization policy, thus far limited to botched diplomatic maneuvers and theoretical idealism.

In terms of this study, however, democratic theory can be somewhat helpful in building a framework for understanding the democratic ideal; it can help strengthen our judgment of democracy in both Jordan and Morocco, and aid in understanding the relationship between socioeconomic status and the appeal of political Islamists. The latter will be explored in chapter two, yet let us first consider several theorists’ definitions of democracy, and consider their relation to Jordan and Morocco.

Ranging from electoral to liberal systems, democracies come in various forms, and therefore an exact definition of what constitutes democracy is difficult. Robert Dahl considers democracy in a broad context, from its essence as a theoretical ideal, to its
application as a political system. He famously stated that the term “democracy” is “like an ancient kitchen midden packed with assorted leftovers from twenty-five hundred years of nearly continuous usage” (Dahl 5).

Dahl posits that a state must satisfy five criteria to qualify as a democracy. These include equality in voting, effective participation, enlightened understanding, control over the agenda, and an inclusive electoral process. Equality in voting relates to the preference of each citizen being “taken equally into account in determining the final solution.” Effective participation includes “adequate and equal opportunities for expressing his or her preferences as to the final outcome.” Enlightened understanding relates to each citizen having “adequate and equal opportunities for arriving at his or her considered judgment as to the most desirable outcome.” The fourth criteria, final control over the agenda, concerns “the exclusive authority to determine what matters are or are not to be decided by means of processes that satisfy the first three criteria.” Finally, the fifth criteria, inclusion, relates to the application of democracy to “all adults subject to its laws, except transients.” Dahl states that these criteria have thus far been limited to theory, as no state has ever fully met these criteria. Yet he argues that to “deny the term democracy to any regime not fully democratic in the ideal sense, would be equivalent to saying that no democratic regime has ever existed” (7).

Samuel Huntington also argues against “idealistic connotations” which equate “true democracy…(with) liberte, egalite, (and) fraternite.” These terms, though acceptable on their own, represent “fuzzy norms (that) do not yield useful analysis.” Huntington posits
that democracy, on its own, is but “one public virtue, not the only one, and the relation of
democracy to other public virtues and vices can only be understood if democracy is
clearly distinguished from other characteristics of political systems” (Huntington 9-10).

Huntington stresses that although society may elect its political leaders through
democratic means; these elected officials may not actually exercise power, and instead
may be “simply the fronts or puppets of some other group.” Therefore to qualify as a
democracy it is important that “elected decision makers do not exercise total power.” He
supports an incorporation of the “concept of stability or institutionalization” into
democracy, particularly “whether to treat democracy and non-democracy as a
dichotomous or continuous variable.” Ultimately he argues that a dichotomous approach
to the topic affords a better understanding of transition from authoritarian regimes to
democratic states. Finally, Huntington highlights that non-democratic regimes do not
share electoral competition, nor is suffrage very widespread (10-11). A combination of
the theoretical ideal of Dahl, and the practicality of Huntington results in a definition of
democracy that stresses equal representation, inclusion, and a robust political process.
Even though this definition is quite simplistic, it also reveals the inherent difficulty in
defining democracy.

Another barometer to gauge democracy may be offered by various think-tanks and
research organizations. In terms of a surface-level judgment, the Economist’s
Democracy Index classifies Jordan as an authoritarian regime with a 3.93 ranking of 10,
and Morocco as an authoritarian regime with a 3.88 ranking. The index focuses on five
categories including electoral process and pluralism, civil liberties, government functions, political participation, and political culture. Countries are categorized into full and flawed democracies, and hybrid and authoritarian regimes. The below map highlights these rankings: light blue countries are the most democratic, and darker countries are the least democratic (Economist Democracy Index 2008: 9). Another research institute, Freedom House, categorizes both Jordan and Morocco as “partly free”, as opposed to “not free” and “free” countries (Freedom House).

However, to label these countries as undemocratic and authoritarian simplifies the limited political reforms occurring within both countries. A more fitting label for the vast majority of these systems as well as for Jordan and Morocco may be offered by Fareed Zakaria, who argues for an alternative to the labels of democratic vs. un-democratic, and instead contends that many countries qualify as illiberal democracies- states that meet the basic expectations of a democracy, yet offer little constitutional freedoms.

Zakaria stipulates that illiberal democracies are a consequence of an “obsession with balloting” by the West. The state systems that result from this process are “democracies
without constitutional liberalism,” which further the “erosion of liberty, and fuel ethnic competition, conflict, and war.” The structural expectations of democracy are indeed met, yet governance is limited by severe constitutional deficit. In addition, the true illustration of democracy, the ballot box, serves to only maintain authoritarian norms (Zakaria).

In terms of a normative understanding of international politics; “for almost a century in the West, democracy has meant liberal democracy,” characterized by “fair elections…the rule of law, a separation of powers, and the protection of basic liberties.” Yet in actual practice liberal democracy does not equate constitutional liberalism, and although democracy is flourishing globally, constitutional liberalism is not. Instead, illiberalism is on the rise and increasingly state systems are morphing “into a form of government that mixes a substantial degree of democracy with a substantial degree of illiberalism.” The danger, posed by illiberal democracy is posed to its own people, as it potentially could “discredit liberal democracy itself, casting a shadow on democratic governance” (Zakaria).

This shadow may have begun to be cast in Jordan and Morocco where the merits of democracy have yet to be proven. For example, a recent survey found that nearly 75% of Jordanians are fearful of openly critiquing the monarchy (Braizat). In a similar poll, less than 4% of Moroccans stated they identify with any of Morocco’s political parties (Binoual). As chapter three will explore these numbers put into question not only the
extent of democratic reforms in Jordan and Morocco, but also beg for consideration of
the potential consequences of touting these regimes as beacons of change.

If illiberal democracies are what states such as Jordan and Morocco have become, the
challenge is how to encourage these governments to become more functional
democracies. Insight may be found through examination of the dynamics of current
politics, particularly Islamist political groups in the Middle East, as these parties have
evolved within highly restricted spaces, not only surviving but flourishing. Arguably this
is the case with the IAF and PJD, which may not qualify as political parties in the
Western sense, yet as we will examine they have been allowed a certain level of political
freedom to develop a political voice to question the norms of Jordanian and Moroccan
authoritarian rule.

However, some scholars argue that political Islamism is not simply a response to
authoritarian rule, but instead is part of a much broader dynamic of North-South
hegemonic play. Mohammed Ayoob posits that political Islam is a response by the South
to the consolidation of power over the international systems by Northern states. Without a
power base, the South has no secular ideology or alternative political system that can
challenge the North in the “realm of ideas.” Political Islam, he argues, is a response to
this deficit, and has emerged to fill the ideological void in the Middle East. Ayoob
argues that similar to socialism, political Islam “possesses the capacity to combine with
nationalism to create a heady brew that can mobilize populations simultaneously for God
and Country thus posing a challenge to the North’s agenda for domination” (Ayoob 628).
Ultimately the drawback of political Islam is its ability to appeal outside the Middle East. Unlike socialism, which has broad North-South appeal, political Islam is largely restricted to states where Islam is the predominant religion. However, the power base of the Muslim world cannot be underestimated, as 1.2 billion, or 1/5 of the world’s population is Muslim. Moreover, this same population stands on some of the world’s most strategic land, with nearly 2/3 of world’s proven oil reserves, and 40% of the world’s natural gas reserves (630).

Ayoob suggests that the North’s concerns over the threats posed by political Islam have been accentuated in the post-Cold War era with a neutralization of the ideological hegemony that helped the West to draw borders, and install leaders in the Middle East. Yet even in this restricted space, Islamists have achieved a unique political voice, and have “become the leading anti-hegemonic ideology representing the South’s resistance to the domination of the North” (632). This process has shifted traditional power structures within the region, and has allowed for the advent of Islamist parties such as the Muslim Brotherhood, the Party for Justice and Development, as well as transnational organizations such as Hezbollah, and Hamas. As these parties and organizations become further entrenched in society it will become increasingly difficult, if not impossible, to ignore their increasing impact upon society.

If the West eventually opens a dialogue with these organizations it may need moderate allies, mainly Islamist politicians, which speak both outside the fold and within it, to temper any political reconciliation process. For example, the Bush administration’s
“Strategy for Winning the War on Terror,” stipulates that “to counter the lies behind the terrorists’ ideology and deny them future recruits (we) must empower the very people the terrorists most want to exploit: the faithful followers of Islam. We will continue to support political reforms that empower peaceful Muslims to practice and interpret their faith. We will work to undermine the ideological underpinnings of violent Islamic extremism and gain the support of non-violent Muslims around the world” (“Strategy for Winning”). One avenue to do so may be through dialogue with organizations similar to the Islamic Action Front and the Party for Justice and Development, parties that may have disagreements with American foreign policy, but are also the best positioned to advance it in terms of common interests ranging from war to development.

Regardless of how the war evolves the study of these organizations provides lessons about the evolution of political Islam in limited illiberal political spaces. A recent report by the United States Institute of Peace found that among countries in the region, Morocco, Jordan, and Yemen, have the greatest promise for Western engagement with moderate Islamists (Yacoubian 1). Nuanced foreign policy that recognizes the legitimacy of the IAF and the PJD, without threatening the Moroccan or Jordanian monarchies may therefore provide an avenue to explore uncharted areas of Islamist political expression, and potentially encourage a subtle shift towards democratic reform that would be advantageous to all parties involved.

One of the most common debates related to the discredit of democracy in the Middle East concerns the compatibility of democracy with Islam. However, a recent Gallup poll of
the Muslim world found that a large majority cite democracy and Islam as equally important variables related to the quality of life and progress throughout the region. Moreover, political freedoms were among things that respondents admired the most about the West. In addition, when polled about political systems in the region, most stated they want neither theocracy nor secular democracy, but instead a third model where religious principles and democratic values coexist. Islamic law should be the foundation of this model, respondents argued, tied with the democratic values that West espouses. Finally, concerning constitutional law, significant majorities argued that religious leaders should not have a direct role in its drafting, legislation, or foreign policy (Lampman).

The greatest challenge that comes with this third model may be its application, which as explored, has thus far been limited to theoretical idealism. Islamist scholar, Ahmad Moussalli, explores the formative path that Islamist scholars have taken concerning Islam and democracy, and stipulates that a great divide remains between discourse and practice. To remedy this divide, Moussalli argues that scholars and politicians alike will need to develop “intellectual and formative discourses that rediscover the original connotations and denotations of the texts (Islamic) within the frameworks of modern life.” To develop this discourse will require harmony between shura and democracy, between which Moussalli argues there is no contradiction. Moreover, he describes the Islamist modern quest for democracy as a “quest for liberation.” In absolute Islamist terms, “if shura is Qur’anic doctrine, and if the state does not refer to the people’s (Islamic) choices, the state is then illegitimate. This form of popular empowerment, derived from a Qur’anic doctrine, offsets the coercive power of the state” (Moussalli 6). Fundamentally
Moussalli’s argument is based on the untested idealism and rhetorical flourish that policy makers utilize to argue in favor of Western democracy in the Middle East.

Another aspect considered essential to a functioning democratic system are institutions - such as the press, human rights groups, and civil society organizations. Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan argue that without these basic institutions civil society is unable to alter the status-quo, and at best can only make empty rhetorical gestures towards authoritarian rulers. For “democratic transition—and especially democratic consolidation to occur civil society needs to be politicized and transformed…into political society.” The scholars define “political society” as the “arena in which the polity specifically arranges itself to contest the legitimate right to exercise control over public power and the state apparatus” (Hunter 58-59). Without political society, civil society is unable to advance to an attainable point where it is able to even question authoritarian rule.

As will be explored in chapter one, although Jordan and Morocco lack the “political society” which Linz and Stepan reference, the changes within the political space of both countries points to a more promising political liberalization process than in other states in the Middle East. This point should not be discounted, as Curtis Ryan contends, “the very act of political liberalization changes the political space, creating the possibility for a broader public sphere and the development of a stronger civil society.” Ryan states that in Jordan and Morocco the limited political space that has already been created includes “individuals and organizations that are dedicated to pushing for real and much deeper levels of democratization than the regime itself seems inclined to pursue” (Ryan 19-20).
The IAF and the PJD are therefore hybrid examples of political organizations that seek “real and much deeper levels of democratization,” yet their ability to actually exert effective political control remains constrained. Moreover, following the embarrassing 2007 electoral defeats for both parties, a shift towards more conservative leadership has followed, and the window of opportunity to truly advance democratic reform may be closing. In response to a more hard-line shift within both parties it is likely that the response from both monarchies will also be more hard-line, potentially limiting the opportunity for true democratic reforms to take place, and for the West to begin a dialogue with Islamist politicians that may be among the most open to such a dialogue.

This study is divided into three chapters, each focused on a specific factor that affects the political Islamism in Jordan and Morocco today. These include the monarchy, socioeconomic conditions, and political conditions. Chapter one examines the structure of the Jordanian and Moroccan monarchies, considers their continued presence in the region, and concludes with an exploration of how both monarchies have historically interacted with Islamists. Chapter two focuses upon current socioeconomic dynamics in both countries, and traces how these conditions play into the popularity of the IAF and PJD. Chapter three focuses on the parties themselves-examining the impact of the 2007 elections, and considering the probable evolution of both parties in light of these losses.
CHAPTER ONE
The Monarchy and Islamists in Jordan and Morocco

Among international theorists, monarchies as systems of governance are often characterized as antiquated. Samuel Huntington, describes the “king’s dilemma” of monarchies, and argues that the decentralized power required for political and economic liberalization prevents monarchies from growing their constituency, as they view change as a threat. This in turns prevents governments from advancing reforms sought by the social groups which have manifest as a result of sociopolitical liberalization. Consequently, Huntington argues, monarchies are doomed to extinction due to their inability to address the needs of their restive populations (Anderson 2, Huntington).

Yet despite the label of archaic, the Jordanian and Moroccan monarchies are among the most stable and resilient systems of governance in the region. Therefore, how these monarchies have responded to domestic Islamic opposition may provide clues as to how democratic transition could potentially evolve in other restricted states in the Middle East. Moreover, when comparing both countries to other countries in the region, states where democratic institutions have been largely structured by foreign powers, liberalization in Jordan and Morocco has come indigenously.

Jordan’s monarchy, led by Abdullah, relies on the foundation of his predecessors of the Hashemite dynasty. Abdullah is only the fourth king in this dynasty, a relatively modern creation. The Hashemites emerged as rulers of Jordan in the 1920’s after previously
ruling the Hijaz region of Western Arabia. The state currently known as Jordan began as the British Mandate of Trans-Jordan in 1921, and then became the Emirate of Trans-Jordan, and finally the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan with independence in 1949.

Modern Jordan’s roots are linked to its colonial past. As a nation-state it came into existence as the Emirate of Trans-Jordan; a creation of the British meant to prevent the French from expanding from Syria. For the country’s founder, Abdullah Ibn Hussein, the states’ formation was motivated by self-interest, as loyalty to the British was his only way to maintain power in light of tribal attacks and revolts of the 1920’s. Without the support of Britain it is fair to say that neither Abdullah nor Trans-Jordan in its formative years would have survived (Wilson 3).

Similar to the Hashemites in Jordan, Morocco’s monarchy is also part of a dynasty, the Alaouites, from whom King Mohammed VI traces his lineage. Morocco also has a history colored by colonial rule, as it lost its independence in 1912 to France after the Treaty of Fez. The treaty accepted the rule of the Alaouites over Morocco yet it effectively neutered any kind of central government control exercised by the monarchy. During this period, much like Hashemite-British relationship in Jordan, the Alaouites worked with the French out of necessity and self-interest. It was not until 1956 that Morocco regained its independence and King Hassan once again controlled the country (Library of Congress Country Profile: Morocco).
The explanation of the continued presence of the Jordan and Moroccan monarchies, among other monarchies in the region, is an aspect of Middle East politics of which there is surprisingly little literature. Lisa Anderson, in an often quoted study on the topic, argues that the “monarchy as currently understood in the region is no more indigenous than liberal democracy.” Anderson contends that as systems of governance, monarchies were meant to assure continued linkage to European policy aims. There is historical evidence to support this point as Morocco, Oman, and Saudi Arabia are the only monarchies that were established prior to the post-colonial era. In her piece Anderson explores the debate over the presence of monarchies with explanations that range from, “a reflection of the vagaries of historical accident,” to systems of governance that are part of “the imperatives of historical process- notably the formulation of new states and the building of new nations” (Anderson 3).

Scholars argue their resilience is also explained through an examination of the successful promotion of images they have propagated, from guardians of tradition to protectors of Islam. Kingdoms and emirates throughout the Middle East have utilized these images to legitimize their rule. By tying Islamic heritage to tradition and religious practice, these regimes have established themselves as inherently linked to the land and population of their respective kingdoms. For example, Saudi Arabia has used religion as a source of legitimacy with the Wahabi interpretation of Islam, and the historical alliance between the Al-Sa’ud and Ibn Abd al-Wahhab tribes. Moreover, Saudi legitimization is strengthened through its role as guardian of some of Islam’s most holy cities including
Mecca and Medinah. Other examples can also be found among monarchies in the Gulf that trace their rule back to the 19th century and the hierarchal rule of Bedouin society.

In Jordan, the Hashemites have utilized Islam as a counter balance to any perceived weakness among the population by tracing their unbroken lineage to the Prophet Mohammad. Until 1953 Jordan was dependent upon the British, and Islam was used to bolster the credentials of King Abdullah, allowing the regime legitimacy in the face of critics who perceived the monarchy as overly controlled by British interests. Morocco too has also utilized Islam to legitimate its rule as a steward of the religion, and as part of attempts to unify the country. During the colonial era, for example, the Alaouites stressed their Islamist roots while under French rule (Albrecht and Schlumberger 377).

**Modernization and the Monarchy in Jordan and Morocco**

Another often argued explanation of the resilience of monarchies in the Middle East is that their unique nature as systems of governance, specifically their dependency upon popular legitimacy, allows them to maintain rule. This legitimacy is based in “a relationship with the ruled in which notions of popular consent play a significant role” (Jones 125). Among the Moroccan and Jordanian monarchies, one method is to present themselves as different from neighboring regimes. Legitimization is derived from modernization as both regimes argue their anemic economic and political reform programs conflict with the even more archaic and backward economic and political systems of neighboring states. The extent to which modernization in Jordan and Morocco
has been successful is difficult to judge, as reforms have indeed occurred in both countries throughout recent contemporary history.

In Morocco the greatest reforms have occurred within the past decade. These changes began after the 1997 elections when King Hassan invited non-loyalist parties to form a coalition, a process described as “alternance.” Hassan’s actions were unique compared to other regimes, yet some argued that they were merely an “exercise in cooptation.” In addition to political reforms the king also instituted political reforms following the receipt of IMF restructuring aid. Hassan realized that improved economic conditions alone were not enough to quell increasing instability. Although these reforms resulted in the formation of various NGO and civil society organizations, they did not represent true democratic opening, as these groups had limited political participation and lacked real power (McFaul and Wittes 27).

After the death of his father King Mohamed sought a new approach to reform. These efforts have fallen into two categories, those focused on relations between the individual and government, and the structure of the government. The first category includes new women’s rights laws, efforts by the Equity and Reconciliation Commission to address human rights abuses during King Hassan’s reign, and formation of the Human Development Initiative, which decentralizes economic and social reform efforts. The second area of reform has focused on economic challenges, a revision of press laws, and parliamentary and judicial reforms (Malka and Alterman 45).
Yet despite these programs the greatest reforms that have not taken place concern the extent of powers exercised by the Moroccan monarchy. McFaul and Wittes argue that although more political reform has occurred in Morocco than other Arab states, the monarchy has not yet “injected any further process into the democratic process by….increasing parliamentary authority or even declining to exercise (their) own considerable legislative powers (McFaul and Wittes 28).” However, Moroccan scholar, Abdeslam Maghraoui, takes a more sympathetic view of reform efforts. He argues that the legacy inherited by Mohamed was extremely complex, with wide-ranging challenges that included rapid population growth, urbanization, globalization, political expectations, and a new international political climate, all of which would represent serious challenges to any government, and therefore any reform efforts will require significant time.

Maghraoui argues that these challenges contribute to three factors that concern the difficulty of modernization in Morocco. These include socioeconomic problems, political challenges, and symbolic concerns. The first, socioeconomic problems relate to economic liberalization programs originally launched by King Hassan that have thus far had a limited impact upon the everyday lives of Moroccans. These programs sought to diversify the country’s weak economy. To meet the country’s health and education needs, the Moroccan economy must grow at an annual rate of 6% over the next 15 years. As will be explored in the following chapter this will be a difficult task as the economy is already precarious and overly dependent upon agriculture. This weak economy manifests as hardship among the general population with nearly 1/6 of all Moroccans living below
the poverty line and 65% of all households living on less than $6,000 per year (Maghraoui 76).

The second factor, political challenges, relate to the country’s inherently weak political process, as a constitutional bias favors the king at the expense of the parliament, and ineffective political parties discredit the electoral process. Although Morocco is a constitutional monarchy, authority lies with the king and therefore the legislative, executive, and judicial branches have historically served as a rubber stamp for policies of the monarchy. Moreover, the Constitution has a largely weak democratic character, with powers of the parliament limited, and the king responsible for appointment of all major positions within the government (78-82).

Maghraoui characterizes the electoral process as anemic, as the populace does not take it seriously and many consider it fixed (80). Moreover, many question its structure, as weak democratic parties are characterized by, “an ideological wavering between nationalism and democracy, and a structural inability to fulfill their function as mechanisms of mass political integration and representation.” Although democratic parties defend modern democracy, they often violate these principles in the name of nationalism. In addition these parties have become disconnected as they play a game of clientele politics that has little to do with the needs of society (81).

The third factor concerns symbolic capital, and questions of legitimacy. Although the monarchy has been somewhat successful in the past decade in opening up the socio-
political sphere, these concessions alone are insufficient to guarantee stability.

According to Maghraoui the monarchy’s legitimation is rooted in religious symbolism, as previously explored, yet he adds “temporal” as a source. Temporal legitimacy includes perceptions of the monarchy among the populace, whose frame of reference in relation to King Mohamed largely spells the success or failure of the kingdom’s transition to a more liberal political environment (83).

In Jordan modernization has evolved as a balancing act between liberalization and not disrupting the status quo. Historians stipulate that this process began in the early 1990’s, when economic instability and riots in the kingdom illustrated a crisis of confidence that resulted in “defensive democracy,” a political strategy by the monarchy which sought to quash potential dissent by seeming to support free political expression. Central to this effort was the 1991 National Charter, which since its inception has been a central point of reference for Jordanian political developments. The Charter, “called for political, party, and intellectual pluralism, social justice, respect for human rights, and the supremacy of law.” In addition, “it identified respect for the mind, belief in dialogue, recognition of the right of others to disagree, respect for the opinion of others, tolerance, and rejection of political and social violence as characteristics of Jordanian society.” It also allowed political parties, “providing their objectives are legitimate, their methods are peaceful and their statutes do not violate the provisions of the Constitution” (George 39-40). Alan George describes the period when the National Charter was drafted as a “watershed” moment in the history of Jordan. It marked a significant turning point in Jordanian history in which political dynamics in the kingdom shifted significantly:
“Before this period “no attempt was made to disguise the regime’s authoritarian essence. In the period since- both under King Hussein and his successor, King Abdullah- the political establishment, with the monarchy at its centre, has walked a tightrope. On the one hand it has tried to maintain a semblance of liberalism in order to appease local opinion and preserve the kingdom’s image with foreign donors increasingly preoccupied with notions of “good governance.” On the other, it has sought to prevent the opposition from mounting any significant challenges, especially to the peace treaty with Israel” (43).

Quintan Wikotorowicz takes a similar viewpoint with his description of Jordanian politics. He argues that political reforms resulted in not only state structural changes, but also changes in the relationship between the monarchy and the populace. He argues that with reform has come a shift in Jordan from overt authoritarianism to “embedded authoritarianism.” He states:

“Despite a series of relatively free and fair elections, the legislation of political parties, and the boisterousness of parliament, the regime continues to limit opposition and dissent....This repression, however, is not typified by the overt, brutal forms of physical coercion that characterized the martial law period; rather it is what be termed “embedded authoritarianism”- social control projected through a complex array of administrative procedures, legal codes, and informal regulative practices designed to constrain opposition without resorting to violence” (43).

Wikotorowicz’s description consequently leads to an important point when considering how the Moroccan and Jordanian monarchies have survived their tumultuous history. Answers may be rooted in their ability to both manipulate and maneuver the domestic and international environment to their advantage. As will be further explored this has
been done through limited liberalization of socioeconomic and political spaces to meet the expectations of Western powers, but equally important through electoral engineering, and through pacification of the opposition.

The Monarchy and Islamists in Jordan & Morocco

In Jordan Islamist politics are rooted in the Muslim Brotherhood (MB). Unlike other Arab states such as Syria and Egypt, where the relationship between the government and the Muslim Brotherhood has been marred by mutual distrust and confrontation, the Islamic Action Front in Jordan enjoys legal standing. The organization gained legal status as a charitable society in 1953, and became a political party in 1992 (Noyon 84). Recognition of the Muslim Brotherhood by the monarchy represented acceptance of the organization on Jordanian soil, yet was also meant to counter the threat posed by banned pan-Arab and communist movements, and reinforced the relationship between the monarchy and Islamists that eventually became one of strategic convenience (Moaddel 295-297).

Rolland Dallas, Jordanian scholar, argues that the relationship between the Jordanian monarchy and Islamists as part of “the abiding reality of mosque-state relations…Islamists and the king needed each other even though, at times, they exchanged cross words.” Just as “the king needed an organization of conservative, gentlemanly Muslims as a buffer against Islamic and Palestinian extremists…the Brotherhood needed the king as an insurance policy covering its continued existence as a
political and religious force” (Dallas 251). The monarchy’s relationship with Islamists has allowed the government assured allegiance from the Brotherhood in exchange for political and financial patronage. In exchange the government has historically received loyalty to the throne, as seen in support of the monarchy by Islamists during the 1970-1971 Black September uprising, stabilization of Palestinian refugee camps in the West Bank, and use of the group to counter more extremist Islamic elements within the kingdom (Bacik 152).

Yet some argue that during the past decade there has been a tangible shift in the relationship between Islamists and the Jordanian monarchy. Previously, the Jordanian monarchy and Islamists were allied on the right against the threat posed by the left, and today they are on opposing sides. Scholars such as Jamie Clark argue that this ideological shift began after the Wadi Arabia Peace Treaty between Israel and Jordan in 1994. The treaty normalized relations with Israel, and was met with anger by both Islamists, and average Jordanians, many Palestinian in origin. Shut out from foreign policy, the Islamist opposition mocked the treaty as the “king’s peace” (544 Clark).

As opposition to the treaty grew, a government rollback of liberties followed, including regulation of speeches in mosques, tighter controls on the press, and restrictions on demonstrations. Although governments efforts had a tangible impact on they opposition they also, as Clark argues, “contributed to a consolidation of the opposition by rendering the Brotherhood’s state position as “loyal opposition” as untenable…the privileged
position the Brotherhood historically had received by successive kings in return for its loyalty and abstinence from violence became increasingly distant” (545).

Historically the IAF has sought not to disrupt the political balance within Jordan as they know it is detrimental to their own survival: “they studiously highlight their support for domestic stability, uphold the constitution and the national charter, recognize the religious legitimacy of the Hashemites, and do not challenge the monarchy in principle” (Kostiner 65). The party has engaged in the debate over Jordanian foreign policy vis a vis Iraq and Israel, as well as Jordan’s relations with the United States. It has also fought vocally against initiatives launched by the government which have sought to restrict the opposition, including those aimed at limiting political activities and political associations (Parker 148).

Similarly, the Moroccan political space is also highly regulated and controlled by the monarchy. Although compared to his father, King Mohammed has sought a more open political space; political life is still dominated by the self-interests of the monarchy. For example, the government has sought to control the political process from the top down by installing loyalists in key posts in the education, financial, and administrative sectors, and through strident electoral laws which regulate the ability to form majorities within parliament and various political parties.

The PJD became a viable political party in 1998 and recognized that, similar to the IAF, its’ survival would be based on flexibility towards the monarchy, and being careful not to
disrupt the balance of power. Throughout its’ recent political history the party has sought to position itself as a constructive critic of the monarchy, yet also has gone out of its way to support its’ legitimacy. The roots of the party are based in the Unification and Reform movement (MUR), a grassroots Islamist movement. The party is now the largest opposition group in the Moroccan Parliament (Yacoubian 2).

The United States Institute of Peace stipulates that among all Islamist political parties in the Middle East, the PJD has the most promise in terms of a dialogue between Islamist politicians and the West. A recent report describes the approach of the PJD, as it “stresses Islamic values as a key point of reference for principles of governance. At the same time, the PJD endorses the king’s title as commander of the faithful and insists on maintaining the monarchy’s supremacy. It does not call for systematic change but rather seeks to be an opposition party within the status quo” (2). As will be explored in chapter three, in the 2002 elections the PJD emerged as the third-largest party yet limited the number of districts it competed in to avoid the appearance of threatening the rule of King Mohammed. In addition, in the 2003 council elections the PJD agreed to only compete in 25% of the nation’s localities (US State Morocco HR Report).

The PJD faces multiple challenges as it evolves into a more viable political party including those posed by government controls, voter apathy, and finally other Islamist political parties. One major challenger is the Justice and Charity movement, a banned Islamist organization that focuses on humanitarian and social causes, and has increasingly become involved in Moroccan politics. The group is structured around its founder
Abdessalam Yassine, who as a religious figure plays an important role within Moroccan society. The group was founded in 1974 as a response to Hassan II’s claim of legitimacy as a religious leader of the country, yet has only taken a true foothold within Moroccan society during the past decade. Instead of devoting their interests to the good of Islamic community, the group claims the monarchy uses Islam to its’ corrupt advantage.

Although Justice and Charity has rejected overt political participation, there are signs that the group may become politically active. The relationship between the movement and PJD is therefore complex, and often contentious, as the group accuses the PJD of being co-opted by the government (Ottoway and Riley). This dynamic will be explored further in the following chapters, yet let us now consider the shared links between both cases.

**Islamists and the Monarchy**

Although the political histories of Jordan and Morocco are unique, relations between the monarchy and Islamists in both countries share interesting similarities. First, in both Jordan and Morocco, Islamists are part of an ideological shift linked to other populist movements. Second, the dynamic between the Jordanian and Moroccan monarchies and Islamists has evolved from mutual convenience into uneasy alliances. Finally, third, during the past decade the socio-political environment in both countries has been affected by competition among Western interests and Islamist extremists.

The first commonality, an ideological shift related to other populist movements can be traced historically. As noted, both the Jordanian and Moroccan monarchies have used
Islam to counter various external political movements that have threatened their power. The alliance between the Jordanian and Moroccan monarchies and Islamists had historically been reinforced by the shared threats posed by secular radical ideologies such as Ba’athism, and Communism, which challenged both the rule of the monarchy, as well as Islamists who sought active roles in socio-political affairs. However, with the 1967 Arab-Israeli War Arab nationalism lost its appeal and the public considered efforts to separate the movement from Islam as misguided. Moreover, with the fall of the Soviet Union, the threat posed by Communism was no longer nearly as great. When these movements failed to rally the masses, Islamists filled the ideological void left behind in the region. As illustrated in figure 1A the ideological failure of these movements resulted in structural changes to the balance of power in Jordan and Morocco.

The second commonality, illustrated in 2A, represents a shift from alliances of mutual interest, to uneasy alliances between the monarchies and Islamists. Indeed, as will be explored in the chapter three, Islamists’ power seems to come in waves, dependent upon public support, and the extent of political controls exercised by the government. Emile Sahliyeh describes these controls as “state supply” conditions. These controls involve constitutional limitations, electoral engineering, and favoritism for political parties which
are loyal to a particular government (Sahliyeh 115). In Jordan, these restrictions have included a tightening of controls related to press freedom and the arrest of IAF members who publicly criticized the monarchy. Similarly in Morocco, “state supply” conditions have included an imposition of various socio-political freedoms.

Examination of the flux of political Islamists in Jordan and Morocco leads to the third commonality, a charged international environment which affects both monarchies and Islamist politicians in both countries. As explored in the introduction, both the Jordanian and Moroccan monarchies have faced mounting pressure from both the United States and other Western powers to liberalize their political systems and economies. Moreover, external pressures have also had an impact upon Moroccan and Jordanian Islamists.

Islamist pressure has come as part of a worldwide push for a more conservative interpretation and embrace of Islam in the post 9-11 environment. Moreover, the _ulma_ (Islamic community) worldwide is more connected then ever before, and therefore events that affect Muslims worldwide quickly become politically charged. This is seen in reaction of the Muslim world to the War in Iraq, to violence in Pakistan, to the ban on the
veil in French school, and to cartoons in Danish newspapers. Not only did these events solicit local reactions from Islamists in these various countries, but also received condemnation from Islamists worldwide, including from those in Jordan and Morocco. In this same light, efforts by the IAF and the PJD to achieve political voice, and the response from the Jordanian and Moroccan governments to these efforts, are not considered simply domestic matters, but also apart of a global Islamic community.

As traced there are multiple commonalities in relations between the monarchy and Islamists in Jordan and Morocco. Chapter two will build upon these commonalities by exploring societal and economic similarities in both countries. It will also consider how socioeconomic conditions could potentially affect support for Islamists in both countries.
CHAPTER TWO

Socioeconomics and Support of the IAF & PJD

To better understand the popularity of the IAF and PJD it necessary to consider the factors that most tangibly affect their support base. This chapter begins with a discussion of the theoretical links between socioeconomic status and the appeal of political Islamists, continues with an examination of identity in Jordan and Morocco, and concludes with an examination of socioeconomic commonalities between the support bases of the IAF and PJD.

Socioeconomics and Islamism

Examination of the links between socioeconomic status and support for political Islamists is difficult on two levels. First, political Islam has a mass appeal, and questions of socioeconomic status are not necessarily relevant when considering what motivates people to support Islamists. Second, the current body of research fails to distinguish political Islamists from extremists, and often lumps the study of their motivating factors together.

For the purposes of this study we will examine support of the IAF and PJD through an incorporation of both perspectives. Concerning the links between socioeconomic status and Islamism, James Piazza, political scientist at the University of North Carolina, frames the topic as part of a theoretical analysis he calls the “rooted-in-poverty hypothesis.” The
hypothesis argues that “impoverished countries teeming with poorly educated, unemployed masses, qualified by a widening gap between the rich and poor combined with low literacy rates are fermentation tanks for dangerous and violent militants.” In turn, “low levels of economic and social development increase the appeal of political extremism and encourage political violence and instability.”

Fundamentally, however, Piazza stipulates that the “rooted-in-poverty” hypothesis is flawed, and that extremism is related more closely to social cleavage, specifically social and cultural differences which contribute to instability and result in increased political violence. Piazza contends that the environments where social cleavage exists, combined with a challenging socioeconomic environment, contribute most tangibly to political violence. Essentially he contends that poverty alone is not enough to cause extremism, and that other socio-political variables must be present for this to occur (Piazza 162).

Similar to the “rooted-in-poverty” hypothesis, another well known theorist, Ted Robert Gurr, developed the term “relative deprivation” to consider the link between economic disparity and violence. Relative deprivation, “denotes the tension that develops from a discrepancy between the “ought” and the “is” of collective value satisfaction that disposes men to violence.” Gurr argued that when “individual expectations of economic or political goods exceed the actual distribution of those goods, political violence is more likely.” Relative deprivation can be both political and monetary, and a deficit of either in turn increases the risk of political violence. (163)
Finally, similar to Piazza’s “social cleavage” theory, well known theorist Charles Tilly argues that sociopolitical rather than economic structures are the best indicators for political extremism. He argues that what matters most in a given sociopolitical environment is the “degree to which the existing political system facilitates independent organization and collective action.” It is within systems where there are less rigid political controls, environments where political expression is tolerated, as where political violence is more likely to occur, as these environments allow for freedom of expression that may manifest as violence. Essentially, Tilly’s approach is opposed to current discourse which stipulates that restricted environments foster extremism (166).

The above discussion can be applied to the relationship between socioeconomic status and the appeal of the IAF and PJD. As will be examined in the following sections both economic strain and political inertia have had, and will continue to have, a broad effect upon the everyday lives Jordanians and Moroccans. If indeed the support of political Islamists is linked to socioeconomic malaise, as Gurr’s “relative depravation” scenario and Piazza’s “rooted-in-poverty” hypothesis suggest, the current socioeconomic environment in both countries is an important determinant in the probable evolution of the IAF and PJD in the coming decade. Before considering specific economic challenges in both countries let us first consider how society, specifically identity, can be linked to current political and societal disaccord in both countries.
Identity in Jordan

When considering the links between socioeconomic status and the popularity of the IAF, it is necessary to consider Jordan’s formation as a modern state. Unlike European nations, Jordanian statehood was not accompanied by economic reforms, or efforts to build a cohesive national identity. Instead borders were drawn and government institutions built within Western frameworks of statehood and governance, frameworks that were the product of complex socioeconomic transformations over centuries in Europe. Following the British colonial era these models were superimposed upon Jordan as if it had the benefit of European experience, despite society in the Middle East fractured along lines of tribal and Islamic identity which were foreign concepts to modern Europe.

Gökhan Bacik contends that a lack of socioeconomic basis that is uniquely Jordanian has fraught the consolidation of other state institutions, including citizenship, and national identity. Since its inception as a state the monarchy has needed to breathe life into an artificial state that lacks any distinct geographical, human, or economic base. In Europe, economic transformation resulted in bourgeoisie classes that shaped states and created momentum that propelled society, the economy, and politics to advance. In Jordan no bourgeoisie classes exist to propel the economy out its malaise, and as a consequence both society and politics are caught in a state of inertia (Bacik 164).

Moreover, by its nature Jordanian society is a mix of supranational identities that add to state fragility. One major group is Jordanian Palestinians. Although estimates vary,
more than half of Jordan’s population are of Palestinian origin, and have had a profound impact upon Jordanian history. Curtis Ryan contends that the “question of Jordanian-Palestinian relations has always been paradoxical…many Palestinian nationalists never forgave the Hashemites for the annexation of the West Bank, for being too conciliatory toward Israel, and for Black September” (Ryan 9).

Examples of this dynamic can be seen in the present, the most recent example being violence between Fatah and Hamas. These events not only contributed to regional instability but were also difficult to ignore in Jordan. In addition, following the victory of Hamas in January 2006 elections the Jordanian monarchy was forced to balance its foreign policy between the European Union (EU) and the United States, largely anti-Hamas, with the interests of average Jordanians, many of whom supported the party.

Moreover, the 2006 elections caused concern in the Jordanian monarchy, and among other Arab governments that Hamas could be used as a model for other parties similar to the IAF to gain power. In Jordan these fears were heightened in 2006 when a weapons cache linked to Hamas was discovered in north Jordan. Although the Jordanian government characterized the discovery as a serious threat to domestic security, these concerns have thus far proven unfounded, as the external impact of Hamas has been limited due to internal disaccord in Palestine (Johnson & Zweiri 10).

Tribal heritage has also had an impact upon Jordanian identity, historically helping to legitimatize Hashemite rule, and contributing to the formation of the Jordanian psyche.
The relationship between the monarchy and Bedouin tribes dates back decades—when these tribes helped defend the British from Iraq and Syria in the 1940’s, to their quashing of popular demonstrations in the 1950’s, to their countering Palestinian resistance in the 1970’s, and finally today by stridently supporting the monarchy in the parliament (Massad 70).

Tribal identity has also been a source of fracture within Jordanian society, as many Jordanians contend that tribalism no longer has a place in modern society. Criticism of tribalism ranges from the status it affords certain Jordanians, to arguments that tribal laws conflict with Jordanian law. Marwan Mu’ashsher, a Christian Jordanian journalist of tribal origins articulated his concerns over tribal heritage in a piece in the *Jordanian Times* in which he stated that, “we have evolved from a desert confederacy of tribes, to a modern country with a law and a constitution. If tribalism still has a place in the social contest of affairs, it certainly should be denied any such place in our legal conceptualization of the country. Jordanians cannot be governed by dual, often contradictory laws.” Mu’ashsher added that all citizens, “even though not born equal should be treated as though they were, under the law, one law” (71).

Joseph Massad divides the relationship between the state and Bedouin tribes between two time periods, the first from 1923-1976, focused on keeping the Bedouins apart from national politics, and the second from 1976 to the present, has sought to integrate and redefine Bedouin culture. The latter stage has “emphasized the collectivity of tribes and integrated individual tribal identities into a broad category of tribal heritage.” Doing so
has allowed the regime to consolidate tribal identity into more manageable groups in terms of Jordanian law, and has allowed the Hashemites to propagate tribal identity as part of post-colonial Jordanian identity (Taylor 11).

Yet tribalism has also helped legitimize Hashemite rule, among the military, as well as among politicians. The history of the Jordanian military is rooted in tribal groups, dating back to the colonial era when the British under the command of John Glubb established the Desert Mobile Force. The force was composed of Bedouin tribes, and eventually became the foundation of Jordan’s Army. Massad describes the establishment of the army with a Bedouin foundation as strategic. He states that the with Army’s formation “Glubb ensured that…(Bedouin) loyalty would be transferred to the nation-state, guaranteeing that the Bedouins would protect the state against all threats, especially so due to their contempt for city-folk from which anti-state threats might arise” (Massad 110-111). This dynamic has continued in to the present day where tribal elements still play an important role in terms of security, and ensuring tribal loyalty to the king.

In terms of politics, tribal support has played a key role in the rule of the Hashemites. This point will be discussed in more detail in chapter three, yet the importance of tribal loyalty as part of the monarchy’s grip on power cannot be understated. Richard Taylor, stipulates that tribal identity “has been used as a quasi-political party to secure the votes of its members and seats in parliament,” noting that tribes make up a unique form of representative polity (Taylor 11).
As will be discussed, tribal identity as a representative polity has had an impact upon support of the IAF and PJD. The monarchy has capitalized upon this polity by maneuvering of electoral laws, and through the mapping of districts which favor tribal areas. For example in reference to the 2007 elections Taylor states that “four years were not enough for the Islamists to defeat the oldest, most legitimate and most persistent organization in Arab society: the tribe” (Fandy 47).

Jordan’s competing identities have been a focus of King Abdullah, who has sought to forge Jordanian identity, a deficit that the monarchy recognizes as having a potential tangible impact upon its ability to rule. An official program, “Jordan First,” was launched in October 2002 to integrate all constituencies within Jordan. The program stressed that no groups in Jordan were more privileged than others, and sought to “deepen the sense of national identity among citizens, and spread a culture of respect and tolerance to integrate and fortify a diverse, but united, national and social fabric” (Jordan First).

The program was labeled as an attempt to regulate political dissent, and was rejected by many Jordanians. Critics contend that the program was tantamount to abandoning Palestinians and recent Iraqi refugees to their fate. In terms of actual successes, only one recommendation from the program’s agenda was implemented, a quota for women in parliament. Yet, apart from that, the only legacy of the program has been roadside placards with the “Jordan First” slogan throughout the kingdom (Alan 50).
Jordan’s Economic Challenges

In addition to tensions over identity, one of the greatest challenges the monarchy faces is a weak economy. The government has sought to stabilize the economy through International Monetary Funding (IMF) programs which have focused on Jordan’s massive budget deficit, at $1,021 million in 2008, and on cutting government expenditures (“Jordan’s 2008 Budget Predicts”).

An important factor which contributes to Jordan’s economic deficit is its anemic economic base, with challenges that range from geography, to a lack of natural resources, to manufacturing deficits. Much of Jordan is desert with only 5% of the land arable, it has no oil, and agriculture accounts for only 3.3% of annual GDP. Its largest natural resources include phosphates, potash, fertilizers, and chemicals, and the mining and quarry sector account for 2.7% of GDP. Manufacturing accounts for 14.7% of GDP, and includes textiles, and food processing. By far the largest economic sectors encompass trade, finance, transport, and communications which account for 46% of GDP. In terms of labor force 3.6% of population is engaged in agriculture, 12.4% in industry, and nearly 75% engaged in the services sector, which includes the civil service and armed forces (Alan 73).

Despite its disadvantages, one of Jordan’s most strategic assets is its location. Laurie Brand states, “whether as a key land link in British imperial designs in the early period, or as a pro-Western buffer between the Arab states and Israel, Jordan’s geographic
location in the Eastern Mediterranean and as a country bordering Israel, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and (near) Egypt has given it an importance of which most small and natural resource under-endowed states could only dream.” With its location has come strategic importance among Western powers and other Arab states, and as result the Jordanian economy has benefited from significant foreign aid and support. From 1999-2003, for example, Jordan received between $280 and $963 million in foreign aid and grants. Moreover, it received $1.1 billion dollars from the United States following the war in Iraq. These numbers account for between 11 and 29% of total government revenues (73).

The economy is also dependent upon remittances from its large labor force abroad, especially from Jordanians employed in the Persian Gulf. With a poor productive base, Jordan’s balance of trade in goods is in deficit and averaged $2.4 billion from 2001-2003. Inversely the balance of trade in services is usually in credit, and averaged at $2.2 billion from 2001-2003. This contrast was the result of remittances which averaged $1.9 billion during the same time period (73).

Alan George stipulates that Jordan’s dependence on foreign aid, as well as its dependence upon remittances, pose a challenge to Jordan’s economic stability, as they tie the economy to external factors over which the government has little control. Muhammad Halaiqah, a former deputy prime minister of economic affairs described the quagmire: “every time we get up to breathe, there’s a hit on the head. Every ten or fifteen years there’s a major happening in the region which confuses (our) plans, we never have a good 10 or 15 years to plan ahead” (74).
Gulf War I, for example, resulted in the expulsion of nearly 400,000 Jordanians of Palestinian origin from Kuwait. The expulsion and war led to the loss of remittances from Kuwait back to Jordan, a loss of oil resources from Iraq, and a decrease in foreign aid from the UN and the United States (35). Another recent example is the current global financial crisis. Its impacts have affected Jordan on multiple levels, including a steep rise in inflation, increased unemployment, and as a result increased instability, all factors that it can develop policies to counter, yet over which it has little control.

For this study data covers a ten-year period from 1998-2008. Graph, 1A illustrates population growth in Jordan over the past decade. Jordan’s population has steadily increased with the largest increase occurring in the years following the 2003 US invasion of Iraq, when an estimated 700,000 Iraqis refugees fled to Jordan. Many of these refugees have returned to Iraq, yet a sizeable number remain, and continue to put a significant strain on Jordan’s health and education infrastructure (Husarka).

In addition to these strains, Jordanians have also suffered due to recent cuts by the government of petrol, diesel, and barley subsidies, as part of an attempt to scale back
government expenditure. These cuts, coupled with the global financial crisis have resulted in a harsh rise in inflation. An October 2008 Moody’s report indicated that inflation had increased 19.4% during the past year alone, and that Jordan’s current deficit had reached 18% of GDP in 2007. The report stated that such a high level of debt, one of the largest in the world, could endanger the economy, and also warned it “could prove socially destabilizing” (Hadfield).

A rise in inflation has had a tangible impact upon all social classes, yet most acutely among middle and lower classes, and this could increase the popularity of the IAF, as the population becomes increasingly frustrated over the country’s economic situation. Graph 2A outlines the rise of inflation in Jordan during the past decade, with the harshest rise in prices from 2007-2008. For example, in one year food prices jumped 26%, housing prices jumped 17%, clothing costs jumped 9%, and goods and services costs increased by 14% (“Inflationary factors remain”). Graph 3A compares the rise in inflation to other major economics in the Middle East and North Africa. As seen in this graph the rise in
inflation in Jordan and the Middle East has been particularly acute, as compared to the rest of the world, and will continue to remain high through at least 2010.

Another development indicator, education, is a sector that Jordan has excelled in, as compared to other states in the Middle East. As natural resources are scant, education is considered a vital resource. Bassam Saket, former head of Jordan’s Securities Commission, recently articulated the importance of education in Jordan: “we invested in a mobile resource-manpower-that could both render services to the country and be transferred to the region, and that could compensate us for our limited natural resource base” (George 225).

Beyond economic considerations education is also seen as an important part of King Abdullah’s efforts to promote state stability. In a recent speech the King stated, “poor people may not have had the opportunities because they didn’t have the chance of education…I think education is the major balancing factor in society.” Abdullah argued
that, “education is a major balancing factor in society. If you give everybody a decent chance to make something of themselves, then the sky is the limit. That’s why we are putting so much into education. Basically we are giving the poor the same chance as the rich” (227).

In 2006, nearly 20.6% of government spending went to education. Similar to other states in the Middle East, Jordan’s youth population far exceeds its older population, representing a serious challenge in terms of internal instability. For example, in 2003 49% of Jordan’s population was under the age of 24, and nearly 12% was under the age of five. Today nearly 1/3 of all Jordanians are involved in the educational sector as either students or teachers. In 1960, only 33% of Jordanians were literate, yet today more than 90% of all Jordanians are functionally literate—one of the highest rates in the Arab world. According to 2007 statistics, 90% of girls and 89% of boys were enrolled in primary school, while 83% of girls and 81% of boys were enrolled in secondary school. Finally, 39% of the population was enrolled in post secondary education (UNESCO UIS Jordan).

Although Jordanians may be educated, a major challenge is finding work as unemployment remains an acute problem. Graph 4A outlines unemployment statistics from 2000-2008 with estimates from the CIA World Factbook. As illustrated unemployment in Jordan is an endemic problem, with its lowest levels nearly 10 years ago. Graph 4B illustrates unemployment numbers according to age group. Unemployment is highest among men aged 20-24 at 37.6% unemployment, and among men aged 25-39 at 31.6% unemployment. Although the population of Jordan is very
young, these numbers equate to nearly 60% of those aged 15-24 as unemployed.

Moreover, the 25-39 age group represents 1/3 of all those unemployed in the country.

All of the above data reveals the tenuity of Jordan’s economy. For example, unemployment levels of nearly 38% for men aged 20-24, and 32% for men aged 25-39 represent serious challenges to internal stability. Moreover with the global financial crisis these numbers are likely to increase, resulting in rising unemployment both domestically, and regionally as unemployed Jordanians return from the Gulf. How these numbers could impact the popularity of the IAF will be explored shortly, but first let us consider similar socioeconomic variables in Morocco.
Identity in Morocco

Similar to Jordan, Morocco faces an identity deficit that affects internal stability. Mickael Bensadoun contends that Moroccan identity is based on three factors, including the monarchy, its progressive image, and finally Morocco’s Islamic character. The first factor concerns efforts by the monarchy to promote its image as an arbitrator of national unity. This image is important to help promote the monarchy’s legitimacy among the general population, and in the international community. For example, during the past several decades the monarchy has sought to institute significant progressive domestic political reforms to maintain legitimacy in the eyes of its Western allies, and has also sought to develop various economic liberalization programs. These initiatives can be generally considered step towards moderation and as part of efforts to maintain stability despite internal pressures that range from unemployment, poverty, and an increasing extremist threat (Bensadoun and Weitzman 14).

The second factor, Morocco’s image as a progressive and moderate Arab country, advances the status of the monarchy among Western powers through support of the war on terror, and through promotion of a tolerant and modern Islam. The monarchy took a similar approach throughout the 1990’s when it presented itself as the “other” Arab country during the civil war in neighboring Algeria. The government argued that the conflict could not threaten Morocco, and stated that “political Islam could not successfully mobilize the population against a traditional monarchy that protected the Muslim identity of the nation” (Weitzman and Zisenwine 14-15).
This stipulation would be painfully defied with the 2003 Casablanca bombings, leading to the final factor of Moroccan identity—radical Islam—which has quickly evolved into a major challenge to internal stability. Before the 2003 attacks, Islamists in Morocco were considered pacifists as compared to Islamists in Algeria, and Egypt. For example, prior to the 2003 attacks no other major terrorist incidents had occurred. Mohamed Sebbar, a human rights lawyer, described the shift that followed the 2003 bombings as, “before the Casablanca attacks, the king was focused on reform and reconciliation, and security services were no longer ascendant. But the bombings turned the kingdom's priorities upside down. The palace smelled a new threat, and security and intelligence forces won back their old leeway” (“Morocco’s atoning clouded”).

The threat posed by radical Islamic identity presents problems to the monarchy as it is both organized and disorganized, and forces the government to challenge its cultivated image of moderation and control over the faithful. In terms of organized groups, the most well-known among all radical Islamist groups is the Justice and Charity movement. The fundamentalist roots of Justice and Charity have gained strength over decades as Saudi Arabian jihadist dogma took root globally, and radicalized volunteers returned from Afghanistan. The organization promotes its efforts through grass-roots activism and couples its humanitarian work with an anti government and anti-corruption platform.

Justice and Charity is not clandestine with its platform, and openly criticizes the monarchy—one of the main reasons it is outlawed. The group’s spokesperson, Nadia Yassine, publicly stated their aims were to “undermine the system, slowly but surely.”
Key to their efforts is to “put into question the legitimacy of the Islamic claims of the regime…. (and to) contest the legitimacy of their power” (“Morocco’s atoning clouded”). The response by the government has typically been harsh, and has included arrests of party leadership as well a clamp down on the party’s grassroots humanitarian efforts.

Ultimately the greatest challenge posed from radical Islamists, are small fringe groups with no public affiliation. With Justice and Charity the government at least has a general idea of who it is targeting. The Casablanca attacks brought home the reality that Islamist extremism is a much broader problem than previously thought. Following the attacks the government restructured the Ministry of Islamic Affairs to bring imams from among the country’s 40,000 mosques under tighter controls. Efforts also included the revision of Islamic textbooks in schools, and the placement of female teachers in mosques. King Mohamed also recently established 69 separate councils meant to guarantee “spiritual security” and preserve “tolerant Sunni Islam as part of the Moroccan identity” (“Morocco’s King launches offensive”).

In addition the kingdom recently established a separate council to target Moroccan imams operating in Spain, the Netherlands, and in Italy (Nagpal). Ultimately these efforts reflect international concern over the growing Islamist threat originating from Morocco, as well as palpable concern by the monarchy that future attacks or arrests on the European continent could be linked back to Morocco.
Morocco’s Economic Challenges

Morocco also faces significant economic hurdles to Jordan, that if not confronted could potentially affect domestic stability. The challenges are numerous and include illiteracy rates that reach 50% (the highest in the Middle East, tied with Yemen), a high infant mortality rate, 14% of the population living on less than one dollar per day, and nearly 1.7 million in shantytowns. Despite Morocco being a middle income country its social measures correspond to a less developed country, ranking 124th in the United Nations Human Development scale, ahead of only Sudan, Djibouti, and Yemen. (Martin 1).

How all of these variables play into support of the PJD is debatable, yet all represent severe challenges to Moroccan society. Graph 5A outlines population growth within Morocco during the past decade, and graph 6A charts birth rates during the same time period. As seen in graph 5A the population of Morocco has increased from 29.1 million in 1998 to a present day population of 33.7 million. Although this increase is a significant climb, it is a moderate increase as compared to skyrocketing growth.
throughout the Arab world. Graph 6A reinforces this trend by illustrating the declining birth rate in Morocco’s population from 26.37 births per 1000 citizens in 1998, to 21.64 births per 1000 citizens in 2008 (CIA World Factbook, Morocco, 2008).

Similar to economic liberalization in Jordan, Morocco also took on major economic reforms through the IMF and the World Bank that began in the 1980’s. These programs sought to target the same problems that plague Jordan, including massive deficits, corruption, unemployment, and underdevelopment. Although these programs had a tangible impact upon the Moroccan economy, economic growth as a result has been neither fast nor stable. For example, the haphazard progression of the economy is illustrated in GDP growth rate numbers. From 1986-1991, the economy grew at an average annual GDP growth rate of 4.4%, while from 1991-1998 this rate fell to only 1.9%, and finally 1999-2003 GDP averaged 3.2% (World Bank).
A key crutch in the Moroccan economy is an over-dependence on agriculture. The entire sector is unstable, and at the mercy of weather conditions due to primitive farming systems ill-equipped to handle seasonal changes. In 2002, for example, only 16% of arable land was irrigated, only a 3% increase in expanded irrigation over a 20-year time period. From 2000-2003 the average level of agricultural output per captia was 83.8, while from 1989-1991 it was 100. This deficit has meant that more food imports are required, which results in inflation, with costs rising between 100 and 125%. The agriculture sector employs nearly 40% of the workforce, a staggering number which accounts for 15% of GDP, and 40% of all exports. Adverse climate conditions during the past several years have affected the economy as seen in a recent slowdown of GDP growth to 2.7% in 2007. Slow economic growth often translates into higher unemployment. This is the case in Morocco where slow growth has resulted in haphazard unemployment levels as illustrated in graph 7A where unemployment in 1998 was at above 15%, and now 10 years later approaches similar levels after having fallen significantly during the 2000-2007 timeframe (CIA World Factbook: Morocco).
All these variables represent a system of interdependency that could ultimately prove destabilizing. A dependence upon the agriculture sector, results in a dependence upon stable weather conditions, and agriculture infrastructure. If there is a particularly harsh weather season, the result is higher costs as food scarcity increases, resulting in less employment, and a further destabilization of society.

Unlike Jordan where the educational sector functions as a buffer to increased unemployment, the education sector is weak in Morocco. Although 85% of girls and 91% of boys are enrolled in primary schools, this number drops significantly to 31% of girls and 35% of boys enrolled in secondary education. Figures at the post-secondary level are bleaker, with only 12% of the population enrolled. The result is that Morocco’s literacy rate is among the lowest in the Arab world- with an estimated 54.7% of men, and 42.2% of women literate (UNESCO UIS Morocco). Let us now consider the shared links between both countries, and consider how socioeconomic tenuity could translate into increased popularity of the IAF and PJD.

Socioeconomics in Morocco and Jordan

It is well known that economic instability results in increased instability in society, yet measuring its actual impact is difficult until a major shift or collapse provides realization of the depth of economic malaise. In the past year alone the global economic crisis has resulted in banks collapsing throughout the world, civil unrest and violence, food
shortages, health epidemics, and finally skyrocketing government and consumer debt. Especially hard hit have been developing countries, and Morocco and Jordan hav not been immune to the crisis.

The links between the economic situations in Jordan and Morocco, and economic theory explored at the beginning of this chapter are plentiful. For example Gurr’s “relative deprivation” term is especially relevant to both countries, as the discrepancy between the “ought” and the “is” is higher today than in the previous decade. In Jordan the level of poverty has consistently increased over a 20-year period. The most significant of these increases occurred from 1999 to 2008, when poverty increased from 523,000 to 847,000, representing 14.2% of the total population. In Morocco poverty increased from 1991-1999, from 3.4 million to 5.3 million. This 84% increase coincided with significant economic turmoil, during which GDP increases slowed significantly. Most recently in 2008 this number had decreased to 5 million, yet still remains a significant challenge. (CIA World Factbook: Jordan and Morocco).

Socioeconomic realities on the ground often contrast with the financial measures set by various developmental institutions. For example, the IMF and the World Bank describe Morocco and Jordan as “advanced” and “successful reformers” despite fundamental economic problems. However it is important to underline that Morocco and Jordan are not alone in the region, and many Middle East economies face similar problems. Jane Harrigan, Middle East scholar, describes economic growth in the region as “extensive (due to increased factor inputs) rather than intensive (productivity gains).” Growth has
not been sustained and therefore governments have been unable to address pressing unemployment, social, and welfare challenges (Harrigan).

As Gurr contends, when “individual expectations of economic or political goods exceed the actual distribution of those goods, political violence is more likely” (Piazza 163). This is not yet the case in Jordan nor Morocco, but the potential consequences of economic instability cannot be underestimated. This is particularly true in the Moroccan and Jordanian context where terrorist groups have already targeted both countries, and new plots are continually disrupted. Economic tenuity in both countries can also be linked to Piazza’s “rooted-in-poverty” hypothesis. Yet as Piazza argues, poverty alone is not the sole driver of extremism, and instead it is poverty combined with socio-political cleavage that increases the likelihood of political violence.

Another useful tool to consider the depth of both countries’ socioeconomic challenges may be the United Nations Human Development Index (HDI). The HDI is a measure of standards of living, life expectancy, literacy, and educational level in countries throughout the world. It is also utilized as a general measure of well being and quality of life. Countries are classified as high, medium, and low in terms of human development.

Under the index, Jordan has a ranking of 0.769, while Morocco has a ranking of 0.646. Of the 180 countries surveyed the 2008 ranking represented a drop of 4 positions to 90th for Jordan, while Morocco’s ranking remained unchanged at a ranking of 127. Jordan’s HDI ranking has increased steadily since 1975, yet as compared to other countries its’
growth has been weak in terms of improved living conditions over the past several
decades. The case is similar in Morocco where HDI rankings have increased in a weaker
fashion as compared to other developing countries in the Middle East (UNDP Human

How these socioeconomic deficits translate into support for the PJD and IAF is difficult
to measure. As noted, international policy groups terrorists and political Islamists as
from the same mold- making an analysis of the factors that motivate supporters of
Islamist political groups as separate variables, a difficult task. However, a key
commonality that can be gleaned from the data concerning Morocco and Jordan is that a
socioeconomic void exists in both countries that could prove destabilizing, and be
manipulated by the IAF and the PJD to their electoral advantage.

These societal voids can include humanitarian, economic, and development spaces where
a significant need is not addressed. In Jordan and Morocco these voids are present
throughout society and range from high unemployment and poverty, to a lack of
education and health infrastructure. As recent history in the Middle East has shown
Islamists fill the voids caused by an inability of the state to meet needs of a given
populace. For example, Richards and Waterbury state that “while government dithers, the
Islamists move in, and win support by providing their own assistance” (Richard &
Waterbury 228). These groups become champions of the poor, offering food, clothing,
health services, and educational support to meet the deficits existent within a populace.
The dynamic in Jordan is no different, as the Islamic Action Front with the help of the
Muslim Brotherhood has built an extensive network of social welfare programs that is
among the largest in the Arab world. In 2003, for example, the MB owned and ran a
community college, a private university, 24 primary and preparatory schools, and 21
kindergartens. Moreover, the MB runs two major hospitals in Amman and Aqaba, and
18 additional health clinics throughout the country. In 2002 over 170,000 patients were
treated in these facilities, with 20,000 of these individuals receiving free treatment. It is
estimated that the total spending of the MB over an annual period exceeds nearly $4
million dollars (Cambanis). Although these numbers may be small as compared to the
Jordanian government expenditure on education and health programs, they represent a
tangible societal impact in these sectors.

Interestingly in Morocco the monarchy recognizes the danger in the relationship between
its precarious economic situation and the void that Islamists could potentially fill. In
recognition of this problem the government has sought to monopolize social welfare
through the King Mohamed the Fifth Fund, which explicitly seeks to prevent Islamists
from enacting major reform programs. The Fund, previously called the Hassan II fund,
was converted into a “national social development agency” meant to bridge the poverty
gap in rural areas, build industrial and tourist zones, and launch major infrastructure
projects. Ultimately this program seeks to circumvent Islamists that seek to build their
base through humanitarian and civic causes (Hassan 2nd Fund Converted).
In addition, in 2005 the government established the National Initiative for Human Development (INDH), which targets poverty-stricken areas and seeks to rehabilitate 340 villages. Its funding comes from 60% state financing, 20% municipal funding, and the rest from international aid programs. The true impact of the INDH will not be known for sometime since the program launched only four years ago. The project thus far has resulted in 1,104 projects that have tied together humanitarian groups and organizations that previously had not been collaborating. The 2005 budget was 23 million euros, while the budget for 2006-2010 periods has a budget of nearly 925 million euros (Martin 2).

Moroccan scholar, Ivan Martin, describes the program as a major turning point in Moroccan domestic policy. He describes it as “reflecting a sincere desire on the part of the palace to make social development a priority.” Moreover, he argues that “it seems that fifty years after independence, it (the monarchy) is admitting that its legitimacy cannot rest entirely on factors such as religious authority, the historical continuity of the monarchy or ‘territorial integrity’, but that the legitimacy of the monarchy must also be linked to the living conditions of the people” (2).

Martin also describes the program as recognition by the monarchy of Morocco’s social precariousness, highlighting a speech by King Mohamed in which he stated that the “exploitation of social misery for political purposes or to feed extremist fervor or to nurture a feeling of pessimism, defeatism or desperation […] is morally unacceptable.” Yet Martin stipulates that the program’s aims may be too ambitious, noting that to tackle the country’s slum dwellings would alone cost at least $2.8 billion dollars. In terms of
funding, the 925 million euro INDH budget is but a drop in terms of resources needed to mobilize against Morocco’s growing poverty problem. Finally, Martin contends that the program may not mesh with other national initiatives already in place, and could turn into a “development without growth’ policy that lacks a clear linkage between the microeconomic projects that make up the INDH and the general macroeconomic policy,” of the country (5).

Ultimately Martin’s points are all valid, yet to criticize the program early on defies it the opportunity to evolve, and discounts the unique approach undertaken by the monarchy to address Morocco’s socioeconomic challenges. Indeed, the INDH is representative of the type of efforts that both the Jordanian and Moroccan monarchies must undertake to counter the socioeconomic voids growing in both countries, and partly being filled by the IAF and PJD. When not addressed by the government, the recognition of these voids by Islamist parties throughout the Middle East has proven a reliable way to rally electoral bases, and this same scenario could evolve with efforts by the PJD and IAF. With the global economic crisis still evolving, these voids are only likely to grow. The following chapter will explore the political history of the IAF and PJD, in terms of how both parties have maneuvered in the political space in both countries, and examine the consequences of the 2007 electoral process.
Decades from now when historians trace the political evolution of Islamists in the Middle East, they may consider the Islamic Action Front (IAF) and the Party for Justice and Development (PJD) as hybrid examples of Islamist parties that challenged authoritarian rule. Although the 2007 electoral defeats of both parties came as harsh blows, they represent only a temporary setback in terms of the history of relations with the Jordanian and Moroccan monarchies.

The Islamic Action Front

As stated in chapter one present relations between the IAF and the Jordanian monarchy are part of long-standing relations with the pan-Arab Muslim Brotherhood (MB). The relationship between the monarchy and the Muslim Brotherhood has historically been of mutual convenience. The Muslim Brotherhood has enjoyed legal standing afforded to its political wing, and in turn the government has been assured tempered allegiance to the throne.

The MB has a unique status in Jordan as compared to other states in the Middle East, such as Egypt and Syria where the MB is banned from participation in politics. Moreover, these groups are often the subject of repression, and sometimes face violent confrontation from their respective governments. For example, in Egypt, the Muslim
Brotherhood recently had the largest number of arrests of its party members in history ("Largest Crackdown on MB"). Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak described the organization as “dangerous to Egypt’s security,” and characterized its political efforts as a threat to national stability (“The blinders have come off”).

Although the IAF maintains ties to Cairo, it has sought to distance itself from direct links with the party membership outside of Jordan. Historically this has proven difficult for the IAF, as the MB in Egypt and Syria have shown significant interest in the Arab-Israeli conflict. For example, when the Jordanian monarchy lost the West Bank and Old Jerusalem to Israel in 1967 and during Black September violence in 1970, the MB in Egypt became vocal critics of the Jordanian government. Moreover, in the late 1970’s the Syrian MB fled Damascus and set up its headquarters and training camps in Jordan. This led to a crisis in 1980 when Syria amassed troops along its border with Jordan, and then seized Muslim Brotherhood members in Jordan (Noyon 85).

Yet compared to the rocky relationship with neighboring states in the region, the dynamic between the Muslim Brotherhood and Jordan has been somewhat agreeable. The party and the government share similar social welfare concerns, and more importantly the IAF has taken a subtle approach to advancing their political power—an approach that is “precisely organized, deliberately non-threatening and focused on popular causes here (Jordan) such as the Palestinians” (“Jordanian Students Rebel”). In terms of political dogma, the MB has historically advocated a “third way” that is “neither Western nor communist. Prior to tensions that followed the 2007 elections this “third way” did not
threaten the monarchy, as “its values and its goals of re-establishing an Islamic society by applying Islamic law were seen as consistent with the aims of the monarchy.” The IAF also provided the monarchy a “focus of organization for Islamic-minded activism (that) absorbed marginalized potential Islamic opposition, including Wahhabism, the political influence of Palestine’s mufti, and the radical Hizb al-Tahrir, a group that advocated the overthrow of the monarchy (86).

In a significant departure in 1992, the Muslim Brotherhood morphed from a uniquely social and religious organization in to a political party. This shift was historic, and with it came internal divisions over policy and control of the organization. Older and established members of the party worried that overt political participation would lead the IAF away from its key focus on social concerns, while the younger party membership was uncertain of its limitations and goals in the new political arena. Following the establishment of the IAF, the MB elite sought to separate it from the Muslim Brotherhood as two distinct organizations. In an interview, IAF secretary general Ishaq Farhan described the Muslim Brotherhood as “not a political party, since its main concern is to spread the call of Islam and its application in all facets of life. Yet he described the IAF as different, as part of, “a modern political attempt to come up with flexible Islamic formula that would include all individuals who believe in Islamic thought and culture as a solution to the problems and challenges that our nation encounters” (88).

In the political arena the IAF flexes its limited power with policy initiatives in Jordan’s National Assembly, which as an institution has more power than parliaments in other
Arab states. For example, the parliament can prevent a bill’s passage, and impeach a prime minister and his cabinet. Yet, similar to other Arab governments, authority rests with the King, and with this power he is able to veto any bills, and dismiss members at his discretion. Jordan’s parliament consists of 110 members who represent a kaleidoscope of Jordan’s political elite.

However, parliament also illustrates a lack of constitutional democracy in Jordan, and represents the challenges that the IAF faces to gain political power. The parliament can also be framed in the context of the “state-supply” conditions described in chapter one. Through “electoral engineering” the Jordanian monarchy has maintained control over the legislature, and has at will dictated the limits of democracy to its own advantage (George 179).

Electoral engineering is seen throughout recent history in Jordan. The most tangible examples are seen during periods of potential political shift. For example in 1989 the monarchy redrew the country’s political districts to the advantage of East Bank Jordanians, who tend to be loyal to the monarchy, at the expense of Jordanians of Palestinian origin, who tend to vote for the opposition. The justification among East Bank Jordanians who supported the move was that they “were the original Jordanians who had always provided the country with its backbone.” A new electoral law passed in 2001 increased the number of parliamentary seats from 80 to 104, yet did not rectify the representation anomaly which heavily favored East Bank Jordanians. For example, Amman and Aqaba, Jordan’s largest cities account for over 50% of the total population
yet only are represented by 32% of the National Assembly membership. Inversely, cities such as Mafraq, Tafila, and Ma’an have 12% of Jordan’s population yet represent 21% of membership in the assembly (179).

Redistricting by the monarchy is not coincidence, as rural areas are full of tribal political leaders that are loyal to the king. An International Crisis Group report articulated the extent of Jordan’s electoral engineering in a report that stated, “given the predominance of the Palestinian-origin population in urban centres, the regime is particularly concerned about a possible combination of the two- that the political radicalism of the cities would often take on a pronounced Islamist hue, accentuating the perceived urban-based opposition threat to the Kingdom’s stability.” Further, the report argued that the “government has chosen to depend on the conservative tribal nature of segments of society to act as a counterweight to the organized opposition….therefore, the government’s reluctance to reform the electoral law-and the political system more generally- in a meaningful way, produced elections in 1993, 1997, and 2003 that ushered in parliaments that were by and large tribal assemblies” (ICG Report 17-18).

The IAF push for reform of the electoral law, another example of electoral engineering, is based on anger over the “one-man, one-vote” system. The law was enacted in 1993, and sought to counter the rising popularity of Islamists by limiting the number of candidates a voter could vote for at the ballot box. Previously voters could vote multiple times for different candidates, yet following the law’s passage, voters were allowed only one vote
per ballot. This in turn limited the popularity of Islamist candidates, as Jordanians have typically voted based first based on tribal loyalties, and second on ideological interests.

On its surface the Jordanian Parliament would seem representative of a fully-functioning democracy with over 30 different political parities represented. Yet this number defies the image of diverse democracy that the monarchy seeks to propagate, as most parties in the parliament are difficult to distinguish from one another. Beyond the IAF the only groups that can be recognized as political parties include small groupings of Baathists, Communists, and Nasserists, many of whom have lost any kind of political sway in light of their failed ideological links. Other parties include a mix of centrists, leftists, and tribal loyalists that are described as “almost ad hoc groupings that essentially support the status quo, can barely be distinguished from each other ideologically and frequently splinter and merge,” and above all they are “based on personal relations and common interests” (George 183).

In addition to operating within a restrictive legislative environment the IAF is also challenged by a sense of malaise among average Jordanians to the political process. For example, a 2007 Center for Strategic Studies Democracy Poll of public opinion found that the public’s perception of democracy decreased in 2007, despite the government municipal and parliamentary elections held that same year. In 2006 the level of democracy was rated 6.3 out of 10; while in 2007 it dropped significantly to a rating of 5.7 (Braizat 6).
In the same poll Jordanians also expressed skepticism at political participation. For example, only 40% of respondents stated they had the freedom to join political parties. 35% stated they had the freedom to demonstrate, down from 43% in 2006. In regard to fear of criticism of the government, 78% of respondents stated they cannot “publicly criticize or disagree with the government without exposing themselves and their family members to persecution related to their security situations or livelihoods,” compared to 74.6% in 2006 (10).

The lowest numbers in the study relate to perceptions among the population that political parties can advance the lives of average Jordanians. For example, only 9.7% of poll respondents stated that they felt existing political parties represented the “political, social, and economic aspirations,” of Jordanians. Concerning the Islamic Action Front, it was judged the most representative of citizen’s interests, yet was still rated by only 5.6% of respondents as truly representative of their interests. The National Constitutional Party came in second with .7% of respondents stating that they felt it represented their interests. No other parties met percentage levels that exceeded .5% representation in the poll (12).

The 2007 poll reveals both the public’s malaise, yet more importantly, fear of the political process. Indeed, with nearly 74.6% of respondents stating that they are fearful for their own security or livelihoods if they criticize the government, it should come as no surprise that voter apathy towards the political process, particularly towards political parties runs high. Yet 55% of those polled still stated that they had voted in the parliamentary elections. This number is particularly impressive in light of so many
respondents that stated they were fearful of the government, reflecting a desire among the Jordanian populace to take an active role in the democratic process despite fears of overt political participation (12).

Therefore the IAF is challenged by electoral engineering of the monarchy, but also by fear among the populace to become involved. In addition it has also has historically been challenged by internal disaccord within the IAF itself. These tensions have for the most part come into the public view during times of major diplomatic upheaval (peace with Israel, Gulf War I & II, Intifada, etc.), and during electoral cycles. Various perspectives within the party have evolved within the party, ranging from liberal to conservative. The first group is made up of pragmatists who advocate working with the government by consensus. The second group is made up of those considered activist members within the IAF. These members generally agree with the pragmatists in principle, yet advocate a more activist approach tied to Islamist idealism as a response to a lack of reform and corruption in government (Ozeren and Ryan 128).

A third group is made up of traditional conservatives. These members have consistently stressed religious education and shari’a law reforms that they argue should be coupled with an emphasis on social, economic, and cultural matters. Finally, a fourth group is made up of ultra-conservative members that stress a doctrinaire approach to social and political issues. These members approach the political process with little interest in compromise or negotiation with the monarchy, or other political elites. Throughout the recent political history of the IAF these groups have either flexed their strength, or have
become less powerful. This process has largely been dependent upon how the party generally views the state of Jordanian domestic and foreign affairs, and IAF electoral successes or failures.

Concerning the break down within the party membership, much of the party leans towards the right of the party center, with most members as activists and traditional conservatives. Although the party membership does include a fair amount of pragmatist members that support dialogue with the government, this is balanced out by more ultra-conservative members that reject compromise with the government. Although these differences are typically outside the public eye, various power plays have come to the surface during times of turmoil, including during Jordan’s 1994 peace treaty with Israel, the US invasion of Iraq, and boycotts of various elections (129). As will be examined shortly these tensions most recently came to the surface following the 2007 electoral loss of the party, which was followed by a shift towards more conservative leadership of the party.

The electoral history of the party is a mix of success and failure, largely based on the party’s response to the maneuvering of the political sphere by the monarchy. For example during the 1990’s the IAF incurred heavy losses due to changes in the one-man, one-vote electoral law. The 1997 parliamentary elections resulted in a boycott by the IAF in response to temporary laws and measures that were set by King Hussein concerning restrictions on public assembly, freedom of speech, and press. In response to the boycott the government responded with even stricter measures which sought to quash dissent by
further restricting press freedoms. By September 1997 the government had suspended the publication of nearly 15 weekly papers. Despite IAF efforts to postpone the elections they went on as scheduled and the result was an anemic showing for Islamists within the kingdom. The vote was largely a sweep for political centrists, pro-regime conservatives, and tribal candidates. Most of those elected were independents, with only five of 80 seats being taken by candidates who were affiliated with specific political parties. Concerning the independent Islamist vote, six of 30 Islamists who ran were successful, and elected to parliament (Sahliyeh 122).

Although parliamentary elections proved a failure for the IAF in 1997, it was the reverse case with the 1999 municipal elections. The elections were limited to municipalities considered significant, as they marked the first election since the accession of King Abdullah to the throne, and the first election since the 1997 IAF boycott. With the 1999 elections a more open approach to the IAF was taken by Abdullah, who met with IAF leaders to encourage them to return to the political process. In the 1999 election the IAF won a majority of council seats in three cities, (including 5 of 20 in Amman) and won mayoral races in five cities. The party applauded the government’s neutral stand, and described the elections as “fair, free, and democratic,” and (stated) that the elections opened the door for future cooperation with the government” (122).

Yet, as political history had suggested, cooperation with the monarchy would be short lived, and once again relations between the two became strained with the expulsion of Hamas membership from Jordan in November 1999, the failure of Camp David in July
2000, and finally the start of the Al-Aqsa Intifada in 2000. These events heightened tensions between the Jordanian monarchy and the IAF, and grew larger as the party critiqued Jordanian foreign policy. For example, top IAF-party leader Abd al-Majid Dhunaybat warned of a “Zionist penetration of Jordan (that had) increased on all levels,” and he argued that “widespread corruption” was due to the “absence of God’s Shari’a in government and in the administration of the nation’s affairs” (123).

The instability surrounding the domestic and international environment from 1999-2002 resulted in tighter government restrictions on the political process, and upon Jordanian society. Concern ran so high that the government suspended elections until the spring of 2003, worried that neighboring events in Palestine would result in an IAF electoral landslide. The Muslim Brotherhood and the IAF opposed the measures, and argued that they were meant to control the political process (124).

With the 2003 municipal elections the IAF decided to boycott the election, and publicly stated that they “could not take part in chopped and non-democratic elections.” However, the party realized that their boycott would only hurt the party, and it was eventually rescinded out of recognition that they “can only achieve reforms and change through participation in public affairs and by shouldering the burdens of such participation.” The IAF participated in the 2003 elections under an electoral platform that focused upon the “preservation of public freedom, the introduction of constitutional reforms, the consolidation of democracy, the advancement of Arab and Islamic solidarity,
and the opposition to American and Israeli influence in Jordan.” Of the 29 party members on the list, the party won 17 out of 110 possible seats (126-127).

Four years later the 2007 elections were meant to be a turning point for democracy in Jordan. The July 2007 municipal elections were the first time that Jordanians had a direct role in the choice of all city council members and mayors. However, several hours into the election the IAF pulled its 90 candidates, labeled the elections a sham, and accused the government of massive fraud. Party leader Hamza Mansour argued that the IAF wanted to stay (in the election) out of our commitment to democracy, but… had enough. This democratic folly (had) turned into a national tragedy.” For its part the government was embarrassed by the pullout, particularly its impact upon the image of democratic reform in Jordan. Prime Minister al-Bakhit labeled the boycott as “illegal” and an attempt by the party to “target Jordan’s reputation ahead of the legislative elections” (Halaby).

Since the municipal elections were marred in controversy with the pullout of the IAF, the government expected the November 2007 parliamentary elections to be equally contentious. Yet this time it was the IAF that suffered the most, as the party ran 22 candidates in the race and only won six seats. The defeat marked one the poorest electoral showings in the party’s history. As will be explored shortly, the defeat sent shockwaves throughout the IAF political structure, and could alter the future landscape of Islamist politics within Jordan.
The Justice and Development Party

Similar to the IAF in Jordan, as the popularity of the PJD has increased, the monarchy has also sought to regulate the success of the PJD through electoral engineering. For example, in 2002 the monarchy passed laws that made it extremely difficult for stronger parties to win more than one seat in a given district, similar to Jordan’s one-man one-vote system (McFaul 24). Malika Zeghal characterizes the PJD-monarchy dynamic as a game of “electoral competition” that allows the government to “portray itself as committed to democratic transition,” yet also allows the PJD more political space to operate including “more contact with domestic and foreign elites…and more opportunities to call for certain changes while professing loyalty to the system.” Although there are tensions between the monarchy and the PJD, Zeghal contends that the government also serves a useful role to the PJD, as it regulates other Islamist parties that could potentially pose a threat to the party, notably the banned Justice and Charity (Zeghal 34).

Similar to Jordan, Moroccan political parties hold little political power. Although a diverse array of opinions is represented within the Moroccan political scene, as nearly 37 parties took part in the 2007 electoral process, this often translates into political disaccord. Broadly speaking, political parties fall into two categories—left and center-right parties which are aligned as part of a governing coalition, and Islamists. The three main political parties dominant on the left and center-right include the Istiqlal party, the Union of Socialist Popular Forces (USFP), and the National Rally of Independents party (NRI). Istiqlal, a conservative nationalist party, was founded in 1944 and is Morocco’s
oldest political party. Among all other parties it fared the best in the 2007 elections with 52 seats won in the parliament, five more than the PJD. The USFP a socialist-leftist party won the 2002 parliamentary elections with 50 seats, yet fared much more poorly in the 2007 elections falling back into fifth place with 38 seats. Finally the NRI is a centrist party that remains close the palace and represents the industrial and commercial bourgeoisie classes in Morocco (“Nationalists to stick with socialists”).

Following the 2002 elections the USFP and Istiqlal formed a coalition known as the “Koula” that also included other popular parties including the Parti du Progres et du Socialisme (PPS), RNI, and the pro-Berber Mouvement Populaire (MP) party. The coalition’s formation was motivated by a realization that the power of parliament is severely limited by electoral constraints, and two a mutual interest in keeping the PJD out of the political process entirely. Moreover, its formation was largely based out of recognition that as small political parties they need to work together to actually have an impact upon internal politics (UNDP POGAR).

It is within this environment the PJD has sought to establish itself as a viable political party. As noted in chapter one it often compares itself to Turkey’s Justice and Development Party. It rejects being characterized as Islamic and instead prefers to be considered a political party with an “Islamist reference.” The party was founded when the pro-monarchy People’s Democratic and Constitutional Movement (MPDC) merged with the radical Islamic youth group, Shabiba Islamiyya. Some historians argue that the
more radical current strands of the PJD are linked to this Islamic youth group, which has been linked to several assassination attempts and attacks within Morocco (33).

The internal structure of the PJD is considered among the most democratic of all of Morocco’s political parties, and among many political parties in the Middle East. McFaul and Wittes describe the PJD as open, with debates over platform position commonplace, and any controversy “authoritatively resolved” so not to threaten party unity. Over time as debates over the future of the party have evolved, and those opposed to violence and in support of overt political participation have emerged as the party leadership.

The PJD leadership often plays a balancing act internally with its own membership, and with the monarchy. Similar to the IAF there are various groups within the party some which promote dialogue with the government, while others that work against it. For example, the Movement for Unification and Reform (MUR), a conservative wing of the PJD, is often more vocal. It criticizes the monarchy’s relationship with Israel, denounces the sale of liquor, and calls for the closure of discos and other “debauchery places” within the kingdom. It also organizes much of the PJD’s civic and educational associations, which form a grassroots network that represent the intellectual and activist base of the organization (Rachidi).

The ideology of the PJD makes it one of the most liberal of Islamist political parties in the Arab world. For example, Ahmad Raysuni, who until 2003 headed Islamic law
within the MUR described democracy as “not a religion, (having) no religion, and is not against religion.” Instead Raysuni contended that democracy is an “experiment,” and one in which he argues in favor of “unlimited democracy, even it is possible that one day democracy will lead to a kind of exit from Islam.”

Raysuni’s perspective is unique as compared to other Islamist parties. For example, he asserts that “thinking through the prism of the Islamic state is a mistake….the state is a means among others, nothing more. I believe in the activism of society and not in activism of the state. We have to rely on the ulma (nation), not on the state.” Essentially confrontation with the state is not necessary- instead more important is that society evolves to a point where democracy becomes the natural alternative to the status-quo (Zegahl 35).

Raysuni’s logic can be described as part containment, and part compromise, and he is not alone in his approach towards the political process, as this same perspective is recurrent throughout the party. The PJD has established itself as a constructive critic of the government, yet not completely opposed to it either. Its lack of full participation in the 2002 (legislative) and 2003 (council) elections was a tacit admission by the party of its potential political strength, yet also an acceptance of the limits of its own power in relation to the monarchy.

Yet containment and compromise do not come without cost to the PJD, which is often criticized by the banned Justice and Charity, which labels the PJD as corrupted by the
government. Historically the relationship between the PJD and Justice and Charity has been contentious over competition for Islamist support within the kingdom. Although the PJD has tapped into the current of Islamization in Morocco, its efforts have failed to trump Justice and Charity. As Amir Hamzawy states, under the party’s leader Salam Yassin, Justice and Charity has “advanced to the forefront of the movement toward Islamization in Morocco, (by) focusing their activism on proselytization and the provision of social services.” Inverse to the logic of compromise, Justice and Charity contends that the “whole political system is corrupt and therefore cannot be reformed.” It criticizes the PJD leadership for their participation in the political process, and condemns the party as “submissive” to the monarchy (Hamzawy 4).

The tension between the PJD and Justice and Charity has resulted in an increasingly growing divide among Islamists. Unlike Jordan where no major Islamic opposition to the IAF exists, Justice and Charity has had a tangible effect upon the electoral base of the PJD. The group contends that it represents a pure and uncorrupt Islamist alternative. As a result the PJD has been unable to fully mobilize the Islamist base it needs to build its political constituency, as Islamist supporters have consistently boycotted elections. This represents both a threat to the future of the PJD who depend on this base, yet also to the entire electoral process which the Moroccan monarchy seeks to gradually institute (6).

The electoral success of the PJD has therefore been limited by electoral engineering of the monarchy, and by other Islamists that label it corrupt. Yet, as noted the electoral history of the PJD is recent, as it only became active in Parliament in 1997 with 14 seats
won. This number was increased to 42 seats in the 2002 election, when the party only ran in half of the country’s electoral districts. Following its electoral success in 2002, and the challenges posed by subsequent criticism of Justice and Charity, the PJD has sought to differentiate itself among Moroccans by not pushing exclusively for Islamist policies.

Instead, as Eva Wegner describes, the party is “establishing and maintaining a reputation as a party that defends the interests of the populace rather than those of a self-interested political elite.” Differentiating itself, Wegner stipulates, is the “political capital” of the PJD, which has gone out of its way to illustrate to the populace that it seeks to seriously govern. For example, it has instituted an internal code which requires all deputies to attend all parliamentary sessions, draft one oral question a week, write one question a month, and one bill per legislative session. Moreover, the party requires that members provide 22% of their salaries to the party to finance party operations, and build the reputation of the party among the general public (Wegner).

With these efforts the PJD has become more popular among the Moroccan population, yet not fully accepted or trusted, as seen during the 2007 elections when the party fared much more poorly than expected. The liberal conservative Independence Party led with 52 seats (16% of the popular vote), while the PJD secured 47 seats (14%) in the new parliament. Other major parties to gain seats included the Popular Movement, which gained 41 seats, and the National Rally of Independents that gained 39 seats. No data prior to the elections supported a strong showing for the Independence Party. Instead
polls prior to the election showed the PJD as the likely victor, suggesting an “unstoppable rise of the PJD.” The five seat gain of the PJD defied expectations, and prior statements by the leadership which suggested 70 to 80 seats were within reach (Wegner). Let us now consider the dynamics of both the IAF and PJD losses at the polls, and consider the implications of these losses.

**Society and Suffrage**

Despite some general concerns, outside international observers judged the elections in Morocco as fair, while in Jordan international observers were not allowed to monitor the process. For Morocco, the presence of observers represented a significant departure from previous elections which were marred by irregularities, and represented a victory for the Moroccan monarchy which sought to highlight its limited democratic reforms to western election observers.

A team of 52 observers led by former Bolivian President Fernando Quiroga Ramirez stated in a report about the 2007 elections that “overall the vote was conducted in an orderly manner.” However, a similar report conducted by a group of nearly 617 Moroccan non-profit associations found broader concerns related to corruption of the electoral process. The report stated that "the honesty of the elections was compromised by the pressure exerted on large sectors of the electorate, in particular by the illicit use of money, merchandise and promises." Moreover, it expressed concern that "while things occurred more or less correctly in voting stations, there was large-scale use of money in
houses and in the streets through intermediaries." Therefore while the elections process seemed just in the eyes of observers, under the surface it remains highly imperfect at best ("Corruption marred Morocco vote").

As noted in Jordan international observers were not allowed to monitor the electoral process, yet the IAF still publicly pushed the government for international oversight of the 2007 process. In response to these requests Jordanian Prime Minister Bakhit stated that the presence of observers would mean "that Jordan's transparency and electoral process (was) questionable." However it is more likely that the Jordanian government feared what outside observers might find as a result of an overt and monitored electoral process ("Jordan elects new parliament").

Yet a controlled balloting process by both monarchies does not fully explain the 2007 electoral losses by the PJD and IAF. Clues to understanding the 2007 loss may be found in the perceptions of the electorate of the government. This is particularly true in Morocco, where the 2007 election marked a historic low in voter participation at 37%. Previous electoral participation was 51% in 2002, and 58% in 1997. These numbers were particularly surprising in light of massive get out the vote campaigns that were launched by government and non-government organizations to bring voters to the polls-with nearly 79% of the Moroccan electorate registered to vote (Wittes). In addition a cursory examination of the PJD party platform suggests the turnout for the PJD should have been stronger, as the party platform did address socioeconomic problems that seemed to trump other issues (Hamzawy 1).
Voter apathy towards the PJD and its platform is likely due to the inability of the party to thus far follow through on previous electoral promises, and apathy towards the entire political process. Despite the PJD articulating more nuanced legislative policy with a focus on unemployment, corruption, and poverty, they have been unable to translate their platform into legislative reality. This is illustrated in the PJD’s poor track record in municipalities they govern, which may have added to doubts among the populace about the party’s ability to confront the government and bring change to the country (3).

Another important factor is the Moroccan monarchy’s grip upon governance. Indeed, the perception of the inability of PJD to make a tangible impact upon the political process increases “citizen alienation”. With the legislature unable to make progress without a rubber stamp of approval from the monarchy, “wide segments of the population have come to see the parliament as a failed institution that can do little to solve their pressing economic and social problems” (Wittes).

In addition voter apathy and ultimately fear towards the electoral process is also found in Jordan. Although voters participated in higher numbers at the polls in 2007, with turnout at 54%, impoverished areas of the country saw much lower numbers including 32% participation in the suburbs of Amman. These same areas have historically been central to the success of the IAF. The largest voter turnout was among districts where royal loyalists reside, and the lowest among poor and disenfranchised areas (Hussein).
Voter apathy is not a new phenomenon in either country, yet what may be new is a rise in “citizen alienation.” Voter participation and faith in the electoral process is not growing, and is instead ebbing in both countries. These numbers are illustrated in graph 9A in terms of political freedoms as perceived as guaranteed. For example in 1996, 24.8% of respondents stated they felt press freedom was guaranteed, in 2007 this number fell to 24%. In 1996, 6.1% of respondents stated they felt participation in political parties was guaranteed, while in 2007 this number remained steady at 6%. Ultimately there has been no change in perceptions among the Jordanian populace of the merits of democracy, despite multiple elections during the previous decade (Braizat 9).

![Graph 9A: Jordan: Extent to which political freedoms are guaranteed.](image)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Data</th>
<th>1996</th>
<th>2007</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Press</td>
<td>24.8</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opinion</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demonstration</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Parties</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sit-ins</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>6</td>
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A recent study published by the Friedrich Ebert Foundation found that voter participation in the electoral process is down in Morocco as well. For example, 96% of those polled stated that they had no political affiliation with any party in the kingdom. The study
focused specifically on the participation of youth voters, and found a growing disinterest in the political process (Binoual).

Indeed, the electorate may also be tired of the power play between Islamist politicians and both monarchies. The last-minute boycott maneuver by the IAF in 2007 municipal elections involved accusations against the government of various crimes concerning the voter registration process. These included the double recording of individuals on voter rolls in select districts, the registering of voters in more than one district, and finally the registration of underage voters. In addition the IAF accused the government of bussing in plainclothes military personnel to the polls. As examined the military has historically been fiercely loyal to the regime, comprised of tribalists and East-Bank Jordanians, and therefore could play an important role in the results of any election.

The IAF Secretary General called the 2007 elections a “democratic massacre,” while Jordanian Prime Minister stated that the pullout by the IAF was “illegal” and that he considered the withdrawal as “unpatriotic, conspiratorial, and opportunistic.” According to David Schnecker the accusations are troubling regardless of their validity. From the standpoint of the government it means that “even with the institutional advantage of determining the electoral and political parties’ laws and controlling the appointments of seats in each district, the kingdom still lacks confidence that it could forestall a significant Islamist victory.” Moreover, Schnecker states that the IAF boycott could also be interpreted as a signal that the “IAF no longer feels compelled to demonstrate even a modicum of deference to the king” (Schenker).
Party Implications of the 2007 Electoral Loss

Among some observers, the 2007 elections were thought to represent a watershed moment in the relationship between Islamists and the monarchy in both Morocco and Jordan. It was thought that the failure of the IAF and PJD would be followed by a stiff crackdown by the Moroccan and Jordanian monarchies. Instead it seems that unexpectedly the reverse course has occurred, at least temporarily.

Following the 2007 losses, both parties made significant changes in their leadership which may or may not represent a shift in relations between the parties and governments in both countries. For example, in March 2008 the IAF Shura Council elected Hamam Said, a former Hamas member, to head the party. Said and his supporters are considered more hawkish in matters of domestic and foreign policy as compared to his predecessor Salem Falahat. Following Said’s election, political analysts Matthew Levitt and David Schenker argued that the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood “can no longer be considered “loyal” to the kingdom” (Schenker and Levitt 2).

Yet in the months following the election Said has taken an unexpectedly moderate approach towards the monarchy, as the IAF has toned down its harsh rhetoric, and sought cooperation with Prime Minister Nader al-Dahabi. Moreover, internal divides that riddled the party following the election seem to have been remedied, at least temporarily, with an agreement reached between IAF hawks and doves. Finally, Zaki Bani Irsheid, a fierce detractor of the government stated publicly the IAF and the monarchy may be
entering a “new political phase.” Doing so may represent a shift in relations between the
monarchy, and tacit acceptance by the party of its limitations in light of the 2007 loss
(Hamid).

The PJD also followed its electoral defeat with changes in party leadership. In July 2008
it elected Abdelillah Benkirane as its new leader, replacing previous PJD leader Saad
Eddine Othamni, who had been expected to win. The choice of Benkirane is considered
a vote for pragmatism. Mr. Benkirane was previously President of the PJD’s National
Council, the policy making apparatus of the party, and is considered a consensus making
candidate. Mr. Othamni was considered vague and indecisive, and some critics have
argued that this led to the PJD loss at the polls.

In addition to a new leadership the PJD has adopted a new theme, “no politics without
credibility,” which goes to the heart of perceived reasons for loss of the PJD in the 2007
elections. The poor showing by the PJD following the elections also led to their exclusion
from a coalition government. However, the party is publicly looking to the future, and in
particular to the 2009 municipal elections to make up ground lost in the parliamentary
elections (“New Face: Morocco’s Islamist-leaning PJD”).
CONCLUSION

This study has explored the 2007 electoral process in Jordan and Morocco, while seeking to understand its potential consequences for the future of the IAF and PJD, and for democracy in Jordan and Morocco. Although it has explored the historical, socio-economic, and political factors which contributed to the loss of the PJD and IAF at the polls in 2007, many questions remain as to how political life will evolve in both countries in the coming decade, and how the United States should respond to both the Moroccan and Jordanian monarchies, and Islamist politicians in both countries.

Ultimately what makes the 2007 IAF and PJD electoral losses dangerous is the context in which they have occurred. Indeed, the term “fragile state,” a term increasingly used by international policy makers applies to the socio-political and economic environment in both countries. For the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), fragile states are states “unable or unwilling to adequately assure the provision of security and basic services (...) and where the legitimacy of the government is in question” (USAID Fragile States 1). From the perspective of the World Bank, fragile states are those that “share a common fragility in particularly weak state policies and institutions and are at risk of conflict and political instability” (“Fragile states - good practice”).

As research in this study has shown Jordan and Morocco meet the definition of fragile states as both face legitimacy issues among their populations. The other common thread, “instability related to weak policies and an inability to adequately provide to the
populace,” was explored in chapter two concerning endemic economic malaise in both countries (“Fragile states-good practice”).

It is important to underline that fragile state insecurity is not unique to Jordan and Morocco, and is instead an inherent reality among state systems throughout the Middle East. Yet as Jordan and Morocco are important American allies, their increasing state fragility should be of concern to US policy makers. Ultimately the US cannot afford for internal disaccord to weaken either country, as it could result in the wavering of their support for strategic American interests.

However this process cannot marginalize Islamists in a way that results in the IAF or PJD parties to become more isolated, or potentially more of a threat. This point leads to a key conclusion—the Islamist base in both Jordan and Morocco is now firmly rooted in society despite government attempts at maneuver, and will continue to remain a potent force. In Jordan, history has shown that the popularity of the IAF tends to come in waves, dependent upon its ability to exercise its political voice among the people, and dependent upon the monarchy’s willingness to allow it to do so. Although the political history of the PJD is more limited the IAF can be considered a model, and therefore the political success of the PJD will likely come in waves as well—with the 2007 election failure simply an ebb in the party’s political fortunes. The same weaknesses that led to defeat of the IAF, are similar to those that led to the PJD defeat, including the inability of the PJD to follow through on electoral promises, a lack of confidence in the party’s ability to govern, and electoral engineering by both monarchies.
Yet as outlined in chapter three it is likely that the 2007 election losses are only diversions in the increasingly robust Islamic political scene found in both countries. Out of the potent consistency of Islamist political life in Jordan and Morocco, emerges two possible scenarios concerning the probable evolution of the PJD and the IAF. The first scenario is a continuation along the most recent path, where the IAF and PJD have taken pragmatic approaches to their electoral defeats or the second a scenario, which would result in a more hard-line shift by Islamists.

Although a conservative hawk, Hamam Said, was elected to lead the IAF, the party has thus far sought to work more closely with the government, and this opening may represent an opportunity for the IAF to regain respect among the Jordanian populace and improve relations with the monarchy. In Morocco, the election of Abdelillah Benkirane to head the PJD, marked a pragmatic approach as well, and sends a signal to the government that it seeks to cooperate as it finds its bearings.

The second scenario, a hard-line shift by Islamists, is more problematic as related to Moroccan and Jordanian stability, and ultimately to the political future of the PJD and IAF. In Morocco, the stage is already set for this possibility, as tensions between the PJD and Justice and Charity will likely increase as the organization is emboldened by the failure of the PJD. In this scenario Justice and Charity could move towards more active political participation, or towards an even more extremist agenda.
Yet officially Justice and Charity has rejected active participation in the government. Nadia Yassine, the group’s spokesperson has stated that Justice and Charity “will only participate in the political process after the current constitution is changed to one appropriate to the times in which we live and the old one is thrown into the dustbin of history—especially parts that sanctify the King and ensure he holds all the levers of power.” Yet from an analytical perspective if Justice and Charity sees an opening in the 2007 failure of the PJD, and finds support of other parties within the Moroccan political arena, its participation cannot not be considered out of the question. Another possibility is a shift towards extremism by certain Justice and Party members. Although no one arrested in conjunction with the 2003 Casablanca bombings had direct links with Justice and Charity, in light of the party’s ban from political life, and increasing instability within Morocco, certain members of the party could turn to more extremist actions to vent their frustrations (Mceneaney).

Although the specter of a shift towards extremism is more pressing in Morocco, in Jordan this scenario cannot be ruled out either. This is particularly true in light of the diverse political viewpoints explored in chapter three within the IAF membership, ranging from pragmatic to anti-monarchy members. Research suggests that it is plausible that in the coming years, similar to the dynamics of the PJD-Justice and Charity, that if conservatives sense that the IAF leadership is being co-opted by the government, or is moving away from its Islamic principles, that a rift could develop in the party and result in a more conservative coalition.
All of these scenarios will largely depend upon the efforts of the Jordanian and Moroccan monarchies to bridge divisions with Islamists. Although the 2007 losses came as a harsh blow to both parties, they will not be considered a particularly unique moment in terms of the history of relations between the PJD and IAF and the Jordanian and Moroccan monarchies. Both parties will remain constrained for some time due to managed electoral systems, and imposed limits of political expression. Therefore to examine what contributed to the 2007 electoral loss of both parties cannot be limited to an examination of the gains or losses of both parties, yet also must include consideration of the role of the monarchy, socioeconomic conditions, and the parties themselves.

Returning to Zakaria’s concerns highlighted in chapter one, he stipulates that “illiberal democracies” are increasingly becoming commonplace, as authoritarian governments worldwide have learned to maneuver political spaces with the ballot box. This process is often devoid of constitutional backing, and therefore allows these existing regimes to stay in power, while meeting the expectations of Western powers to hold “free & fair” elections. As examined this is particularly true in Jordan and Morocco where electoral engineering has allowed both monarchies to make certain that even if political parties gain in popularity, it will be the electoral system that prevents any further success.

The United States runs the risk of being labeled hypocritical for touting illiberal democracies such as Morocco and Jordan as beacons for democratic change. The current message the US sends is that it supports these governments as long as there is a semblance of democracy. This message marginalizes the IAF and PJD, further erodes the
greater push for democratization in the region, and diminishes the likelihood of dialogue with these parties in the future.

Berman and Lonsdale describe democracy as a learning process. They stipulate that democracy is not the holding of elections and counting ballots but instead is part of a “learning process” that is made up of “largely unconscious and contradictory” developments “involving conflict, negotiations, and compromises between diverse groups” (Migdal 343). With current political dynamics in both Jordan and Morocco far from being a democratic process, and instead one largely based on electoral maneuvering, competing realities over the merits of democracy among both electorates are created.

For example, the United States lauds the democratic reforms occurring in Jordan, yet research has shown nearly 75% of people are fearful of openly criticizing the monarchy. Moreover, in terms of finding a political party that could provide an avenue to encourage reforms, only 9% of respondents felt that current political parties represented their interests. The situation in Morocco is even worse as only 4% of respondents stated they were a part of specific political parties. These numbers represent both a palpable malaise towards the political process, as well as a growing alienation towards democracy.

The latter is the most dangerous, and has implications that reach far beyond the foreign policy challenges of the present. The growing alienation of Jordanians and Moroccans should worry international policymakers as it represents a pullback from democratic mores and values. Although malaise towards politics can be expected, particularly in a
context where the political space has been overshadowed by authoritarian rule, alienation is different. The inherent danger is that the democratization process has begun in a context that leaves people with skewed perceptions of its rational and confused over the merits of its application. Moreover, in a context where overt participation in the democratic process is feared, or where it seems democracy will simply replicate previous socioeconomic and political malaise, it quickly becomes discounted.

The current sociopolitical environment in both Jordan and Morocco therefore represents challenges and opportunities for the new Obama administration. Ultimately the greatest challenge that the administration faces with Morocco and Jordan and similar countries, will be the same challenge that burdened the Bush administration- how to encourage democracy in the Middle East without upsetting status-quo norms that have maintained a semblance of stability in the region.

As explored in chapter one, Jordan and Morocco are among the most stable of state systems in the Middle East, and among the most reliable of allies in the region. How we approach liberalization from a foreign policy perspective could affect not only direct diplomatic relations but more importantly greater foreign policy questions.

Foreign policy by the United States therefore must balance strategic US interests, while finding a middle ground to encourage democratic reform. The research explored in this study suggests that despite the desire among populations in both countries for reform, no true political alternative exists to address to the massive sociopolitical vacuum that would
be left behind if the Moroccan or Jordanian monarchy fell. Although the IAF and PJD are among the strongest and most robust of political parties in both state systems they lack the necessary experience, and more importantly, the international credibility to truly challenge either monarchy. Therefore the United States will need to formulate democratization policy that focuses on the current governments already in place, seeking not to overthrow either, but instead encouraging incremental reforms that result in increased development tied to expanded political freedoms.

As explored in chapter two, political liberalization in both countries followed significant economic liberalization linked to IMF programs that began in the early 1990’s. For example IMF programs that began under Hassan served as the foundation for political liberalization under Mohamed, and Jordan’s history is similar under Hussein and Abdullah. Therefore economic liberalization tied to political reforms could be a potential avenue for the United States to encourage subtle democratic reforms that do not fully threaten either regime, neither support their authoritarian controls.

In the current global economic environment, one in which both Jordan and Morocco are suffering, one avenue to consider could be tying economic aid to incremental political reforms. For example, in 2008 Jordan received nearly $518 million dollars in foreign aid from the United States to support its budget and fund development (“US Gives Jordan”). Similarly, Morocco received nearly $700 million dollars in foreign aid in 2007 as part of the Millennium Challenge Corporation Compact, a five-year program that focuses on development, increasing employment levels, and generating economic growth (Tyler).
If at the diplomatic level the United States could push both the Moroccan and Jordanian monarchies by tying funding to reform, this could be a path towards broader political liberalization. This would also send the signal to these regimes that the United States does not seek to completely challenge the authority of either monarchy, but instead remains determined to encourage a more nuanced political process in both countries.

This approach may also encourage the IAF and PJD in their efforts to attain greater political voice as both monarchies are encouraged to allow these parties broader freedoms. However, in the current sociopolitical environment Islamist political persuasion is likely to remain at a crossroads. Although Islamists are more popular than they ever have been, their ability to advance within the current electoral system will depend upon the extent of electoral engineering by both monarchies. This situation is unlikely to change as long as no incentive exists for these regimes to institute political reforms.

In conclusion, it is important to remember any evolution of the political sphere in Jordan and Morocco will continue to be most affected by the interests of the Jordanian and Moroccan monarchies. In the long-term, both monarchies hold the keys to liberalization of the political space, and therefore hold the keys to the political fortunes of the IAF and the PJD. From the perspective of the United States it is ultimately in our interest to continue to encourage liberalization and reform in Jordan and Morocco, both out of self-interest, and in the interest of all free peoples in the Middle East.
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