Role Expectations and State Socialization: Germany's Rediscovery of the Use of Force 1990–1995

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Role Expectations and State Socialization: Germany's Rediscovery of the Use of Force 1990–1995

Abstract

This dissertation engages the question of why German political elites accepted the use of force during the 1990s and started to commit the country's armed forces to multilateral peacekeeping missions. Previous governments of the Federal Republic had opposed foreign deployment of the military and Germany was characterized by a unique strategic culture in which the efficacy of military force was widely regarded as negative. The rediscovery of the use of force constituted a significant reorientation of German security policy with potentially profound implications for international relations.

I use social role theory to explain Germany's security policy reorientation. I argue that political elites shared a national role conception of their country as a dependable and reliable ally. Role expectations of the international security environment changed as a result of a general shift to multilateral intervention as means to address emerging security problems after the Cold War. Germany's resistance to the use of force was viewed as inappropriate conduct for a power possessing the economic and military wherewithal of the Federal Republic. Elites from allied countries exerted social pressure to have Germany contribute commensurate with capabilities. German political elites adapted role behavior in response to external expectations in an effort to preserve the national role conception of a dependable and reliable ally.

Security policy reorientation to maintain Germany's national role conception was pursued by conservative elites who acted as 'role entrepreneurs'. CDU/CSU politicians initiated a process of role adaptation to include the use of force for non-defensive missions. They persuaded Social Democrats and Alliance 90/Green party politicians that the maintenance of the country's role conception necessitated a reorientation in security policy to accommodate the changes in the security environment.

The dissertation uses structured, focused and comparative case study methodology to trace the process of role adaptation in the understandings of German parliamentary elites. It finds that German policy orientation was a product of external expectations which increased in their socializing impact as intervention norms became more concrete and ethnopolitical violence increased in intensity. As a constructivist account of the normalization of German foreign policy, the dissertation finds that social, rather than utilitarian considerations were primarily responsible for initiating the reorientation of German security policy. The finding that social expectations caused a reorientation in the security policy of a great power strengthens social constructivist claims about the impact of norms in international relations. The dissertation also contributes to knowledge on processes of domestic norm promotion and national compliance.

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ABSTRACT

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The Puzzle of German Security Policy Reorientation

Since the mid-1990s, the Federal Republic of Germany has deployed combat forces outside its national territory. German involvement in multilateral peace enforcement missions of the UN, NATO and EU constitutes a significant departure from previous policy parameters. Until 1995, German elites had categorically ruled out participation of their country’s armed forces in any military activity not directly linked to the defense of NATO territory. As such, Germany’s decision to use military force outside German and NATO territory is an indication of a major shift in the country’s security policy orientation since reunification.

The reorientation of a state’s established foreign policy parameters remains an intriguing phenomenon in foreign policy analysis which routinely emphasizes the path-dependent nature of foreign policy. The German case is particularly interesting because policy change involved security policy and the use of force. These are considered areas of ‘high politics’ in which states tend to protect their policy autonomy. Germany’s rediscovery of the use of force also conflicted with the value of antimilitarism that defined the country’s strategic culture since World War II. Political elites and the general public shared a negative view on the efficacy of force in international relations. Thus, the security policy reorientation was the more significant because it contradicted German
identity and breached a cultural taboo on the use of force that had existed since World War II (Dalgaard-Nielsen 2006, 1). The antimilitarism in German strategic culture suggests that policy reorientation was not initiated domestically but, instead, was primarily a function of external factors. Was Germany encouraged by its allies to abandon its long-term stance on the use of force in favor of a more active and possibly militant role in international politics? If so, what was the basis for external expectations of German security policy and what was the social process by which the majority of Germany’s political elite came to accept their country’s military responsibilities in global society?

Germany carried the heavy military burden as the frontline state against the Warsaw Pact during the Cold War. Political elites had promoted the country’s remilitarization and integration into NATO in 1955 but had categorically ruled out the use of force for any objective other than territorial self-defense. They viewed the country’s militant past as a historical burden which established a special responsibility to eschew military force and promote cooperation through the support of international institutions and law. This elite view of Germany’s role and appropriate foreign policy actions in global society is frequently referred to as civilian power role conception (Maull 1990).

Civilian powers are trading states that exhibit a preoccupation with economic concerns. They rely on international law and consensual policy formulation within multilateral forums to pursue their interests including those pertaining to national security. Defense expenditures as percentage of GDP are low when compared to states of equal power. Foreign policy is characterized by a tendency towards diplomatic reticence
and reluctance to engage in high-profile leadership behavior. The civilian power role differs from the traditional state role in a number of important ways.

Traditional or normal roles of states are defined by two central elements: National interests and relative power. Normal states take as their natural right the ability to formulate and pursue their national interests with or without international consent. The use of force in pursuit of the national interest is considered a state prerogative. As the relative power of the state increases, a normal state will increasingly value policy-making autonomy over policy-making influence (Rittberger 2001).\(^1\) At the level of a great power which possesses considerable political, economic, military and cultural wherewithal, the foreign policy behavior of states will be characterized by relatively frequent divergence from international standards and recourse to the use of military force. Great powers will seek out and deploy advanced military technologies for their national defense including weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Within international organizations, great powers will attempt to control the agendas and processes of norm creation while resisting constraints imposed by such standards on their own policy autonomy.

The Federal Republic of Germany is considered a great power that plays a civilian power role. Unlike other powerful states, the country has allowed its foreign policy to be constrained by the international organizations it is enmeshed in to a degree that the pursuit of national interests is no longer easily ascertainable. Germany has been a strong advocate for the expansion of the supranational authority of the European Union. It has

\(^1\) Realists argue that the insecurity created by an anarchical system establishes clear state preferences for security policy autonomy. Less powerful states have more to gain by surrendering some autonomy in return for gaining influence within international organizations. As the relative power of a state increases, the search for policy autonomy becomes a more prominent feature of state security policy. See Rittberger (2001) for a more detailed discussion.
supported the expansion of international law and shown a preference for multilateral foreign policy making. The country’s security rests on multilateral arrangements foremost of which is NATO. Fully integrated into NATO’s force structure, Germany does not have the independent military command structure that other great powers take as their sovereign right. Even though Germany does pursue its own interests in multilateral fashion, the country has been willing to accept an unusually high level of constraint on its ability to autonomously formulate and pursue national interests. The origin of this ‘odd’ behavior for a great power is generally traced to Germany’s defeat in World War II and the long period it spent as occupied and semi-sovereign state. Countries like Germany and Japan are also seen as prototypes of an emerging category of trading states that are adapted well to conditions of interdependence that are beginning to characterize modern, global society.

The restoration of German sovereignty which came with the end of the Cold War allowed its political elites greater leeway to define their country’s role conception. Growing insecurity and instability accompanying the breakup of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union also created a strong rationale for elites to shed the civilian role they had allowed Germany to play in favor of a less restrained, normal role that would allow for greater policy autonomy in addressing specific German security needs. Conservative elites quickly seized on the opportunity to normalize German role behavior but the civilian power role proved resilient even as international pressure mounted to have Germany contribute in military ways to the maintenance of regional and global security.

The Persian Gulf War of 1991 marked the dawn of a new global security era that was both less stable than the bipolar order of the Cold War but also offered expanded
possibilities for multilateral intervention. American and UN requests for military assistance to liberate Kuwait clashed with central elements of Germany’s role conception as civilian power. Parliamentary elites maintained negative views on the efficacy of force and widespread antiwar demonstrations confirmed the enduring strength of antimilitarism in German strategic culture. The government declined military contributions on the basis of a longstanding interpretation of the country’s Basic Law under which extraterritorial missions of the armed forces were deemed unconstitutional. Under international pressure to contribute commensurate with capabilities, decision-makers resorted to making significant financial and material contributions to compensate for their non-compliance with the request for military assistance. Chancellor Kohl and Foreign Minister Genscher also promised that they would initiate the necessary domestic changes allowing for military contributions in the future. Germany’s ‘checkbook diplomacy’ caused consternation on the part of its closest allies and criticism of being a ‘free rider’ stung elites who had prided themselves on maintaining the country’s role as predictable, calculable and reliable member of the Western value community.

Within a relatively short time span, German contributions to international peace-keeping efforts and NATO out-of area missions increased. About 450 Bundeswehr soldiers were dispatched for medical support functions as part of the United Nations mission in Cambodia (UNTAC) between 1991 and 1992. Germany deployed 1700 troops for humanitarian relief operations as part of the United Nation Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II) and Operation Hope in Somalia between 1993 and 1994. The country also participated in the humanitarian airlift to Sarajevo between 1993 and 1995 and the German Navy helped enforce a weapons embargo on Yugoslavia during Operation Sharp
Guard in the Adriatic Sea in 1992. German crews on NATO AWACS planes helped monitor the no-fly zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina as part of Operation Deny Flight in 1993 and fighter jets were deployed for UN reconnaissance missions in Bosnia during the summer of 1995. These missions had mostly been in support of humanitarian and reconnaissance objectives with the government taking great care to avoid the possibility of military combat. Each deployment caused a major debate among elites as opposition members from the Social-Democratic Party, Alliance 90/Greens and the Reformed Communist Party heavily criticized foreign policy actions they perceived as deviating from behavior associated with Germany’s civilian role.

The main divergence from Germany’s tradition of abstaining from the use of force for non-defensive purposes occurred at the end of the Bosnian Civil War in 1995 when a majority of parliamentarians chose to help enforce the Dayton Agreements by contributing to NATO’s Implementation Force (IFOR) in Bosnia. This first deployment of combat troops outside of Germany since World War II marked a turning point in German security policy after which participation in UN and NATO missions increased significantly.

Germany supported IFOR’s follow-up mission in Bosnia by contributing combat troops to NATO’s Stabilization Force (SFOR) in 1996. Indicating the formation of a new elite consensus, the measure was passed in the Bundestag by an overwhelming majority. Another significant taboo was breached when German fighter aircraft participated in NATO combat missions during the Kosovo Crisis in 1999. During the 78-day air campaign Operation Allied Force against Serbia, Germany also performed high profile leadership and mediation roles for the coalition. Remarkably, German contributions to air
combat operations took place under a cabinet controlled by the former opposition which had vehemently opposed reorientation during the early 1990s.² After the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center, Germany supported the US campaign against international terrorism by contributing to the challenging mission in Afghanistan in 2001. As part of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), Germany deployed thousands of troops in the hostile environment of Afghanistan and took over leadership functions when the United States passed control over to NATO command. The creation of special commando forces in the late 1990s and their use in secret combat operations in Afghanistan also shows German tendencies to assume a more prominent role in world politics.

Germany now deploys thousands of troops in crisis spots around the world. Like other powers engaged in international activities the German public has had to get used to increasing numbers of military casualties. For many outside observers, the acceptance of the use of force and the growing international deployment of the Bundeswehr as part of the foreign policy of the Federal Republic has been nothing short of dramatic, if not revolutionary. The country is developing a new reputation by contributing to international security management commensurate with its power and by actively seeking out command-and-control positions.

Change is also indicated by Germany’s more determined diplomatic efforts to increase its international profile and status. In a clear sign of a growing post-unification

² In 1995, Germany committed both fighter aircraft and troops to the crisis in Bosnia which did not see action. At the time, Green Party leader Joschka Fischer criticized the parliamentary decision as the ‘German Rubicon’ (“Letzter Versuch”, Der Spiegel, July 3, 1995, 26). After becoming the Foreign Minister in a Red-Green coalition government just two years later, Fischer found himself supporting aerial combat during the Kosovo Crisis.
self-consciousness, Germany led an initiative to reform the United Nations Security Council under Chancellor Schröder (Schöllgen 2004, 10). At the core of the series of proposed institutional and membership-related reforms was Germany’s desire to be included as permanent member. While the objective failed, Germany has continued to pursue the goal of ‘taking on greater responsibility’ by securing a seat in the Security Council as indicated by Chancellor Merkel’s address to the United Nations in 2007 (Merkel 2007).

A final indicator suggesting that German role conceptions might be undergoing change is Germany’s “absolute deviation from multilateralism and the turn to unilateralism” (Maull 2004, 17). The unilateral recognition of Croatia and Slovenia in 1991, the growing unwillingness to serve as the European Union’s ‘paymaster’ during the 1990s and the confrontational stance taken against the United States during Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003 are noteworthy examples of a more assertive German role in European and global politics. Also significant was the German government’s refusal to back the US-led invasion of Iraq even if it had been authorized by the United Nations Security Council (Masala 2004, 2). Elite discourse since 1995 in which national interests and the country’s power are more openly acknowledged further confirm that some kind of change is underway (Baumann 2002).

Germany appears to be assuming a new role in international society with foreign policy behavior increasingly characterized by the tendency to more openly define and pursue national interests in ways more similar to that of ‘normal’ great powers like the United Kingdom or France. What prompted this fundamental change in role conceptions of which the use of force is considered a central aspect? Two major schools in
international relations theory provide differing accounts for the observed behavioral changes with opposing implications for international stability.

The Importance of the Study

For power-based explanations of national policy change including structural realism, the German security policy reorientation represents the beginning of a process of normalization with foreign policy behavior adjusting toward the less inhibited pursuit of national interests. During the Cold War era, residual rights of the quadripartite powers had restricted Germany’s foreign policy autonomy. The bipolar distribution of power in Europe further reduced national policy latitude and sustained security cooperation on the basis of joint alliance objectives. The changes in the international system after the end of the Cold War and restored German sovereignty are viewed as primary causes for the normalization of policy conduct. Germany has the inherent capabilities of a great power. Faced with the less secure, multi-polar order of the post-Cold War era, Germany is seen as naturally seeking to increase its policy-making autonomy on security issues. Unilateral policy actions and the open pursuit of national interests are expected to replace the emphasis on multilateralism and consensus-seeking that characterized previous security policy parameters. German foreign policy will become less predictable which could have profound ramifications for European and international security. Realist assumptions and the associated connotations for German foreign policy are contested by liberal schools of thought that emphasize the impact of domestic and international institutions.

3 Some realists content that the current unipolar world order is relatively stable and will characterize the international system for many years to come. See Wohlfforth (1999).
Neoliberal institutionalists regard German enmeshment in international institutions as relatively irreversible condition that will guide the preference formation of decision-makers for years to come. German participation in international institutions has greatly benefited the country which derives considerable national benefits from economic and political integration. Neoliberal institutionalists can claim that Germany has not abandoned its traditional inclination to support the expansion of the regulatory powers of international institutions. Germany has consented to additional losses in autonomy to supranational authority since reunification. The continued existence of the most important domestic institutions of the Federal Republic in the newly unified Germany further supports the argument that policy continuity rather than change is to be expected. Germany maintains a ‘semi-sovereign’ political system in which power is decentralized among different tiers in society. The constitution saw no significant revisions in regard to executive powers and the constitutional court has repeatedly supported the right of parliamentary approval in issues of military deployment. Germany maintains the military institutions created after the end of World War II. The absence of a joint chief of staff, the unique form of civil-military relations and the reliance on a conscripted rather than professional army continues to inhibit the development of a more assertive security policy. From an institutional point of view, the increasing assertiveness found in Germany’s global role appears as relatively inconsequential. Increasing military involvement in peace enforcement operations may be viewed as arising naturally from a

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4 For instance, Germany supported further economic integration in the form of the European Monetary Union even though this entailed sacrificing the Deutsche Mark as important symbol of its postwar economic revival and success.
trading state’s practical concern for economic and political stability in international politics.

Realist and institutional approaches employ variants of utilitarianism as main operative logic informing the foreign policy preferences of politicians. Both approaches downplay the importance of cultural variables according to which the interests of policy makers are ‘constructed’ in interactive social processes. Social constructivists cover that angle by assuming that the relations between actors within the international environment are structured by common understandings and normative principles about what constitutes appropriate behavior. This dissertation contributes to the social constructivist tradition.

A Social Argument for Security Policy Reorientation

Following constructivist logic, I argue that the reorientation of German security policy that started after reunification was a function of social pressure from the international community which convinced German political elites to adjust their country’s role behavior by embracing the use of force to support multilateral peace enforcement missions.\(^5\) Since reunification, leaders of important Western states and international organizations have confronted parliamentary elites in Germany with expectations to contribute to international stability through the use of military force. Conservative elites promoted role adjustment during the 1990s on the basis of external expectations because they were concerned about their country’s reputation as reliable and predictable ally. Elites from the center and the left vehemently opposed changes in

\(^5\) Rathburn (2004, 3) defines peace enforcement as “the use of military coercion by third parties to impose peace among conflicting groups or force an improvement in humanitarian conditions”.

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security policy. They argued that the maintenance of Germany’s civilian power role necessitated the maintenance of a policy stance based on the rejection of the use of force. They lost their argument against policy adjustment because their role conception was not affirmed by the international environment.

I propose that the international environment of the early post-Cold War era constituted a type of social structure characterized by shared security understandings (threat perceptions and necessary responses) and the specific contributions or role expectations (functions) of important member states. Role conceptions are used to encapsulate the understanding shared by policy-making elites about the status of their state within the social environment and its obligations towards the collective. In short, elite conceptions of state status and function within the environment can be associated with understandings of appropriate state behavior.

Normative standards in the early post-Cold War environment changed under the impact of a significant increase in the number of domestic conflicts and expanding possibilities for multilateral action. An emphasis on state sovereignty and nonintervention had characterized the Cold War period during which the standoff between two antagonistic alliances had reduced the possibilities for intervention in the domestic affairs of sovereign states. The breakup of monolithic societies in Eastern Europe was accompanied by the temporary surge in the number of ethno-political conflicts. Domestic instability replaced national survival as preeminent threat. The normative accent placed on the preservation of sovereignty was qualified by the

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6 According to Gurr (2000), the number of ethnopolitical conflicts increased dramatically during the early 1990s and has since then declined substantially.
increasing acceptance of the principle of multilateral intervention designed to reduce the threats emanating from the instabilities within states. Changing threat perceptions coupled with emerging possibilities for military action prompted the development of new strategic doctrines by international institutions. The principle of deterrence receded into the background and was unseated by that of rapid intervention. Important system actors were being called upon to restructure their internal ideational and material capabilities in line with the evolving consensus on the emergence of a new security environment that was less stable and predictable than the one that had characterized the Cold War. The transformation of security perceptions, principles and response capabilities after the Cold War had a profound impact on German security policy.

Innate material capabilities conferred upon Germany the social status of a great power. As such, the country was perceived to have special responsibilities for the maintenance of peace and stability in Europe. During the Cold War, German responsibilities were met through the country’s unequivocal commitment to the NATO alliance. Germany served as the frontline state against the Warsaw Pact. German elites allowed the militarization of German territory and supported the seamless integration of the *Bundeswehr* into alliance structures. The emergence and solidification of intervention standards after the Cold War transformed the nature of responsibility. Within the context of the altered threat and response perceptions, German responsibilities could only be met by restructuring and deploying the *Bundeswehr* in peace enforcement missions outside of the country’s territory. Since Germany’s traditional role conception of a *civilian power* specifically ruled out such behavior as inappropriate, socialization by leaders of important reference states and institutions occurred to bring German role behavior in line
with the altered role expectations. Socialization occurred internationally through a process of role adjustment in the form of a series of German learning experiences called role episodes. Internally, role adjustment was initiated and pursued by leaders of the conservative Christian-Democrats (CDU/CSU) who acted as ‘role entrepreneurs’.  

Conservative elites with traditionally Western orientations and ideologically higher inclinations to use force were able to persuade other members of Germany’s political elite through the effective use of Germany’s role conception as a ‘reliable and predictable ally’ within the ‘Western value community’. Role entrepreneurs presented behavioral adaptation as necessary to maintain the traditional role conception within the social reference group. They utilized a range of persuasive techniques centered on the argument that the requirements for maintaining international security had changed and that Germany had to meet its obligations to alliance and Western community. Failure to adapt by including the use of force was presented as leading to political and social isolation. Opponents of reorientation argued for the continuation of the antimilitant stance of the past. Their role conception of Germany as civilizing power in global politics was not affirmed by international expectations and an increasingly more volatile security environment. Eventually, many of the opponents changed their positions and either supported or acquiesced in Germany’s acceptance of the use of force. Inter-elite processes of persuasion were significantly influenced by the fluctuating strength of external expectations.

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7 The concept of role adaptation is taken from a theory addressing behavioral change in organizations (Kahn et al. 1966).

8 Role entrepreneur is an appropriation of the term ‘norm entrepreneur’ used by Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) to denote domestic actors who promote an externally generated normative standard at the domestic level. Role entrepreneurs promote new behavioral sets in the foreign policy orientation of their states.
The ability of social messages to affect actor behavior - the effectiveness of socialization - is influenced by factors of message coherency and consistency. The socializing power of normative standards increases as these become more concrete through the process of codification and their systematic application by an international organization. The natural tendency of other state actors to interpret standards according to their national interests and produce ‘normative noise’ to exert influence diminishes as standards of appropriate action become more clearly defined and more consistently applied. Variance and potential delays in actor socialization are to be expected as normative standards evolve. Intervention standards and response mechanisms became more concrete after the Cold War as the emphasis shifted from deterrence to addressing internal insecurities through multilateral intervention. The pressure on German politicians to comply with expectations steadily increased over the observed time period. Social messages became effective in modifying the security policy behavior of the Federal Republic only after advanced degrees of codification and application of intervention norms had been reached.

Additional factors important in understanding variance in compliance with external demands are the interests of domestic elite actors themselves. Socialization initially involves the transformation of elite behavior. Elite actors may also internalize new values and develop different identities which result in altered behavioral preferences. Identity change is difficult, complex and characterized by internal conflicts. The transformation of established identities and policy preferences may be supported by utilitarian considerations. External demands of behavior create political opportunities for
some elite actors which then make the adoption of new standards desirable from an instrumental point of view.

The decades of the 1980s and 1990s produced important changes in Germany’s party landscape. The three-party system that had defined much of the post-war era began to give way to a five-party system. A virulent Green Party and a reformed communist party (PDS) emerged on the left while the extreme Republikaner Party gained support on the far right. As a general disillusionment with politics (Politikverdrossenheit) was undermining membership in the main catch-all parties, Christian-Democratic (CDU/CSU) and Democratic Socialist (SPD) parties struggled to redefine themselves in the changing landscape. External expectations of Germany’s proper role in global politics during the early 1990s influenced the process by which the main parties sought to redefine their policy platforms. Foreign expectations established standards of appropriate foreign policy behavior that influenced perceptions of electoral viability (Regierungsfähigkeit). Increasingly, political elites embraced the externally generated demand for the use of force to establish themselves and their parties as viable contenders for governance. In sum, the dissertation investigates the relationship between externally generated role expectations and the micro-level interests of parliamentary elites. It primarily focuses on the socialization of state elites but also considers the process by which elites contribute to the evolution of social environments through role performance, role avoidance or role challenges.

Within the constructivist agenda, the contribution of this study is found in the application of a cultural model to understand the process of behavioral change. Cultural models generally view social constructions as independent variables. This tends to lead to
a preoccupation with stability coupled with the neglect of factors explaining normative transformation. I am proposing that a combination of insights culled from foreign policy analysis, strategic culture, role theory and norm diffusion literature allows us to better understand the important phenomenon of foreign policy reorientation.

Foreign policy analysis illuminates factors that influence the behavior of states. The field consists of an often eclectic mix of theories operating at one or several levels of analysis. Characteristics of the international system including the distribution of power, the level of institutionalization and the cultural components of international society have been considered as influences on state behavior at the structural level. At the state level of analysis, internal processes including bureaucratic politics, intra- and intergroup dynamics and the cognitive processes and personal attributes of high-ranking decision-makers are just some of the elements that are routinely examined for their influence on state foreign policy formulation. Two puzzles, in particular, have occupied researchers in the field. The first one is the relationship and relative influence of internal and external factors on processes of state foreign policy formulation. The second puzzle is the explanation of policy restructuring which is thought to occur relatively infrequently due to constraints imposed by domestic path-dependencies created by culture and institutions on one hand and constraints imposed by the external environment on the other. This dissertation contributes to both problems through the use of a social theory which employs the concepts of roles and role behavior.

Roles are important concepts within the context of the turn to culture, ideas and norms in international relations theory. Role theory offers a complementary account of the constructed nature of international politics to Wendt’s (1992; 1999) emphasis of
identities, Onuf’s (1989) consideration of speech acts or Kratochwil’s (1991) use of law. As properties of the collective, roles establish behavioral expectations on the basis of an actor’s status, functions or responsibilities within a social environment. When actors internalize the behavioral patterns associated with certain roles, the behavior becomes part of their identity. Role-related actions then constitute appropriate behavior and deviation from the socially validated behavior becomes ‘psychological painful’. By linking security policy conduct to state roles and viewing policy changes as a type of role adaptation occurring in response to altered role expectations, the dissertation contributes directly to the current constructivist research agenda on state socialization.

Socialization is defined as the adoption of the norms, values, attitudes and behaviors accepted and practiced by the ongoing system (Sigel 1970, vii). By showing that Germany underwent behavioral changes in the paramount area of security in response to external socialization processes, the dissertation supports constructivist claims about the impact of international norms on state behavior. By considering the impact of strategic culture on elite role conceptions, I also add to the knowledge on processes of international norm diffusion and domestic resonance. Normative standards are transferred to the state level through the adaptation of elite role conceptions. This allows for an explanation of norm diffusion even in the absence of resonance with mass publics, institutions or strategic cultures.

The contemporary debate between rational and reflectivist approaches in international relations theory finds utilitarian-rationalist approaches including realism and liberalism on one side and social constructivism on the other. The approaches suggest two competing decision-making logics. Rationalism assumes that actors weigh costs and
benefits of potential policy actions. Behavior is motivated by utilitarian and self-serving considerations. It is considered instrumental because it is based on the logic of consequences. The position of reflectivism is linked to the logic of social appropriateness. Here, actors consider the validity of their actions within the context of cultural constructions including morals, norms, or community values. By focusing on socialization processes, I intend to contribute primarily to the tradition of reflectivism. However, I reject the position of pure reflectivism in favor of one that views the actions of actors as being motivated by both types of logic. This raises the question of how the adaptation of role behavior was ‘useful’ to German elites pursuing a range of instrumental objectives during the ongoing process of international socialization. By including the domestic dimension of elite interests, this dissertation bridges the divide between the two positions in an effort to contribute to greater clarity about their relationship in actual policy situations.

Strategic culture is part of the category of foreign policy approaches that views state behavior as consequence of domestic characteristics. The central premise of strategic culture is that states exhibit differential foreign policy behavior due to value sets generated by unique historical and cultural development trajectories. These value sets impose broad cultural restraints on elite and public preferences. They define standards of acceptable foreign policy behavior. A central issue in the study of strategic culture has been the utility of the concept given that national foreign policy may at times deviate from the culturally defined value set. Germany’s rediscovery of the use of force is an excellent example of this problem.
German strategic culture is widely acknowledged to have changed profoundly after World War II. The collective trauma incurred by two lost world wars is believed to have generated a new national culture informed by the central value of antimilitarism. Since 1945, political elites and the general public view the efficacy of military force as negative with a smaller part of the population rejecting force under any circumstance. Antimilitarism in German culture produces a dilemma for strategic culture approaches attempting to account for the turn to military force during the 1990s. Did German culture change in important ways after reunification or does the policy divergence from the value of antimilitarism indicate problems within the paradigm? Strategic culture studies of the ‘third generation’ suggest the possibility of culture as “the product of more recent practice and experience” (Johnston 1995a, 41). Newer approaches also assume the existence of separate strategic cultures whose values may inform particular institutions or groups and act as intervening variables in policy formulation processes.

The use of elite role conceptions has several advantages for the study of strategic culture and its use in foreign policy analysis. Elite role conceptions allow for the differentiation between the value-sets of political elites and society in Germany. Separating elites and society creates the potential to illuminate processes of domestic

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9 Antimilitarism refers to the cultural rejection of militaristic and nationalistic norms held responsible for what is widely regarded as the ‘German catastrophe’. The term catastrophe conjures up a cluster of collectively shared negative and traumatic memories. These memories include the elements of authoritarianism, militarism and jingoism (which expressed itself in a unique form of foreign policy realism called Geopolitik). The conjunction of these elements is generally perceived as dotting a unique development path (Sonderweg) which culminated in the disrespect for international law, internal suppression, genocide and war. See Markovits and Reich (1997) on the importance of collective memory in structuring cultural parameters in modern Germany.

10 Johnston (1995a) categorizes strategic culture studies in three generations of scholars.

11 Kier (1995), for example, has compared military cultures in France and Germany during the interwar period.
value transformation occurring through elite leadership. Elites also act as interface between external and domestic cultures. Showing that socialization occurred effectively shows how strategic cultures - long viewed as generated by internal elements - may be influenced and even reshaped by external factors. The inclusion of elite actions and external influence suggests that strategic cultures of states ought to be viewed as much more malleable and temporary constructions than previously thought.

Methodology and Case Selection

The dissertation employs a structured, focused and comparative case study methodology to investigate the impact of external expectations on the role conceptions of German elites between 1990 and 1995. The term structured refers to a method in which cases are compared by asking the same general questions to guide data collection. This allows for a systematic comparison and accumulation of the findings. The method is focused because it investigates specific aspects of the cases as determined by a theory-guided selection in the analysis of cases. It differs from a rich historical account in that it is based on an analytical explanation in which some of the richness of the account is lost. In return for disregarding some of the case details, the researcher should be able to verify or falsify the processes among variables as established by the research design. The combination of rigor in comparison and detailed context in qualitative case studies allows for the identification of variables and hypotheses, the testing of causal mechanisms as well as the development of typological theories, or contingent generalizations involving differentiated types of variables, cases and outcomes (George and Bennett 2005).

12 Notable contributors to the method of structured, focused comparison have been Lijphart (1975), George (1979) and George and Bennett (1997; 2005).
Three cases between 1990 and 1995 were chosen for analysis. Each case involved an important security policy challenge after the Cold War in which German decision-makers were confronted with external expectations of appropriate foreign policy conduct. Each case represents a role episode which consists of a complete cycle of role sending, the response by the focal actor, and the effects of that response on the role senders (Kahn et al. 1966, 277). German elites had the option to comply with, avoid or reject role expectations. Throughout the examined period, pressure on German elites to conform by participating in peace enforcement missions increased steadily as newly arising security challenges generated organizational responses in the form of revised strategic doctrines. The concretization of these doctrines increased the normative pressure on elites to give in to expectations regarding their country’s military contributions. In each case, German actions or inactions were vital enough to the international social environment to attract international attention and incur criticism. Finally, during each role episode, elites were concerned about their country’s role in international politics but also wrestled with different diplomatic or domestic issues of their own which influenced their ultimate policy behavior. The social argument for reorientation is tested on the cases of the Persian Gulf War (1990-1991), the unilateral recognition of Croatia and Slovenia (1991-1992) and the Bosnian Civil War (1992-1995).

Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 created the first major security challenge of the post-Cold War era. The United States and important NATO allies quickly developed a consensus on militarily reversing Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait. NATO allies and the UN repeatedly requested German military assistance in the multilateral effort. Foreign policy elites advocated a new role for Germany through
formal and informal channels. The country was to show greater responsibility by militarily contributing to international peace and stability. Germany was expected to act more commensurate with capabilities, deploying its resources in ways similar to other great powers. External expectations of German policy behavior ran counter to traditional role conceptions which disallowed decisive and military engagement in international politics. German elites were caught between international expectations to alter the country’s functions in international relations and the tradition of maintaining the civilian power role conception which had served the country well since 1945. Normative pressure to alter German behavior coming from important allies and the UN remained relatively ineffective. Intervention standards were only just beginning to change and German elites generally failed to grasp the profound changes occurring in the international security environment that necessitated the use of force.

Conservative elites attempted to meet international expectations and promoted role behavior changes on the basis of alliance solidarity. They quickly backed down when challenged by their own coalition-partners and politicians from the left on the basis of elements of the traditional role conception. FDP politicians articulated concerns with the legal aspects of German participation while the SPD leadership emphasized negative views on the efficacy of force. Elite unity was maintained on the basis of the traditional role conception. Germany declined military assistance and practiced checkbook diplomacy by contributing considerable amounts of financial assistance. Troops were deployed to defend NATO ally Turkey from a potential Iraqi attack but only after a diplomatically damaging domestic discussion. The rise in the number of conscious objectors and widespread demonstrations for peace throughout Germany indicated that
the general public continued to reject the use of force. The decisions of political elites were also influenced by important domestic concerns which made the maintenance of the traditional role conception advisable from a utilitarian point of view.

Concerns and issues pertaining to the reunification of Germany trumped all other areas of politics in 1990. The Persian Gulf War could not have occurred at a more momentous time in the country’s history. At the core of the complicated reunification process was the negotiation of the Two-Plus-Four Treaty which restored full sovereignty but had to be ratified by each one of the quadripartite powers. Elites were concerned about being perceived as playing too assertive a role at a momentous time when the fate of Germany was decided by foreign publics many of which remained apprehensive about renewed German strength and national ambitions after reunification. With little guidance from international intervention norms, a somewhat euphoric mindset about newfound possibilities of international governance after the Cold War and the need to complete German reunification, elite role conceptions coalesced on the basis of the country’s civilian power role. The Persian Gulf War episode marked the beginning of the process of role adaptation.

In June 1991, Croatia and Slovenia declared independence from Yugoslavia. Nationalistic constitutions were passed that insufficiently protected the rights of the sizable Serb minority still residing in the newly independent states. Civil war broke out as the Serb-controlled Yugoslav army intervened to safeguard the territorial integrity of the state of Yugoslavia and protect the rights of the Serb minority. The international community withheld recognition of the two breakaway republics while hostilities intensified. German policy reactions first remained within the international consensus to
maintain Yugoslav unity. In the fall of 1991, German politicians diverted from that consensus and mounted an intense diplomatic campaign to recognize Croatia and Slovenia. Chancellor Kohl and his foreign minister Genscher made informal assurances of official recognition to the leaders of the states. Germany began to play an increasingly more assertive role which eventually forced the European Union to move towards recognition. Having achieved its diplomatic objectives, Germany still found it necessary to extend recognition unilaterally in early 1992. This diplomatic act stunned international observers and alienated the country’s close allies. Heavy international criticism over the assertive role followed Germany’s first major unilateral action after the Cold War.

The recognition episode saw international norms of sovereignty and state recognition clash with those of national self-determination and intervention. Normative latitude allowed individual countries to pursue their national interests. German elites bandwagoned on the recognition train after politicians noticed that dramatic political action to stop the violence in Yugoslavia resonated with the electorate. Germany’s unilateral recognition may be understood in terms of elite electoral interests and the need to resolve a major crisis without recourse to the use of force within the context of underdetermined normative standards regarding intervention that characterized the international social environment at this time.

The Bosnian Civil War between 1992 and 1995 constituted the central period of German security policy reorientation. Here, lessons learned from the previous role episodes, in conjunction with the ongoing concretization of global security norms translated into increasing social pressure on German elites to change their country’s position on the use of force. Massive human rights violations in Bosnia and the failing
efforts of international institutions also contributed to changes in elite perceptions. The civilian power role conception based on the rejection of military force became increasingly untenable. The civil war featured a series of smaller role episodes including the 1993 decision to allow German crews to stay on NATO-run AWAC monitoring missions over Bosnia, the deployment of Tornado fighter jets for reconnaissance missions in June of 1995, and the eventual deployment of troops as part of the multilateral Implementation Force (IFOR) enforcing the Dayton Agreement. The 1994 decision of the Constitutional Court to allow German military participation in out-of-area actions as part of allied peace enforcement operations was widely regarded as historic, as was the country’s deployment of the largest contingent of troops outside of German territory since World War II. During the episode(s), Germany also joined the high-profile Contact Group which sought to negotiate an end to the conflict in Bosnia. Finally, the country developed a strong interest in gaining a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council.

Conclusion and Organization of the Dissertation

This dissertation explores a fundamental reorientation in security policy in the case of Germany since reunification. The central principle under investigation is the use of force although the more general focus is on the conceptions elites hold about their country’s role in international relations after the Cold War. The main process of reorientation occurred between 1990 and 1995 when Germany sent significant numbers of combat troops outside of its territory for the first time since World War II. Since then, Germany has become a major contributor to international peace-keeping missions under
UN and NATO auspices. The country has also sought to increase its diplomatic profile as indicated by the country’s persistent attempts at acquiring a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council. Domestic institutions have been reshaped to accommodate role adaptation and long-standing interpretations of strategic doctrines have been challenged. The German Constitutional Court supported out-of-area missions in 1993 and 1994 and the *Bundeswehr* has been restructured to develop the capabilities for rapid deployment outside of German territory. Germany’s embrace of the use of force remains at odds with its strategic culture that emphasizes the importance of unique post-war values and institutions inhibiting the use of force outside of German territory. This study proposes that security policy reorientation occurred as a function of new elite understandings of German responsibilities after the Cold War. These were generated by new understandings of the international security environment which established new role-specific expectations of important actors within the system.

The dissertation will proceed in the following way: Chapter 2 presents the context and the outlines of a social theory explaining the process of security policy reorientation between 1990 and 1995 as well as the methodology employed. Chapters 3, 4 and 5 apply the theory to three cases which are considered as role episodes because of their social nature: The Persian Gulf Crisis (1990-1991), the recognition of Croatia and Slovenia (1991-1992), and the Bosnian Civil War (1992-1995). The Bosnian Civil War is crucial to understanding reorientation because international expectations became concretized and role pressure to conform eventually forced German compliance. Because of its importance to the argument, the case is presented in greater detail with an emphasis on the following policy situations and debates: *Operation Sharp Guard* in the Adriatic Sea,
Operation Deny Flight over Bosnia-Herzegovina, Operation Deliberate Force and the enforcement of the Dayton Agreements through NATO’s Implementation Force (IFOR). Chapter 6 revisits the theory, presents the findings, addresses contributions to ongoing debates in the research areas of norm diffusion, strategic culture and foreign policy analysis and concludes by suggesting an agenda for further research.
CHAPTER II
SOCIALIZATION THROUGH ROLE EPISODES

Introduction

Understanding the behavior of states is one of the most complex undertakings in political science. The over-simplified view of states as both unitary and rational actors reacting to systemic challenges has long ceased to be of much use in foreign policy analysis. Approaches that focus on the interplay of domestic actors, institutions and processes frequently downplay or neglect the impact of the external milieu. More useful approaches will account for the unique characteristics of the state under observation while also considering the impact of external factors. A more complex theory “that considers…multiple levels and that grapples with the intricacies of the link between domestic and international factors in foreign policy analysis is by nature more cumbersome and messier” (Haar 2001, 8). The theory of foreign policy reorientation to be presented combines the quest for generalization with the need to include the unique details of processes within Germany.

I begin by presenting a brief overview of the context of German security policy including a historical account of security policy during the Cold War period and the discussion of unique cultural and institutional factors. After that, this chapter will cover the main theoretical approaches to German foreign policy from which hypotheses about foreign policy preferences can be deduced. I then lay out a social theory of German
foreign policy reorientation. The chapter ends by presenting the methodology employed including a list of research questions used for comparative analysis and the consideration of data sources.

The Context of German Security Policy

German Security Policy during the Cold War

Germany has played a crucial role in the history of the world. Divided into a patchwork of independent states, modern Germany was proclaimed after a war with France in 1871. The comparatively late consolidation of the state was followed by a fast-paced modernization process. In the interest of national unity and power, democracy and liberal values were sacrificed by some and systematically suppressed by others. The nationalistic strategies pursued by the powerful state would weigh heavily on future generations. Associated with Germany’s modernization between 1864 and 1945 were aggressive wars, millions of military and civilian casualties as well as millions of murders perpetrated as part of the genocidal policies of the Third Reich. World War II resulted in Germany’s total military defeat, sociopolitical bankruptcy and utter physical destruction. Two newly emergent superpowers had finally dealt with the problem of unbalanced hegemony in Central Europe. The division of Europe resolved the German problem by keeping the Soviets out, the Americans in and the Germans down.13

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13 The original statement attributed to Lord Ismay was that “NATO was designed to keep the Americans in, the Russians out and the Germans down” (quoted in Ash 1993, 389). Ash (1993, 358) writes that “both the Atlantic Alliance and the European Community were to save Europe from itself - that is, from reverting to the bad old ways of warring nation states - to protect all of Western Europe from the Soviet Union and to protect the rest of Western Europe against Germany”.
The Federal Republic of Germany came into existence in 1949 when British, American and French occupation zones were merged and a new capital was established in Bonn. Also that year, the German Democratic Republic emerged from the Soviet occupation zone as a communist client state of the Soviet Union. Two central objectives determined the foreign policy of the Federal Republic during the early post-war years: The desire to reintegrate the country into the world community as a sovereign state after the total defeat and the reunification of the German nation.

The historic burden created by the aggressive and nationalistic policies of the past weighed heavily on the new republic. To overcome this burden, Chancellor Adenauer pursued a foreign policy aimed at reestablishing trust with Germany’s former occupiers. The policy of Western integration (Westbindung) clearly prioritized the unequivocal positioning of Germany as part of the emerging Western alliance and, only to a secondary degree, involved efforts aimed at reunification. As part of Westpolitik and the goal of reintegration, German political elites pursued their country’s membership in international organizations. Support for multilateralism and international governance would become a defining characteristic of post-World War II German foreign policy. Germany signed the Treaty of Paris in 1951 which established the European Coal and Steel Community, joined NATO in 1955, and also signed the Rome Treaty of 1957 which established the European Economic Community. The decision to rearm and join NATO was controversial given a profoundly altered strategic culture characterized by the central value of antimilitarism. Opposition parties used moral, financial and even constitutional arguments to prevent rearmament (Lantis 2002b, 73). In the end, rearmament and NATO membership was achieved with unique provisions assigning the Bundeswehr’s 340,000
combat forces to NATO rather than German central command. The German military became an alliance army, designed to play its part in maintaining a credible deterrent. It was not intended to be a fighting force employable for the pursuit of Germany’s national security policy objectives. In return, allied countries stationed troops in Germany as defense against Soviet aggression and pledged to protect Germany through both conventional and nuclear means (Ibid.). Germany also renounced weapons of mass destruction in 1954 and acceded to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1975. When the Adenauer cabinet agreed to the stationing of US nuclear warheads on German soil, a contentious campaign against the decision erupted between 1957 and 1958. The nuclear weapons debate ended when the Social Democratic party dropped its resistance to Germany’s Western orientation. Elite preferences prevailed over public concern about stationing weapons of mass destruction.

Compared to the diplomatic flexibility and innovation of Westpolitik, policy towards East Germany and Eastern Europe had appeared stilted and dogmatic. Political gestures including the use of the term Basic Law (Grundgesetz) for the new constitution to indicate the open-ended nature of German state building could not disguise the fact that German policy towards the East was dictated by Western priorities which, in turn, became increasingly subjected to the imperatives of the Cold War.

Between 1955 and 1969, the Federal Republic attempted to isolate and delegitimize the communist regime in East Germany through the use of an exclusive mandate to representation known as the Hallstein Doctrine. The policy directive threatened the termination of diplomatic relations with states that chose to recognize the Democratic Republic. It was applied inconsistently and alienated governments in many
parts of the world. It also prevented the establishment of relations with Eastern European countries because it ran counter to the interests of the Soviet Union. To correct that problem, Adenauer’s successor Erhard attempted to revitalize German foreign policy in 1963 by starting a diplomatic initiative to conclude friendship treaties with Eastern European states designed to isolate East Germany. However, the Soviet Union quickly countered these efforts by signing a mutual assistance treaty with East Germany in 1964. Even the successful establishment of diplomatic relations with Rumania in 1967 would do little to validate a policy that had clearly failed in its primary objective to reestablish ties with Eastern Europe without surrendering the claim to the exclusive mandate. A fundamental reorientation of foreign policy was needed. It would not be achieved until the cabinet of Willy Brandt in 1969. Chancellor Brandt’s foreign policy initiative known as Ostpolitik was designed to reconnect West and East through a series of important agreements.

Brandt quickly moved towards a realistic acceptance of the territorial status in Europe by signing non-aggression treaties with Poland and the USSR. After that, the as yet unsolved status of Berlin was finally settled through the Four Power Agreement of 1971 which affirmed joint quadripartite rights and responsibilities for Germany. With East Germany, the Federal Republic signed a comprehensive Basic Treaty in 1972 which extended de facto recognition to East Germany as ‘German state of the same nation’. As such, sovereignty of the East German regime was not fully recognized - a distinction that was lost on the rest of the world which quickly recognized the German Democratic Republic. The foreign policy reorientation was possible because the period of détente during the early 1970s had increased the policy latitude of German politicians. In turn,
German Ostpolitik became the centerpiece of superpower détente. The period culminated in the Helsinki Accords of 1975 in which 35 European countries and the US established a range of important provisions including the inviolability of borders and respect for territorial integrity. The norms supporting sovereignty were highly useful because they allowed for the peaceful coexistence of diametrically opposed regimes during the Cold War. They would only be challenged when the Cold War ended and its associated security environment was superseded by one characterized by greater instabilities.

The USSR’s invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 effectively ended the period known as détente. Additional tensions had emerged over Soviet efforts to modernize its theatre nuclear forces in Europe. With the deployment of the intermediate range SS-20 missiles in 1977, the growing imbalance in tactical missiles became a major cause for concern in Western Europe because the strategic arms control agreements SALT I and SALT II had neutralized US superiority in intercontinental ballistic missiles.\(^{14}\) When NATO addressed the imbalance through the Double Track Decision on Theatre Nuclear Forces in December 1979, Chancellor Schmidt agreed to have Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) stationed in Germany. The Bundestag would approve Schmidt’s initial decision in 1983 but the prospect of stationing large numbers of tactical nuclear weapons in Germany again created major problems given the country’s antimilitant culture. A vocal peace movement opposing the deployment of INF weapons developed.\(^{15}\) The vehement public resistance would soon raise questions abroad about German reliability within the


\(^{15}\) A petition against INF deployment called the ‘Krefeld Appeal’ had received over 1.5 million signatures by 1982 (See Boutwell 1983, 80).
alliance. The emergence of the movement was part of more fundamental processes of change within German society that had been ongoing since the late 1960s.\textsuperscript{16} The consequences of these social and political changes were now beginning to affect the traditional party spectrum and the positions of parties.

The German peace movement had its roots in the anti-nuclear energy campaigns and the rise of environmental concerns of the 1970s. The political leadership of the diverse movement was provided by the Green Party. Formed in the 1970s as an antiestablishment party, the Greens were quickly gaining prominence among voters dissatisfied by the centrist consensus maintained by the CDU/CSU, SPD and FDP. In the early 1980s, the party greatly benefited from its firm pacifist position and the stance against nuclear proliferation. Electoral support for the Green Party increased and in 1983, Greens first achieved parliamentary representation by garnering 5.6 percent of the electoral vote. By 1987, party support had soared to 8.3 percent as increasing numbers of formerly social democratic voters switched to a party that better represented their core concerns. Voter realignment processes also affected the CDU/CSU as main party on the right spectrum.

In 1983, disenchanted members of the CSU formed the right-wing populist party \textit{Die Republikaner}. Languishing for a number of years, the party’s electoral fortunes improved when Germany faced a surge in the number of refugees and illegal immigrants during the late 1980s. During the 1989 Berlin elections, the party took 7.5 percent of the vote, followed by 7.1 percent in the European elections (Betz 1993, 415). The federal elections of 1990 were relatively disappointing for the party because it failed to gain

\textsuperscript{16} See Boutwell (1983) for a more detailed overview of the origins of the peace movement.
parliamentary representation. However, successes continued at the regional level where the rightwing party continued to siphon electoral support from the CDU/CSU by appealing to conservative voting groups. In April 1992, the *Republiker* Party received almost 12 percent of the vote in the state of Baden-Württemberg (Ibid.). Rightwing successes at the regional level had the potential to reduce CDU/CSU power in Germany’s upper house. Both SPD and CDU/CSU leaders were eager to prevent the other party from becoming a co-governing force in Germany’s federal system through control of the powerful *Bundesrat*. In sum, the successes of more radical parties on both sides of the spectrum generated pressure on established parties to reexamine their programs in an effort to maintain voter appeal.

For the Social Democrats as traditional advocates for peace, the programmatic challenge posed by the Greens initiated discussions about abandoning centrist policy orientations maintained since Chancellor Schmidt. Influential party members began to argue that the party ought to move further to the left in order to regain the support of young voter groups who had been lost to the Greens (Berger 1998, 164). CDU/CSU politicians responded to pressure from the right wing by embracing the issue of immigration reform which they saw as fuelling support for more extreme positions. Both CDU/CSU and SPD were also struggling with considerable membership declines as citizens increasingly preferred grassroots engagement to active participation in the catch-all parties. For liberal politicians of the FDP, the most pressing issue was the potential loss of their kingmaker position in coalition governments which was in danger of being

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17 See Kvistad (1999) for a more detailed overview of changes in participation and party membership during the early 1990s.
usurped by the Green Party. Thus, the years preceding reunification were characterized by realignment processes in the traditional party system which increased elite concerns about maintaining electoral support. These processes coincided with the dramatic chain of events that would radically transform international politics.

Mikhail Gorbachev took control of the Soviet Union in 1985. He ended the Cold War dynamic between the superpowers through a series of bold foreign policy moves. Perhaps most momentous among those decisions was his abandonment of the Brezhnev Doctrine which had threatened independent regime change in Eastern European countries with military intervention by the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{18} A series of earthshaking transitions swept across Europe. The changes began with the legalization of the Solidarity Movement in Poland in April 1989 and culminated with the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991. The Cold War effectively ended and its relatively stable bipolar security environment soon gave way to more uncertain conditions and new security threats. Nationalist conflicts, disintegrating states, genocide and large-scale refugee problems reemerged as security problems in Europe. The challenges of the new security environment created the need for revised threat definitions, response doctrines and capabilities to address the emerging problems associated with domestic instabilities. International organizations including NATO, UN, OSCE, EU and WEU responded by strengthening the emphasis on the principle of multilateral intervention. Rapid intervention doctrines and the expanding peacekeeping agenda of international organizations included...

\textsuperscript{18} The Brezhnev Doctrine of 1968 justified the external suppression of anti-socialist developments in socialist countries. It was articulated by the Soviet Union in response to liberal reforms in Czechoslovakia commonly known as the Prague Spring which were ended through the invasion of the country. For a full text of the speech given by Soviet Leader Brezhnev see http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/pgc.asp?page=mod/1968brezhnev.html (accessed May 19, 2009).
organizations required new national capabilities thus prompting both reorganization and modernization of national militaries to accommodate the new mission spectrum. The required changes produced particular problems for Germany.

Germany’s ‘alliance army’ was a blunt sword designed for little else but territorial defense against a massive attack. Antimilitarism had made achieving rearmament and NATO membership a heavily contested process in 1955. Now that the Cold War had ended, Germany’s public expected a ‘peace dividend’. Powerful antimilitary institutions, widespread pacifist attitudes and negative views on the efficacy of military force all made reorganization and modernization of the Bundeswehr a politically difficult goal. Nevertheless, the changing requirements created by the international security environment exerted pressure on the country’s elites and its public to consider the basis for a new consensus on Germany’s role in world politics.

The overview of German security policy until reunification reveals three central contextual elements important in understanding the security policy reorientation of the 1990s. The first element is the persistence of the value of antimilitarism characterizing the strategic culture of the Federal Republic. The public’s rejection of the use of force resulted in repeated challenges to government policy during the 1950s and early 1980s. The profound skepticism about both appropriateness and usefulness of military force present in strategic culture imposed constraints on elite decision-making in issues or policy actions involving the use of force. A second element is Germany’s strong preference for multilateral foreign policy and regional integration coupled with the aversion to having the country assume a leadership role in international political affairs (Hyde-Price 2003, 187). Political elites have literally been obsessed with having the
country appear as calculable and reliable partner who honors international commitments (Duffield 1999, 782). Lastly, the survey of Germany’s security policy during the Cold War period indicates the crucial role played by parliamentary elites. Elites redirected security policy at important junctures in the history of the Federal Republic. They pursued German remilitarization, firmly committed the country to the NATO alliance and consented to the stationing of nuclear weapons. At times, elite actions went contrary to public opinion and even deviated from central values established by strategic culture. It is plausible to view political elites as promoters and agents of the security policy reorientation process that took place during the 1990s. Germany’s decision-makers reacted to external demands generated by a transformed security environment.

Strategic Culture and Institutions

A central problem for any explanation of foreign policy reorientation is the strong inertia attached to institutions and processes characterizing the domestic realm of policy-making which makes radical and durable shifts in foreign policy comparatively rare phenomena (Volgy and Schwarz 1991, 617). A domestic ‘web of constraint’ is created by factors such as bureaucratic processes, the path-dependencies generated by prior decisions and institutions, ideological commitments and limitations imposed by national resources. This web restricts the ability of leaders to effectuate fundamental foreign policy change (Volgy and Schwarz 1994, 27). In part, the problem is due to a tendency

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19 Insights from organizational theory, in particular, suggest that institutions are more stable than the environment they operate in. Resource constraints and high transaction costs associated with changes in organizational parameters tend to reduce the pace and extent of adaptation. Organizational inertia is further maintained through behavioral standards, selection biases in recruitment and socialization, tasks and operating procedures, rituals, jargon, perceptions and shared memories (Welch 2005, 32-33).
in foreign policy analysis to focus on stable patterns and to “treat breaks in patterns as exceptions, as nuisances which complicate our task” (Rosenau 1976, 371). National policy path-dependencies are frequently the result of values contained within strategic culture which suffuse existing institutions and constrain individual preferences. German strategic culture and security policy institutions are characterized by a set of unique values which provided the context for policy reorientation of the 1990s.

Strategic culture has been defined as “ideas, conditional emotional responses, and patterns of habitual behavior” (Snyder 1977, 8) or “a limited, ranked set of grand strategic preferences” (Johnston 1995, 38). The concept refers to enduring national tendencies that arise from unique and prolonged historical experiences (Longhurst 2004, 17; Gray 1986, 36-7). Strategic culture acts a collectively shared framework, filter or prism which determines individuals’ interpretation of reality (Poore 2004, 50). It suffuses society and its political institutions. It imposes constraints on elite action by establishing standards on what is considered natural and common sense (Kier 1995, 78; Duffield 1999, 772). Crucial elements in strategic culture are the “modes of thought and action with respect to force” (Gray 1986, 36-7; Johnston 1995; Longhurst 2004, 17). In its rejection of military force, German strategic culture since 1945 is considered unusual.

Germany underwent a permanent shift in its strategic culture after World War II (Berger 1998; Duffield 1998; Longhurst 2004; Malici 2006). A history of state repression, unilateral diplomacy and external aggression associated with values of militarism and hyper-nationalism culminated in two lost world wars which devastated the

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20 The statement retains considerable validity even given the democratic transitions of the 1990s and the studies of these regime changes. See Bunce (2000) for an overview of factors affecting democratic regime changes.
country. These extreme and traumatic events produced a discontinuity in strategic culture (Longhurst 2004, 25). A condition of ‘collective infancy’ resulted during which Germans had to relearn “affective and evaluative schemes” including matters related to the role of the armed forces in society and the use of military force (Ibid.). The value of antimilitarism came to dominate Germany’s transformed strategic culture.

Antimilitarism is the belief that war is generally indefensible and that military force is an inferior and preventable means of addressing disagreements between states. This negative view on the efficacy of military force results in critical predispositions towards military institutions and ideas within society. Antimilitarism as measured in terms of public attitudes on the utility of force has characterized German society since 1945. Heated domestic debates over rearmament during the late 1950s, the INF deployment during the 1980s and the Bundeswehr ‘out-of-area’ missions of the 1990s indicate the powerful influence of antimilitarism in German culture. Even with the expanding military commitments since 1995, the German public continues to exhibit a profound skepticism about both appropriateness and usefulness of military force (Haumann and Petersen 2004, 316; Hyde-Price 2003, 187).²¹ Peace is considered an absolute value and the presence of gross injustices or violations of international law in other countries does not automatically generate popular support for military action (Duffield 1999, 780). The power of antimilitarism in German state and society is further enhanced by the relative weakness of nationalism. Nationalism is perceived as enabler of

²¹ A survey conducted in 1999 by the Allensbach Institute on the question of humanitarian intervention revealed a majority of young Germans (ages 14-19) opposing war under any circumstances (Haumann and Petersen 2004, 316).
militarism and major cause of war. Until the 1990s, the use of nationalist appeals and arguments in politics, common in other countries, was considered inappropriate.

Antimilitarism and negative views on the efficacy of military force explain the public’s persistent opposition to increasing national defense spending. The majority of citizens supported reductions in defense expenditures after the Cold War. It has since favored keeping defense spending at the comparatively low levels of the post-Cold War era and even decreasing it (Berger 1998, 155). As percentage of GDP, defense spending has consistently declined since reunification and remains low in comparison with other great powers.\footnote{In 1990, Germany spent 2.8 percent of GDP on defense, compared to 3.4 percent for France, 3.9 percent for the United Kingdom and 5.3 percent for the United States. By 1995, those numbers were 1.6 percent for Germany, 3 percent for France and the United Kingdom and 3.8 for the United States. German defense expenditures as percentage of GDP have continued to decline, reaching 1.3 percent of GDP in 2006 (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, http://milexdata.sipri.org/result.php4 (accessed March 15, 2009)).} The low military budgets and public resistance to even minor increases have acted as constraints on elite efforts directed at modernizing and reorganizing the Bundeswehr.

Calculability or predictability is the second key value in German strategic culture. Outside observers have frequently commented on the obsession of political elites to have Germany appear as calculable and reliable partner who honors international commitments - a concept Germans call Berechenbarkeit (Duffield 1999, 782). Multilateralism, defined as “the practice to co-ordinate national policies in groups of three or more states” (Keohane 1990, 731), is a behavioral manifestation of the value of calculability. A second behavior type is elite aversion to having Germany assume a leadership role in international political affairs (Hyde-Price 2003, 187). The central strategic values of
antimilitarism and calculability are sustained by important national security institutions created after the militaristic institutions of the past had been abolished.

The German constitution or Basic Law, promulgated in 1949, plays a crucial role in the country’s security policy because it constrains options of both decision-makers and outlines the basic functions of the armed forces. The constitution explicitly prohibits the use of force for aggressive purposes by making the preparation of aggressive war unconstitutional and perpetrators punishable (Article 26a). This makes the military accountable for its actions on the basis of national and international law. The constitution allows the use of the German armed forces other than for defense only if explicitly stipulated by the Basic Law (Article 87a) and also establishes a citizen’s right to refuse military service for reasons of conscience (Article 66). In addition to supporting antimilitarism, the document creates the basis for German multilateralism in security policy by allowing for the country’s participation in collective security organizations as long as these institutions serve the maintenance of peace (Article 24). The unusual inclusion of this article is viewed as an indicator of a preference for the pursuit of multilateral security policy (Baumann 2001, 146; Berger 1998, 31). Germany’s constitution strongly influences the organization and institutional culture of its armed forces.

The organizational structure of the German military supports the multilateral and antimilitant tendencies observed in other institutions. Completely integrated into NATO’s military structure, the Bundeswehr was established as alliance army (Baumann 2001, 147) without a general staff (Paterson 2000, 27). The multilateral security orientation and the firm integration into NATO’s command structure was upheld after the Two-plus-Four
Treaty in 1990 restored full German sovereignty in military matters (Duffield 1999, 783). The Bundeswehr remains an alliance army that is ill-suited to unilateral and nationalist policy objectives. The organizational culture of the Bundeswehr is defined by a unique philosophical concept referred to as inner guidance (Innere Führung).

Inner guidance is the foundational element of German civil-military relations. It conceptualizes German soldiers as citizen in uniform (Bürger in Uniform) who serve the state in the capacity of a soldier but remain citizens throughout the time of service. This preserves the soldier’s full rights and establishes individual responsibilities on the basis of the values and norms enumerated in the German constitution. A soldier’s primary obligation rests with constitutional principles guaranteeing inviolable and inalienable human rights rather than the military command. Institutionalized respect for constitutional principles and the maintenance of the soldiers’ connection with society are intended to strengthening liberal-democratic values in the armed forces (Hyde-Price 2003, 186). The resulting military has been characterized by a critical orientation towards the use of force which mirrors the general antimilitant predisposition of society. Civil-military connections are also maintained by the institution of national military service which is viewed as preventing the emergence of a military controlled by a particular group or class (Kohl 1996; Hoffmann and Longhurst 1999, 35 and 43).

The brief overview of German cultural and institutional characteristics indicates that considerable societal impediments to security policy reorientation existed during the 1990s. But these factors also offered unique possibilities for policy transformation. The value of antimilitarism and its associated behavioral preference for non-military actions in global politics would not remain uncontested given the value of calculability which
established the need for compliance with multilateral policy decisions. Germany’s advanced levels of integration in multilateral security institutions created opportunities and settings for agents pursuing the objective of policy reorientation. The country’s reliance on external sources to validate its post-Cold War identity as calculable and reliable member of the Western alliance established foreign expectations of German contributions to international security as significant factors that would create both obligations and incentives for elites to engineer changes in the country’s central foreign policy principles.

Foreign Policy Analysis: Internal and External Factors

Security policy reorientations are durable transformations of the traditional security policy patterns of a state actor. Alternatively called policy restructuring, policy shift or policy redirection, reorientation involves the revision of a state’s traditional stance on important issues or challenges emanating from the environment. Reorientation differs from but usually affects specific policy decisions, general guidelines or strategic doctrines, observable behavior or verbal pronouncements. Within mature democracies, shifts from established parameters of foreign policy behavior may also be related to changes in public opinion, political institutions and a country’s collectively shared security values or strategic culture. Reorientation is a foreign policy phenomenon. As such, the central questions in the field of foreign policy analysis also pertain to this class of events. Nothing is more central in the field than the debate about the relative influence of internal and external influences on state behavior.

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23 This definition is an adaptation of that of foreign policy used by Kaarbo, Lantis and Beasley (2002, 4).
The question of what drives national foreign policy - domestically generated interests or structural constraints - comes with the territory. States are bounded entities within the international environment. Leaders of states act as liaisons between the domestic and external sphere and deploy foreign policy “to mediate the impact of the external on the domestic and to find ways of projecting a particular set of concerns in a very intractable world” (Hill 2003, 31). The nature of foreign policy as gateway between two connected worlds suggests that it can be influenced from either direction. Many approaches have concentrated on illuminating one or the other side of the relationship.


\(^{24}\) Fearon (1998, 290) notes that between 1987 and 1996, slightly more than one-third of 193 abstracts from *International Organization* invoke domestic-political factors as independent or intervening variables.
level approaches have been criticized for being reductionist because they either neglect or downplay the importance of stimuli and constraints emanating from the international system (Waltz 1979). Environmental influences are captured in theories of international politics. Three international relations paradigms are routinely used to develop hypotheses on state foreign policy conduct.

The neorealist paradigm views the international environment in Hobbesian fashion. Anarchy defines the international system which imposes the primacy of survival as state security objective. States are the preeminent actors which view gains in relative terms. This limits their ability to engage in cooperative and multilateral behavior. The distribution of power within the system, known as polarity, directly affects state behavior because the differential state capabilities establish power-based categories of states. The foreign policy behavior of a great power is deemed to be characterized by a tendency to preserve its foreign policy autonomy while states with less capability will tend to seek influence (Rittberger 2001; Baumann 2001). State conduct deviating from this standard is viewed as temporary occurrence because the international environment will have a tendency to ‘normalize’ state policy to reflect inherent actor capabilities.

Neo-liberal institutionalist approaches to understanding foreign policy and foreign policy reorientation consider the impact of international institutions on state conduct. Representing this perspective, Keohane states that “the nature and strength of international institutions are also important determinants of expectations and therefore of

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25 Multilateral arrangements do not necessarily provide evidence for multilateralism. Even within the European Union, states have jealously guarded their national sovereignty by refusing to shift real power from the intergovernmental European Council to truly supranational institutions such as the Commission or the European Parliament (Hacke 1998). Consistent French support for European integration may well be understood as a means to control Germany or the desire to amplify its own influence (Loriaux 1999).
state behavior” (Hoffmann, Keohane, and Mearsheimer 1990, 193). States are conceptualized as rational utility-maximizers that value cooperation over the costs imposed by conditions characterized by unregulated relations. States will adapt their foreign policy behavior to international rules in an effort to better pursue a range of utilitarian objectives. As rules evolve and connect actors in increasingly more complex networks of interdependence, multilateral policy conduct and the reliance on international organizations to pursue collective, international goals become widespread (Keohane and Nye 1977). Neoliberal institutionalists contend that after bipolarity, interdependence remains the single most important structural feature of the international system (Peters 2001).

Social constructivists see the international environment as possessing a cultural, interactive quality in which social relations create normative understandings between actors which lead to the coordination of values, expectations and behavior (Finnemore 1996, 192). States adopt international norms, understandings or principles and redirect their foreign policy out of a desire to comply with standards of behavior that are generally considered socially acceptable or appropriate. Changes are pursued by domestic norm entrepreneurs who have “strong notions about appropriate or desirable behavior” (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 896). Initial compliance with externally generated norms may be the result of utilitarian considerations as leaders perceive benefits for ‘doing the right thing’. Over time, decision-makers may internalize what they now consider as appropriate behavior and it becomes associated with identity or role. In advanced stages

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26 Finnemore and Sikkink (1998, 896) define norm entrepreneurs as “agents having strong notions about appropriate or desirable behavior in their community”. The authors see them as playing a crucial role in the norm building process.
of socialization, actors assume new identities and the transformed behavioral patterns become ‘second nature’. Deviation from the norm will become less likely as norms reconstitute interests and reshaped domestic institutions lock in the changes.

International relations paradigms suggest general preference patterns for states including tendencies towards maximizing power (neorealism), pursuing cooperation (neo-liberal institutionalism) and valuing social compliance (constructivism). Theories of international politics do not explain differences in state foreign policy conduct resulting from internal factors. The suggested policy preferences for power (neo-realism), cooperation (neo-liberalism) and social compliance (constructivism) constitute broad guidelines of state action and rarely determine foreign policy directly.27

A third path taken in foreign policy analysis involves attempts to reconcile the close relationship between the domestic and the international sphere by explaining foreign policy as the result of conjunctions of external and internal factors. Hanrieder suggested that foreign policy was a “continuous process bridging the analytical barriers between the international and the domestic political system” (1967, 977). Feasible foreign policy goals were those that were both compatible with the “strictures and opportunities of the international system” and enjoyed a sufficient degree of domestic consensus on the ends and means of foreign policies (Ibid.). Responding to Waltz’s criticism of state-level explanations of foreign policy, Gourevitch proposed his ‘second image reversed’ in which domestic outcomes are seen as shaped by international factors (1978). Other important contributions include the prolific research on two level games in which rational decision-makers are viewed as negotiating international agreements that

27 Waltz (1979, 121) wrote on the issue that “it is an error… to mistake a theory of international politics for a theory of foreign policy”. 49
enhance the power of supporting coalitions on the domestic side (Putnam 1988; Evans, Jacobsen, and Putnam 1993). More parsimonious models have also been constructed. Alons, for example, argues that factors understood as internal and external polarities determine a states’ foreign policy direction (2007). Frequently, crises or external shocks are seen as playing an important role, particularly in accounting for foreign policy reorientation. Hermann, for instance, views dramatic international events as accounting for the majority of foreign policy change (1990, 14). For Krasner, crises force the adaptation of policies that are “no longer feasible” (1976, 341). Lantis sees decision-makers reacting to ‘strategic dilemmas’ which he defines as “regional or international crises that demand a response from great powers and may prompt realignment in foreign policy” (2002a, 5). Ikenberry considers the effect of particular historical moments that empower specific expert groups who redefine state conceptions of the national interest through new policy approaches and philosophies (1993, 59).

More recent attempts to connect external with internal variables have evolved out the social constructivist research agenda which investigates the impact of international norms, understandings and principles on domestic politics. Notable investigations of successful or unsuccessful norm diffusion include studies of human rights norms (Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999), humanitarian intervention (Finnemore 1996), the taboo on weapons of mass destruction (Price and Tannenwald 1996), conceptions of state citizenship (Checkel 1999; 2001), liberal-democratic institutions (Flockhart 2005; Vachudova 2005; Schimmelfennig 2001), and policy towards ethnic minorities (Kelley 2004). Increasingly, the constructivist research focus has moved to an examination of the
sociopolitical processes by which transnational and domestic actors utilize international norms and promote transformations in state laws, policies and principles.

The proposed theory follows in the tradition of explaining foreign policy change as the result of a conjunction of external and internal factors. It contributes to the social constructivist tradition that views state policy changes as a result of the diffusion of international norms and understandings. I hypothesize that Germany was socialized by the international system, understood as international organizations and important allies, to assume the rank and to exhibit the behavior of a great power. Social expectations prompted German security policy reorientation, not changes in the distribution of power as postulated by realist approaches. Germany was pressured to play the role of a responsible ally in the global system by contributing commensurate with capabilities which included the use of force. Changes in foreign policy behavior were the result of transformations of the conceptions held by political elites about Germany’s appropriate role within the international system.

National Role Conceptions

The focal point of the current constructivist research agenda is the study of social and cultural variables. A key variable deemed to affect the behavior of actors is that of identity. Succinctly stated, identity may be understood as an actor’s conception of itself.\textsuperscript{28} Identities emerge as the result of a combination of internal factors including inherent capabilities, unique development processes, formative experiences and external conditions such as material contexts and the social expectations of other actors embedded.

\textsuperscript{28} Wendt (1992, 397; 1999, 21) defines identity as relatively stable, role-specific understandings and expectations about self.
in the same culture. Many authors believe that states maintain identities not unlike individuals (Rosenau 1987; Chafetz, Abramson, and Grillot 1997, 174) and that these identities generate motivational and behavioral dispositions (Wendt 1992; 1999, 224). State identities are deemed to be the product of material factors, elements that Wendt refers to as “rump materialism” and social interaction with other actors in the international system (Wendt 1999). Communities of states create and maintain social expectations and behavioral prescriptions for members. These expectations establish categories of proper or appropriate behavior which are maintained and reinforced through socialization processes between states. A different way of thinking about identity and its associated behavior is to conceptualize it as a social role and role behavior, respectively.

Roles are the main means by which social collectives organize the behavior of their members. Roseau defines them as “attitudinal and behavioral expectations that those who relate to its occupant have of the occupant and the expectations that the occupant has of himself or herself in given situations” (1990, 220). The use of roles creates the possibility “of treating individuals not as concrete, identifiable persons, but as complexes of roles and statuses…that so fully account for the expectations to which they respond that nothing meaningful is left over as the quintessentially unique person”

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29 Material influences may include a state’s location or available resources while social influences refer to the prevailing culture of the external environment which establishes specific types of appropriate and inappropriate identities which, in turn, make certain state actions appear as either appropriate or inappropriate. For instance, within a security community, armed force is considered inappropriate conduct (Adler and Barnett 1998). Wendt (1999) distinguishes between Hobbesian, Lockean and Kantian cultures that each are characterized by different ‘logics of appropriateness’. Thus, power-seeking and military conflict appear appropriate in a Hobbesian but not in a Kantian culture in which multilateral consensus-formation is considered more appropriate conduct.

30 Holsti (1970, 239) writes that “the foundations of human behavior … are both the position and the norms and expectations the alter projects on the position”.
(Rosenau 1987, 45). Like individuals, states maintain relatively stable roles within international society which determine behavioral predispositions in specific contexts. The theoretical concept used to describe this tendency is that of a national role conception.

National role conceptions (NRCs) are social constructions of “the policy-makers’ own definitions of the general kinds of decisions, commitments, rules and actions suitable to their state, and of the functions, if any, their state should perform on a continuing basis in the international system or in subordinate systems” (Holsti 1970, 245-46). This includes perceptions of the nation’s position in international society and understandings “of the general kinds of decisions, commitments, and associated long-term international functions which are associated with these positions” (Wish 1987, 96). The NRCs of policy-makers constitute a type of cognitive “image of the appropriate orientations or functions of their state” (Ibid.) and “a set of norms expressing expected foreign policy behaviour and action orientation” (Aggestam 1999, 2).

Role conception theorists claim that states are actors that exhibit behavioral orientations consistent with specific roles with which they identify (Chafetz, Abramson, and Grillot 1997, 174). National role conceptions specify what foreign policy goals should be pursued, what tasks must be accomplished, and what performances are required in a given regional or issue-specific context. State roles are reproduced through the combination of subjective elite understandings of what behavior a role requires (role conceptions), external demands of international society (role expectations) and the

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31 The extrapolation of the role concept from individual to state actors can be justified because role understandings, as cultural constructs, can be shared by the decision-makers commanding the state.
particular context in which the role is acted out (role performance). In short, state role performance is a function of domestically generated role conceptions and externally formulated expectations. National role conceptions held by elites come under pressure and may experience adjustment when role performance is no longer validated by other states through intersubjectively grounded practices or shared meanings (Wendt 1999).

National role conceptions are ideational variables. The perceptions, values and attitudes of the actor occupying a position become the crucial independent variables explaining the role performance of the national actor (Holsti 1970, 240-241). In developing their national role conceptions, policy-making elites consider a range of elements which can be broken down in internal and external as well as material and ideational elements. Figure 1 illustrates the elements believed to affect role conceptions with internal and external ideational factors represented in bold font.

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33 Social constructivists view the end of the Cold War as important example showcasing their argument for social variables and the importance of intersubjective understandings in international relations. They argue that the Cold War ended when President Gorbachev failed to affirm its existence. Thus, the most important transformation in international politics of the last 50 years is explained by ideational rather than material changes. See Koslowski and Kratochwil (1994).
Figure 1: Internal and External Origins of National Role Conceptions

NRCs are primarily the product of a state’s history, memory, and socialization (Krotz 2001, 3). Socially constructed elements at the domestic level include the values and historical memory of the state’s strategic culture, institutions, and patterns of public opinion. Externally generated ideational elements consist of community norms and understandings as well obligations incurred as part of a state’s alliance or treaty commitments. Material elements include a range of national capabilities and the distribution of power within the international system.

The relationship between the various elements is complex. An attempt has been made to list the main influences on national role conceptions but the list is by no means exhaustive. Material factors influence the development and maintenance of role conceptions at a very basic level but they are mostly excluded from the focus of this study. National role conceptions may differ depending on changing regional and issue-
specific contexts. The inclusion of the situational context is beyond the scope of the dissertation. Keeping in mind these important qualifications, what do we know about German national role conceptions understood as a function of both internal and external ideational variables?

Germany’s national role conception has been described by the term of *civilian power* or trading state.\(^{34}\) The central values deemed to compose this role are responsibility, reliability, predictability, calculability and antimilitarism (Krotz 2001). This constellation of values makes Germany unique compared to other powers with comparable capabilities. The core values also represent a major departure from those of previous German regimes. They developed as a result of the two lost world wars which were themselves perceived as logical consequence of the unilateral ‘catastrophe’ of German history.

The key value in the role conception of the Federal Republic is foreign policy stability. Alternatively understood as reliability (*Zuverlässigkeit*), predictability (*Berechenbarkeit*), calculability (*Kalkulierbarkeit*) and continuity (*Kontinuität*), these concepts denote the ‘obsession’ of German politicians with having their country perform a stabilizing or supportive rather than destabilizing role within the international environment. Germany wants to be seen as calculable and reliable partner who honors international commitments (Duffield 1999, 782). This value constraints the development of unilateral tendencies in foreign policy. Instead, multilateralism in foreign policy is

\(^{34}\) Maull is credited with developing the concept of the civilian power (Maull 1990; 1995; 1999) which builds upon Rosecrance’s (1987) concept of the trading state. Both roles are viewed as the product of a globalizing environment in which new types of power, especially economic power become more useful and prevalent. However, Maull emphasizes the importance of historical factors in Germany and Japan in explaining the emergence of the role although the maintenance of the role is still seen as function of the altered environment.
preferred to cast German interests and actions within the legitimacy of international rules and conventions. The emphasis on policy stability also explains the continual support for the increasingly more precise legal framing of international relations (Krotz 2001) and Germany’s “self-confident self-integration in larger political contexts” (Haftendorn 1993, 41). Unlike the decision-makers of other great powers, German elites perceive the expansion in scope and application of international law and norms not as restraints but opportunity for the legitimization of foreign policy. Thus, Germany allows international institutions to play their classic function of placing restraints on action in return for the self-confidence achieved as consequence of the adherence to appropriate rather than instrumental action. The prospect of social rewards trumps material advantages in Germany’s utility function.

The statements of German foreign ministers from different legislative periods and parties indicate a desire for stability, reliability and continuity. Genscher, for instance, was well-known for his commitment to maintain Germany’s foreign policy traditions, values and calculability (Genscher 1995, 62). His successor Kinkel reiterated this position after reunification and promised that “Germany’s policy will remain consistent and calculable” (Kinkel 1994, 7). Fischer added in 1998, that “continuity is the main focus of our policy” (Fischer 1998) and went on to deny claims that Germany’s military participation in airstrikes over Kosovo signaled any fundamental change in policy (Hertkorn 2001, 62). Germany’s emphasis on policy stability is closely intertwined with the value of responsibility.

Responsibility (Verantwortungsbewuβtsein), frequently referred to as ‘politics of responsibility’ (Verantwortungspolitik) in official discourse, is understood as the need to
honor Germany’s commitments to the NATO alliance and the Western value community. The Western orientation (Westbindung) of the Federal Republic since 1945 is considered permanent. It differentiates present-day German policy from the unilateralist, self-centered stance (Schaukelpolitik) of past regimes. Membership in the Western value community entails a domestic commitment to democracy (Demokratische Grundordnung) and the rule of law. In addition, official phrases frequently invoke terms of Germany’s ‘co-responsibility for peace’ (Hacke 1996, 6) indicating that the international dimension of German responsibility requires the support of multilateral peacekeeping efforts. The emphasis on efforts to contribute to international peace and stability is also closely associated with the country’s historical burden. The militarism of the past is viewed as establishing special responsibilities for strengthening international human rights regimes. Until the 1990, both the efforts directed at maintaining peace and preserving human rights were strictly understood in nonmilitary fashion. Military force was categorically rejected in favor of efforts directed at improving global governance.

Germany’s predisposition towards peaceful means of conflict resolution and aversion to the use of force is an important characteristic of elite role conceptions since World War II (Berger 1996; 1998; Maull 1990; Markovits and Reich 1997). The general public shares the profound skepticism about both appropriateness and usefulness of military force (Berger 1996; 1998; Hyde-Price 2003, 187). Antimilitarism developed as result of a collective learning process following the devastation of the world wars and the deliberate actions of policy elites since 1945 (Berger 1996, 1998). Political

35 In his investigation of German chancellors and foreign ministers since reunification, Malici (2006) finds that the operational codes of German leaders tend to differ from a mean score of world leaders in terms of their tendency to prefer diplomacy, cooperation and peaceful means to conflict resolution.
institutions placing restrictions on the use of force help maintain the cultural aversion to militarism and military force (Duffield 1998; Hoffmann and Longhurst 1999). German role behavior emphasizes ‘soft power’ - the reliance on economic, trade-related and normative tools to pursue national objectives. The allocation of significant proportions of GDP towards defense is viewed negatively by both policy makers and the general public (Berger 1996; Maull 1990; Harnisch and Maull 2001). The country continues to disappoint expectations of important allies to increase its national defense expenditures. International organizations and mediation efforts are strongly supported while the use of military power is regarded as unacceptable option. Germany’s tendency to avoid leadership roles in international affairs (Hyde-Price 2003, 187) is indirectly linked to its antimilitarist stance because global leadership functions still require the ability to deploy force as a final resort in deterrence and diplomacy. German values of stability, responsibility and soft power fit the role of a mediator state in international politics.

Mediator or integrator roles in world politics are based on decision-makers’ desire to reconcile differences between other nations (Walker 1987, 273-275). Policy elites of mediator states prefer to play a go-between role as an honest broker. They engage in international conflict resolution and support peacekeeping efforts through multilateral efforts. The concern with the welfare of other nations ranks high and tends to be viewed as a function of one’s own welfare. Economic concerns outrank military ones. The mediator role also involves a non-assertive foreign policy with a low diplomatic profile characterized by multilateral policy conduct and the fostering of mutual understandings.

Maull disagrees somewhat when he writes that civilian powers are not pacifist in the strict sense because the role does not exclude the military implementation of international norms and decisions, particularly when conducted within a multilateral setting (Maull 1990; 1999; 2004).
(Ibid.). Most distinctive is a mediator’s concern with its reputation which causes political elites to try to stand behind their policy commitments. Mediator roles are frequently performed by states with relatively weak national capabilities. The assumption of such roles by weaker parties may be understood as an attempt to address deficiencies in power relative to other states.

Germany’s traditional tendency to support global governance and act through multilateral organizations, to maintain a low diplomatic profile in international relations, to value economic over military concerns and to reject the use of force as a way to resolve conflict in world politics establish its civilian power orientation as a type of the mediator role. Germany’s out-of-area debates revealed that the mediator role was by preferred by many members of the political elite and the general public. Germans viewed countries like Sweden as more appropriate role models than assertive powers including the United States, the United Kingdom and France even though the country’s national capabilities would identify it as member of the aforementioned group. In short, in maintaining a mediator role conception in spite of its national ability to assume a leadership role, Germany maintains an unusual foreign policy predisposition that varies substantially from that of other great powers (Duffield 1998).

Parliamentary Elites

The degree of elite decision-making autonomy in foreign policy questions continues to be one of the important questions discussed in foreign policy analysis. No definitive answer on the issue has emerged. I assume that political elites possess sufficient policy autonomy from both public opinion and institutions to merit being
viewed as the initiators of German foreign policy reorientation. The research focus on political elites is motivated by a number of important considerations.

Political elites are routinely viewed as carriers and modifiers of national role conceptions. Through their interaction with leading officials of other governments and international organizations, policymakers become aware of role expectations emanating from the international environment (Holsti 1970, 335). Policymaking elites also possess the ability to influence state role performance through their command over institutions and their knowledge of political issues and processes. Because of their higher awareness and knowledge of political issues, elites tend to frame these issues and dominate debates about them. As such, they control the political agenda (Checkel 1999, 88; Bachrach and Baratz 1963) and their actions and opinions are likely to shape those of the public (Brettschneider 2001, 245-6; Holst 2001, 260).

The focus on elite conceptions is particularly relevant for issues pertaining to foreign policy and national security. Public influence on foreign policy decision-making is minor unless an issue achieves a high degree of salience (Burstein 2003; 2006). Elites perform liaison functions between domestic and international politics. They are the product of their domestic environments yet they respond to international challenges and opportunities on behalf of their societies, striving “to minimize costs and maximize opportunities” (Rosenau 1981, 50). Even in consolidated democracies, the degree of elite policy-making autonomy expands on topics

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37. The research on NRCs has concentrated on “responsible, legitimated decision-makers” acting as representatives of the state (Gaup 1983, 15), political elites (Wish 1987, 99-102) or the highest-level policy makers (Holsti 1970, 256).

38. Higley and Burton (2006, 27) see non-elites establishing parameters for elite action but that these are “quite wide … [and] leave elites with a range of choices, and these choices are normally decisive for political outcomes”.

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new to the national agenda and during conditions characterized by rapid change (Putnam 1976, 140). Elites may elaborate and propagate new political concepts under these conditions (Ibid., 139). They may be particularly influential during situations marked by crises (Dogan and Higley 1998), external challenges or strategic dilemmas (Lantis 2002a), during which elites change policy traditions, reinterpret doctrines or redesign political institutions. Observed changes in the role conceptions of political elites, therefore, are significant for understanding fundamental changes in foreign policy.

Critical junctures in the history of the Federal Republic are characterized by elite leadership: The rearmament of Germany after World War II, the subsequent integration of the country’s armed forces into the NATO alliance as well as the long-term policy of Western integration; the decision to deploy mid-range nuclear weapons; the swift German reunification in 1989, the introduction of the Euro and persistent support for European integration all represent policy situations in which political elites forged ahead of the consensus of the general public. The current reorientation of foreign policy may be seen as part of a similar pattern in which political elites, in an ongoing, top-down process, pass their opinions down to the general public (Lantis 2002a; Lutz 2003, 31; Brettschneider 1998, 245-246). The argument for the elite-focused analysis of foreign policy reorientation is further supported by a number of factors specific to German politics including the existence of a high level of elite consensus on questions of national interests and policy objectives.

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39 The degree of elite autonomy varies between countries. See, for instance, Risse-Kappen (1991) on the relationship between public opinion, domestic structure and foreign policy.
German political elites exhibit ideological tendencies towards the moderate center and general civility in their way of social interaction. Parties with extreme positions regularly partake in the formation of governments in Italy. In France, powerful fringe-parties influence debates and issues at the center. In contrast, German ruling elites since World War II have come from just four main parties: The CDU/CSU, the SPD, the FDP and, since 1998, the Alliance 90/Green Party. Relations between political elites in Germany’s multiparty system are predominantly characterized by a consensual and cooperative deliberation and policy-making style. The comparatively high proportion of unanimously passed bills indicates that opposition parties seek “to exercise control through cooperation in legislation rather than confrontation in debate” (Katzenstein 1987, 43).

Cooperation and consensus on important issues are possible because political elites in Germany hold a “distinctive, widely shared, and rather elaborate set of beliefs and values” in regards to foreign policy (Duffield 1999, 779; also, Hoffmann and Longhurst 1999, 38). As a result, “there are few disagreements in concrete foreign policy issues in this discourse among social scientists, political advisors, foreign policy decision makers, and opposition politicians” (Hellmann 1997, 25-27). The elite consensus on central foreign policy dimensions stems from cultural cohesion which, in turn, is primarily a function of collective memories of national defeat and destruction (Markovits and Reich 1997).\^40 The strength of the elite value consensus becomes evident in processes by which dissenting individuals perceived as deviating from the accepted

\^40 Examples of major elite division include the struggle and eventual adoption of Ostpolitik as well as the out-of-area controversy over of the use of the military which is the subject of this dissertation. See Hoffmann and Longhurst (1999, 37-38).
cultural consensus are shamed or ostracized. In short, a focus on the national role conceptions of policy-making elites in Germany is justified given the elite’s generally greater awareness of political issues, the relatively high degree of decision-making autonomy in foreign policy as well as the crucial function of elites during times of crisis and policy innovation, all of which have been observed in past German foreign policy behavior. However, the focus on elites as modifiers of German foreign policy also presents a number of scholarly challenges. They emanate from the nature and application of the elite concept itself which remains as yet slippery and under-defined.

The use of the elite concept in political science has been plagued by definitional, empirical and methodological problems (Zuckerman 1977). There is no shortage of definitions. In his classic study, Mosca saw elites as comprising a ruling class that “performs all political functions, monopolizes power and enjoys the advantages that power brings” (1939, 50). Pareto considered as ‘governing elite’ all “those who directly or indirectly play a significant part in government and political life” (1966, 248). Dahl advanced a more limited notion of “a minority of individuals whose preferences regularly prevails in cases of differences in preference on key political issues” (1958, 269) while Putnam defined political elites as “those who in any society rank toward the top of the presumably closely related dimensions of interest, involvement, and influence in politics” (1971, 651). More recently, Bill and Hardgrave have defined elites as minority group possessing most political power and making the most important political decisions within society (1981, 144) with Higley and Burton considering elites as “persons who are able,
by virtue of their strategic positions in powerful organizations and movements, to affect political outcomes regularly and substantially” (2006, 7). The definitional variations of the term have in common the concern with “the behavior of a relatively small number of decision-makers, rather than the formal and institutional apparatus of government” (Bill and Hardgrave 1981, 143). The problem of conceptual vagueness can be reduced through greater specificity on the individuals to who ought to be included in elite analysis. For the purposes of role conception analysis, a conceptually and empirically useful way of defining important individuals is to focus on the specific subset of German parliamentary elites.

Parliamentary elites are defined as key decision-makers within the German political system whose actions regularly influence foreign policy. This includes individuals occupying positions in government. This group is considered as cabinet elites. Cabinet elites within Germany’s parliamentary system include the chancellor, the ministers and the heads of their respective bureaucracies as well as important advisors. Additional individuals considered as carriers and potential modifiers of national role conceptions include the President of the Federal Republic. German presidents exert general influence on role conceptions by establishing moral imperatives and guidelines. These help define German identity and conceptions of appropriate role behavior. Leaders and important policy advisors of opposition parties are also considered key decision-makers because of the nature of the German political system. The Federal Republic has a multi-party system with two major and three minor parties. It is a strong federal system with a bicameral parliamentary structure. These structural characteristics allow opposition leaders to influence the process of foreign policy formulation, particularly in
times of ‘co-governance’ during which the opposition controls the upper house (Bundesrat).

The German chancellor plays the key role in foreign policy making. Article 65 of the constitution (Grundgesetz) grants him/her the right to set general policy parameters. The chancellor’s power to direct and redirect policy is supported by the institution of the chancellery which functions as a kind of super-ministry generating information independent from that of the other ministries. Advice produced by this institution allows the chancellor to challenge the policy suggestions made by ministers in the cabinet. Finally, unlike conventional prime ministers, the German chancellor is protected by the institution of the constructive vote of no-confidence which allows for his/her removal only in the case of the existence of a fully functioning opposition government. The formation of such a counter-coalition has proven to be difficult in the multi-party system of the Federal Republic. For these reasons, as well as the traditional tendency for chancellors to remain autonomous in the foreign policy field (Korte 2000), this position is a key to understanding foreign policy redirection within the context of Germany’s role conception. Notable decisions made by past chancellors, frequently against popular opinion, include Germany’s rearmament and joining of NATO, the deployment of intermediate range nuclear missiles and the adoption of a swift reunification plan after the collapse of the East German regime.

Cabinet members play important roles in policy formulation. The ‘departmental principle’ establishes a minister’s authority and responsibility for independently conducting the affairs within the respective ministry with the chancellor resolving

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42 In German: Richtlinienkompetenz
interdepartmental differences. The institutional structure suggests that the cabinet members directing foreign policy and defense are the key players in security policy formulation. The importance of the position the foreign minister is underscored by the fact that in the past, chancellors performed this function themselves or made the foreign minister the vice chancellor.\textsuperscript{43} Foreign ministers including Genscher, Kinkel and Fischer have played leading roles in directing the external policy orientations of the Federal Republic.\textsuperscript{44} Performing a bridge function between state and foreign interests through their frequent official contacts, foreign ministers tend to be very conscious of the expectations of other governments of German policy conduct. Defense Ministers also play a crucial role in security policy through their supervision of the \textit{Bundeswehr} which does not possess a central command structure. In conjunction with the General Inspector (\textit{Generalinspekteur}) of the army, defense ministers influence the capabilities of the armed forces through decisions regarding procurement, organization and defense doctrines as indicated in internal memos and the White Papers of the \textit{Bundeswehr}. Due to Germany’s multilateral commitments, defense ministers also are closely tied into the European security organizations including NATO, the EU and the WEU as well as the OSCE. Here again, the minister plays a bridge function in constantly having to reconcile German national interests with those of foreign actors. Foreign minister Rühe, for instance, was both credited and criticized for his ‘Salami-tactics’ by which he incrementally committed

\textsuperscript{43} During the first cabinets of the Weimar Republic, the positions of chancellor and foreign secretary were actually performed by Gustav Stresemann.

\textsuperscript{44} For instance, Foreign Minister Genscher played a key role in the process leading to Germany’s unilateral recognition of Slovenia and Croatia. Evidence seems to suggest that Genscher redirected the anti-recognition position of the entire ministry. In so doing, he acted against the interests of the ministry which was engaged in multilevel European negotiation over the upcoming Summit of Maastricht which would mark one of the most important points in the evolution of the European Union.
the Bundeswehr to increasingly more dangerous foreign mission types and helped change foreign policy parameters through a series of decisional faits accomplis. Foreign and defense ministers are important cabinet actors in German security policy. However, the network of important decision-makers extends beyond them. Frequent cabinet reshuffles, unanimous decision-making principles which require consensus-building, information procurement as well as party connections and even personal loyalties requires the inclusion of other individuals in the policy-network surrounding each security policy decision. The influence of these persons has to be ascertained on a case by case basis.

The President of the Federal Republic is among the group of individuals considered as carriers of the country’s role conception. Federal Presidents do not actively participate in day-to-day policy formulation but influence the contours of policy making by setting agendas, formulating national aspirations and articulating a consensus on national values. Speech acts of the German head of state are important indicators of the country’s role and desired role changes and are vital for any cultural understanding of foreign policy redirection. President von Weizsäcker’s 1985 speech commemorating the 40th anniversary of the end of World War II cast Germany’s devastating defeat in terms of liberation from the inhumanity of the tyrannical Nazi regime. The President validated Germany’s transformed post-war identity and went on to articulate a special German responsibility for addressing inhumanity in current times. President Herzog’s 1995 speech to the German Society on Foreign Affairs included the now famous line “the end of free riding has been reached” (1998, 27). The President used the role conception value of responsibility to argue for a more engaged German role in support of international peace and stability.
The leadership cadre within opposition parties constitutes a final category of the parliamentary elites playing a role in foreign policy formulation. This includes the party leaders, faction heads, party whips, federal managers (Bundesgeschäftsführer) and foreign policy experts. Opposition party leaders are important for a number of reasons. Germany’s federal democracy is a party state (Parteienstaat) in which all major political decisions are shaped by political parties (Schmidt 2003, 6). Parties connect the various “tiers, arenas and corporate actors in the Federal Republic’s decentralized state…” (Saalfeld 2005, 46). The Christian Democratic Party and the Social Democratic Party are catch-all parties with moderate programs that are accustomed to government by coalition and a style of policy-making which emphasizes cooperation through committee work and legislative specialization rather than adversarial confrontation (Katzenstein 1987, 39-43; Saalfeld 2005, 49-50; Schmidt 2002). The consensus-oriented policy style within Germany’s multiparty system also enhances the role of the smaller party heads as so-called ‘king-makers’. The increasing tendency of opposition parties to take control of Germany’s upper house, the Bundesrat, in a strong federal system frequently makes the opposition a co-governing power. Finally, there are cultural and institutional traditions

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45 The role of political parties is so pronounced that researchers have employed the term party-state (Parteienstaat) or the conjoining of state and party (Wagschal 2001) to describe a structural reality in which Germany’s main parties have interpenetrated the branches of the government as well as the civil service. They receive substantial subsidies from the state and their role as linkage institutions between public demands and policy-making is anchored in the constitution. They are relatively cohesive, and well-organized institutions that remain at the very center of policy-making even though membership has been declining and the linkage between parties and social organizations has loosened somewhat during the last 30 years (Saalfeld 2005, 67).

46 This differs from a majoritarian policy style which is based on the articulation of competing policy models by opposition parties and the tendency of ruling parties to pursue their policies in partisan fashion.

47 With an average of four regional elections per year, Germany’s federal system frequently allows for opposition control of the upper house. Between 1990 and 1999, the Bundesrat was controlled by the
of inclusiveness, solidarity and corporatism that support the concept of co-governance. German politicians have a tendency to feel more comfortable with pursuing policies supported by the majority of participating actors - a tendency that has frequently been used to explain incrementalism in policy making. Tracing the process by which a new elite consensus developed after reunification will be crucially important to understanding foreign policy reorientation during the 1990s.

The focus on the understandings that parliamentary elites hold of their country’s role in the world is a reasonable approach to assessing changes in national role conceptions. It also offers the possibility of tracing social interaction processes between leaders of countries and between German elites engaged in debates about their country’s foreign policy in the period immediately following reunification. Such a research focus offers the advantage of theoretical parsimony but involves a significant degree of oversimplification of political processes. The institutional literature on Germany’s semi-sovereign political system suggests that society - including public opinion - ought to have considerable influence on state processes and policy output. I view public opinion as having indirect rather than direct influence on elite policy preferences. That position is supported by the current state of research on the public’s influence on foreign policy decisions in advanced industrial societies which remains inconclusive. Some systems appear to be more responsive than others and domestic structure matters as intermediate

opposition for 32 months (30 percent) of the time (Saalfeld 2005, 63). Since the Bundesrat addresses primarily regional concerns, the interests of regional parties may diverge from those of the federal parties.

48 The question of whether foreign policy makers are responsive to the public continues to be debated in the field. One position is based on the assumption that affective components drive an otherwise uninformed public (Holsti 1992). An opposing school of thought views the public as both rational and stable offering the possibility of policy maker accountability (for instance, Page and Shapiro 1992). As yet, no study has conclusively linked public opinion to specific foreign policy outcomes (Burstein 2003; 2006).
variable (for instance, Risse-Kappen 1991). Survey studies have found repeated and consistent gaps between public sentiment and foreign policy actions of governments indicating that political elites enjoy significant degrees of policy autonomy. This justifies an elite-centric research focus coupled with the consideration of public opinion as part of the multidimensional and instrumental calculus of elites. Public opinion matters as part of the electoral concerns of elites but is not viewed as affecting foreign policy outcomes in the form of an independent variable.

A Social Theory of Security Policy Reorientation: Role Pressure and Adaptation

The Role Episode: Role Pressure and Adaptation

The general argument thus far conceptualizes German foreign policy reorientation leading to the incorporation of the use of force during the 1990s as a function of changes in the role conception of parliamentary elites. A logical extension of the focus on role conceptions held by policy-makers is the use of role theory to understand changes in such role conceptions and, in so doing, illuminate the process of security policy reorientation. Role theory assumes that elites share “a set of ingrained beliefs about the role, function, mission and obligations of their country in international affairs” (Dalgaard-Nielsen 2006, 21). The German change in policy conduct can then be conceptualized as resulting from transformations in elite role conceptions. Roles are products of social environments. The adaptation of actor role behavior occurs in response to changes in the normative parameters of the environment. Actors adapt role behavior through social learning processes called role episodes.
Role episodes are policy-making situations characterized by intense social message exchanges between actors. They occur within social environments in which actors attempt to affect each other’s role or behavior on the basis of shared perceptions about reality and understandings of appropriate conduct. Role episodes capture the logic of appropriateness that accompanies policy contexts during which political elites convey social expectations. A role episode is a social process which gives rise to an actor’s behavioral response. It consists of a complete cycle of role sending, the response by the focal actor, and the effects of that response on the role senders (Kahn et al. 1966, 277).

Figure 2: General Model of the Role Episode (Adapted from Kahn et al. 1966, 277)

Role senders maintain expectations about the way in which the focal role should be performed and the actual performance of the focal actor (Ibid., 277). In the case of incongruence between expectations and behavior, social pressure is exerted to bring the two in line.

Social pressure on the focal actor is exerted through persuasion efforts by role senders. Persuasion to change actor behavior in line with the expectations held by the collective may take the form of a range of interpersonal influences including rhetorical processes or speech acts. Social rewards including the possibility of maintaining or elevating social status within the group is frequently invoked as a way to positively
reinforce the desired behavioral change. Persuasion and status cooptation as a type of socialization may instigate a process of value and identity change within the focal actor. Initially, social demands for role adaptation may lead to certain maladjustive responses (Kahn et al. 1966, 277).

It is plausible to expect socialization attempts to frequently engender maladjustive responses as the actor learns to play the as yet unfamiliar role and tends to be fraught with internal conflict and ambiguity over the definition of personal and appropriate interests. This is particularly likely in the case of a state which is not a uniform actor. States are constituted by individuals and institutions whose ‘micro-level’ interests interact with social demands coming from the outside reference group. Internal ambiguity and maladjustive behavior may also be the result of muddled social messages.

Figure 3: Model of Factors in Role Adjustment Processes (Adapted from Kahn et al. 1966, 280.)
Inconsistent messages coming from a social environment in transition may make the maintenance of uniform role expectations difficult. Such environments introduce wiggle room that allow for challenges or avoidance instead of compliance. Muddled messages may also be the result of a divergence between group standards of appropriate behavior as practiced multilaterally and the expectations of individual states pursuing their own agendas. Under such circumstances, the micro-level interest of elites may make the difference in how the role is interpreted. This may lead to anomalous foreign policy conduct.

The focal actor’s response completes the role episode. A response may involve a challenge of the role expectations. Acts of avoidance or compliance represent additional options for the actor. Any type of response carries with it the possibility of influencing the development of group norms. If the actor complies, the question emerges of whether such compliance is purely instrumental or occurs as a result of the internalization of normative standards. The element central to processes of socialization and subsequent German role adaptation after the end of the Cold War was the shared understanding of the post-Cold War security environment which generated new expectations of German role conduct.

The International Security Environment

The international security environment changed dramatically after the end of the Cold War. The bipolar distribution of power that had characterized the Cold War period ended with the disintegration of the Soviet Union. The countries of Eastern Europe gained their freedom from communist control and democratized. Soon, many of them
would join international and regional institutions. The existential threat to humanity posed by the system of mutually assured destruction had ended. But the changes did not usher in a more peaceful global order. Instead, the emerging environment was characterized by a host of unexpected security challenges. Ethnic warfare in failing and failed states, uncontrolled refugee flows, economic threats emanating outside of state borders, drug trafficking, environmental decay, terrorism and pandemics of untreatable and deadly diseases were just some of the threats characterizing the new security environment which quickly distinguished itself from the Cold War era through the fluid, unpredictable and interrelated nature of the challenges to state security. These challenges required new responses.

Governments, militaries and international organizations responded to the changes in the security environment by revising their strategic doctrines. As early as 1991 and even before the disintegration of the Soviet Union, NATO’s new strategic concept recognized the new security threats as ‘multi-faceted’ and ‘multi-directional’ in nature, arising from “adverse consequences of instabilities”.  

49 This assessment was shared by the European Commission’s 1993 White Paper on Security which identified many of the diverse security problems that would emerge as focus in future years.  

50 In their 1992 Petersberg Declaration, WEU member states agreed to develop national capabilities for European rapid-deployment forces that would engage in humanitarian assistance,


peacekeeping operations, crisis management and prevention as well as peace enforcement operations. Within the EU, the more earnest pursuit of a Common Foreign and Security Policy and a European Security Identity within NATO were partly motivated by the desire to more adequately address the multi-faceted threats of the new security environment.

German foreign policy elites shared the threat perceptions of the transformed security environment that were emerging in international circles. Commandeering the most powerful state in Europe, they became both architects and promoters of multilateral security arrangements to address the emerging threats. In part, German concern for global instability stemmed from the country’s role as one of the world’s leading trading states that had a strong interest in guaranteeing the security of both trade and resource acquisition. But more importantly, the enmeshment of German elites in the multilateral security institutions and German participation in the process of fashioning new threat responses dramatically increased the pressure on Germany to support multilateral peacekeeping capabilities that its own politicians had helped develop. As strategic doctrines and response mechanisms became more articulated, generating and increasing capabilities for rapid intervention and as it became increasingly clearer that the new security environment did, indeed, require the use of these capabilities, German elites were caught in a normative trap of their own making. They had helped develop the new standards and were obligated to support institutional capabilities in the spirit of alliance

solidarity. Not participating commensurate with the country’s capabilities which included the use of force would have entailed reputational losses, the loss of influence within the international organizations so important to Germany and worse, the risk of sociopolitical isolation. To avert that danger, parliamentary elites would adapt their country’s national role conception.

Norm Diffusion and Elite Socialization

The importance of external demands as potential explanation for German foreign policy reorientation has been suggested by a number of observers and authors (i.e. Hoffmann and Longhurst 1999, 38; Baumann 2001; Lutz 2003; Clement 2004; Hyde-Price 2003; Noetzel and Schreer 2008). Expectations about a more engaged international role for Germany were voiced by President George Bush who called for West Germany and the United States to be ‘partners in leadership’ and who personally requested that Chancellor Kohl consider the deployment of troops to join Operation Desert Storm in August 1990 (Lantis 2002b, 82). Similar expectations were conveyed by President Clinton in 1994 and by UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali who urged “Germany to

52 The Strategic Concept of the NATO alliance of November 7, 1991 states under Principles of Alliance Strategy: “The security of all Allies is indivisible: an attack on one is an attack on all. Alliance solidarity and strategic unity are accordingly crucial prerequisites for collective security. The achievement of the Alliance’s objectives depends critically on the equitable sharing of roles, risks and responsibilities, as well as the benefits, of common defence” (NATO, “New Strategic Concept”, 1991).

53 President Bush (2009, 52-3) expressed these expectations in his important speech in Mainz in May 1989 in which he recognized Germany’s role as Europe’s preeminent economic and political power and saw the US and Germany as ‘partners in leadership’ in responsibly grasping ‘the promise of the future’ created by Gorbachev’s initiatives.

54 This position was reiterated by President Clinton in 1994 during his visit to Germany when he stated that “I do hope that we will have the benefit of the full range of Germany’s capacities to lead…[i]t has no other choice but to assume a leadership role. Germany cannot withdraw from its responsibility” (SZ, July 4, 1994, quoted in Haar 2001, 23). Clinton also said “anything that can be done to enable Germany to fulfill
be fully responsible and engaged in peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and peacemaking” during a visit to Bonn in 1993.\textsuperscript{55} Equally important in their socializing effect on German policy elites was criticism conveyed when German behavior failed to live up to expectations. This occurred during and after the Persian Gulf War in 1990-1991 and during the unilateral recognition of Croatia and Slovenia in 1991 when Germany was widely criticized in international circles.\textsuperscript{56} The consistent foreign expectations of Germany to take on a role commensurate with its capabilities within the system constitute a type of social pressure that routinely characterizes processes of socialization.

Political socialization is the process by which actors “learn to adopt prevailing norms, values, attitudes and behaviors accepted and practiced by the ongoing system” (Sigel 1970, vii). Norms are cultural constructions that generate and maintain a collectively agreed upon standard of appropriate behavior (Finnemore 1996, 22; Schimmelfennig 2001, 6; Coleman 1990, 242; Checkel 1999, 83). As such, normative standards create behavioral expectations between members (Khagram, Riker and Sikkink 2002, 14).

State socialization within international society occurs when norms are transferred to the national level in the form of new understandings, values, attitudes or types of behavior. States can be impacted by environmental socialization in either regulatory or constructive ways (Schimmelfennig 2001, 10). In the first instance, norms constrain actor


\textsuperscript{56} During the Persian Gulf War, for instance, Germany was stung by censure from its allies by acting like a “teutonic, double-headed European ostrich” (Sked 1991, 51-60).
behavior without affecting deeper interests or identity (Khagram, Riker and Sikkink 2002, 14; Johnston 2001, 495). In the second instance, norms can provide actors with new understandings of their role or identity (Checkel 1999, 84). At that point, norms have been internalized and the interests of actors have changed permanently. Regulation and sanctioning by an external institution is complemented or even superseded by internal sanctioning (Coleman 1990, 293) which makes the violation “of an established norm psychologically painful” (Axelrod 1986, 1104). As part of identity, norms assume a ‘taken-for-grantedness’ character and the gains from behavioral compliance are evaluated in abstract social rather than concrete and consequential form (Johnston 2001, 495; Risse 1997, 16). Identification between actors supports norm internalization. By identifying with the socializing agent a focal actor takes the agent’s interest as his own (Coleman 1990, 295).

Identification processes create similarity of interests through the need of one actor to associate with another. The need for association or affiliation is the fundamental

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57 The utilitarian benefits of regulatory frameworks for rational state actors have been extensively discussed in the literature under the heading of neoliberal institutionalism and regime theory. See, for example, Keohane (1988) and Krasner (1983). Socialization has also been addressed by realists. Waltz (1979, 128), for instance, writes about socialization that “states will display characteristics common to competitors: namely, that they will imitate each other and become socialized to their system...The socialization of nonconformist states proceeds at a pace that is set by the extent of their involvement in the system”. This view of socialization is based on rationalist assumptions about the nature of a competitive environment in which state actors are compelled, like corporations, to emulate each other’s most effective strategies in order to survive. Strictly speaking, this is not socialization but natural selection (See Johnston 2001 for a detailed discussion).

58 Klotz (1995) uses the now familiar phrase “norms reconstituting interests” to describe the process of internalization.

59 Schimmelfennig (2002, 10) argues that the degree of internalization can be evaluated objectively by investigating the extent to which a norm has been translated into a state’s domestic political institutions and political culture as well as the degree of rhetorical challenge of the norm within society. In advanced stages of internalization, norms will generally result in “convergence between discourse, formal institutions, and behavior” (Ibid., 12).
objective that creates and sustains all social collectives. Like individual actors in families, peer groups or societies, states identify with one another to organize their knowledge about reality and their place within it (Druckmann 1994). The psychological need to become or remain a member of the group will assure compliance with its principal norms (Axelrod 1986, 1105). Thus, membership within a social group provides a normative context for what constitutes proper behavior and attitudes (Flockhart 2005, 46). Social groups will control the behavior of their members through social pressure.

Social pressure to achieve compliance may be exerted through a variety of means with the most general types being persuasion and social influence. Persuasion involves the changing of minds, opinions and attitudes about causality and affect without the use of overt coercion (Johnston 2001, 496). Central to persuasion are language and argumentation which may cause actors to adjust views of reality or adopt new values (Majone 1989, 2). Arguments will have a more persuasive effect when they can be related to information coming from in-groups rather than out-groups (Johnston 2001, 497).

Socialization may also occur through social influence based on the distribution of social rewards or punishment (Ibid., 499). Rewards include psychological well-being derived from conforming to role expectations, status, honor or prestige and a sense of belonging. Punishments include shaming, shunning, exclusion and demeaning as well as cognitive dissonance resulting from actions inconsistent with role and identity (Ibid, 60).

Thus, democratic transitions in Eastern Europe were successful in part because of the desire of domestic policy-making actors to identify with the group of democratic states constituting the European Union (See, Schimmelfennig 2005; Flockhart 2005).

For a more comprehensive discussion on the complex topic of persuasion see Johnston (2001, 496-499).
Shaming government decision-makers into compliance through the use of international norms is a common and powerful way of changing actor behavior (Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999, 15). Shaming becomes more effective an instrument of socialization when states have publicly committed themselves to upholding a certain norm. In this case, rhetorical action—the strategic use of norm-based arguments to evoke norm-compliant behavior—may effectively be used to draw on a state’s desire to remain consistent with past commitments to avoid hypocrisy. All types of social influence tend to become more effective in influencing state behavior as the need for a state to belong to a particular group increases. The elements pertaining to socialization presented above allow a number of preliminary conclusions about national role expectations.

Role expectations of German contributions to international security after the Cold War were based on three central elements: Generally held threat perceptions of the environment, effective responses to those threats that developed into standards of

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62 In the United States, an amendment to the 1997 National Defense Authorization Act was passed in 1996. The objective of the burden-sharing amendment was to increase the financial support for foreign US military presence by 11.5 Billion over six years. The amendment was approved by the House in May 1996 by a 353 to 62 margin. After the amendment passed, Barney Frank’s press release contented that “this year’s extraordinary support demonstrates the importance of requiring our wealthy allies to pay their fair share of common defense costs and ending the defense subsidy that American taxpayers give to wealthy nations of Western Europe and the Pacific (Burdensharing Press Release, May 16, 1996, quoted in Haar 2001, 3).

63 Schimmelfennig (2001) demonstrates the salience of reputation in shaping national interests by showing how EU norms of inclusiveness persuaded member states who were initially opposed to Eastern enlargement to change their position without receiving tangible benefits.

64 Schimmelfennig (2005) sees the desire of Eastern European states to belong to the EU as important reason for the strengthening of liberal-democratic institutions in those countries. Paradoxically, social influence as a means to control German behavior may have become more effective after Germany regained its full sovereignty. As long as Germany was fully integrated into NATO and semi-sovereign, the social bond between it and its allies was unbreakable and uncontested from either side within the context of the Cold War. With independent status, German elites had to worry about the maintenance of the social bond which protected their country. Full sovereignty within the context of a more uncertain security environment produced the potential for policy disagreements but also raised fears of abandonment which increased the effectiveness of external socialization.
appropriate behavior for states and a state actor’s specific function and status within international society. The scope of the allocated functions is based on perceptions of a state’s relative power or capabilities. More is expected of stronger actors than of weaker ones. The functionally differentiated nature of states is sustained through intersubjective validation processes. States that disregard their capabilities and do not act according to the role assigned to them by their reference group because of domestic inclinations towards certain types of behavior will become targets of socialization. Group pressure will be applied to make the behavior of the state conform to the role assigned to it by the collective. Regional instabilities emerging after the Cold supported the concretization of multilateral intervention standards. This generated new behavioral expectations and social pressures on Germany to abandon its cultural aversion to the use of force. External demands of German military contributions proved effective in socializing the country because they created pressure on political elites to preserve the country’s reputation as dependable, calculable and reliable ally.

Domestic Concerns and Elite Persuasion Processes

Socialization processes taking place between actors at the domestic level are similar to those that occur within the international realm. Again, persuasion and social influence are the key elements to consider. To a considerable degree, the establishment of a consensus between elites on behavioral changes in foreign policy is a function of

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65 Neorealism assumes that states are not functionally differentiated but differ on the basis of capabilities (Waltz 1979). But states are functionally differentiated in that they play different roles in international politics which are maintained through external expectations. Functions are likely to be related to material conditions including the distribution of power which determine an actor’s capabilities. However, the behavior of a state cannot be deduced from those capabilities alone. Rather, behavior as based on external influences is likely the result of social function as well as perceived capabilities which establish the level of expected contributions.
persuasion through effective argumentation pursued by individuals determined to affect a change in role behavior. Interpersonal persuasion is “a two-way interchange, a method of mutual learning through discourse” (Majone 1989, 8). A persuasive argument is more than a logical demonstration involving a rational response to a policy problem. A vital function of public deliberation and of policy-making is defining the normative standards on the basis of which specific conditions become policy problems that require a response (Ibid, 24). Within the social environment of the Bundestag, parliamentary elites engage in argumentative processes during which they will attempt to connect their preference for policy behavior with a generally accepted normative standard. The values of the national role conception constitute a basis for what is considered appropriate conduct. A crucial function in the argumentation process leading to role adjustment is that performed by role entrepreneurs.66 These individuals possess strong notions about appropriate national role conceptions and are willing to initiate a process of role adaptation. Role adaptation is essentially a process that establishes new shared conceptions of appropriate behavior and interests. Role entrepreneurs may use a variety of strategies to challenge existing standards of appropriate behavior. They will, for instance, construct new cognitive frames consisting of language designed to name, interpret or dramatize issues in an effort to create alternative conceptions of both appropriateness and interest (Ibid., 897). Role entrepreneurs may also clandestinely use the old standard of appropriateness to promote new behavior (Ibid.). Alternatively, they may challenge the existing standards through foreign policy actions or commitments considered ‘inappropriate’ that both prepare opposing groups for the changes and hollow out existing standards.

66 Finnemore and Sikkink (1998, 896) use the concept of norm entrepreneurs to denote “agents who have strong notions about appropriate behavior within their community”.
I propose that in the social environment shared by Germany’s parliamentary elites, conservative elites acted as role entrepreneurs by employing the above strategies. On issues of international instability, they constructed a cognitive frame consisting of solidarity, reliability and calculability which they linked to their preference for role normalization, including the use of force. In addition, they used their control of government to incrementally commit the Federal Republic to extraterritorial missions in what was frequently labeled as ‘Salami tactics’. These high-profile behavioral commitments hollowed out the accepted anti-militant meaning of the civilian power role and further increased the effect of international socialization.67

Figure 4: Elite Persuasion in the Domestic Environment

Human beings are not social automatons who blindly follow normative parameters of action. Within existing social environments, elites also pursue a range of interests and concerns that are not necessarily social in nature. These will include utilitarian concerns about resolving important domestic issues, electoral prospects and even personal career goals. Individual concerns are pursued against the canvass created by the ongoing domestic and international socialization processes. Domestic concerns of

67 Addressing the effectiveness of persuasion, Cialdini (1984) argues that new, high-profile behavioral commitments increase the persuasiveness of a new set of attitudes.
elites must have affected the degree of compliance with international expectations during each role episode. Thus, Germany’s eventual compliance on the use of force may have been facilitated through some degree of convergence between external expectations and the domestic concerns of major players. Conversely, the lack of convergence should explain non-compliance. In short, the final piece of the investigated puzzle is the domestic context of policy-making and its influence on German policy responses to external expectations during each role episode.

Evidence Collection and Data Sources

Research Questions for Comparative Investigation

The debate about German foreign policy normalization after reunification has not yet generated a strong theory that explains reorientation by relating the complexity of the post-Cold War period to domestic processes. This dissertation employs a comparative case study design to investigate whether German foreign policy was reoriented by its elites as a result of changing expectations and altered role conceptions after the Cold War. Qualitative case studies with small numbers of cases are particularly well suited for uncovering a potential causal path for which there is no pre-existing theory (George and Bennett 2005, 221). Such studies have the potential to identify variables and causal mechanisms culminating in the development of contingent generalizations. The main methodological approach used is process tracing which involves the search for a causal link between independent and dependent variables. Key to a successful application of the process tracing method is the specification of a set of questions that guides the collection of evidence. This allows for a focused and structured comparison.
The central areas under investigation in this dissertation are 1) perceptions of the international security environment prevalent within important international organizations charged with security functions 2) the evolution of norms within those organizations addressing the new security threats emerging after the Cold War 3) the behavioral or role expectations of member states, 4) the role pressure exerted on German elites, 5) the persuasion processes initiated by domestic role entrepreneurs, 6) the interests of domestic parliamentary elites, 7) the resistance or constraints, if any, established by strategic culture and institutions. These areas generate a set of ten questions for comparative research that will be utilized for each of the role episodes under investigation.

Threat perceptions are generally assumed to have changed after the Cold War. This process is investigated through a focus on the official output and internal debates of international organizations with particular focus on statements of NATO, UN, EU, WEU and OSCE (Q1). It is assumed that a qualitative change occurs over the time period under investigation with perceptions of greater instability becoming universally shared by the elites commanding states and international security organizations. New threat assessments of the international security environment which frame perceptions of appropriate responses should be reflected in official statements, summit reports and agreements.

The evolution of responses to the newly defined security environment in the form of security norms is the focus of a second set of questions. Revised strategic doctrines and declarations established new standards of appropriate state contributions (Q2). These behavioral expectations are viewed as generating pressure to adapt Germany’s role commensurate with capabilities (Q3). Foreign leaders and heads of international
organizations conveyed new expectations of German role behavior through formal and informal requests for military contributions, public demands for greater involvement in peacekeeping operations and criticism in cases when Germany failed to comply (Q4).

The next area under investigation is the domestic context of argumentation and persuasion between elites. I start by assessing the initial role conceptions held by parliamentary elites (Q5). Then, I address the question of whether parliamentary elites shared the threat perceptions of the international environment as one characterized by greater instability (Q6). Also, did elites generally share the understanding that Germany had special responsibilities to the international community because of its position as great power in terms of status and national capabilities (Q7)?

Next, I ask the question of how a particular subset of parliamentary elites instrumentally deployed both threat perceptions and externally generated role expectations to pursue the process of role adaptation by promoting the use of force in support of multilateral peacekeeping missions (Q8). Role entrepreneurs needed to persuade non-compliant elites. This was accomplished through two central means: First, role entrepreneurs constructed an effective argument for role adaptation by linking external expectations to alliance solidarity and Germany’s responsibilities. Thus, concerns about reputational and status losses were combined with the threat of political isolation after reunification.68 Second, role entrepreneurs used their control over existing

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68 The threat of political isolation carries special weight in German politics because of the elite consensus on maintaining a national identity that is intrinsically tied to Western values and membership in a Western value community. This makes isolation or ‘special paths’ politically unacceptable.
institutions to prepare other elites and the public for the use of force by incrementally committing the *Bundeswehr* to out-of-area mission with escalating risk levels.\(^6^9\)

The last area considered is the domestic context of elite interests (Q9). How did parliamentary elites relate their electoral and party interests to external role pressure on one hand and the domestic antimilitarism of strategic culture on the other? This aspect is seen as crucial in explaining variation and timing of compliance during each role episode (Q10). Elite autonomy from external expectations declines as expectations of behavior become more consistent with the concretization of intervention standards. As such, external expectations are seen as reconstituting domestic elite interests by the mid-1990s.

Table 1: Questions for Comparative Research

| Q1: What were the threat perceptions of leaders of international security organizations? |
| Q2: What types of normative responses were generated within these organizations? |
| Q3: What behavioral obligations for Germany can be deduced from the norms? |
| Q4: What type of role pressure was exerted on German elites? |
| Q5: What were the role conceptions of parliamentary elites? |
| Q6: What were the threat perceptions of parliamentary elites? |
| Q7: Did elites share an understanding of German great power responsibilities? |
| Q8: How did role entrepreneurs use external role pressure to pursue role changes? |
| Q9: How did concerns or interests of parliamentary elites interact with role expectations? |
| Q10: What explains variance in compliance with role expectations? |

The question set outlined in Table 1 will be used for each of the three role episodes under investigation. The episodes are characterized by variance in compliance. Elites partially complied during the Persian Gulf War 1990-1991, failed to comply during the unilateral recognition of Croatia and Slovenia 1991-1992 and complied at the end of the Bosnian Civil War in 1995.

\(^{6^9}\) Among the ways in which role entrepreneurs used existing institutions to promote the adoption of the use of force was the quest to seek an institutional amendment to allow participation in out-of-area peacekeeping missions, the creation of rapid intervention capabilities within the *Bundeswehr* which was promoted under the heading of force ‘modernization’, the development of new strategic concepts to facilitate deployment and the increase in cabinet autonomy for running military missions.
Data Sources

The dissertation study will analyze the statements of international organizations and those of important national and international foreign policy elites. International organizations issue publications, proclamations, announcements and briefs. Elites exerting their influence at national and international levels of governance convey their positions through formal and informal statements in proclamations, debates, media interviews and memoirs. Document analysis of the elite discourse during specific role episodes will be used to establish general threat perceptions, the external expectations of German role behavior, the role conceptions held by parliamentary elites and the nature of persuasion processes occurring between states and within them. Content analysis should also reveal the electoral concerns of domestic-level elites. Four major categories of primary sources will be utilized.

Official charters, pronouncements, declarations, programs, strategies, doctrines and national white papers indicating shared perceptions of the international security environment after the Cold War constitute the first category of primary source documents. This includes the joint declarations following important NATO, EU, WEU and OSCE summits as well as important internal debates recorded in organizational journals including NATO Review. The statements of the heads of these organizations are considered significant as well, particularly in regards to developing an understanding of external expectations of German conduct.

A second important category of primary sources comprises elite position statements from the national level of foreign policy formulation. It includes the official records of parliamentary debates between 1990 and 1995. Parliamentary records
(Plenarprotokolle des Bundestags) provide comprehensive accounts of parliamentary proceedings, hearings, debates and resolutions. They document voting behavior by a parliamentarian’s name and party and provide sufficient detail to allow for an investigation of discursive practices, speech acts and rhetorical persuasion efforts between elites.⁷⁰ Position changes of parliamentarians can be ascertained and associated with the effects of argumentation and persuasion. Parliamentary records are detailed enough to chronicle nonverbal actions by individuals and party factions.

Transcripts of official statements and speeches of parliamentary elites are also considered. Of particular importance for this time period were statements and speeches made by Presidents von Weizsäcker (CDU) and Herzog (CDU), Chancellor Kohl (CDU), foreign ministers Genscher (FDP) and Kinkel (FDP), defense minister Rühe (CDU) as well as opposition leaders including Vogel (SPD), Scharping (SPD) and Fischer (Alliance 90/Greens). Elite interviews in newspapers or periodicals are also considered as primary sources. Other primary sources indicating role conceptions are the German Defense Ministry’s irregular series of Bundeswehr White Books (Weiβbuch der Bundeswehr), particularly the 1994 edition. Debates about role conceptions and appropriate German behavior after the Cold War were particularly important within the opposition parties. The information service of the Social Democratic Party (Informationsdienst der SPD) will be consulted to establish internal debates and concerns.

⁷⁰The parliamentary logs record more than just the speeches or presented party positions. By indicating outbursts, commotion or general versus party-line support for speeches, the logs allow for the study of discourse practices and the relative support for particular arguments. The logs even take notice of unusual actions including individuals breaking with party lines by clapping when their party does not.
Primary evidence indicating foreign and German elite positions will be complemented by information derived from biographical accounts. The autobiographies and memoirs of Chancellor Kohl, Foreign Minister Genscher, U.S. Secretary of State Baker, US Ambassador to Yugoslavia Zimmermann, US Ambassador and Chief Bosnia negotiator Holbrooke, to name just the important ones, will be consulted to reveal underlying motivations, interests and concerns. Additional episodic records will be included as they become available. Media interviews should also shed light on positions, motivations and understandings of lower-rank decision-makers of the German foreign policy establishment.

Final primary sources to be consulted are media reports. Articles, editorials and reports in newspapers and journals establish a true record of events. Journalistic accounts also tend to capture the general political and social climate of their time. As such, they should record the existence of social variables including threat assessments, international expectations of German foreign policy conduct, role conceptions and strategic culture. Journalistic accounts will also indicate important policy debates and elite controversies during the 1990s. The editorial statements of authoritative newspapers are considered important influences on public opinion and indicative of external role pressure.\textsuperscript{71}

\textsuperscript{71} The main focus will be on the New York Times, the BBC, The Times, as well as any other newspaper carrying editorials that can be shown to have some impact on debates between German elites. The main German papers included in the research effort are Der Spiegel, Die Zeit, Die Welt, Der Focus and Süddeutsche Zeitung, among others.
Conclusion

This chapter presented the historical, cultural and theoretical context as well as a theory of German security policy reorientation during the 1990s. The history of German foreign policy since the end of World War II shows the importance German elites have attached to their country’s continued membership in a community of states characterized by liberal values. As such, parliamentary elites were prone to undertake changes in their country’s foreign policy behavior if such behavior conflicted with the expectations coming from that community. Antimilitarism in strategic culture and institutions would present obstacles to policy reorientation. The following cases will show that conservative elites, acting as role entrepreneurs, were able to persuade opposition parties and circumvent cultural antimilitarism to successfully adapt their country’s role performance on the basis of foreign expectations of German contributions to international peace and stability after the Cold War.
CHAPTER III
THE PERSIAN GULF WAR EPISODE

Introduction: A New Script

On November 9, 1989, the East German regime under its recently appointed and what was to be its final authoritarian leader Egon Krenz, announced the forthcoming opening of additional border check points in Berlin. Under duress, the regime was acceding to the demands of its citizens for greater freedom of movement including travel to West Berlin. Tens of thousands of East Berliners forced their way past the existing border crossings later that memorable night. The Iron Curtain had divided Germany and Europe for 28 years. It would pass into history within weeks. The German Democratic Republic conducted its first and only democratic election in March 1990. Less than a year after the fall of the wall, the Federal Republic and the Democratic Republic of Germany reunited in October 1990.

Germany’s reunification process took place against the backdrop of international efforts directed at liberating Kuwait from Iraqi occupation. The escalating Persian Gulf crisis and the demands it placed on the international society of states caught German parliamentary elites off guard. They were addressing the immense domestic policy agenda resulting from the objective to complete the merger of two dissimilar social, economic and political systems. The speed of the unification process presented a challenge as did a concern with preserving some degree of socioeconomic equality
between citizens from the different parts of Germany. In addition, foreign policy elites were engaged in the complicated process of negotiating the critical Two-plus-Four Treaty. The Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany was intended to formally conclude the system established at Potsdam in 1945. Its successful conclusion required a diplomatic consensus involving the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and France. A delicate diplomatic balancing act would commence.

Parliamentary elites quickly joined in the chorus of international diplomatic statements condemning Iraqi aggression. German politicians were quicker and more decisive in their initial, official criticism of Iraqi actions than those of many other states. This was due to the fact that Germany had no strategic interests in the region. The country’s relations with Iraq had been kept to relatively minor level contacts. Soon, however, the country’s actions began to be out of step with the direction taken by the United States, France and the United Kingdom who chose to act swiftly and decisively by militarily countering Iraqi aggression. In comparison, German elites and their population appeared strangely out of touch with the crisis management requirements created by a more complex security environment emerging with the end of the Cold War. Cultural resistance against the impending military solution to liberate Kuwait was widespread and frequently, the German public seemed more concerned with the plight of Iraqi civilians than with the victims of Iraqi aggression in Kuwait. Germany’s financial contributions

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72 Revelations about the extent to which German firms had contributed to Iraq’s war making capabilities would become a major embarrassment for the government later on during the crisis.

73 Addressing parliament on the eve of the expiration of the UN ultimatum on January 14, 1991, Chancellor Kohl found it necessary to remind members of parliament that war would be the direct result of Iraqi actions from August 2 rather than the ultimatum issued by the United Nations (Asmus 1992, 10-11; PB 12/2, January 14, 1991, 21)
to the coalition were offered belatedly and after much prodding by President Bush, Secretary of State Baker, President Mitterrand of France, Prime Minister Thatcher and others. German politicians declined the national and international requests for troops and categorically ruled out military participation from the start. Germany was considered a great power with the economic wherewithal of France and the United Kingdom put together. It had loyally served alliance objectives during the Cold War. Now, Germany rejected the duty call coming from its closest allies during the first major crisis of the post-Cold War era.

The German policy response to the Persian Gulf War was more than a simple case of domestic concerns trumping foreign policy. The crisis in the Gulf was the first in a series of role episodes by which German foreign policy was reoriented in the early 1990s. The episode still found German elites adhering to their country’s traditional civilian role conception. Political elites viewed the use of force as counterproductive method to resolve international crises and generally considered foreign deployment of the military for purposes other than territorial defense as unacceptable. Strategic culture remained vehemently antimilitaristic and a powerful antiwar movement quickly developed to constrain elite actions in regards to a potential military involvement of the Federal Republic. Opposition politicians were able to effectively draw upon the public’s antimilitarism to forestall the desire of conservative elites to act as role entrepreneurs by adapting role behavior in line with external expectations. The case for role adaptation would strengthen as regional instabilities were beginning to establish the need for operations outside of alliance territory. The emergence of the new threats would change the Cold War emphasis on territorial defense and non-interference in internal affairs.
which had stabilized relations between the superpowers during the Cold War. The Gulf War marked the beginning of this transformation. The old system norms were undergoing change but had not solidified into the comprehensive regime of strategies, doctrines and response capabilities that would characterize the later 1990s. German elites were caught up in the euphorically optimistic times of the ‘winds of change’ blowing in Europe that had made possible the country’s reunification. The nature of the post-Cold War security environment appeared as yet undetermined. Foreign expectations of German military contributions lacked persuasive power because they were not supported by strong intervention standards. In this context, Germany’s traditional role conception continued to set the parameters of appropriate national conduct. Hence, elites were genuinely surprised and taken aback by the international criticism they received about their country’s inappropriate conduct during the Gulf War.

In addition to the inertia produced by traditional role conceptions, elites also were preoccupied with completing the most important project in Germany’s post-war history which was the unification of their country and the restoration of full sovereignty. This clearly affected their decisions during the Gulf crisis because the international crisis had the potential to disrupt the constructive relations between the quadripartite powers upon which successful conclusion of the Two-plus-Four Agreement depended. Elites also sought to allay international fears about German national intentions after reunification by playing the traditional role of the civilian power.\(^7\) International apprehension about

\(^7\) An (2005) argues that British foreign policy towards Germany during this time was not as obstructive as was generally perceived and the rhetoric of Prime Minister Thatcher and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office has to be differentiated from the active and constructive role British diplomats played in devising workable solutions to the process by which Four Power rights over Germany were terminated. However,
reawaked German power and ambitions on one side and the demands to contribute militarily on the other produced contradictory role expectations. This led to role conflict which elites resolved by having foreign policy conduct during the Persian Gulf War be consistent with the normative expectations generated by the Cold War environment. Playing the old role in a new play produced problems because the elements of reliability, calculability and solidarity that crucially defined the country’s role conception were beginning to take on a new meaning within the environment of the Post-Cold War world. Role adaptation was required to meet expectations and elites struggled with coming to terms with the new expectations.

In short, the combination of contradictory expectations and as yet underdeveloped intervention norms produced confusing messages about expected role behavior for political elites engaged in domestic and international projects of the highest national order of importance. Elites maintained the foreign policy orientation associated with the traditional role conception to pursue all of these objectives. Germany incurred substantial international criticism for non-compliance with the expectation to contribute militarily to extraterritorial security threats. The elite decision to not contribute commensurate with capabilities caused Germany to be perceived as ‘free rider’ in the new security environment. This produced social pressure on German elites to adapt their country’s policy orientation to international expectations. Cabinet elites reacted by acknowledging and confirming the validity of external demands even though they

the majority of German elites must have been under the impression that their country’s reunification was met with a high degree of apprehension in many parts of the world.

75 Wendt (1999, 421) refers to the process by which an actor is ‘reminded’ by others of its desired role as ‘altercasting’ which is an “attempt to induce alter to take on a new identity…by treating alter as if it already had that identity”.

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initially did not share the threat perceptions of the security environment. They decided to pay for a considerable part of the war costs incurred by the Gulf alliance. Conservative elites also promised to adapt institutional conditions to allow for future military contributions. German ‘checkbook diplomacy’ was not a rejection of external demands but represented a compromise between foreign expectations, traditional role conceptions and strategic culture.

The Persian Gulf War marked the beginning of the process of German foreign policy reorientation. Political elites would eventually come to accept the necessity of using force outside of German territory. The crisis substantiated a less optimistic perception of international security in which it was both possible and necessary to address regional instabilities through multilateral interventions. Elite recognition of new systemic requirements and the international expectations to contribute militarily generated role pressure to adapt foreign policy conduct in regards to the use of force.

The Invasion of Kuwait and the International Response

The devastating, eight-year long war between Iran and Iraq ended in 1988. Iraq and Kuwait had been close allies during the war. Kuwait had served as Iraq’s main port after fighting had shut down the harbor of Basra. Kuwait had also provided Iraq with about $14 billion in loans (Hayes, NYT, September 3, 1990). The war left Iraq impoverished and its economy in ruins. Iraqi financial problems would become crucial issues in the escalating conflict between the former allies.

Claiming that Iraq had protected the Arab world from aggression by the Shiite theocracy in Iran, Saddam Hussein announced that he expected Kuwait to forgive Iraqi
debt incurred during the war. The Kuwaiti government rejected this demand. A number of meetings held in 1989 were ultimately unsuccessful in resolving the differences between the two countries. On a separate track, Iraq attempted to address its economic problems through diplomatic efforts aimed at increasing its oil production quota within OPEC. Iraqi oil industry had suffered greatly during the war and the country’s oil production had been reduced substantially. The vast Rumaila oil field, located between Iraq and Kuwait, had been mined to protect it from a potential seizure by Iran. The reduced production capacity had been taken over by Kuwait which had also been able to expand its exploration efforts in the field. By 1989, Kuwait was exceeding its OPEC quota by 700,000 barrels a day (Ibid.). Hussein’s diplomatic efforts to achieve an increase in Iraq’s OPEC quota were unsuccessful. He also failed to coerce Kuwait into compensating Iraq for allegedly undermining world oil prices through violations of the country’s OPEC production quota. An emergency session of the Arab League in May 1990 ended on Hussein’s ominous statement that “we cannot tolerate this type of economic warfare” and "we have reached a state of affairs where we cannot take the pressure" (Ibid). Iraq’s final warning was issued in a letter to the Arab League on July 16 in which Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz accused Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates of direct aggression. A day later, Hussein warned that something effective must be done in a speech commemorating the twenty-second anniversary of the Ba’ath Party’s revolution (Baker 1995, 271).

76 In 1986, 225 out of a total of 615 wells in Iraq were located in the Rumaila field (Hayes, citing figures from the oil industry consulting firm John S. Herold Inc, NYT, September 3, 1990).

77 Adding to the complexity of the issue was the fact that the border between Iraq and Kuwait had never been officially demarcated.
On August 2, 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait. The armed hostilities ended within two days and resulted in the complete occupation of the Kuwaiti state. Hussein went on to exploit unresolved territorial and political issues surrounding the emergence of both territories from colonial rule. Iraq had long questioned Kuwaiti sovereignty by considering the country a former part of the Ottoman province of Basra. On August 8, 1990, Hussein declared portions of Kuwait to be part of the Iraqi province of Basra and designated the rest of the occupied territory as Iraq’s 19th province.

Within hours of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the UN Security Council passed resolution number 660. It condemned the aggression, called for the withdrawal of Iraqi troops and instructed the two parties to resolve their differences peacefully. 78 NATO and the European Economic Community followed suit as did individual countries including France, the United Kingdom, Italy and Germany (NYT, August 3, 1990). On August 4, the European Community imposed sanctions on Iraq which included a ban on oil imports and the export of weapons, the suspension of all types of cooperation and the confiscation of Iraqi assets (Genscher 1998, 472). UN Resolution 661 was adopted on August 6, 1990 in which Iraq was charged with “usurping the authority of the legitimate government of Kuwait” and economic sanctions were imposed to force Iraq to comply with resolution 660. 79 The UN would continue to uphold the principle of state sovereignty in no fewer than twelve resolutions passed during the next months.


Following President Bush’s memorable words “this will not stand, this aggression against Kuwait”, uttered on the White House lawn, the United States quickly showed the resolve to meet Iraqi aggression and restore Kuwaiti sovereignty (Baker 1995, 276). The Bush Administration decided on a multilateral course of action and began to assemble an international coalition designed to evict Iraqi troops from Kuwait. Invoking the Carter Doctrine, the US also moved to protect Saudi Arabia from a potential Iraqi attack by deploying troops as part of operation Desert Shield starting on August 7, 1990. Against the backdrop of a number of diplomatic efforts to resolve the crisis and the continuing military buildup that would eventually culminate in the deployment of over 500,000 soldiers in Saudi Arabia, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 678 on November 29. The resolution established a final deadline of January 15, 1991 for Iraq to comply with Resolution 660 and to withdraw from Kuwaiti territory. The resolution also authorized member states to use all necessary means to enforce Iraqi compliance (Lantis 2002a, 28). By this time, the United States had been able to assemble an international coalition that included thirty-four countries including the United Kingdom and France. Both European powers chose to act resolutely. Together they would dispatch close to 50,000 troops.

On September 9, Bush and Gorbachev met in Helsinki and issued a joint declaration calling for the unconditional Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait. A number of

80 This decision followed a discussion between President Bush and Prime Minister Thatcher who happened to be in Washington at the time. The Prime Minister has argued for prompt action involving only a few very committed states on the basis of Article 51 of the U.N. Charter which allowed self-defense to protect national interests (Baker 1995, 279).

81 The Carter Doctrine justified the use of force in the Persian Gulf to defend U.S. national interests. The doctrine had been articulated by President Carter in 1980 in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.
diplomatic initiatives by the UN, the Arab League as well as the European Community did not resolve the crisis. A six hour meeting between Secretary of State Baker and Iraqi Foreign Minister Aziz in Geneva on January 9 also ended in failure.

Following a final congressional authorization on January 12, 1991, the United States and its allies commenced an air campaign on January 17 named Operation Desert Storm. Iraq escalated the conflict by targeting Israeli cities with Scud missiles. The full-fledged invasion of Kuwait and Iraq during the end of February followed the destruction of Iraqi air defenses and command centers. The ground assault lasted just 100 hours and on February, 27, 1991 the United States declared a cease-fire and the liberation of Kuwait as complete.

The German Response to the Gulf Crisis

German elites and the general public strongly opposed the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and on August 3, 1990, the Kohl government condemned the invasion of Kuwait as act of unwarranted aggression that violated international law and human rights. The Federal Republic also supported the various mediation efforts aimed at persuading Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait including the twelve resolutions issued by the UN Security Council. Lastly, Germany participated in the economic sanctions imposed under UN Resolution No. 661. In his speech to the UN General Assembly on September 26, 1990, Foreign Minister Genscher indicated concerns about safeguarding principles of state sovereignty and human rights. He condemned the annexation of Kuwait as illegal and offered Germany’s unqualified support in demanding the complete and unconditional

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82 NYT, August 3, 1990.
withdrawal from Kuwait, reinstitution of the country’s full sovereignty, and immediate release of all hostages (Genscher 1998, 477).  

The Federal Republic addressed the Gulf Crisis diplomatically as indicated by its condemnation of Iraqi aggression and the call for the restoration of Kuwaiti sovereignty. Yet Germany did not join in the growing international consensus on a military solution to the crisis and showed little concern about the possibility of further Iraqi aggression in the region. In contrast, leaders of the United States, the United Kingdom and France quickly decided on the use of force and proceeded to deploy troops in Saudi Arabia to deter Iraq from further aggressive moves. German policymakers also showed no inclination to force Saddam Hussein to relinquish control over Kuwait. Neither parliamentary elites nor the general public seemed to perceive Iraq as grave threat to international security (Berger 1998, 171). Public debates were characterized by the absence of discussions about German interests in the region and how these interests should guide policy (Asmus 1992, vi). The concern for domestic issues including reunification clearly preoccupied elites, public and the media. The failure to partake and support a military solution pursued by NATO allies and the United Nations would soon leave Germany diplomatically isolated and susceptible to international criticism.

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83 Chancellor Kohl would later explain the government’s reasoning in a Bundestag speech on January 14, 1991 where he stated that “once the international community allows the forceful extinction of one of its members as a state, it will have unforeseeable consequences in other parts of the world” (Kohl 2007, 299; PB 12/2, January 14, 1991, 22). The session of parliament ended with an all-party resolution calling on Saddam Hussein to prevent war by withdrawing from Kuwait (Genscher 1998, 479; PB 12/2, January 14, 1991).

84 Extraordinary parliamentary sessions convened during the summer break on August 8 and 9 addressed domestic issues including reunification and upcoming elections but made no mention of the crisis in the Persian Gulf.
Germany’s parliamentary elites were divided on the appropriate course of action to address the escalating Gulf crisis. Cabinet elites were aware of the growing international expectations of German military contributions. Members of the cabinet including Chancellor Kohl and Defense Minister Stoltenberg were sympathetic to the requests for military assistance issued by the United States and the United Nations and initially recommended the deployment of logistical support troops to demonstrate German solidarity with its allies (Berger 1998, 174; Bennett, Lepgold, and Unger 1994, 68). They supported their argument with article 24, paragraph 2 of the constitution according to which German membership in a collective security system could be interpreted as establishing the special responsibility to support the coalition forces being assembled in the Gulf (Stoltenberg 1991).85 This interpretation of the constitution produced significant disagreements among parliamentary elites. Members of the opposition parties dismissed the argument outright and even the coalition partners from the FDP were unprepared to commit troops without judicial clarification. A political controversy developed which indicated that the room for a consensus on the German policy response was narrow and pre-determined by the role conceptions of the past.

Foreign Minister Genscher of the junior coalition partner FDP opposed changes in German role behavior. He argued that the deployment of German troops in the Gulf required a constitutional amendment (Bennett, Lepgold, and Unger 1994, 69). Addressing the general question of military contributions to actions outside of NATO territory, the

minister emphasized the requirement of an international mandate. Politicians from the Social Democratic Party went even further in opposing Kohl’s initial position on deploying logistical support troops in the Gulf region. Party members criticized American actions as attempt aimed at preserving hegemony in the region and maintained that the party was unwilling to support superpower interests at the cost of overturning Germany’s pacifist traditions (Berger 1998, 173). These concerns were shared by the politicians from the Alliance 90/Green Party who criticized past US policy in the region and contended that it had contributed to the crisis. Green Party politicians also categorically opposed any use of military force.

In the end, parliamentary elites settled their differences at a meeting on August 20 in which the leaders of the CDU/CSU, FDP and SPD agreed to a compromise in which military contributions of any sort were ruled out in return for an agreement on addressing the issue through a constitutional amendment at a later date (Bennett, Lepgold, and Unger 1994, 69). Foreign Minister Genscher and Defense Minister Stoltenberg conveyed the Federal Republic’s position at a meeting of the WEU the next day and three days later, on August 23, Genscher informed the Bundestag of the cabinet’s decision to deny military assistance on the basis of limitations on the use of military force contained within the federal constitution.87

86 In October, Genscher stated that the only option on the table was participation in peacekeeping operations under UN auspices (Der Spiegel, October 1, 1991).

87 Genscher stated that “Our basic law does not permit us to send troops into territory beyond the borders of our alliance…It is our objective to enable the German forces to participate in military actions that have been voting in by the Security Council in accordance with the provisions of the United Nations Charter. The Federal Republic of Germany thus expresses its preparedness…to assume its responsibility for securing world peace within the framework of the United Nations and on the basis of its charter” (Genscher 1998, 474; PB 11/221, August 23, 1990, 17469).
In the ensuing parliamentary debate, opposition politicians remained true to the informal agreement forged at the inter-factional meeting three days prior. They also reaffirmed their support for a constitutional amendment that would allow the *Bundeswehr* to participate in UN peacekeeping missions. Backed by the elite consensus, Chancellor Kohl turned down a personal appeal for military assistance made by President Bush during the end of August by claiming that the constitution prohibited the out-of-area deployment of *Bundeswehr* troops (Hyde-Price 2003, 188; Lantis 2002, 82). On September 13, the Chancellor declared that Germany would aid the coalition within limitations and that he would introduce a constitutional amendment after the November elections allowing for the use of the *Bundeswehr* in crisis spots within a multilateral framework provided by the United Nations (Genscher 1998, 476).

Unwilling to render military assistance while being subject to increasing international pressure to aid the coalition, Germany began to concentrate on financial and diplomatic means to address the crisis. Kohl pledged about $2.1 billion in economic aid to the coalition during a meeting with US Secretary of State Baker on September 15 (Bennett, Lepgold, and Unger 1994, 66; Baker 1995, 299). Half of that amount was to go to the United States with the other half to be divided between Egypt, Jordan and Turkey (Ibid.). Baker, who personally believed “that Germany’s response to the crisis up to then had been disappointing”, emphasized the importance of Germany living up to its responsibilities (Baker 1995, 298-299). By Germany made a second pledge in January

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88 Baker (1995, 299) wrote in his memoirs: “You’re not going to contribute any forces because your constitution prohibits it, and then if it looks like you’re being skimpy on the money, you’re getting all the benefits of this and you’re not contributing. And even if I don’t believe it, that’s the way it’s perceived. You have to put me in the position where I can argue when I appear before Congress that Germany is doing
1991 with the country promising an additional $5.5 billion to the United States and $550 million to the United Kingdom, followed by another pledge to support French efforts in February 1991 (Bennett, Lepgold, and Unger 1994, 66; Kohl 2007, 308). In total, German financial contributions would amount to $10.6 Billion (Berger 1998, 173).

Nonfinancial contributions were not insignificant. Germany sent seven support ships to the Mediterranean in August to replace American vessels that had been reassigned to the Gulf. It would later dispatch five minesweepers to the Gulf. Germany also agreed to the use of its airspace, paid for the transportation of the bulk of US troops from Germany via rail and river barges and dispatched eighteen Alpha jets to Turkey to protect it against a potential Iraqi attack in response to a government request. Germany mobilized about 3100 troops in support of allied efforts.\(^89\) The air force deployment as part of the Allied Mobile Force was largely a symbolic act of alliance solidarity. Public opinion remained strongly opposed to military actions (\textit{Der Spiegel}, March 11, 1991). Antimilitarism in society and the armed forces turned the deployment decision into a minor governmental crisis. The number of conscientious objectors surged with fifty alone among the troops sent to Turkey.\(^90\)

Germany continued to emphasize the need for non-violent means of resolving the conflict although hopes for a negotiated end to the crisis quickly faded with Hussein’s steadfast refusal to withdraw from Kuwait. Iraq’s position became increasingly more isolated through September 1990, when Hussein began to detain foreign citizens as


hostages and also ignored the appeals of the Soviet Union. At the United Nations, Germany repeatedly underscored its support for principles of international law which clearly defined Iraq’s actions as aggressive and illegal. Germany also helped facilitate the Soviet Union’s continued political cooperation with the West which contributed to the maintenance of cohesion among Gulf coalition members and indirectly supported alliance objectives.91

A noticeable shift in the domestic debate about adequate responses to the crisis occurred after the Scud missile attacks on Israel on January 17, 1991. German elites agreed that the country had a special responsibility for Israeli security arising from the historical burden of the Holocaust. The indiscriminate attacks on Israeli civilians made German military reticence appear morally unacceptable and increased international pressure to boost support for the multilateral coalition. The diplomatic damage worsened when German firms began to be implicated in the design and construction of Iraq’s chemical and biological laboratories (Lantis 2002a, 30). Germany, which had been quicker to condemn the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait than some other states because it had not engaged in major arms trading with Saddam Hussein’s government, now was subjected to intense international criticism for having aided Iraqi capabilities (Ibid.). Criticism, guilt and the missile attacks on Israeli civilians “triggered a complex psychological and political reaction that helped produce a major shift in policy”… “[it] created a political imperative for Germany to act” (Asmus 1994, 63). As such, the attacks

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91 Later, Genscher (1998, 483) would write about this frequently overlooked role that “Germany’s willingness to support the Soviet Union’s economy facilitated its withdrawal from Europe … [which] … improved the Alliance’s strategic position in regard to security”.

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on Israel led to a noticeable shift in both the elite and the public’s perception on the use of force as a more effective means to address Iraqi aggression.\textsuperscript{92}

The attacks on Israel and guilt over having aided Iraq shifted situational parameters for German elites. The question of German responsibility elevated the Gulf crisis to a high level of national importance. Parliamentary elites stepped up their support for the coalition by increasing financial and material contributions significantly. In his speech to the \textit{Bundestag} on January 30, 1991, Chancellor Kohl justified an additional $5.5 billion in aid by referring to the sacrifices other allies had made as well as US contributions to the maintenance of German unity and freedom. He also argued that a united Germany had greater responsibility that came with its increased freedom of action (\textit{PB 12/05}, January 30, 1991, 69).

Germany’s significant financial and logistical contributions did little to shake the international perception that it had not contributed commensurate with capabilities. International criticism of German policy conduct and military reticence heated up during the peak of the coalition’s air attack in February. German policy elites responded with baffled indignation. For instance, Foreign Minister Genscher stated that “nobody should complain when Germans are thoughtful and not rash in questions of war and peace”.\textsuperscript{93}

Voicing a civilian power conception of the German role in the world, President Richard von Weizsäcker commented on international criticism of German inaction “that the world would not want to rediscover how well German soldiers can fight”.\textsuperscript{94}

\textsuperscript{92} A number of prominent left-leaning intellectuals also began to support the use of force as necessary evil.


Germany’s future role on the forefront of addressing the ‘real security problems’ of the world which he considered to be overpopulation, hunger, social inequality and environmental destruction.\(^95\)

The country’s refusal to deploy troops on the grounds that the country’s constitution ruled out the deployment of *Bundeswehr* troops in ‘out-of-area’ operations can be contrasted with that of other middle powers such as the United Kingdom and France which chose to act resolutely and between them, dispatched close to 50,000 troops to the region. Both countries were cognizant of their leadership responsibilities in the maintenance of the international order arising from their great power roles. French military support against an Arab country, in particular, was strongly motivated by the country’s desire to demonstrate great power status in the post-Cold War world (Wood 1992, 45-49). But emulating the role of the United Kingdom or France did not appeal to most German politicians even though Germany was more dependent on oil from the Gulf than France and many of the countries who militarily supported the coalition. Therefore, preserving continued access to the region’s oil supply and preventing a dictator from controlling them should have constituted a vital national interest. On the basis of the principle of state sovereignty, as well, Germany should have militarily supported the restoration of Kuwaiti sovereignty which had been so blatantly violated by Iraq. There also was the issue of the Iraqi human rights violations in Kuwait which should have been a prime concern for a civilian power that had supported the strengthening of international

\(^95\) In a clear misunderstanding of the altered nature of the international security environment after the Cold War, the President also saw the controversy about German military involvement as superfluous and the Gulf War as the last of its kind (“Normale Rolle”, *Der Spiegel*, March 11, 1991, 22).
human rights regimes for many years. The relatively swift reaction to the Scud missile attacks on Israel did little to dispel the international image of German policy as being callous and unconcerned. The debate over whether NATO ally Turkey should be defended from a potential Iraqi attack was awkward and diplomatically damaging. Perhaps most perplexing was the fact that the ongoing negotiations over the vital Two-Plus-Four Treaty required the goodwill of the allied powers which should have made diplomatic and political concessions in response to Allied requests more likely. How can the fact that Germany failed to exhibit the role behavior of a responsible and calculable ally that it had shown throughout the Cold War be explained through the interplay between role expectations and role conceptions?

Role Expectations and Role Perceptions

The diplomatic fallout over the German response to the Persian Gulf War was dramatic. Foreign media and government officials criticized the Federal Republic for failing to provide combat troops and for dragging its heels on offering financial assistance. In the United States, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee singled Germany out for special criticism (Baker 1995, 298-99). Along with Japan, Germany was accused of being an ‘ostrich power’ that was strangely out of touch with international

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96 The extent of human rights violations appears to have been deliberately exaggerated at the time by sources acting on behalf of the Kuwaiti government.

97 Secretary of State Baker (1995, 299) was perplexed about the lack of German reciprocity. As he pointed out during his meeting with Chancellor Kohl: “We have worked very closely in the last year to meet your needs. I think that we have done a good job, and it wasn’t always easy. We worked closely together, and we kept you informed every step of the way. It’s a wonderful achievement for all of us, but [we] have some needs now”.

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realities. Even more stinging criticism came in the form of accusations of cowardice and callously having traded lives of soldiers for checkbook diplomacy. The failure to act decisively to protect Turkey exasperated many NATO officials and even raised doubts about German reliability within the alliance (Stephen Kinzer, *NYT*, January 26, 1991, A8). Defense Minister Stoltenberg was forced to acknowledge that the Federal Republic had been subjected to some very critical reactions (Ibid.). Chancellor Kohl and Foreign Minister Genscher would spend months attempting to repair the diplomatic damage caused by the war. Clearly, Germany had not lived up to role expectations from important allies. These expectations were based on the desire for Germany to act responsibly by assuming a leadership role in international affairs after the end of the Cold War. The intensity of the demands for a new German role during this period needs to be viewed within the context of the evolution in NATO’s strategic doctrines and the organization’s general purpose and self-perception which influenced the behavioral expectations of important member states.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization was established by the North Atlantic Treaty, signed in Washington in 1949. As a collective defense system, Article 5 of the treaty treated peace as indivisible by considering an attack on one of the member states as


100 President Bush expressed these expectations in his important speech in Mainz in May 1989 in which he recognized Germany’s role as Europe’s preeminent economic and political power and saw the US and Germany as ‘partners in leadership’ in responsibly grasping ‘the promise of the future’ created by Gorbachev’s initiatives (Bush 2009, 52-3).
an attack on all. Article 5 was also referenced to Article 51 of the United Nations Charter which supports states’ rights to individual and collective self-defense (NATO, Art. 5). Charged with defensive functions for European and North American territory, NATO was not set up to conduct operations outside of its territory. So-called out-of-area or non-article 5 operations which were not directly related to the defense of alliance territory but undertaken in the interest of maintaining international stability had always been the source of disagreements between the member states (Baumann 2001, 160). However, the rigid balance of power system of the Cold War generated few opportunities for out of area mission and hence caused few issues of contention. This would change with the emergence of a new security environment after the Cold War ended.

NATO’s Summit in Brussels in May 1989 acknowledged the far-reaching changes that were beginning to envelop Europe as a result of Mikhail Gorbachev’s policy revolution in the Soviet Union. The summit also began to address what would soon be perceived as radical change in the international security environment. For instance, articles 31-32 of the Brussels Declaration established the need to deal with regional conflicts as well as comprehensive security problems including environmental depredation, resource conflicts and economic disparities. However, the defensive strategy of the alliance remained essentially unchanged with Article 12 stating that defense depends on “a strategy of deterrence based upon an appropriate mix of adequate and effective nuclear and conventional forces” (Ibid.). Subsequent role expectations were conveyed in Article 13 which required that

the Allies fulfil [sic] their essential commitments in support of the common
defence. Each of our countries will accordingly assume its fair share of the risks,
rôles and responsibilities of the Atlantic partnership (Ibid.).

Threat perceptions and strategies began to change in earnest at the London
Summit in July 1990 during which governmental leaders attempted to come to terms with
the fundamental transformations taking place in Europe. The creation of multinational
rapid reaction forces was a major issue at the summit (Berger 1998, 169).102 Article 14 of
the London Declaration addressed the need for crisis management through “smaller and
restructured active forces...which...will be highly mobile and versatile so that Allied
leaders will have maximum flexibility in deciding how to respond to a crisis”.103 With the
increasing tendency of the UN to engage in peacekeeping missions in accordance with
Chapter VII of its charter, NATO would move even further towards the creation of crisis
reaction forces through the development of a new strategic concept in 1991.

In sum, NATO revised its strategic doctrines during the early 1990s in response to
changes in the international environment and the possibilities generated by the end of the
Cold War. The new doctrines effectively transformed normative parameters for state
action and participation in non-article 5 operations. Alliance responsibility was no longer
understood as state contributions to territorial defense. Instead, member states were
expected to develop the capability and willingness to address global stabilities through
peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions. During the period of the Persian Gulf
Crisis between August 1990 and February 1991, the new norms were not fully articulated

102 Among the important concerns addressed by the London Summit was the need to contain soon-to-be
reunified and sovereign Germany through the maintenance of a dense institutional network (Berger 1998,
169).

103 NATO, London Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance, art. 14, par.1.
and national force structures had not even been reorganized to allow for the capability for rapid reaction missions. Changes in the physical environment were occurring faster than institutions could respond to them. Given the uncertain and fluctuating nature of the situation, the social impact of the developing intervention norms was muted which increased the policy autonomy of German elites whose role conceptions still reflected those of the Cold War.

The international criticism came as a surprise to elites whose civilian power conceptions had largely survived the fundamental transitions that accompanied the end of the Cold War. In fact, Germany’s response to the Gulf War suggested that the country had not emerged from reunification as stronger actor, secure in its role as Europe’s leading power, but a country “that really wanted to be a Greater Liechtenstein” (Schoenbaum and Pond 1996, 67). Nevertheless, conservative elites quickly seized the opportunity to attempt to change role behavior concurrent with international expectations. Their interest lay in having Germany become a ‘normal’ state that would exhibit foreign policy behavior similar to that of other great powers. The interest in normalization was argumentatively presented as part of a concern with the country’s reputation as dependable ally.

CDU party leaders quickly began to view Germany’s anti-military traditions and institutions as obstacle to be overcome rather than as valuable post-war identity asset to be preserved. Chancellor Kohl, his advisor Horst Teltschik, Defense Minister Stoltenberg and Secretary General of the CDU, Volker Rühe, argued that the future reputation of the Federal Republic would depend substantially on its willingness contribute militarily to
the resolution of international crises.\textsuperscript{104} Karl-Heinz Hornhues, the foreign policy spokesperson for the CDU/CSU coalition, maintained that the “unified Germany is a normal state and should accept its responsibility in the international community” (quoted in Lantis 2002a, 32). The desired role changes were also motivated by a desire for full equality in social status as revealed by statements by Volker Rühe who voiced his concern that “the quality and size of Germany’s contribution influences its political capability and thus determines the weight that can be thrown behind its interests” (quoted in Duffield 1998, 183). In line with their quest for behavioral normalization, Kohl and Stoltenberg emphasized the need for the revision of the constitutional limitation on deployment of troops outside of NATO area (Bach 1999, 122).

The role adaptation sought by the ruling party was pursued under the heading of responsibility which had been the hallmark of elite role conceptions for many years. Responsibility was the argumentative centerpiece of Chancellor Kohl’s inaugural policy speech from January 30, 1991 in which he stressed that Germans could not exclude themselves from world developments and that the country had a responsibility to participate in the maintenance of international peace and stability. In that speech, the chancellor also argued out that Germany’s allies expected such a role shift and that Germany’s membership in the ‘community of free nations’ obligated it to contribute with “all rights and with all the responsibilities”.\textsuperscript{105} Kohl also promoted the normalization of

\textsuperscript{104} “Normale Rolle”, Der Spiegel, March 11, 1991, 22.

\textsuperscript{105} Kohl conveyed the desired changes in role behavior in the following words: “There can be no safe little corner in world politics for us Germans,” and “we have to face up to our responsibility, whether we like it or not. Until now, we have worked actively and successfully for the world’s economic stability. This will no longer be enough… The attainment of full sovereignty does not just increase behavioral latitude but also comes with increased responsibilities. That is how our partners view this. They expect from the united Germany that it becomes true to its new role. This is not a question of unilateral policy or ambitions of
German policy and identity including Germany’s need “of finding its inner balance, its center…which included what was considered normal in other countries, …[a] living patriotism”.

The statements of conservative politicians reveal that they desired a change in the role behavior of the Federal Republic after the end of the Cold War. They promoted policy normalization by cleverly linking allied expectations to values of responsibility and reliability that had been central to the country’s traditional role conception since World War II. Role entrepreneurs were unsuccessful in persuading other parliamentary elites. Politicians from the coalition partner FDP and the opposition SPD advanced their own positions of maintaining policy continuity on the use of force by invoking Germany’s traditional civilian power role conception.

Politicians from the Free Democratic Party were concerned with preserving the country’s traditional role conception including the institutionally anchored military reticence. This foreign policy orientation was considered as a prudent state policy that had proven itself in the past. For FDP politicians, the future reputation of the Federal Republic was a function of maintaining the traditional role as an antimilitarist power that

__power because for us there is only one place in the world and that is among the community of free nations” (PB 12/5, January 30, 1991, 69).__

__106__ Chancellor Kohl concluded his speech with the statement that Germany was in need of finding its inner balance, its center…which included what was considered normal in other countries, …[a]living patriotism and…that the unified Germany takes its role in the circle of nations – with all rights and with all the responsibilities. This is rightfully expected of us and we must meet this expectation…a vision of a new order for Europe and the world which is based on national self-determination, the inviolability of human dignity and the respect for human rights (Kohl, PB 12/5, January 30, 1991, 90).

__107__ FDP parliamentarian Feldmann conveyed this role conception in parliament by stating that “the Federal Republic of Germany has achieved a good reputation and trust as a result of a forty-year record of a commitment to a political and consistently nonmilitary foreign policy. Now, this condition of trust has to be strengthened and transferred to the united Germany” (PB 11/221, August 23, 1990, 17478).
addressed global security through holistic and institutionalized approaches. The differences between CDU/CSU and FDP politicians over Germany’s future role took the form of a disagreement over the nature of the mandate allowing for the participation of German troops abroad. Emphasizing antimilitarism as part of the country’s role in world politics and relying on Genscher’s holistic and institutionalized conception of global security, party members preferred a UN over a NATO or European mandate. Thus, Otto Graf Lambsdorff openly questioned the grounds on which the government could decide to deploy German troops to the Persian Gulf. Genscher and others argued for the resolution of the issue of the mandate through judicial clarification by Germany’s Constitutional court.

Politicians of the Free Democratic Party also worried about the precise nature of the decision-making procedure leading to the deployment of troops. To prevent potential abuse by the executive, they insisted on Bundestag majorities to allow out-of-area deployments (Duffield 1998, 185). By linking out-of-area participation to Bundestag majorities and hence, popular support and by emphasizing the importance of international peacekeeping through the UN, the position of the FDP did not deviate substantially from that of the traditional civilian power role. The disagreement between the coalition

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108 This benign, civilized vision of global politics relied on the premise that resolution of violence and misunderstandings within international politics could be achieved through the support of institutions and international law. Genscher was well-known for this vision (even referred to as Genscherism). The underlying assumption behind this view of international politics was that international society could be turned into something resembling domestic society – a concept German politicians referred to as world-domestic politics (Weltinnenpolitik). See Longhurst (2004, 62).


110 Germany’s Constitutional Court would not decisively rule on this issue until July 12, 1994 when it allowed German participation in out-of-area missions on the basis of the country’s responsibilities as member of a defensive alliance.
partners undermined the ability of conservative politicians to promote a new role conception of the Federal Republic as normal power. Politicians from the opposition parties were even more vehemently opposed to a course change.

Politicians from the Social Democratic Party were among the strongest supporters of Germany’s traditional role conception. SPD party chairman Hans-Jochen Vogel opposed the cabinet’s original idea of deploying troops for logistical support missions and criticized the economic support provided for the Gulf coalition. Party leader Oscar Lafontaine went even further by questioning the use of military force to remove Iraqi forces from Kuwait on the basis of principle. Instead of military force, party members viewed sanctions as the only appropriate way of pressuring Iraq into restoring Kuwaiti sovereignty. Humanitarian assistance operations were seen as the only acceptable form of German participation.

The left-of-center rejection of the use of force and the view of war as counterproductive and unacceptable means of diplomatic conduct closely corresponded to the civilian power role conception. Opposition leaders fought hard to preserve that role conception. They conjured up the specter of the potential militarization of German foreign policy and the dangers inherent in abandoning the primacy of the established policy tendency to seek political rather than military solutions to conflicts. They recommended, instead, that the government pursue all opportunities leading to a speedy

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112 Vogel cited concerns of US conflict expert Paul Nitze about the potential side effects of the of Gulf war including the global rise of fundamentalism and environmental destruction. He went on to argue that the logic of war needed to be disrupted at every possible moment so that the political process may be given the chance to pursue justice by non-violent means (PB 12/6, January 31, 1991, 96).
resumption of the political process. Left-of-center politicians also emphasized the misuse of military force in the past and suggested, fully in line with the expectations arising from the role conception of a civilian power, that the Federal Republic had a special moral obligation arising from its history to disavow the use of military force to resolve international disputes. Referring to the participation of German soldiers in the Gulf as unacceptable, Vogel stated categorically: “We don’t want it and the constitution does not allow it”.

Responding to the idea of role normalization and explicitly rejecting its great power ramifications, members of the SPD argued against such a national role if that meant emulating France, the United Kingdom or Italy. Many party members had been calling for the reduction of national force levels to under 250,000 troops. This figure was significantly under the 370,000 troops agreed upon in the Two-Plus-Four Treaty (Longhurst 2004, 55 and 62). Germany was to perform an international role comparable to the one played by Sweden. The country’s foreign policy was to be characterized by the central values of antimilitarism and humanitarianism (Kamp 1993, 167). SPD politicians also rejected Kohl’s argument that Germany had an obligation to demonstrate solidarity with the alliance.

Members of the more radical left wing within the Social Democratic Party also were distrustful of American intentions in the region. US actions were viewed as primarily hegemonic and self-serving in nature. The Gulf Crisis was perceived as a

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113 In German: “…jede Möglichkeit genutzt werden, damit erneut die Politik eine Chance erhält, das Recht mit gewaltlosen Mitteln wiederherzustellen” (Ibid.).

114 PB 12/6, January 31, 1991, 96. SPD parliamentarian Wischnewski had used similar words during the debate from August 23, 1990: “We welcome that clarity has been achieved about the fact that there will be no Bundeswehr in the Gulf. “Our constitution does not allow it” (PB 11/221, August 23, 1990, 17471).
Peripheral event given the party’s traditional policy focus on European events. Europeanists had been advocating for the dismantlement of NATO in favor of an expanded and strengthened European security policy after the end of the Cold War (Berger 1998, 181). The questioning of US motives is revealed in the discourse on Turkey’s request for military assistance under the auspices of NATO’s Allied Mobile Force.

The Turkish president had publicly criticized Germany for its delayed response in providing military aid against a potential attack from Iraq. SPD Party chairman Vogel rejected the criticism and accused Turkey of trying to use the incident to boost the country’s regional power in an effort to become a regional hegemon. Clearly rejecting external role expectations that required Germany to act responsibly by rendering assistance to an ally in need, Vogel maintained that “the Federal Republic gets to decide if she wants to participate in military operations on the basis of UN decisions and not the Turkish president or the NATO General Secretary”. He later reaffirmed his disapproval of German military assistance to Turkey because he perceived the risk of having troops be used in violation of constitutional parameters.

The positions of SPD leaders emphasized values of Germany’s traditional role conception over those of foreign role expectations. Responsibility was understood as adherence to the civilian power values of the past. Antimilitarism and humanitarianism

115 The party decided to abandon this position during the December elections of 1990.

116 The term used here was Ordnungsmacht which roughly translates into hegemon. The relevant sentence in Vogel’s statement in German was: “Das Wort von der Ordnungsmacht in der Region läßt da aufhorchen” (PB 12/6, January 31, 1991, 97).

117 This statement was followed by strong supporting applause from politicians of the SPD and the Alliance 90/Green party.
were viewed as guiding principles of German policy orientation in the post-Cold War era. This stance would be affirmed through a series of party congresses during the early 1990s. The vast majority of party delegates would continue to reject German participation in peacekeeping mission that carried the risk of weapons being used for purposes other than self-defense. SPD leaders had initially agreed to compromise on the necessity of a constitutional amendment on the use of military force. But support for that position during the August 1990 meeting had been lukewarm and possibly guided by the conviction that the necessary two-thirds majority for an amendment in the Bundestag was out of reach.118

Members of Germany’s Alliance 90/Green Party maintained the most restrictive position on the use of military force. Claiming that “military intervention by the United States exacerbates the conflict and contributes to the escalation”, party member Beer criticized the actions of the United States as “gunboat diplomacy”.119 Green Party politicians emphasized the importance of political rather than military means of resolving the conflict by voicing their support for continued UN sanctions and Iraq. They also criticized the desire of the government to meet foreign expectations through military involvement and “demanded strict military abstention” in this and all future conflicts (Ibid.,17477). The categorical rejection of the use of force was based on a role conception of Germany as an immature state.

118 Some dissent did exist within the party. For instance, Hans-Ulrich Klose, Karsten Voigt and Rudolf Scharping who would later take the position of Defense Minister in the first Schröder cabinet, supported a more active stance for Bundeswehr participation in UN peacekeeping missions even if combat was involved (Longhurst 2004, 63; Lantis 2002a, 32).

119 Beer stated that “the US disregarded the UN resolution and that is proof of the fact that the old thinking and foreign policy based on gunboat diplomacy is the determining element” (Beer, PB 11/221, August 23, 1990, 17476).
According to the view of the radical left, Germany was a state not yet ready to take on international responsibility. The country’s imperial past and its militant-expansionistic foreign policy orientation established the obligation for the Federal Republic to rule out military involvement outside of state territory. Continued state immaturity and irresponsibility in international affairs were confirmed by German actions in the Gulf region. Germany was seen as guilty for having contributed to the region’s militarization and insecurity through a defective arms export policy. In their categorical rejection of the use of military force and their opposition to German involvement abroad, Green Party elites strongly supported the traditional role conception of the Federal Republic.

The elite debate during and immediately following the Persian Gulf War shows that conservative elites attempted to meet foreign expectations and wanted to combine that goal with their desire for the normalization of German role behavior. As first major crisis of the Post-Cold War order, the Gulf War initiated a debate on the normalization of national identity and German foreign policy. The war helped define the discursive terrain along with what would become the rhetorical positions and argumentative dividing lines between elites for the next years. The battle would rage over what type of role behavior

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120 In German: “… dass die BRD und die DDR erheblich zur Mitaufrüstung und Militarisierung dieses Konfliktes im Nahen Osten beigetragen haben zeigt, dass das vereinigte Deutschland erst noch unter Beweis zu stellen hat, dass es nicht zu Eskalationen von Konflikten auf der Welt oder gerade in der Dritten Welt beitragen wird” (Beer, PB 11/221, August 23, 1990, 17477).

121 In a striking turnabout, Fischer and the Green Party would later support and oversee the country’s first military engagement since World War II during the Kosovo Crisis.

122 The debate was not always strictly divided along ideological lines. Former Chancellor Willy Brandt (SPD) and left-of-center opinion leader Magnus Enzensberger supported the use of force to liberate Kuwait to the need to oppose aggression by authoritarian regimes in reference to Germany’s own past.
most closely matched the central tenet of responsibility that had defined German role conceptions since World War II. Conservative elites would argue for a change in role behavior that included the pursuit of ‘normal’ national interests and the use of force. They were joining forces with a small but influential group of scholars who argued strongly for the acceptance of the country’s ‘natural’ great power role in Europe. The opposing position was that of role continuity which entailed the preservation of the civilian power role including its defining principle of the rejection of the use of force. The decision to not comply with new international expectations of German behavior during this role episode was also influenced by domestic elite interests.

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123 Even Social Democrats who vehemently opposed the participation of Bundeswehr troops in Gulf operations accepted the need for greater responsibility. In the first major rhetorical exchange in parliament, Wischniewski (1990, August 23, 1991, 17471) stated that Germany needs to be prepared to contribute to international peace outside of NATO area. In German: “...weil wir bereit sein müssen, in aller Behutsamkeit und in aller Bescheidenheit unseren Beitrag zu leisten, um den Frieden auch außerhalb des Bereiches unseres Bündnisses zu erhalten oder wiederherzustellen”.

124 Examples of the arguments promoting normalization are found in the contributions by Stürmer, Schöllgen and Gillessen. Schöllgen wrote that “half a century after World War II, Germany is again united, again a nation-state and thus on the evolutionary path to again becoming a European Great Power” (1993, 27). Stürmer argued that Germany, as “defined by the four Gs: Weight and size, history and geography (Gewicht und Größe, Geschichte und Geographie)... is by its nature a Great Power. Germany is thus both becoming normal and returning to normalcy” (Stürmer 1992 quoted in Schöllgen 1993, 140). Finally and perhaps most telling, Gillessen wrote that “Germany will have to become a normal nation among other nations...Identifiable interests are the basis of continuity, credibility and trust...a nation which is not able to talk about its national interests openly and clearly will appear to pursue a hidden and perhaps suspect agenda...A country that cannot define its interests properly and set its policies accordingly will be regarded by others as unpredictable and if, in addition, that country is powerful, as dangerous (Gillessen 1994, 30-31). We see here the clear linguistic appropriation of concepts associated with the traditional role conception including predictability and calculability (trust) to forge a new role conception and foreign policy conduct.
Table 2: The Persian Gulf War Role Episode: Important Events

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>August 2</td>
<td>Iraq invades Kuwait</td>
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<tr>
<td>August 6</td>
<td>UN imposes trade sanctions</td>
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<tr>
<td>August 20</td>
<td>Request for German military support</td>
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<tr>
<td>August 23</td>
<td>Inter-Factional meeting between all major parties leads to agreement on rejecting military involvement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>End of August</td>
<td>President Bush requests military assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 12</td>
<td>Two-Plus-Four Treaty signed in Moscow</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 15</td>
<td>Kohl pledges $2.1 Billion after meeting with Secretary Baker</td>
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<tr>
<td>September 26</td>
<td>Genscher condemns annexation of Kuwait in speech to UN Assembly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 29</td>
<td>UN Security Council passes resolution 678 giving Iraq until January 15, 1991 to withdraw from Kuwait</td>
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<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>January 10</td>
<td>CDU/CSU looses election in Hessen</td>
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<tr>
<td>January 17</td>
<td>Operation Desert Storm begins</td>
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<tr>
<td>January 19</td>
<td>First SCUD missile attacks on Israel</td>
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<tr>
<td>January 28</td>
<td>President Bush requests additional financial support for the coalition</td>
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<tr>
<td>January 30</td>
<td>Kohl’s inaugural speech lays out new role for Germany as normal power with international responsibility</td>
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<tr>
<td>February 27</td>
<td>Kuwait is declared liberated</td>
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<tr>
<td>March 15</td>
<td>Supreme Soviet ratifies Two-Plus-Four Treaty</td>
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Domestic Concerns of Parliamentary Elites during the Gulf War Crisis

The crisis in the Gulf could not have developed at a more momentous time in Germany’s post-war history. The government of Helmut Kohl was preoccupied with the range of political, socioeconomic and fiscal ramifications of reunification and the preparations for the first all-German elections since World War II. The December elections were widely perceived to create some type of watershed in German politics that would influence politics for years to come. On the foreign policy side, the negotiation of the crucially important Two-plus-Four Treaty trumped other issues.

Germany’s domestic agenda in the fall of 1990 was dominated by the need to address the extraordinary range of political, economic and social issues pertaining to reunification. These issues revolved around nothing short of the conjoining of two states
that, after five decades of leading a separate existence in opposing systems, had little in common safe language and the will of the citizens to unite sooner rather than later.

Adding to the complexity of the domestic situation was the mind-boggling speed of the reunification process which frequently rendered plans obsolete even as they were being drawn up. In the face of these fast-moving events, the options available to policy-makers changed continuously. Plans for a federation of the two German states and a currency union were quickly superseded by the necessity of full national reunification. This, in essence, took the shape of an annexation as most East German economic and political models were deemed unacceptable to a majority of Germans. Parliamentary debates in 1990 were dominated by the extraordinary range of issues that needed to be addressed to both facilitate reunification and address issues of social and economic integration.125

In early October, 1990, the Democratic Republic of Germany formally ceased to exist when its parliament, the Volkskammer, voted for unification with the Federal Republic. The country began to prepare for the first all-German elections since the last Reichstag elections of 1933. Kohl and the CDU/CSU won the first post-unification election of December 2, 1990 by a landslide. He had advocated a swift reunification course, maintaining that Article 23 of the German constitution allowed for the extension of West German institutions to the five Länder of East Germany. The euphoria surrounding reunification in both East and West undoubtedly contributed to the party’s election success. Meanwhile, the opposition parties incurred major losses. The SPD had

125 In the end, Kohl’s government chose the easiest path to reunification. Invoking Article 23 of the German constitution which allowed for the extension of the institutions to the new provinces, the 5 Eastern provinces were simply incorporated in the existing territory of the Federal Republic. Nevertheless, major problems were in need of resolution: These included in particular the rather complex laws governing German federalism – meaning the relationship between the Länder and the federal government as well as between the Länder themselves.
to surrender about 3.5 percent of its seats in parliament. The Green Party suffered a major defeat. It lost 4.5 percent of its votes and failed to preserve the right to parliamentary representation.\textsuperscript{126} Both parties had advocated a more cautious and incremental reunification process based on stages. Party leaders had warned of the high costs for the West German population as well as inflated expectations in the East. Aware of the euphoria surrounding reunification, Social Democratic politicians had relied on what they believed was their party’s powerful reputation among East Germans.\textsuperscript{127} CDU/CSU politicians since Chancellor Adenauer had pursued an unequivocally Western orientation which should have negatively impacted their electoral prospects in East and West. SPD politicians including Willy Brandt and Egon Bahr had built a strong and lasting reputation for conciliatory politics towards East Germany. The party’s popular \textit{Ostpolitik} had linked populations in East and West Germany during the 1970s and had enabled the two states to maintain cordial relations even during times of renewed tensions in the 1980s.

Germany’s Green Party was relatively unknown in the East. To overcome their party’s name recognition deficit, party leaders had pursued an alliance with leading intellectuals from the East who had been instrumental in bringing about the democratic changes in the former GDR. These individuals, turned politicians, had banded together in

\textsuperscript{126} Support for the Green Party dropped from 8.7 percent in 1987 to 4.8 in 1990. The party did not clear the five percent hurdle and, subsequently, failed to win the right to parliamentary representation (Finkel and Schrott 1995, 360).

\textsuperscript{127} The reputation was build on the \textit{Ostpolitik} policies pursued under the Brandt cabinet which had replaced the confrontational course of previous cabinets with a series of conciliatory policies culminating in the semi-official recognition of East Germany in return for increased contact between the two populations. SPD politicians viewed increased contacts and communication as major factors in bringing about the peaceful revolution in the German Democratic Republic and the desire of the population for reunification.
the Alliance 90 Party. Neither Green nor Alliance 90 parties were able to produce a strong showing during the election because the reunification issue trumped everything else by a wide margin.

Eager to regain some of the public confidence lost during the election, politicians from SPD and Alliance 90/Greens had an interest in continuing to embrace the country’s civilian power role by opposing German contributions to the Gulf War alliance. The nonconformist roots of the Greens as pacifist party opposing German NATO membership made that stance credible and corresponded effectively to the public’s antimilitant attitudes at the time. The antiwar position paid off during the election campaign in the state of Hessen on January 20, 1991 during which the SPD and Green Party successfully used the Gulf War to mobilize their respective bases (Kohl 2007, 307). The election took place just three days after the start of the air campaign in the Gulf. The incumbent CDU/FDP government lost power and was replaced by a Red-Green coalition.128

SPD politicians, in particular party chairman Vogel, would continue to pursue the theme of antimilitarism as the ruling elites came under international pressure to increase German contributions to the alliance. Chancellor Kohl was forced to commit 6 Billion to the United States after a phone conversation with President Bush on January 28, 800 million to the United Kingdom after a meeting with British Foreign Minister Hurd in early February and yet another 300 million to France after a phone call with President Mitterrand on February 12, 1991 (Kohl 2007, 308). In his memoirs, Kohl complained bitterly about the criticism coming from SPD politicians who had effectively been able to

128 The state of Hessen was traditionally left-leaning and the Green Party had scored some of its first successes in government here. Thus, the success of the SPD and the Greens may not solely have been due to their anti-war campaign strategies.
publicly label Germany’s financial contributions to the coalition as a ‘war tax’ (*Kriegsschuld*). This allowed SPD politicians to deny political responsibility for the action and the party to distance itself from any potential tax increases (Ibid., 316).

A central campaign promise given during the federal elections had been Chancellor Kohl’s insistence that reunification would not result in tax increases for West Germans. But throughout 1990, reunification costs spiraled out of control. Payments to the USSR, a currency swap that converted the significant savings held by East Germans for a multiple of their true value, the rapid adjustment of East German wages to their West German counterparts irrespective of comparatively low productivity as well as massive public infrastructure spending in the East made Kohl’s campaign promise unsustainable. The financial pledges to the Gulf War coalition provided a convenient excuse that taxes would eventually have to be raised.129

In his January 30 speech to the *Bundestag*, Kohl justified the financial contributions to the Gulf War coalition on the basis of German responsibilities. The Chancellor invoked the sacrifices made by other allies and US contributions to the maintenance of German unity and freedom. He expressed his view that a united Germany had more responsibility as well as more freedom of action (Kohl, PB 12/05, January 30, 1991, 69). Kohl’s concern with responsibility after reunification is conveyed strongly in his memoirs in which he viewed checkbook diplomacy during the crisis as a way of ‘buying off’ (*freikaufen*) responsibility and admitted that such a strategy would prove

129 Protzman argues in similar fashion: Unification costs vastly exceeded expectations and probably would have forced the government to raise taxes regardless of the unforeseen contributions to the coalition. The Gulf War contributions may have served as excuse to justify breaking untenable campaign promises (Ferdinand Protzman, “Kohl Says Gulf War May Bring Tax Rise”, *NYT*, January 24, 1991).
untenable in the long run. Germany had to be prepared to participate in peace keeping and peacemaking missions (Kohl 2007, 564). These statements clearly reflected the influence of external role expectations on the mindset of Germany’s political elites. But the invocation of external demands also conveniently dovetailed the moral argument of responsibility towards allies and citizens in the East that would sustain unavoidable and unpopular tax increases. An additional concern of policy elites during reunification was the external diplomatic game being played to make reunification possible in the first place.

The Treaty on the Final Settlement in Regards to Germany, more commonly known as the Two-plus-Four Treaty, was one of the most significant treaties in German history. The treaty finalized the agreement between the Allied Powers that had been formulated at Potsdam in 1945. It restored German sovereignty by terminating all special privileges and responsibilities of the Allies. Thus, it was designed to resolve all remaining issues pertaining to end of World War II which had been precluded by the division of Germany and Europe during the Cold War. In return for its full sovereignty, the united Germany would accept the borders established by World War II and seek to conclude a separate peace treaty with Poland. In addition, the country was expected to reduce the size of its armed forces, agree to not station foreign troops in East Germany and to renounce the possession of all types of weapons of mass destruction. Meetings between the two Germanys and the quadripartite powers started in May 1990 and would not be concluded until the signing ceremony in Moscow on September 12, 1990. When

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130 A German-Polish Border Treaty was concluded on November 14, 1990 in which Germany formally recognized the Oder-Neisse border as final and renounced all further territorial claims.
the Gulf Crisis erupted, parliamentary elites were concerned about the possibility that it
could lead to a falling out between the superpowers. Foreign minister Genscher’s later
commented that “my first thought after the Iraqi invasion was whether this event would
have any effect on relations between the West and the Soviet Union, which were vital for
the German agreement” (1998, 473). German elites clearly viewed the invasion of
Kuwait as an illegal act of unwarranted aggression and supported UN resolution against
Iraq. But politicians were also anxious to smooth over potential points of contention
between the US and the Soviet Union.\footnote{131} They perceived two different sets of social
expectations.

Politicians perceived important NATO allies and the United Nations as expecting
more active German leadership and contributions to address international instability. Yet
too forceful a contribution including military force was seen as potentially harming the
relationship with the Soviet Union. Genscher wrote about this time that he “…opposed
the use of Bundeswehr troops in the Gulf for reasons of constitutionality but also of
foreign policy” (1998, 479). Even after the signing of the Two-Plus-Four Treaty in
September 1990, the German government remained concerned over the treaty’s possible
rejection by the Soviet Parliament which would have had “catastrophic consequences for
Germany and Europe” (Ibid., 478). Political elites wanted to act appropriately but
appropriate action was motivated by the national interest of ensuring reunification. This
required meeting perceived expectations from NATO alliance partners and the Soviet
Union without which the normalization of Germany’s status could not have been

\footnote{131} Major differences between the superpowers remained as Secretary of State Baker chronicles in his
achieved. The continually changing situation within the disintegrating Soviet Union complicated matters further.

President Gorbachev had ended the Cold War by initiating a series of profound policy reforms within the Soviet Union and by changing the fundamental tenets of the country’s foreign security policy. Domestically, Gorbachev’s Glasnost and Perestroika reform initiatives represented fundamental efforts at modernizing and revitalizing the Soviet system. In the area of foreign policy, Gorbachev ended the war in Afghanistan, negotiated fundamental arms control agreements with the United States that effectively reduced Soviet military power and perhaps, most importantly, substantially increased the political leeway of forces seeking reforms within the Warsaw Pact societies in Eastern Europe. Domestic reform measures and the Soviet Union’s new tendency towards noninterference in the internal affairs of other Warsaw Pact states were politically contentious. Gorbachev was making enemies among the party rank and file which increasingly opposed his reform policies because they undermined Soviet power. At the historic bilateral summit in July 1990, Chancellor Kohl had been able to extract Gorbachev’s concession of a united Germany’s NATO membership. Repeated policy changes and diplomatic concessions increased the frictions within Gorbachev’s government and the Communist Party. Soviet foreign minister and Genscher’s main negotiating partner Shevardnadze resigned on December 20, 1990, citing concerns about an ‘impending dictatorship’ by forces intend on undermining political and economic reform efforts. The prospect that the end of Perestroika would also jeopardize the ratification of the Two-Plus-Four Treaty greatly concerned Genscher and Kohl. Only on March 15, 1991, when the German Foreign Office received the ratification document by
the Supreme Soviet, did Germany regain its full sovereignty (Genscher 1998, 479). On the other side of the Atlantic, the Two-Plus-Four agreement was still awaiting ratification by the US Congress. In sum, Germany’s response to the crisis in the Gulf is impossible to understand without considering the impact of the ongoing Two-Plus-Four negotiations with particular emphasis on relations between Germany and the Soviet Union (Lantis 2002a, 26). German politicians viewed the most effective foreign policy role for the pursuit of the country’s vital interests as one based on the predictable and calculable nature of the past. The concern with predictability was considered prudent policy even in relations with Germany’s alliance partners.

The prospect of German reunification presented a dilemma for allies of the Federal Republic. For many years, the governments of the United Kingdom and France had supported West Germany in its quest for the exclusive mandate and had maintained an official commitment to the need of national reunification. Faced with reunification in 1990, however, some allied governments quickly became concerned with the reemergence of the ‘German problem’ and a potential return to the power-oriented policies of the past. The fear that Germany “might break loose from its Cold War moorings in NATO and the European Economic Community and adopt a more independent, unilateral and nationalistic approach to foreign policy” had Prime Minister Thatcher and President Mitterrand attempting to slow down the reunification process and even exhibiting some inclination to stop it altogether (Berger 1998, 168). Traditional balancing against Germany as way to contain a stronger German state was considered and the reorganization of international organizations including NATO was conducted in part with the goal of containing German power through institutional integration (Ibid.)
German politicians were aware of the reemerging concerns about German power in European capitals and addressed any potential impediments to reunification through confidence building measures. They renewed the country’s commitment to multilateralism in security issues by promoting the functions of the WEU and the OSCE. Elites accelerated the process of European integration by supporting preparations for the milestone summit in Maastricht and made crucial economic concessions that allowed for progress on Economic and Monetary Union. Playing the traditional role of a civilian power role enabled Germany to maintain European support for reunification. Adherence to the behavioral parameters of the calculable and predictable role Germany had played throughout the post-World War II era was also seen as supporting President Gorbachev against the forces that opposed his domestic and foreign policy agenda from within the Communist Party.132 Domestically, the country maintained its commitment to traditional institutions including the commitment to the unique type of civil-military relations based on ‘inner guidance’ and national service even though the latter was being considered an outdated and inefficient institutional form of recruitment even at the time.

Given the primacy of the objective to achieve German reunification through the successful negotiation of the Four-Plus-Two Treaty, the decision to exhibit foreign policy behavior consistent with the normative expectations generated by the Cold War environment appears as prudent course of action. But the decision to conform to ‘outdated’ rather than contemporary behavioral expectations came at a cost. The appropriate behavior associated with values of predictability, calculability and

132 These forces particularly opposed the withdrawal of the Red Army from East Germany for reasons of national pride, distrust and economic concerns about the living standards of the soldiers who generally fared much better in East Germany than they would within the Soviet Union.
responsibility was beginning to change. Exhibiting the old behavior without adapting it to conditions of the post-Cold War environment increasingly carried the risk of it being perceived as inappropriate policy conduct. Without the willingness to militarily participate in peacekeeping operations when such actions were beginning to constitute the norm rather than the exception, adherence to the role conception value of responsibility was being compromised. As a consequence, Germany appeared as unreliable and irresponsible ally. It was perceived as free rider who failed to contribute commensurate with capabilities. Domestic elite interests were not the only factor explaining noncompliance during the Persian Gulf War. The value of antimilitarism in Germany’s strategic culture also inhibited security policy reorientation during this role episode.

Strategic Culture: Antimilitarism as Constraint on Elite Action

Strategic culture with its dominant value of antimilitarism acted as major constraint in delimiting the space for elite responses to the Persian Gulf War. Public opinion polls indicated that Germans generally supported allied actions to evict Iraqi troops from Kuwait but only a twenty percent minority supported the deployment of the Bundeswehr. A majority of Germans explicitly rejected the use of force and preferred a diplomatic solution to the crisis. Public opinion also supported the UN sanctions against Iraq with a majority indicating the desire to allow more time for the sanctions to persuade the Iraqi regime to comply with the international demands to withdraw from Kuwait. Public opposition to German military involvement in the Persian Gulf grew steadily

between November 1990 and January 1991 as a military solution became more likely. The number of public protests against the war increased as did dissent within the ranks of the armed forces (Lantis 2002a, 34). The German public sympathized with Iraqi civilians as victims of a potential bombing campaign with references being made to the 1945 firebombing of the city of Dresden (Berger 1998, 172). An opinion poll from January 18 found that 79 percent of Germans viewed the use of force against Iraq as wrong with support for NATO declining to a historic low (Asmus 1994, 60-61). The respected, influential weekly journal Der Spiegel ran a series of articles criticizing the use of military force. The centrist and equally influential newspaper Die Zeit took issue with any potentially emerging nationalism after reunification and criticized the small group of conservative writers who had argued for the normalization of foreign policy. In addition, a relatively small yet vocal and well-publicized anti-war movement organized demonstrations in many cities under the heading of ‘no war over oil’. The subsequent outbreak of war on January 17, 1991 was greeted by the German public with general surprise, dismay and calls for sympathy for the victims of the conflict (Asmus 1992, 10). SPD and Green Parties effectively exploited the public sentiment against the war during the regional elections in Hessen on January 10 and forced the CDU into opposition (Kohl 2007, 307). However, public opinion was not as staunchly antiwar as it appeared from media coverage of the vocal minority of protesters and the general value structure of the


136 The largest anti-war demonstrations took place in Bonn on January 26, 1991 with about 200,000 people attending. For a detailed account, see Der Spiegel, January 28, 1991.
antimilitant strategic culture. This was revealed by the missile attacks on Israel which caused significant changes in public sentiment.

The missile attacks on Israel and the media images of gasmask-wearing civilians huddling in bleak shelters influenced public opinion. Surveys taken at the end of January and the beginning of February began to show the majority of German citizens now supporting military actions against Iraq, financial support to the multilateral coalition and military assistance to Turkey.\textsuperscript{137} Polls also indicated the beginning of a trend of a mildly supportive public acceptance that Germany needed to take on greater responsibility with 59 percent of those asked indicating that “Germany should pursue a more active role in world affairs” (Asmus 1994, 61).\textsuperscript{138} The list of prominent intellectuals from the left that began to publicly support the use of force as necessary evil to assist Israel and liberate Kuwait grew. It would eventually include Jürgen Habermas, Hans Magnus Enzensberger and songwriter Wolf Biermann as well as leaders from the Green Party ‘realist’ (\textit{Realo}) Wing including Petra Kelly, Joschka Fischer and Micha Brumlik.\textsuperscript{139} Nevertheless, antimilitarism continued to be a powerful value among the population with Bundeswehr actions generally being rejected. Antimilitarism was shared by Germany’s political elite.


\textsuperscript{138} However, this development should not be overemphasized because a long-term RAND study of German foreign policy goals between 1991 and 1993 found that strengthening the UN and defending the security of allies consistently ranked last among the leading ten foreign policy goals which included goals such as preventing proliferation, the global environment, arms control (Asmus 1994, 65). The RAND polls also revealed that Eastern Europe was considered a key national interest which may or may not have had anything to do with the German hesitancy in regards to the Persian Gulf Crisis.

Political elites occupied a Janus-headed position between external and internal demands. On one hand, they were exposed to foreign expectations which, as indicated above, consisted of confusing and contradictory social messages about the future role of Germany. On the other hand, elites were attached to the main tenets of strategic culture and carriers of principle state values. Genscher refused to support an amendment to the constitution because of his concern with public opinion.\textsuperscript{140} The foreign minister concluded early on in the crisis that “the government was in an accordingly weak position both internally and externally given that the war fit neither the political needs nor the mood of the people” (Lantis 2002a, 26). Key to understanding the elite debate about the adequate response to the crisis was the controversy about the proper interpretation of constitutional provisions on the use of the armed forces in areas outside of NATO territory.

The debate about the proper role of the *Bundeswehr* in situations that went beyond territorial defense had ignited on previous occasions during the Cold War. German governments had reacted to foreign requests for military assistance by declining participation in reference to limitations on the use of military force stipulated by the Basic Law of 1949. The key sections of the Basic Law related to the question of the potential deployment of troops for missions outside of Germany were article 24, paragraph 2 and article 87. In article 24, paragraph 2, the Federal Republic agreed to limitations on its sovereign decision-making prerogatives due to the country’s membership in a collective security system.\textsuperscript{141} Article 87 declared that the role of the

\textsuperscript{140} “Standing Up”, *The Economist*, August 18, 1990.
\textsuperscript{141} The precise wording of Article 24, paragraph 2 is: “For the maintenance of peace, the Federation may enter a system of mutual collective security; in doing so it will consent to such limitations upon its rights of
armed forces be of an exclusively defensive and rule-based nature. By stating that “apart from defense, the armed forces may only be used to the extent explicitly permitted by this Basic Law”, the constitution substantially reduced the decision-making authority of the chancellor democracy. The pursuit of national interests through the deployment of the use of force constituted an important element in the foreign policy of other great powers. In Germany, this governmental option was largely precluded. The institutional limitation on the exercise of military force was an important aspect of the civilian power role. However, the relevant paragraphs of the constitution could reasonably have been interpreted to allow for German participation in peacekeeping missions outside of NATO territory (non-article 5 operations) as long as these missions were undertaken to “secure a peaceful and lasting order in Europe and among the nations of the world” (art. 24, par. 2). This was, in fact, the position of leading government officials including Kohl and Stoltenberg who favored the deployment of German troops to demonstrate the country’s solidarity with its allies (Berger 1998, 174). In mid-August, Kohl had suggested that Germany could partake in coalition actions in the Gulf under the auspices of the WEU (Lantis 2002a, 23). The use of force could also have been presented as necessary when Turkey invoked Article V of the NATO Treaty, in which all parties agreed that “an armed sovereignty as will bring about and secure a peaceful and lasting order in Europe and among the nations of the world”.

142 Article 87 of the constitution reads: “The Federation shall build up Armed Forces for defense purposes. Their numerical strength and general organizational structure shall be shown in the budget … Apart from defense, the Armed Forces may only be used to the extent explicitly permitted by this Basic Law”.

143 This is, in fact, what the Constitutional Court would decide in 1994.
attack against one or more of them…shall be considered “an attack against them all”. In spite of the interpretative possibilities allowed by the constitution and the NATO treaty, the Basic Law had always been used to stave off **Bundeswehr** participation in foreign missions. After a brief debate, Chancellor Kohl’s coalition cabinet would continue in this tradition and present this position to Germany’s allies. As such, this interpretation of the constitution could be said to constitute a key aspect in the elite consensus on the issue of military deployment which was, in turn, deeply related to the key value of antimilitarism so important in Germany’s post-World War II strategic culture. Evidence for both presence and dominance of antimilitarism abounds. For instance, prior to President Bush’s visit in November 1990, Kohl stated that “some believe that the problem can be solved by military means…[but that] I strongly advise trying everything possible to bring about a solution through negotiations”. Genscher, as well, pleaded for a peaceful resolution of the crisis hinting that such resolution may have positive consequences for other regional conflicts. SPD party members adamantly rejected military measures to evict Iraq from Kuwait. Their concern with civilian casualties and the potentially adverse effects of military actions indicated a deeply-held belief in the counterproductive nature of the use of military force.

The prominence of antimilitarism among both the general public and parliamentary elites explains in part the inability of the government to accede to the

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requests of the allies to actively participate in military operations to liberate Kuwait. Conservative politicians were inclined to meet foreign expectations. Their lack of resolve in pursuing their position indicated a lack of resolve in changing the cultural agreements upon which Germany’s postwar institutions had been constructed. Doubts about the efficacy of force prevented a stronger push for the use of force against a parliamentary opposition that was able to use the elements of the traditional civilian role conception to construct a more convincing argument and public opinion that remained overwhelmingly antimilitaristic. A cultural and institutional web of constraint prevented the effective reorientation of German foreign policy. Falling back on the understanding of the German role of a civilian power, the country chose to engage in ‘checkbook diplomacy’ by contributing financial and material assistance to the coalition effort. The antimilitant dimension of strategic culture is, however, not sufficient in explaining policy behavior during the Persian Gulf Crisis. The foreign policy objective of securing full sovereignty weighted heavily on the minds of political elites. Playing the traditional civilian role made it easier to secure the agreement of France, Britain and the Soviet Union.

In referring to the impact of socialization processes, Johnston saw the desire to maximize status, honor and prestige within a group as outweighing concerns of material rewards (2001, 499). German actions during the Gulf War corroborate that assertion because the country’s financial and material contributions began to increase as international criticism increased. Germany’s failure to conform to social expectations regarding the use of force in the post-Cold War security environment led to public consequences. It led, for instance, to criticism from other coalition countries that Germany did not contribute its fair share to the effort which had a shaming effect and
acted as effective means of persuasion. In the US congress, both Germany and Japan were criticized for not living up to the responsibilities of reliable allies.\textsuperscript{147} Perhaps most importantly, it led to a condition of cognitive dissonance from actions inconsistent with role and identity (Johnston 2001, 499).

German identity reproduction requirements since World War II have relied to a considerable degree on complying with allied expectations as member of a social reference group of liberal states joined in a security community. The liberal identity of the Federal Republic distinguishes this state from its previous incarnations, Imperial and Nazi Germany. Previous German states are viewed as bad because they sought autonomy through the maximizing of power. This course of action left them isolated and these policies are viewed as having caused the national catastrophe of two world wars as well as the rise of right and left-wing totalitarianism. In short, German history has created a compelling reason to never again be isolated or to pursue a special path (\textit{Sonderweg}) and this is part of the generally accepted understanding shared by elites as well as the public.

The Federal Republic’s unique social identity reproduction requirements made its elites particularly susceptible to influence of international expectations and hence, socialization. Foreign expectations from important allies empowered those internal actors or groups who were most likely to prevent a condition of diplomatic isolation. Thus, the Persian Gulf War empowered cabinet elites as these individuals argued for compliance with external expectations and the use of force regardless of longstanding cultural values.

of anti-militarism, the reliance on diplomatic efforts to resolve conflicts and the tendency to use economic means to pursue national interests. In the words of Chancellor Kohl, “It is now time that the unified Germany takes its role in the circle of nations with all rights and obligations (Kohl 2007, 316). This is rightfully expected of us – and we must meet that expectation. There is no niche for us Germans in world politics, and there can be no flight from responsibility for Germany. We want to make our contribution towards a world of peace, freedom and justice” (Ibid., 316).

In opposing reorientation and supporting foreign policy actions in line with the traditional role of a civilian power, SPD leaders had won a Pyrrhus victory and its own political orientation could not be maintained in the face of the growing awareness of the international security environment. Among some SPD leaders, and through the international rejection of this role during the Persian Gulf War, the consensus was already shifting towards supporting military participation in out-of-area missions even as the rigid opposition to these actions remained popular among the party base (Duffield 1998, 185). The world was changing and with it, most of the assumptions about threats, stability and peacekeeping were changing as well as the evolution of NATO’s strategic doctrines during the next years would demonstrate. A succession of humanitarian crises was about to make this clear to Germany’s foreign policy elite and it would pursue the fundamental reorientation of foreign policy regardless of party ideology. Of these, the unfolding crisis in Yugoslavia would be the one that had the greatest impact on the reorientation of foreign policy since reunification.
Conclusion: Explaining Partial Compliance

The Gulf Crisis finds Germany performing its traditional civilian power role as had been expected and affirmed by the external environment for the duration of the post-War period. German elites continued to believe that the country’s constitution ruled out the army’s deployment abroad and that the antimilitary tendency of public opinion would make the military engagement of the country outside NATO territory impossible. In interpreting existing institutions in a way that categorically ruled out the use of force, elite behavior suggested the continuity of existing strategic culture. In part, this was due to cultural and institutional path-dependence. The perceptions of elites were still anchored in the Cold War understandings of security threats and viewed their country’s obligations towards the alliance in terms of territorial defense. They could not reorient themselves that quickly, particularly, since they were used to a consensual policy-making style. They had their country perform the civilian power role out of habit and because it become the quintessential German identity after World War II. Thus, they showed genuine surprise at the pronounced international criticism of German military inaction and obstinacy during the liberation of Kuwait. Statements by President von Weizsäcker and other politicians that indicate surprise at the fact that anyone would want Germans to fight again are revealing this respect.148 They indicate both a desire to comply with international expectations and confusion about the nature of those expectations. Thus,

148 President von Weizsäcker conveys the confusion political elites experienced as a result of contradictory foreign expectations: “All our alliance partners always proceeded from the assumption that because of our historical burden no new German military potential could ever again arise. In the year 1990 there were many fears about what a Germany, strengthened in power by unification, would one day do with it militarily—and now, at the beginning of the year 1991, Germans are faced with the accusation that they do not want to participate in war” (von Weizsäcker, Die Zeit, February 1991, quoted in Ackermann and McArdle Kelleher 1993, 418).
elites blamed their failure to act in concert on the country’s antimilitant strategic culture and institutions which they claimed placed political constraints on further action and did not allow for more commitments beyond the traditional checkbook diplomacy. The international criticism had the effect of forcing a reinterpretation of antimilitant views and institutions in a process that would continue for years to come.\textsuperscript{149} Clearly, value conflicts within strategic culture and role ambiguity caused by a changing security environment were important determinants of the unique mix of German foreign policy responses during the episode. However, to fully understand German behavior, the interests of particular policy-making elites have to be considered who were able to effectively utilize the condition of role ambiguity to their advantage.

An overriding foreign policy interest of parliamentary elites during the Persian Gulf War episode was the achievement of national reunification. The diplomatic process of negotiating the Two-plus-Four Agreement that ended quadripartite powers in Germany entailed the negotiation of a series of delicate bilateral agreements with allies that could potentially be at odds with each other. Regional conflicts during the Cold War always carried the danger of superpower confrontation and subsequent proxy wars. Considerable distrust and divergence of interests continued to characterize US-Soviet relations during the Gulf War. In addition, fears about German power and the future German role after reunification remained high in the United Kingdom, France and the Soviet Union. Superpower differences and widespread fears about German intentions

\textsuperscript{149} Longhurst (2004, 58-59) views the Gulf War as important watershed event in German foreign policy. He writes: “Discord emerged between external demands and conditions within Germany. Policy-thinking was caught between expectations and fears at home and abroad, and sought to do justice to both … what transpired in the course of the conflict was a tension, even a dialectic, among certain foundational elements of German strategic culture; namely, how a parochial stance of restraint was to be maintained if other core values, such as solidarity with the alliance or responsibility towards Israel, could not be served this way”.

145
could have derailed the immensely important reunification project. To facilitate a smooth diplomatic process that ensured continued external support for reunification, German elites had an interest in avoiding military actions because this made the country appear more calculable and predictable.

The inclusion of elite interests in the ongoing process of socialization through external role expectations helps explain the timing of the foreign policy changes. It is only after reunification is achieved, that German elites allowed the changes leading to *Bundeswehr* participation in military missions to take place. After the Gulf War, conservative elites would promote a new type of role behavior through the use of the concept of responsibility as understood within the framework of a new understanding of international security after the Cold War. The consistent use of the values of responsibility and alliance solidarity allowed them to tie the desired behavioral changes to the country’s principal values established by its strategic culture. In addition, they would be able to cast opponents to the changes in role behavior as unreasonable or even immoral.

The desire to combine the need to comply with international demands to avoid diplomatic isolation with the domestic interest of role normalization is revealed in Chancellor Kohl 3rd inaugural address delivered on January 30, 1991. Here, the chancellor argued that the “escape from the responsibility for maintaining peace and freedom through global crisis management is not an option for Germany” (Kohl 2007, 315). Falling short of articulating a military role, the Chancellor nevertheless sought to establish a more independent, active and authentic role for Germany after reunification. The new role presented a middle ground between the extreme of antimilitarism on one
hand and the feared militarism potentially associated with traditional roles on the other. This role could be linked to the behavioral expectations generated by the new security environment after the Cold War. It would establish full equality in status with other alliance members while enabling Germany to remain unique in that the use of force would be acceptable only for morally higher reasons rather than used for the pursuit of national interests. Increasingly, conservative politicians would also present the new role as the natural endpoint in a process of maturation since World War II.

The Persian Gulf War episode suggests that international socialization processes via expectations from social reference groups of states can affect domestic policy debates with the potential of leading to changes in state foreign policy behavior. The aftermath of the Persian Gulf War saw conservative elites with traditionally strong ties to NATO and Western allies initiate the process by which the deeper meaning of traditional elements of Germany’s role conception—concepts like reliability, alliance solidarity, continuity, stability and predictability—would be redefined. Social Democrats and Greens first argued against the reinterpretation of the traditional civilian power role. Over the next decade, these elites would reexamine their reservations about the efficacy of force to engage their country in a kind of ‘moralistic Realpolitik’. As such, the Persian Gulf War marked the beginning of the process of reorientation that would eventually culminate in the deployment of troops in Bosnia.
CHAPTER IV
UNILATERALISM IN YUGOSLAVIA

Introduction: An Awkward Performance

The role episode produced by the Persian Gulf War was associated with a firestorm of international criticism for Germany’s parliamentary elites. The decision to play the civilian power role by hiding behind the country’s constitutional limitations on the use of force outside of NATO territory tarnished Germany’s international image as a reliable ally. The hurtful and near universal foreign criticism constituted a clear social message that German policy responses had been inappropriate given the existing expectations based on the country’s global role and capabilities. The criticism threw Germany into “a crisis of confidence and direction” (Stephen Kinzer, NYT, February 17, 1991). A major debate about Germany’s responsibilities ensued with conservative and centrist newspapers alike questioning the cabinet’s decision to risk the country’s reputation by not contributing commensurate with capabilities. Several newspapers

150 Stephen Kinzer reported for the New York Times that “in Washington, London, Paris and other allied capitals, there has been much grumbling in recent weeks over Germany’s perceived reluctance to help the anti-Iraq coalition. German leaders have been assailed as self-absorbed, niggardly, and ungrateful for four decades of Western support”. The writer also quoted an unnamed diplomatic source in Bonn as saying that “whatever you get out of them, you really have to squeeze it out” (Stephen Kinzer, NYT, February 17, 1991).

151 The influential conservative newspaper Bild editorialized that “while the Americans, British, Canadians, French and Italians are in the desert doing freedom’s grueling work, the German Army sits aloof on the sidelines”, and “In 10 days, the Bonn Government has ruined the reputation that took us three decades to build”, Hans-Hermann Tiedje, Bild Zeitung, February 17, 1991, quoted by Stephen Kinzer, NYT, February 17, 1991. The Süddeutsche Zeitung added that the cabinet had been lucky because if coalition forces would
also carried an appeal from the Atlantik-Brücke, an organization promoting German-
American ties, which urged Germans to show solidarity with coalition forces.\footnote{152}

The Persian Gulf role episode had created an untenable situation of diplomatic
isolation from Germany’s social reference group of Western states. For the first time in
many years, Germany was not in compliance with the expectations from those states. A
powerful social message had been generated that Germany would risk further isolation
unless its elites took steps to adjust the country’s role in global politics. The episode had
also revealed the country’s continuing institutional and cultural limitations on meeting
external expectations.\footnote{153} Role expectations would lead to the internal adjustment process
by which a central tenet of the civilian role conception of parliamentary elites—the use of
force—would be challenged and eventually overturned. Yet an additional, crucial element
in the process of reorientation would be elite perceptions that the security environment
had inexorably changed and that new military responses to address internal instabilities
would be required. With the Gulf War barely over, another international crisis was
quickly developing in Yugoslavia during the summer of 1991. This crisis brought post-
Cold War instability to Germany’s backyard and its unimaginable cruelty and disregard
for human rights standards would quickly challenge everything policy makers had come
to believe in.

\footnote{152} The appeal was signed by many prominent Germans including former chancellor Willy Brandt, a social
democrat.

\footnote{153} In his memoirs, Kohl 2007 criticized the public’s antimilitant response and intransigence of the
opposition in failing to recognize the German responsibility to international peace through the participation
in peace keeping after the Cold War.
The violent disintegration of Yugoslavia underscored policy makers’ perception that the world had changed after the end of the Cold War. Old demons including ethnic strife and genocide were reemerging as new threats to peace and security even in Europe. Yugoslavia’s proximity to Germany and the growing refugee problems established an urgent need for political action. The high levels of violence and the systematic violations of human rights directly clashed with the central values of Germany’s antimilitarist culture. UN and NATO involvement in the region intensified to manage the escalating crisis. As the efficacy of international security institutions was repeatedly challenged by determined regional adversaries, Germany was confronted with requests to play a larger role in supporting the missions of these organizations. Eventually, the country would get involved militarily for the first time since World War II. Thus, Yugoslavia’s descent into unimaginable violence can be considered as the “catalyst for the development of a new German security policy” (Hyde-Price 2003, 189).

More than any other foreign policy area or challenge, the recurring violence in Yugoslavia would profoundly test the traditional role conception of a civilian power developed during the post-war period which had allowed Germany to become readmitted to the ranks of civilized states after World War II. Playing this role had enabled the country to navigate the often unruly and unpredictable waters of international relations through the deployment of its considerable economic and normative influence. Specifically, violence in Yugoslavia would challenge the claim to moral superiority that non-violent means of conflict resolution had enjoyed as part of German strategic culture after World War II. Parliamentary elites would begin to view the widespread pacifism among the general public as problematic and the country’s position on the use of force as
unsustainable when correlated with international expectations and security perceptions of the post-Cold War environment. In a series of role episodes, elites would move to enlarge the foreign policy role of the Federal Republic by taking on greater responsibility. The fact that the role adaptation process would not always be smooth was made evident by the first major attempt at assertively engaging the crisis in Yugoslavia.

Like the Persian Gulf crisis, external and internal processes leading to the unilateral recognition of Croatia and Slovenia may be viewed as constituting another example of Germany’s maladaptive response to the international pressure to develop a role proportionate to the country’s economic, military and political significance. During this role episode, the international environment was characterized by a high level of normative ambiguity. Long-honored norms of state sovereignty clashed with those of group self-determination as Eastern European states disintegrated quickly and the post-World War II political map literally changed before policy makers’ eyes. The confusing normative context allowed German elites to ignore role expectations and pursue unilateral policy options which were based to a significant degree on domestic concerns of maintaining levels of electoral support. Multilateralism was pursued to a point but abandoned when the prospects for electoral gains generated by an assertive and unilateral stance became apparent. Parliamentary elites would choose to instrumentally appropriate external demands when it suited them and to reject or avoid them when these demands conflicted with their political interests. The result was an awkward performance.
The Breakup of Yugoslavia and the International Response

The breakup of Yugoslavia began after Marshall Tito’s death in 1980. The socialist dictator had managed the country’s ethnic and religious differences through the de-emphasis of regional identities, the centralization of power and his personal appeal as hero of the guerilla war against the Nazi occupation. The power of the Serb majority in particular had been reduced through an administrative trick by which the regions of Kosovo and Vojvodina had been turned into independent provinces whose votes within the state council were used to balance those of the Serb faction. The fairly rapid estrangement between the national groups inhabiting the Yugoslav federation after Tito’s death indicated that animosity and distrust between groups had not sufficiently been reduced through socialization and propaganda efforts aimed at promoting socialist unity. The death of Tito also coincided with mounting economic difficulties. These economic stresses contributed to the process by which groups of people frequently tend to identify with their own kind in times of trouble.

Modernization efforts and oil imports had led to the need for foreign loans which Western governments had been eager to provide given the country’s non-aligned position and the role it played as balancer of Soviet power in the region. The dual oil crises of 1973 and 1979 had drastically exacerbated the problem of exchange imbalances. By the 1980s, Yugoslavia was deeply in debt.\(^\text{154}\) In 1987, the IMF initiated structural adjustment measures which had the effect of corroding “the social fabric and the rights and securities

that individuals and families had come to rely on” (Woodward 1995, 15). Real incomes fell dramatically between 1987 and 1991.\textsuperscript{155} In addition to straining social cohesion amongst citizens, the economic crisis also created stresses between the ethnic provinces. Wealthier regions such as Slovenia and Croatia began to question their membership in the Yugoslav federation due to what they perceived to be the one-sided transfer of resources to poorer regions. Comparatively poorer areas and groups, in turn, sought to preserve the federation through the control and deployment of state power. The ongoing process of democratization became another nail in Yugoslavia’s coffin.

The arrival of democratic institutions including legalized party pluralism in Yugoslavia brought to power nationalist parties and their leaders (Cohen 1995, 104).\textsuperscript{156} After 40 years of multiethnic policy-making, the sobering reality revealed a divided citizenry with a multinational Yugoslav identity being the property of all but a minority of citizens.\textsuperscript{157} By appealing to primary ethnic identities within an economic environment marked by intensifying resource competition, Tudjman, Kučan, Milošević and other nationalist leaders fanned the flames of ethnic animosity and prepared the ground for


\textsuperscript{156} In examining newly registered parties, Cohen finds that the number of parties devoted to preserving national unity and the attainment of liberal-democratic goals is relatively low (1995, 104-107). Contemporary opinion polls also indicated that a Yugoslav identity remained relatively poorly developed and that Yugoslavs were more likely to identify themselves along regional lines. This condition was fairly well understood in academic and reconnaissance circles as indicated by a CIA report from November 1990 according to which the ‘Yugoslav experiment’ had failed and the country was predicted to violently fall apart within eighteen months (\textit{NYT}, November 28, 1990, 7).

\textsuperscript{157} Democratization as transitional phase has been considered as characterized by greater instability. During democratization, countries have been viewed as more aggressive and war-prone. The likelihood of violence is higher in multiethnic societies. See, for instance, Mansfield and Snyder (1995) and Cederman et al. (2008).
separatist aspirations. A final element in the escalating crisis was the systematic appropriation of state power by Yugoslavia’s Serb faction led by Slobodan Milošević.

In an act of manipulation as brilliant as it was ominous, Milošević and his nationalist supporters had subverted the federal institutions designed by Marshall Tito to ensure unity through the balance between national groups. By stripping the provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina of their political autonomy and installing a pro-Serb leadership in Montenegro, Milošević created a voting bloc that allowed him to seize control of the Federal Presidency and with it, the ability to deploy the state’s armed forces (Maull 1995, 100). The raison d’être of the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA) as the guardian of the territorial integrity of the (multiethnic) Yugoslav state would cleverly and effectively be subverted to pursue the nationalist objectives of the Serb majority. National groups in other provinces were left with little choice but to accept membership within a Yugoslavian federation dominated by the Serbs under Milošević or to leave this federation altogether. Eventually, all major groups would opt to leave.

On June 25, 1991, the year-long process of Croatian and Slovenian emancipation culminated in their unilateral declarations of independence. Under the control of nationalist parties, the new states quickly passed constitutions denying minority rights as

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158 In July 1991, the Dutch Ambassador to France, Henry Wynaendts, was sent to Yugoslavia on a fact-finding mission for the European Community. He noted that the Federal Presidency resisted peacekeeping efforts by the EEC which he attributed to Serb control of half of the eight votes in the Federal Presidency. The voting power of the Serb block was a direct result of the removal of autonomy of the provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina and the usurpation of their votes (Libal 1997, 26). With the vote of Montenegro, the Serb faction was able to control the presidency and deploy the JNA against seceding provinces.

159 True to the JNA’s declared mission of preserving Yugoslav integrity, US ambassador Zimmermann found Ministry of Defense officials and generals of the JNA to be hostile towards Croatia’s intention to secede (Zimmermann 1996, 100-102). However, by 1989, most of the army’s generals were Serb (Stoessinger 2005, 122). Thus, the guardians of the Yugoslav state would allow themselves to become the tool of Serb nationalism.

160 The idea of a confederation was considered but did not find much traction among either side.
defined by the Conference of Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).\textsuperscript{161} Clashes between the Yugoslav People’s Army and Croatian and Slovenian National Guard elements had occurred before that–now they escalated. Armed hostilities peaked in Slovenia but quickly ceased, ending hostilities in that part of the country when JNA forces withdrew by July 19, 1991 (Cohen 1995, 227). The situation was more complicated in Croatia because a significant number of Serbs lived in the \textit{Krajina} region located between the capital Zagreb and Bosnia. The new state’s nationalist constitution had not adequately protected their cultural rights.\textsuperscript{162} Open warfare commenced between the JNA which, through desertions, had become an almost entirely Serb-Montenegro force, and the Croatian National Guard and volunteers.\textsuperscript{163} Conflict between the parties intensified throughout the spring and summer of 1991. The first human rights violations were committed and full-fledged civil war conditions had developed by October and November, when JNA forces destroyed the Croat city of \textit{Vukovar} and lay siege to \textit{Dubrovnik}. By December 1991, the conflict in Yugoslavia had cost over 10,000 lives and over half a million people had been made homeless (Duffield 1998, 190). Europe was witnessing its worst violence since World War II. Even so, few people would anticipate

\textsuperscript{161} The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) became the permanent Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in 1995.

\textsuperscript{162} About 12 percent of Croatian citizens were Serb (Zimmermann 1996, ix). That amounted to a number of about 670,000 Serbs living in Croatia (Ibid., 94).

\textsuperscript{163} The military action against Croatia, ordered by the government of Yugoslavia, violated Article 316 of the Yugoslav constitution which stipulated that the use of the armed forces during peace time could only be authorized by the Federal Presidency. However, the Presidency could be considered to have become illegitimate due to the blocking of the routine rotation in its chairmanship by the Serb-led faction in the government. Libal views this action as the first “act in an attempt to solve the Yugoslav crisis by means of a joint JNA-Serbian dictatorship” (See Libal 1997, 13 and Genscher 1998, 496).
that the series of civil wars fought in the Balkans would last four more years and eventually reach a death toll of over 250,000 people.

The initial response by governments and international organizations to the escalating crisis was characterized by the objective to maintain Yugoslav unity and sovereignty. The emphasis of the principle of state sovereignty over that of national self-determination was based on a number of normative reasons as well as national interests. The UN charter protects the integrity of sovereign states in article 2 which establishes that states, as principle actors in international relations are entitled to respect for their territorial and political sovereignty and have the power to regulate internal affairs without foreign dictation (Alexander 2000, 403 and 408). Directly derived from sovereignty is the principle of non-intervention which requires that states refrain from intervening in the domestic affairs of another (Ruggiero 2003, 7). The general acceptance of this principle in customary law and international treaties actually predates the UN charter (Alexander 2000, 408). The Helsinki Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe of 1975 also enumerated several points protecting the integrity of states (notably, principles III, IV and VI). This agreement on the inviolability of World War II borders had always been crucial for the maintenance of cordial relations on a continent divided along ideological lines. The reliance on principles of international law at this time may also have been influenced by policy-makers’ increasing concern with regional stability. After all, central political parameters in Europe were changing quickly and both EU and NATO had already published important security analyses arguing for

\[164\] In a display of unity and out of the desire to build an independent foreign and security policy, members of the EC came to an agreement that the status quo should be preserved (Crawford 1996, 492-3).
the revision of long-standing perceptions and responses to a newly emerging security environment.

In addition to the normative context, many states chose to support maintaining the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia as leading political objective due to the existence of unresolved ethnic and national questions in Europe. Policy-makers in Spain, Belgium and the United Kingdom had long been concerned with reemerging regional autonomy issues within their own states and did not want to set a precedent by recognizing break-away provinces of Yugoslavia which would have indicated the support of the principle of national self-determination. The issue was also relevant given the national aspirations of national groups within the convulsing Soviet Union. Policy makers were reluctant to encourage secessionist tendencies by supporting claims to Croatian and Slovenian self-determination (Ramet and Coffin 2001, 50).\textsuperscript{165}

The United States, as well, had historically supported Yugoslav unity and was particularly concerned about negative repercussions on the cohesion of the Soviet Union (Cohen 1995, 218). US Deputy Secretary of State Eagleburger was dispatched in February 1990 to convey the position of support of Prime Minister’s Marković’s reform policies. In the face of the escalating crisis, US Secretary of State Baker himself visited Belgrade on June 21, 1991 to convey the US position in support of national unity and in opposition to recognition (Cohen 1995, 218; Baker 1991, 478-483).\textsuperscript{166} At the prior CSCE

\textsuperscript{165} For instance, Soviet Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh considered the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia to be “one of the essential preconditions for the stability of Europe” (Politika: The International Weekly 56, April 13 – April 19, 1991, 2, cited in Cohen 1995, 218).

\textsuperscript{166} Secretary of State Baker (1995, 481) would later recall his own words as “we regard your policies as the main cause of Yugoslavia’s present crisis…you are propelling your people, your republic, and Yugoslavia toward civil war and disintegration”.

157
meeting in Berlin, a Croatian attempt to achieve support for a peaceful session was
defeated by the United States with the support of all major powers who had committed
themselves to a policy of supporting the federal Yugoslav government (Cohen 1995,
220). French and British positions tended to be especially supportive of Serb-controlled
Yugoslavia (Ramet and Coffin 1995). Given the normative consensus of the international
environment and the national interests of powerful actors such as the United States, the
Soviet Union France, the United Kingdom and France, multilateral institutions like the
EC and the UN initiated a number of mediation efforts designed to support the territorial
integrity of the Yugoslav state and to discourage the use of violence between the parties.

On May 30 and 31, 1991, Jacques Santer, Chairman of the European Council of
Ministers and Jacques Delors, the Chairman of the European Commission visited
Belgrade to meet with federal and republican leaders. The envoys offered a substantial
economic support package to convince Yugoslavs that they resolve their constitutional
differences peacefully and maintain the cohesion of the state.167 Under the impression of
the escalating violence throughout the later summer and fall of 1991, perceived Serb
intransigence and, no doubt, in part due to German diplomacy, the EEC would
increasingly move towards identifying the Serb-controlled Federal government as the
main aggressor in the conflict and target it with sanctions.168

167 The policy makers offered financial support between $4 and $5 Billion, the immediate commencement
of association talks for Yugoslavia and the intercession with international financial institutions like the IMF
to help strengthen foreign currency reserves, the convertibility of the dinar and increasing foreign direct
investment levels (See Cohen 1995, 219).

168 Trade sanctions against Yugoslavia were announced in November and the Peace Conference was
suspended. More important as indicator of the growing conviction that Serbia was to be blamed for the
conflict was the decision in December to drop sanctions against the republics except for Serbia and
Montenegro (Libal 1997, 187).
International mediation efforts continued through the Berlin meeting of the CSCE in June, the meeting of the Committee of Senior Officials of the CSCE in Prague in July and a peace conference convened in The Hague in September after open conflict had broken out. Chaired by Lord Carrington, this peace conference would broker no fewer than 14 ineffective ceasefires between Serb and Croat forces. The United Nations also attempted to mediate in October with its efforts being led by Cyrus Vance but the rationale for denying recognition was increasingly being undermined by the quick and almost automatic recognition of the break-away republics of the USSR after the attempted August coup in the Soviet Union and the JNA’s persistent refusal to withdraw from Croatian territory. The Yugoslav government’s decision to exclude all the other republics from the Federal Presidency undermined the credibility of its argument that the Serb-controlled rump state constituted the legitimate successor to Yugoslavia and on December 16, the EEC agreed to recognize all Yugoslav republics seeking independence provided they met constitutional conditions protecting the rights of ethnic minorities (Ramet and Coffin 2001, 51/Table 1). An arbitration commission led by Robert Badinter was dispatched to assess the degree of compliance and make recommendations regarding recognition.

169 The 15th ceasefire held when the Serb-controlled federal government dropped its opposition to UN peacekeepers on January 1, 1992 and hostilities in Croatia began to cease after President Milosevic pronounced the war to be over. Whether the German decision to internationalize the conflict through the unilateral recognition contributed to the success of the final ceasefire continues to be debated.
Table 3: The Recognition Role Episode 1991-1992: Important Events

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
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<tr>
<td>January 30</td>
<td>Chancellor Kohl argues for greater international responsibility</td>
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<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>Alliance 90/Green Party proposes recognition</td>
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<tr>
<td>June 19</td>
<td>All-party resolution supporting Yugoslav unity in the Bundestag</td>
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<tr>
<td>June 25</td>
<td>Croatia and Slovenia proclaim independence</td>
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<tr>
<td>June 27</td>
<td>Hostilities erupt in Slovenia</td>
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<tr>
<td>July 1</td>
<td>Meeting of the Foreign Affairs Committee leads to agreement on recognition</td>
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<tr>
<td>July 4</td>
<td>Germany suggests recognition by the EU</td>
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<tr>
<td>September 25</td>
<td>UNSC Resolution 713 imposes arms embargo on Yugoslavia</td>
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<tr>
<td>October 1</td>
<td>Siege of Dubrovnik begins</td>
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<tr>
<td>December 10</td>
<td>UN Secretary General de Cuellar urges German compliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 13</td>
<td>UK and France introduce Security Council Resolution to forestall German unilatera</td>
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<tr>
<td>December 15</td>
<td>Kohl announces recognition at CDU party Congress in Dresden</td>
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<tr>
<td>December 16</td>
<td>EC yields to German pressure on recognition after a 10 hour meeting</td>
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<tr>
<td>December 17</td>
<td>Genscher announces German recognition of Croatia</td>
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<tr>
<td>December 20</td>
<td>Baker urges German compliance at NATO Summit in Rome</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 23</td>
<td>Germany recognizes Croatia and Slovenia, delays exchange of ambassadors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 14</td>
<td>Badinter commission recommends recognition of Slovenia but not Croatia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 15</td>
<td>EC members recognize Croatia and Slovenia, UK delays exchange of ambassadors</td>
</tr>
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</table>

The German Response to the Breakup of Yugoslavia

Germany’s foreign policy during this crisis was characterized by a number of multilateral as well as unilateral foreign policy moves with the overall impression left by the latter. In the beginning of the crisis, Germany clearly followed its multilateral policy-orientation characterized by the use of consensus-seeking processes within international organizations and based on a normative structure provided by international law. To that effect, Germany supported a joint declaration of the foreign ministers of the European Community in favor of the political integrity of Yugoslavia coupled with a pledge to not accept unilateral declarations of independence by Yugoslav republics wishing to secede
Germany’s commitment to Yugoslav unity grew out of the special relationship that the two countries had maintained for many years and which Genscher himself had been instrumental in cultivating. Referring to international norms upholding state sovereignty, Foreign Minister Genscher called for the suspension of the declarations of disassociation of the two republics (Ramet and Coffin 2001, 49). Throughout July, Genscher would promote the internationalization of the conflict by involving European organizations such as the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and the Western European Union (WEU) which Germany was chairing at the time. Flexing its economic muscles, Germany also threatened the federal government of Yugoslavia with the suspension of economic aid.\footnote{Agence Europe, June 24/25, 1991, 4.}

An important debate in Bundestag on June 19, 1991 ended with an all-party declaration supporting Yugoslav unity (Ramet and Coffin, 49; Crawford, 493). Representing the government’s position, Minister of State Schäfer stated succinctly that Germany, along with its allies supported the peaceful maintenance of Yugoslavia on the basis of democracy and human rights.\footnote{In 1990, German economic aid to Yugoslavia amounted to $550 million (Ramet 1993, 327).} The debate revealed that the position of the government was more pro-unity, in line with the international diplomatic consensus at the time, than that of the parliament. Even though the Bundestag eventually chose to support goal of preserving the unity of Yugoslavia, members of parliament had mostly been concerned with issues of democratic and peaceful processes of conflict resolution within

\footnote{In German: “Gemeinsam mit den Partnern treten wir für den friedlichen Erhalt gesamtjugoslawischer Strukturen auf der Grundlage von Demokratie und Menschenrechten ein” (Schäfer, PB 12/13, June 19, 1991, 2564).}
the country and they appealed to all parties in the conflict to refrain from the use of force in the settlement of the relationship between provinces and central government (PB 12/33, June 19, 1991, 2558-2566).\(^{173}\) As such, parliamentary factions appeared more concerned with the issue of national self-determination and the potential for violent suppression by the central government.\(^{174}\) Members of parliament perceived the role of Germany to be one of a careful mediator, cognizant of the country’s past role in the region and intend on not repeating it.\(^{175}\) The concern with the principle of self-determination indicated by the chamber would soon have consequences for German diplomacy.

In July 1991, the German position on recognition began to divert sharply from that of its European and NATO allies—a fact that would generate considerable pressure on the country’s ability to conform to traditional role expectations which emphasized predictability and calculability. On July 1, Chancellor Kohl first publicly spoke out in favor of the norm of self-determination for Croats and Slovenes (Maull 1995, 102).\(^{176}\) Volker Rühe, Secretary General of the CDU, supported him, arguing that Germany had been reunited due to the principle of self-determination and that extending it to Croatia and Slovenia was imperative to not loose moral and political credibility (Maull 1995,

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\(^{173}\) The key principles discussed were renunciation of force (\textit{Gewaltverzicht}), Democracy (\textit{Demokratie}) and human rights (\textit{Menschenrechte}).

\(^{174}\) In closing his speech, Minister of State (\textit{Staatsminister}) Schäfer points out that “the Bundestag appears to have focused more on the issue of national self-determination” (PB 12/33, June 19, 1991, 2565).

\(^{175}\) In the words of one of the members, “Germany is neither the protective nor preeminent power of Eastern Europe or Southeast Europe”. In German: “Deutschland ist weder die Schutzmacht noch die Vormacht Osteuropas oder Südosteuropas” (Glotz, PB 12/33, June 19, 1991, 2560).

\(^{176}\) Chancellor Kohl made a general statement regarding recognition. According to Axt (1993, 359, footnotes) newspaper sources disagree on whether he specifically stated his intentions to diplomatically pursue the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia.
Other important party members within both CDU and SPD were beginning to support recognition at about the same time. Among others, Karl-Heinz Hornhues, the Deputy Chairperson of the CDU/CSU parliamentary party, explicitly criticized Foreign Minister Genscher’s hesitancy and called for immediate recognition. It appears that Genscher and his Free Democratic Party were the last group within the policy establishment to embrace recognition; even at the cost alienating important allies of the Federal Republic (Ramet and Coffin 2001, 49).

Officially, Germany advocated EC recognition of the break-away republics a few days later at the EC Council of Foreign Ministers meeting in The Hague—a move that was vetoed by France (Ramet and Coffin 2001, 49; Maull 1995, 103). France and the United Kingdom would continue to obstruct German recognition efforts until the end of the year, particularly within the UN Security Council. The position on recognition began to crystallize throughout the summer with Genscher expressing the government’s willingness to recognize unilateral declarations of independence if negotiations were to fail on September 4 (Ramet and Coffin 2001, 50). The government’s increasing divergence from the international consensus on recognition has to be considered against the backdrop of a number of important domestic and international developments at this time.

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177 This included Karl Lamers, the CDU foreign policy spokesperson and Volker Rühe, the Party Secretary-General although Lamers would later reverse his position and become one of the few CDU politicians to question the recognition course (“Brennend nach Aktion”, Der Spiegel 26/1995, 38-41). Important party-members of the SPD had moved towards recognition as early as May (Maull 1995, 102).


Domestically, a public groundswell was developing in support of more resolute diplomacy towards the crisis in Yugoslavia. The German media presented the escalating violence in Croatia in rather concrete and vivid imagery (Libal 1997, 15; Woodward 1995, 184). Croatia had been a popular travel destination for German tourists.180 Erb, comparing domestic debates about the situation in Yugoslavia in Germany and the United States, reports that while the debate appeared detached in the United States, concerned with abstract political issues such as setting precedents for recognition or the inviolability of territorial boundaries, media reports in Germany were almost entirely characterized by the concern for human rights and the suffering of the Croat people (2003, 159).

Chancellor Kohl would later call the news and media images coming from the Yugoslav civil war as unbearable.181 Influential conservative dailies including the Frankfurter Allgemeine and Die Welt had launched effective press campaigns in support of recognition (Maull 1995, 102; Heidenheimer 1995, 51; Woodward 1995, 149). In press reports and editorials, the rump-state of Yugoslavia as controlled by the Serbs was frequently painted as the aggressor.182 Public sentiment, as yet, was not fully supporting recognition but public opinion was beginning to exert pressure on politicians to act in some meaningful way to stop aggression and violence in Yugoslavia. Leaders of the Catholic Church had been adamant supporters of recognition (Jakobsen 1995, 405). As

180 Yugoslavia’s and, specifically Croatia’s close ties with Germany are exemplified by a joke according to which Yugoslavia had not six but seven provinces – the seventh one being Germany – in reference to the many cars with German license plates on the road (Woodward 1995, 469, notes).

181 Kohl used the terminology of “kaum auszuhalten” to describe the intolerable images (Kohl 2007, 564).

182 The Serb-controlled state media ran orchestrated campaigns to denounce German diplomacy by associating the Federal Republic with Nazi Germany (Ramet and Coffin 2001, 49-50). Kohl and Genscher, who grew up resisting Nazi totalitarianism, were greatly offended and saw the campaign as evidence for intransient totalitarianism of the Serb-run Yugoslav regime that needed to be resisted.
additional indicator of public sentiment moving policy-makers, representatives of all German state governments (Länder) requested EEC recognition of the two republics if the Yugoslav army continued to attack with the state government of Hessen even offering material aid to Croatia.\textsuperscript{183}

The public’s empathy for the suffering of the Croat people influenced German political elites. Within the main parties, the principle of self-determination began to trump other issues and concerns–often to the surprise of party leaders (Axt 1993, 355). The Alliance 90/Green party had supported recognition as early as February 1991 (Crawford 1996, 508).\textsuperscript{184} Leading politicians of the Social Democratic Party, noticing that recognition seemed to strike a chord with the electorate, had called for diplomatic recognition within days after the declaration of independence of the two break-away republics (Heidenheimer 1995, 51). The FDP had decided on a policy in support recognition by July 9\textsuperscript{th} (Crawford 1996, 493-94) and at the annual Party conference of the CDU in Dresden on December 15, 1991, Chancellor Kohl declared to thunderous applause that Germans had won the valuable prize of national self-determination at the time of unification and wanted others to share in the same good fortune (Horsley 1992, 239).

Internationally, the failed coup in the Soviet Union, followed by the rapid dissolution of the Soviet Union had changed strategic realities that had existed for a generation. The successor states of the Soviet Union were recognized fairly swiftly. The

\textsuperscript{183} FAZ, July 11, 1991, 2.

\textsuperscript{184} Both the Social Democrats and Alliance 90/Green parties were trying to recover from rather embarrassing electoral defeats at the time.
international community’s relative lack of concern for minority rights in the new states underscored the inconsistent and interest-driven application of international norms governing recognition at the time—a fact that may have contributed to the German decision to extend recognition unilaterally. The deterioration of the situation in Yugoslavia and the escalation of force was another important concern that increased the urgency of the need for some kind of diplomatic action.

Genscher had visited Yugoslavia in July. The fact that he had been unable to meet with Croat and Slovenian leaders in their own capitals due to Serb attacks had apparently left quite an impression on him (Maul 1995, 102; Libal 1997, 16). The German foreign minister identified Serb aggression as leading cause of the conflict during the July meeting of the CSCE (Crawford 1996, 493). The violence unleashed during the brutal battle for Vukovar which started in August, followed by the Serb siege of the city of Dubrovnik in October clearly helped push Germany towards accepting the dissolution of Yugoslavia as irreversible at a time when other governments still clung to the possibility of maintaining Yugoslav unity. In fact, Ramet and Coffin claim that it was “Yugoslavia’s continued use of force in Croatia that changed the nature of the conflict for Germans and reoriented German foreign policy” (2001, 50).

Policy divergence did not mean abandoning multilateralism and Germany became a leading force behind the pro-unity EEC initiatives that were generated during the

185 Crawford (1996, 501) writes that “…underdeveloped regimes and conflicting international norms provided permissive conditions for defection”.  

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summer and fall of 1991 (Duffield 1998, 188). When Chancellor Kohl first suggested recognition in July, he also warned that unilateral German policy actions would jeopardize European integration (Maull 1995, 102). As late as September 20, 1991, Genscher rejected unilateral steps in a declaration to the German Bundestag. Despite the official insistence on multilateralism, however, Germany had begun to ignore the wishes of its allies by beginning to establish increasingly closer ties with Croatia and Slovenia. Between July, when Croatian President Tudjman was received for official talks, and recognition in December 1991, Croatia was perceived by many international observers to have assumed the role of a rather unpredictable German protégée. A German consulate was established in Ljubljana in November and unofficial assurances were given after President Kučan’s visit to Bonn in October that recognition was “only a matter of choosing the right moment and right circumstances”.

These developments raised the specter of a reunited Germany resuming traditional power politics in the Balkans. The

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186 In early July, Genscher tentatively proposed that the EEC consider a joint recognition in the event that the Yugoslav Army continued to violate cease-fires. He quickly dropped the idea when he encountered opposition from other community members.

187 Emphasizing joint action with France, Genscher said that “the widest possible support will make every step we take more efficient. The same holds true for the issue of whether Croatia and Slovenia should be recognized...We consider it crucial to take a stand with France.” Indicating the government’s desire to move towards recognition within a multilateral setting was a joint statement by Kohl and Mitterrand from September 19, 1991 which confirmed respect for the right to self-determination as long as it was exercised peacefully, democratically and safeguarded the rights of minorities (Genscher 1998, 505).

188 The line is taken from a statement of a spokesman for the Slovenian Ministry of Foreign Affairs after President Kučan’s visit to Germany in early October (FBIS-EEU, October 10, 1991, 35, as cited by Cohen 1995, 238). The close link between Croatia and Germany was indicated by the levels of arms exports. Between April 1992 and April 1994, the Federal Republic exported $320 Million worth of arms to Croatia despite the existing arms embargo on Yugoslavia (Der Spiegel 32/94, Prügel vom Ziehvater, 121). That was roughly 25 percent of the total arms exports to Serbs, Croats and Muslims.

189 A number of international observers viewed Germany’s unilateral pro-recognition initiatives as indication of the intention to reestablish German hegemony in Eastern Europe and to force the EC to legitimize these hegemonic aspirations. For examples of these critiques see, Misha Glenny, "Germany Fans the Flames of War," New Statesman and Society, December 20 and 27, 1991, 145; Daniel Singer,
negative perception was not helped by the fact that Germany had begun to put together a pro-recognition group of states that, not counting Denmark and Belgium, looked embarrassingly like the World War II coalition that had backed fascist Croatia (Crawford 1996, 496). However, any association with power politics was vehemently denied officially and in parliamentary speeches.

In a speech to the Bundestag on November 6, 1991, Chancellor Kohl said that his government would continue to pursue the recognition of all Yugoslav republics that sought recognition (Kohl, PB 12/53, November 6, 1991, 4367). By early December, Kohl promised Tudjman that Germany would recognize Croatia before Christmas. In a letter sent to UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar, Genscher clearly broke with the tradition of multilateralism when he argued that the EEC’s founding treaty of Paris allowed for unilateral action when a member state’s overriding national interest was involved (Owen 1995, 343). In an uncharacteristically stern reply, the General Secretary rejected the German position.190 France and the United Kingdom, recognizing that Germany was clearly heading towards unilateral recognition, introduced a UN Security Council resolution on Yugoslavia on December 13 designed to forestall any unilateral state action that could change the political balance between the parties engaged in the civil war (Crawford 1996, 496). The resolution had the backing of the United States which had earlier issued an official statement that recognition should be part of only a larger peace


190 Making his preference for non-recognition very clear, the Secretary General sternly reminded Genscher of the EC declaration in Rome from November 8, 1991 in which the recognition of independence had been viewed as acceptable only within the context of a comprehensive settlement (Owen 1995, 343-344).
settlement. At the margins of the NATO summit in Rome in November, the US strongly pressed Germany not to break the non-recognition consensus (Baker 1995, 638, footnote *). Germany remained undeterred with Foreign Minister Genscher confirming the government’s decision of official recognition on December 16 (Maull 1995, 104) against the objectives of Britain’s foreign secretary who cautioned of an escalation in the Balkans (Cohen 1995, 238). Germany’s official recognition of Croatia and Slovenia followed on December 23, 1991.

In extending unilateral recognition, Germany was preempting the decision of the EEC’s Badinter Commission sent to the region on December 16 as well as joint EC recognition agreed on for January 15, 1992 pending the results of the arbitration commission. More importantly, Genscher had promised German recognition regardless of the Badinter Commission’s findings (Maull 1995, 104) and on December 19 pledged economic, legal and cultural assistance to Croatia. A diplomatic ‘firestorm’ during which Genscher had tried to convince other states to join the German position had done little to alleviate what Maull has called ‘a bad aftertaste’ of German diplomatic tactics (Maull 1995, 105). The ‘premature’ act of recognition stunned the international community. Germany had disregarded the wishes of the United States, ignored the warnings of the United Nations and risked diplomatic repercussions within the European Community.


192 The unilateral act was cushioned diplomatically by the qualification, lost on most international observers, that recognition was ‘awaiting implementation’ until January 15, 1991 at which point the act was formally concluded together with the multilateral recognition by the member-states of the European Union.

The impression left of unilateral and bullying conduct was strikingly out of line with the role of the reliable, calculable and consensus-focused actor that the country had played in the past. Where did the reticence, patience and caution go that had characterized German foreign policy conduct since World War II? Germany failed to comply with the expectations of its French, English and American allies as well as the United Nations. But the country acted unilaterally while supporting multilateralism in European institutions with its bureaucratic elite busy preparing for the important Maastricht summit.

Role Expectations and Role Conceptions

Expectations of German behavior during the role episode were generally based on German support for the consensus on maintaining Yugoslav sovereignty that prevailed within the international community. Expectations were based on having Germany play the role of a mediator pursuing a non-assertive foreign policy with a low diplomatic profile that would lend its weight to the establishment and maintenance of a multilateral consensus. When German elites showed inclinations to deviate from that international consensus, social pressure was applied to make the country’s policy conform. UN Secretary Perez de Cuellar’s exchange with Foreign Minister Genscher and the efforts by the United States, France and the United Kingdom to prevent Germany from unilateral recognition represent but a few important actions in a sequence by which external pressure was applied to change German behavior.

Scathing criticism of German actions, mixed with apprehensions about its future role and intentions, further confirms the nature of external expectations. US Secretary of
State Warren Christopher later claimed that “Germans bore a particular responsibility for the failure of the international community to stop the bloodshed”\textsuperscript{194} and Lord Carrington, the chief negotiator between Croatia and Serb-controlled Yugoslavia alleged that the peace conference “had been torpedoed by Germany’s premature recognition…”\textsuperscript{195} More importantly, observers saw in this “first action taken by Germany against the expressed preferences of its allies since 1949” a sort of reawakening of the German giant (Jakobsen 1995, 401). French President Mitterrand warned that the days of the “good German are almost over and that the world must brace itself for the worst.”\textsuperscript{196} Daniel Vernet expressed the concern of many around the world when he wrote in \textit{Le Monde} that the “lesson drawn from the Yugoslavia affair is that Germany no longer will accept European integration to bind its potential power”.\textsuperscript{197} Foreign criticism of German actions was not confined to political decision-makers and journalists but extended to the academic community in which power-based positions predicted the reestablishment of German influence in the Balkans on the basis of the ethnic alliances forged during World War II and made possible by the waning of Soviet power (Jakobsen 1995, 401-402).\textsuperscript{198}


\textsuperscript{196} Hella Pick, “A Master Germany wants to lose”, \textit{The Guardian}, January 10, 1992.


\textsuperscript{198} Woodward (1995, 146-147), for instance, criticizes Germany for pushing the EU towards recognition ahead of the negotiation of a comprehensive settlement involving all provinces in spite of warnings of future violence. Horsley (1992) is equally critical. Academic concerns included the arguments made by Waltz (1990; 1993) and Mearsheimer (1990) that foresaw Germany’s return to power-based unilateralism within the emerging multipolar order after the Cold War. The time period immediately before and after reunification was characterized by widespread fears that Germany would resume a traditional role
The scathing criticisms of German foreign policy conduct coming from its close allies disaffirmed German role behavior in Yugoslavia. The international community rejected Germany’s role as trailblazing policy leader that acted commensurate with capabilities in this case. Contrary to the Persian Gulf War where German actions were viewed as inappropriate because they were too reticent, German behavior in Yugoslavia was viewed as inappropriate and labeled as unilateral because it was too brazen. What was the role conception held by policy elites?

Germany’s initial response to the crisis in Yugoslavia corresponded closely to its traditional civilian power role conception with its role performance characterized by a strong emphasis on multilateralism, consensus-seeking and compliance with the norm of state sovereignty. Core elements of the role conception including reliability and calculability were maintained and the country was eager to meet the role expectations of its closest allies, France, United States and United Kingdom. When German elites first encountered French resistance to their desire to pursue EEC recognition of Croatia and Slovenia, they backed down, deferring to the French position (Ramet and Coffin 2001, 50). German elites appeared united in supporting a multilateral course of action even though they had clearly developed a preference for the norm of self-determination by late summer of 1991. At the European level, Germany had been firmly committed to the integration process of the EEC and substantial bureaucratic and diplomatic efforts had been expended on preparing the upcoming Summit of Maastricht with the intention of making it one of the most important integrative milestones in the history of the European involving power politics. Woodward (1995, 470, note 121), for instance, quotes an unnamed Western ambassador as telling her that “Grossdeutschland is second nature to them [the Germans], it is part of their makeup; they can’t do anything about it, but it is a problem for others”.  

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Community. In support of the long-term project of European Monetary Union, Germany had signaled its willingness to make substantial concessions including the surrender of a key symbol of its post-war economic identity, the *Deutsche Mark*. German elites had also been on the forefront of the development of a Common Foreign and Security Policy for the EEC which represented a significantly improved set of multilateral procedures over the more loosely coordinated foreign policy adjustment through the European Political Cooperation mechanism of the past. Overall, German actions during this time were characterized by a desire to manage the rapid changes in Europe through the reorganization and empowerment of multilateral institutions including the EEC and its military arm, the Western European Union (WEU), the CSCE and NATO (Maull 1995, 101). Given Germany’s diplomatic support for strengthening international organizations through a policy emphasis on multilateralism, it is not surprising that some of the strongest opposition to unilateral recognition came from the Foreign Ministry.

Leading bureaucrats in Germany’s Foreign Ministry had a key interest in not wanting to risk Germany’s reputation as a good team player in Europe and a reliable ally of the United States (Horsley 1992, 239). Horst Grabert, the former ambassador to Belgrade aptly captured the prevailing attitude within the foreign service when he voiced legal concerns about recognition, stating it would set a bad precedent since it entailed the waiver of established rules on diplomatic recognition based on the control of

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199 The crisis has to also be understood within the context of Germany’s recent reunification. The newfound sovereignty and increase in national power had given rise to apprehension even among Germany’s long-term allies within the European Community such as France and the United Kingdom. As a result, Germany felt pressured to show good faith by accepting increasing integration. The result was the summit of Maastricht and its main agenda points of a common foreign and security policy (CFSP) as well as monetary integration through the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU).
governments over their territory and populations. In internal memos, the embassy in Belgrade also warned of the possibility of a diplomatic failure and even accused policy makers in Bonn to have promised too much. President Tudjman’s ‘official’ visit to Bonn in mid-July was met with considerable criticism (Ramet and Coffin 2001, 50). When Secretary of State Dieter Kastrup, the highest ranking permanent official of the German Foreign Ministry, briefed leading parliamentarians on the Yugoslav situation on July 31, 1991, he did not even touch upon the question of recognition (Libal 1997, 26). Ministry bureaucrats also appeared to be concerned about the effects of recognition on multiethnic Bosnia. Outside of the government as well, there were prominent voices in society warning of unilateral policies while criticizing the merits of the recognition course overall. Rhetorical exchanges between elites in parliament had politicians distance themselves from any hint of wanting to reassert a hegemonial role in the Balkans. Thus, official announcements in support of maintaining role behavior based

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202 Ambassador to Belgrade, Hansjörg Eiff later pointed out that ethnic violence in Croatia started only after Tudjman’s intolerant course towards the Serb minority. Eiff had briefed Bosnian President Izetbegović for a meeting with Genscher during which the president inexplicably failed to point out the possibility of civil war arising from a general recognition policy of all former Yugoslav republics (“Brennend nach Aktion”, Der Spiegel, June 26, 1995, 38-41).

203 For instance, the centrist daily Die Zeit questioned recognition on September 19, 1991.

204 Debating responses to the crisis, CDU/CSU parliamentarian Lummer rejected both unilateralism and regional hegemony as German motives by stating: “We also passed on unilateral recognition because we wanted to say; What happened in 1941 is over once and for all; we will have nothing to do with it. We are not concerned with influence or supporting one or the other republic but we are supporting freedom, democracy, self-determination, rights of minorities and peaceful conflict resolution”. In German: “Wenn wir auf eine einseitige Anerkennung verzichtet haben, dann auch deshalb, weil wir sagen wollen: Was 1941 war, ist endgültig vorbei; damit haben wir nichts zu tun. Uns geht es nicht um Einflüsse oder das
on consensus-seeking were not empty statements. Germany continued to be a ‘team
player’ seeking the multilateral resolution of the conflict.\(^{205}\) Germany sought to comply
with international norms and behavioral expectations based on the support of the
principle of sovereignty but then attempted to change that international consensus on
recognition through diplomatic persuasion within multilateral settings. Even after having
achieved that goal, parliamentary elites still found it necessary to break with the
European consensus unilaterally.

Domestic Concerns of Parliamentary Elites

Parliamentary elites of Germany’s dominant catch-all parties were dealing with a
number of challenges during the early 1990s. Party membership had declined
substantially during the previous decade as the Germany constituency had grown weary
of the tendency of the entrenched party system to maintain a stable consensus on major
foreign policy issues since the 1950s (Crawford 1996, 509). More radical parties emerged
and grew their membership numbers at the expense of the traditional ones (Ibid.).\(^{206}\) The
rapid socio-political transformations in Eastern Europe created additional challenges for
German parties. The disappearance of the Communist threat and the controversies
surrounding the German reunification process transformed the political landscape and
presented the leadership elite of the main parties with the challenge to maintain party

\(^{205}\) Erb (2003, 159) suggests that German actions could still be considered multilateral in nature. He writes
that multilateralism “does not require a state to simply join in an existing consensus, but rather to act to
persuade…others to go along should they be outside of the consensus”.

\(^{206}\) The left-wing, anti-establishment Green Party emerged in 1980 while the right-wing Republikaner Party
was formed in 1983 by former members of the CSU.
cohesion and appeal through the incorporation of popular issues. The reformulation of
traditional ideology and incorporation of more popular and even radical positions offered
the prospect of acquiring support from hitherto inaccessible voting groups as well as
arresting the defection of traditional constituencies to smaller parties. In this
environment, foreign policy issues became politicized to a degree previously unknown.
The appeal to national self-determination represented a logical move.

Along with anti-communism, self-determination had been part of the conservative
agenda since World War II (Crawford 1996, 506). The emphasis on the principle through
the promotion of a speedy reunification course during the general elections of 1990 had
provided the CDU/CSU with an election landslide. In West Germany, the
conservatives had been able to overcome their legacy of being a party of primarily
Western rather than Eastern policy orientation. In the Eastern Länder, the CDU cleaned
up its tarnished reputation as former Block Party affiliated with the Socialist Unity Party
(SED) that had controlled the German Democratic Republic. Thus, the public appeal of
the self-determination principle had proven so effective that it had overcome the
conservative party’s ideological and historical deficiencies and established it as the
dominant force in reunification Germany. Chancellor Kohl closed his first inaugural
speech in January 1991 with his vision of the future that involved a new order for Europe
and the world based on the self-determination of nations, the protection of human dignity
and respect for human rights” (Kohl 2007, 316).

After the successful reunification election, the party’s position among the
electorate quickly came under attack: As public enthusiasm over reunification gave way

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207 Self-determination had been cast as the ‘expressed will of the people’ (Woodward 1995, 185).
to the realization that the project was immense, costly and associated with long-term sacrifices, the CDU-FDP coalition lost the successive Länder elections in Hessen (January 1991), Rhineland-Palatinate (April 1991) and Hamburg (June 1991). The loss in the Rhineland was particularly disconcerting because this was Chancellor Kohl’s home state in which he had actively campaigned. It was the first CDU defeat since 1946 (Jakobsen 1995, 415; footnote 36; Kohl 2007, 322). The electoral victories allowed the opposition to take control of the upper house and effectively become a co-governing force. The decrease of electoral support in the West was somewhat expected given that its population stood to pay for the modernization of the East. Massive tax increases to pay for reunification costs and Gulf War contributions had been decided on in February and went into effect in July. But the party’s popularity in the Eastern provinces was also waning (Jakobsen 1995, 415). Here, the primary reasons were popular dissatisfaction and disappointment over the fact that reunification was resulting in massive job losses due to privatization and the closings of hundreds of companies. In his memoirs, Kohl wrote about the impact of the elections in 1991 that “…the five elections in 1991 brought soberness and created new challenges…the acceptance of the CDU had to be re-conquered in manifest ways” and that the party had a need to differentiate itself morally from the more economic orientation of the FDP (Kohl 2007, 324). Retracing the party’s success through the public display of support for the principle of self-determination in Yugoslavia became a logical line of action. Woodward writes that “Chancellor Kohl seized the opportunity of the vote in the Bundestag demanding recognition of Croatia and Slovenia, which was initiated by the opposition SPD, to divert attention abroad to a

208 The income tax increase of 7.5% percent would later come to be known as ‘Solidarity Tax’.
diplomatic gain and capture the issue for his party” (Woodward 1995, 185). The support of oppressed people offered strong moral appeal and was immensely popular. In conjunction with Kohl’s stated goal of taking on greater responsibility after the Gulf War debacle, the foreign policy action also offered the possibility of moral action and the display of international responsibility without having to face military responsibilities as these were precluded by the present institutions. In fact, German policy demonstrates a very clever and flexible appropriation of existing values and institutions by Germany’s leading party at the time.

On July 3, Volker Rühe asked the European Community to open the prospect of recognition to Slovenia and Croatia (Libal 1997, 19). The purported reference to reasons of demonstrating political and moral support for the two peoples based on the German people’s recent ability to reunify is in line with the emphasis on human rights that is a central component of German strategic culture. But the action also represented a shrewd political choice by this seasoned politician and ambitious ally of Chancellor Kohl. His position was quickly supported by the Deputy Chairperson of the CDU/CSU parliamentary party Karl-Heinz Hornhues, who went on to criticize Genscher’s hesitancy on the issue and called for immediate recognition. More important because of its proximity to actual recognition in December is the fact that Kohl and Genscher gave the promise of recognition to Croatia on December 15, one day before the party’s important summit in Dresden. This provided the Chancellor with the political powder that unleashed the thunderous applause from the CDU delegates. The consideration of elite interests in conjunction with cultural variables is crucial to understanding this policy.

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episode. It explains the conundrum of why Germany would push for multilateral recognition throughout the fall of 1991 and basically achieve that diplomatic victory by moving the EEC through strong arm tactics and promises of diplomatic concessions at Maastricht only to still defect on its promise. Self-determination and human rights were used instrumentally to shore up party support and win electoral support. The reason this could be done was because they appeared as morally superior actions within the German cultural context.

The leadership of the CDU’s sister-party CSU also was quick to embrace the pro-independence position. The fact that both Croatia and Slovenia were predominantly Catholic and the existence of a sizable Croat community in Germany may have contributed to the urgency of the decision for a party with traditionally strong ties to Catholic voters (Paterson, 1996, 142).\(^\text{210}\) The desire to aid the Croatians may also have been influenced by the Vatican’s early support for catholic Croatia which it exerted through Episcopal conferences in Bavaria.\(^\text{211}\) CSU politicians were among the earliest critics of Foreign Minister Genscher’s initial course of action in which he attempted to maintain Yugoslavian unity (Axt 1993, 353).\(^\text{212}\) In all likelihood, the CSU leadership was also worried about the party’s diminished importance in the united Germany as the role of Bavaria as pivotal player in the Bundesrat was being diluted through the addition of

\(^\text{210}\) According to Jakobsen (1995, 407), about 700,000 Croatians lived in Germany at the time.

\(^\text{211}\) This was the view of Italian Foreign Minister De Michelis which he expressed in a personal interview with Woodward in 1994 (1995, 149). Woodward also suggests that the Croatian community in Germany was well-organized and politically active. Serb emigrants, who had arrived more recently, were lacking this political power (Woodward 1995).

\(^\text{212}\) The impact of the element of religious affinity should not be exaggerated. Genscher was also criticized by the Social Democratic Party which did not have ties to Catholic voting groups and Alliance 90/Green Party politicians had endorsed recognition ahead of everyone else.
the new Eastern provinces. The electoral benefits generated by the popularity of the principle of self-determination were too good to pass up. Thus, in the fall of 1991, conservative elites increasingly began to embrace the self-determination for instrumental reasons.\(^{213}\)

Support for the principle of self-determination was steadily increasing within the Social Democratic Party. During the German general elections of 1990, the SPD had opposed the rapid reunification platform of the CDU with a slower, incremental integration course. The CDU’s resounding success in all of the five new provinces of Germany convinced the SPD leadership that the will of the people expressed in the movement for self-determination had not been adequately accommodated by the party line. The SPD had been unable to reap the benefits from the political opening to the East that had been initiated by Willi Brandt’s Ostpolitik during the 1970s and the party’s linkage to the East German intellectual opposition. It had viewed itself as instrumental in contributing to the fall of the Socialist regime yet was facing with the prospect of being consigned to the political sidelines during this critical juncture in the nation’s history. The SPD had also experienced the erosion of its traditional voter base during the late 1980s (Crawford 1996, 509). Struggling to regain its former political role and recognizing the popular appeal of the recognition course, leading figures in the SPD called for diplomatic recognition within days after declaration of independence of the two break-away republics in spite of the party’s traditional aversion to ultra-nationalist movements.

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\(^{213}\) Elite competition between the CDU-controlled Chancellery and the FDP-controlled Foreign Ministry may also have been an issue. The Chancellery’s leading figures including Foreign and Security Advisor Horst Teltchik had a poor personal relationship with Genscher and his top aides. Teltchik’s appointment ran counter to the established pattern of Chancellors recruiting security advisors from the Foreign Office. See, Merkl (1995, 48).
At the meeting of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Bundestag on July 1, 1991, SPD leaders joined the CDU in demanding from Genscher that he commit the European Community to the speedy recognition course sought by the German public.\textsuperscript{214} Indicative of the party’s position, SPD leader Björn Engholm later remarked that the recognition was arriving too late for Croatia and Slovenia and Norbert Gansel stated that “if the EU sticks to this schedule [of recognition on January 15, 1992], she might be able to only recognize corpses and ruins”.\textsuperscript{215} The second parliamentary resolution for recognition on November 14, 1991 received widespread support from both the SPD rank and file. The threat of further party fragmentation became more pressing when considering the position and the influence of the SPD’s junior partner in opposition—the Alliance 90/Green party.

Germany’s Green Party had been founded in 1980. With a platform centered on environmental and gender equality issues, the party had steadily gained strength and credibility with the electorate through the 1980s. During the parliamentary elections of 1987, the Greens had received a stunning 8.3 percent of the vote.\textsuperscript{216} The party’s success steadily eroded the central role that the Liberal Democrats had played as ‘kingmaker’ in Germany’s multi-party system. The successful run came to an abrupt halt when the Greens experienced a catastrophic defeat during the 1990 federal elections. The emphasis

\textsuperscript{214} A controversy developed within the SPD between foreign policy expert Karsten Voigt, Norbert Gansel and Guenther Verheugen who pleaded for recognition and the party’s East European specialist, Gernot Erler who urged caution. Eventually, Voigt and Gansel succeeded in persuading the SPD minority faction in parliament to support a course of speedy recognition against the advice of Erler. See Heidenheimer 1995, 51.


\textsuperscript{216} “Dagobert vorm Fleischerladen”, Der Spiegel, October 12, 1990, 29.
on environmental issues had not appealed to an electorate concerned with reunification and nationalism. In addition to campaign-related mistakes, the party had always struggled with profound internal problems. Fierce personality clashes, ideological conflict between the left wing (the Fundis) and the more mainstream (the Realos) side as well as an unorthodox style in organization, decision-making and debating had always characterized the anti-establishment party whose leaders had been active in the civil rights movements of the 1960s. In 1990, the electorate punished the party severely. Receiving just 4.8 percent of the vote, the Green Party support fell beneath the critical five percent threshold necessary to retain the right to parliamentary representation (Ibid.). The special nature of election law during reunification offered the last way out.  

In East Germany, the Greens had survived because they had campaigned as part of a coalition with the Alliance ’90 Party formed by notable civil rights activists. Thus, in December 1990, 41 West German Green parliamentarians were given notice by the Bundestag administration to vacate their seats while two East German Greens along with six members of the Alliance 90 moved in. The existential threat posed by the West German Greens’ poor showing at the polls thus necessitated a merger with the East German civil rights activists. The defeat and the nature of the newly combined party would profoundly influence the emergence of the German foreign policy preference for recognition.

Forged for pragmatic reasons, the union between East German activists and West German Greens created a marriage of convenience characterized by an uneasy and

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217 Election law in the Federal Republic bars parties receiving less than five percent of the vote from parliamentary representation. Prior to the historic election of 1990, an exception was made that allowed for representation for a party that achieved five percent in either West or East Germany. As a result of this new law, Alliance 90/Greens and a reformed communist party (PDS) were represented in the first all-German Bundestag.
conflict-prone relationship from the start. The East German activists from the Alliance 90, who had been instrumental in bringing about the peaceful changes leading to reunification, harbored strong resentments against the West German Greens whom they accused of having viewed the former regime in the Democratic Republic through rose-tinted glasses. They claimed that Greens had emphasized peace and détente while turning a blind eye to human rights violations committed under the East German regime (Der Spiegel 7/1992, 30). The two parties shared a tradition of grass-roots activism but greatly differed on the goals that should be pursued. Alliance 90 members were more conventionally oriented and considered the ideological squabbles within the Green party as childish enterprise of a generation of privileged Westerners who, unlike the Alliance 90 activists had never managed to fundamentally transform society (Der Spiegel 16/1991, 26). The former East German activists were particularly at odds with the left wing of the Green party and its anti-capitalist polemics. As a result of having achieved a grass-roots revolution against a totalitarian and communist regime through the will of the people, Alliance 90 activists brought with them a loathing of undemocratic regimes combined with a principled emphasis on human rights standards. Thus, the prominence of the Alliance 90 activists within the parliamentary faction of the Greens and their moral authority derived from their activism in support of civil rights translated into a powerful endorsement of self-determination and human rights in former Yugoslavia. But that is not the whole story. Within the Green Party, important changes were taking place as well.

The Green party’s devastating defeat prompted a process of inner soul searching and programmatic reorientation. Joschka Fischer, one of the Greens most popular and charismatic politicians, strongly supported the long-range goal of participating in
government through the pursuit of a more pragmatic orientation. Stating after the election that “we will be different in four years or disappear” (*Der Spiegel*, December 10, 1990, 90), Fischer worked hard on achieving a more pragmatic consensus build on environmental and human rights issues. This emphasis on core issues was intended to forestall further losses to the SPD which had increasingly appropriated some of the traditional policy suggestions of the Greens. Rather than the party’s anti-unification stance during the election, Fischer saw issue convergence as main reason for the massive voter losses during the parliamentary elections (Ibid.). Against the backdrop of a generally accepted need for reform within the party, his pleas for a streamlined and more pragmatic position took hold. At the Green Party’s congress in April 1991, Fischer and his *Realos* were able to isolate the most adamant of the radical *Fundis* under Jutta Ditfurth who chose to leave the party.

While ensuring that the Greens continued to differentiate themselves from the catch-all parties through the adherence to a set of core issues, Fischer also was crucial in laying the groundwork for future cooperation with the Social Democrats as stepping stone to governmental power. As first Green politician to join government as environmental minister in a Social-Democratic/Green coalition ruling the state of Hessen between 1985 and 1987, he would serve in that position again after the defeat of the conservatives in January 1991. Greens and Social Democrats had shrewdly exploited the German public’s antimilitant attitudes during the Persian Gulf War (Kohl 2007, 307). The process, by which the two left-of-center parties would move towards one another culminating in their eventual coalition and victory during the 1998 parliamentary

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elections, was among the crucial developments in German politics of the 1990s. The incrementally occurring normalization of their policy stance on the use of force and German participation in international peacekeeping efforts would play a critical role as convergence point which increased both the prospects for a workable coalition as well as electoral viability.

The move from radicalism towards the center, the renewed focus on core issues with the strong emphasis on human rights as well as the prominence of the Alliance 90 activists after the demise of the West German Greens in parliament all explain the joint party’s concern with minority rights in Yugoslavia. Consequently, Alliance 90/Greens were calling for the recognition of Croatia and Slovenia on the basis of the principle of self-determination as early as February 1991 when the other parties were still concerned with the negative consequences of the Yugoslav breakup (Crawford 1996, 508). By June, when Green parliamentarian Poppe advocated peaceful self-determination as only viable option because “the current basis for coexistence no longer enjoyed the consensus of all Yugoslav nations”, he also noted that the other parties’ desire to maintain Yugoslav unity had finally given way to a more realistic assessment of the situation. The fact that the other parties had moved over to the Alliance 90/Green position on self-determination indicates that the small party was somehow crucial in the process. The groundswell supporting self-determination and national independence as a solution to the conflict in


220 Crawford (2006) also sees the Alliance 90/Greens as crucial in explaining the emergence of an all-party consensus on recognition. She views the Alliance 90/Green Party promotion of self-determination as example of small parties’ attempts to distinguish themselves on foreign policy issues. Concern over loss of votes then prompted the catch-all parties to embrace the new position in a process she calls ‘elite bandwagoning’. The temptation of larger parties to embrace the new position is likely to be stronger with increasing salience of the issue and perceived popularity of the proposed policy decision.
Yugoslavia also enveloped the liberal FDP with its strong legacy of promoting multilateralism in foreign policy.

The outcome of the election in 1990 had generally been positive for the Germany’s small but influential liberal FDP. The traditional king-maker party had fared well in the new provinces with its relative gains outpacing even those of the CDU. But given its small constituency, FDP politicians always had to be concerned with correctly maneuvering politically among the fluctuating policy interfaces produced by the catchall parties. Foreign Minister Genscher personified and became famous for this ability to survive by reconciling contradictory foreign policy positions and decisions.221

The convergence of interests between politicians of the CDU/CSU and SPD in the fall of 1991 created a dilemma for the FDP. Controlling the Foreign Ministry, parliamentary elites like Genscher were most concerned with not alienating the allies of the Federal Republic by straying from the traditional path of reliability and calculability. This had left FDP elites in a position of wait-and-see on recognition while focusing on the upcoming Summit of Maastricht. The sudden alignment of CDU/CSU and SPD politicians caught leaders of the FDP off-guard and created the possibility of leaving the party isolated—an untenable political position given its minor popular basis of support (Axt 1993, 354). The convergence of the main parties’ positions on recognition became evident during the meeting of the Foreign Affairs Committee in early July. This meeting had a profound effect on Foreign Minister Genscher. According to an eye-witness, Genscher went into the meeting a cautious diplomat opposing recognition and left it

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221 Foreign observers of German foreign policy coined the verb ‘to genscher’ or ‘Genscherism’ to describe the foreign minister’s uncanny ability to survive by periodically adapting his political position.
singing the recognition tune (Horsley 1992, 240). By July 9, Genscher had succeeded in revising the FDP’s position to accommodate the pro-recognition course (Paterson 1996, 142; Crawford 1996, 494).

The investigation of the interests of party elites at the time of recognition indicates the instrumental appropriation of the norm of self-determination. In essence, elites were falling over each other in trying to be the first to embrace the new position because it offered electoral benefits for the ruling coalition parties CDU/CSU as well as the opposition Social Democrats and the struggling Alliance 90/Greens. In the case of the FDP, perceived electoral advantages may have taken second place to the desire to avoid political isolation. Given the popularity of the recognition decision, parliamentary elites were tempted to pursue career and party interests over those of the country as a whole. The fact that the parties that lost the previous election seemed to be the first to embrace the recognition course while Genscher’s FDP and Kohl’s CDU were the last, supports that view that domestic considerations were important and eventually trumped role expectations of multilateral calculability.

**Strategic Culture: Antimilitarism and Self-Determination**

Elite policy actions in support of national self-determination in Yugoslavia were generally in line with constituent elements of German strategic culture. Two important values of strategic culture after World War II include human rights on one hand and antimilitarism and a negative perception of force on the other. The official commitment to the protection of human rights differentiates the identity of the Federal Republic from that of its predecessors. The protection of minority rights is viewed as part of the
country’s special responsibility and historical burden and enjoys a general national consensus (Crawford 1996, 504). Statements about the preservation of human rights and dignity regularly find their expression in official documents and statements of government principles as well as state policies.  

222 Debating the escalating crisis in Yugoslavia just days before the declarations of independence, all parties in the Bundestag applauded the statement, “where the process of state disintegration is taken as opportunity to mistreat and deprive minorities of their rights, we, the German Bundestag are on the side of the minority”.  

223 Later, the Deputy Chairman of the CDU/CSU parliamentary party, Rupert Scholz, would justify Germany’s support for self-determination by invoking United Nations’ principles and stating that misperceptions of German foreign policy during the recognition of Croatia and Slovenia may have to be the price for “doing the right thing” (Scholz 1995, 51). Support for self-determination is also found among the public which showed a majority of those polled indicating a preference for self-determination and possible independence for Yugoslav republics in September 1991.  

224 Support for human rights also can be linked to Germany’s post-war history as a divided nation existing in two separate states which necessitated the support for peaceful self-determination to allow for reunification. After achieving this goal, German elites

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222 For instance, in the preamble to the Constitution and Germany’s asylum policy, which until amended in 1992, was considered one of the most tolerant in the Western world. As strong supporter of strengthening international human rights regimes, Germany has traditionally been very sensitive to arguments related to human rights and prone to take diplomatic action when such rights were demonstrably violated. On German human rights policy, see Boekle (2001).


thought that the country’s moral and political credibility depended on recognizing the right to self-determination in Croatia and Slovenia.\footnote{General Secretary of the CDU, Volker Rühe, argued in July 1991 that “we won unification through the right to self-determination…if we may pursue a policy of the status quo without recognizing the right to self-determination of Croatia and Slovenia, we lose our moral and political credibility” (quoted in Maull 1995, 117).}

A final issue in regards to the central human rights value was the nature of the regime in Yugoslavia. Discourse and government statements indicate that German elites viewed rump Yugoslavia as totalitarian. Totalitarian regimes violate human rights and employ violence as part of state policy to control their populations through fear. As such, Belgrade and the JNA enjoyed very little legitimacy from parliamentary elites in Germany many of whom had experienced Nazism in their youth and who had helped develop a political culture in which force and intimidation were frowned upon. The prevalence of the human rights value in Germany’s strategic culture explains the urgency of German elite actions although the preference for protecting minority rights through reliance on the principle of self-determination also raises a number of questions.

For one, the cultural emphasis on the protection of human and minority rights does not have to be automatically linked to a policy in support of self-determination, much less the immediate recognition of the independence for oppressed minorities. Institutional and cultural forms guaranteeing minority rights have been developed in many states. In addition, serious doubts exist whether the cultural preference for the support of human rights translated into actual German policy. Woodward, for instance, claims that within the CSCE, German policy was more focused on stability concerns and the inviolability of post-1945 borders (Woodward 1995, 153). Lastly, if protecting the
rights of minorities in Yugoslavia was such important concern, why were the German government, parliament and the public so keen on supporting the rights of Slovene and Croatian minorities in Yugoslavia while all but ignoring the rights of Serb minorities in the breakaway provinces? More likely, self-determination served as surrogate for some other motivating force.

The most important of the values constituting German strategic culture since World War II was that of antimilitarism. Elite aversion to the use of force characterized the parliamentary discourse at the time of recognition. The debate on June 19, 1991, for instance was characterized by the frequent use of expressions of such as “preventing the use of violence” (Gewaltanwendung verhindern), “seeking an mutually agreeable solution without force” (einvernehmliche Lösung ohne Gewalt), “peaceful resolution of the conflict”, (friedliche Beilegung des Konfliktes), and the “renunciation of force” (Gewaltverzicht).\textsuperscript{226} The value of antimilitarism naturally predisposed German politicians to take sides against actors in the civil war who engaged in violence. The Serb-controlled rump state and the JNA were quickly perceived to be the prime culprits. In a radio interview from July 3, 1991, Genscher blamed military force by the JNA in support of totalitarian state objectives for the disintegration of Yugoslavia (Libal 1997, 17).

Contrary to the position held by the United States, United Nations and chief negotiators who viewed recognition as a trump card that could be used to force the civil war parties to settle their differences, Genscher argued in his letter to the UN General Secretary that “delaying recognition would lead to further escalation of violence by the Yugoslav People’s Army, since the troops would necessarily regard our refusal to recognize the

\textsuperscript{226} PB 12/33, June 19, 1991, 2565.
republics as encouragement for their policy of conquest toward Croatia” (Genscher 1998, 513). The escalating of violence in Yugoslavia made vivid by the German media and the identification of the main aggressor created a moral imperative for politicians to act. Thus, at the important Foreign Affairs Committee meeting of the Bundestag on July 1, Genscher had to defend himself against accusations of German inaction in the face of Serb violence by emphasizing that the government’s chief aim in Yugoslavia’s crisis had been the prevention of violence (Libal 1997, 15). The trouble for elites was that the country’s antimilitant culture and traditions disallowed anything but diplomatic action.

Public opinion imposed significant and clear constraints on elite actions towards Yugoslavia. Military involvement was widely rejected with public opinion polls indicating a clear preference for humanitarian missions (Figure 5).

Figure 5: Public Attitudes toward Military and Non-Military Missions

The Rand data shows that the public generally rejected the participation in peace enforcement missions even if sanctioned by an international organization. Furthermore, the declining support for such missions within the population between 1991 and 1993
suggests that, if anything, the escalating violence in Yugoslavia only strengthened the public’s generally negative perception on the efficacy of force in addressing domestic instabilities.

Conclusion: Explaining Non-Compliance

The crisis in Yugoslavia leading to the fragmentation of the state, ethnic warfare and the recognition of Croatia and Slovenia in 1992 found German parliamentary elites initially performing role behavior corresponding to that of a civilian power which international society had affirmed for many years. This explains the emphasis on multilateralism which was very strong in the beginning of the crisis and never completely disappeared until Germany clearly broke with the consensus by recognizing the two breakaway republics in December 1991, roughly three weeks ahead of the scheduled recognition by the European Union and the presentation of the Badinter Commission findings. Thus, the actions of parliamentary elites also showed a clear desire to play a more prominent role based on leadership conduct instead of the traditional reticence. Germany had been encouraged to play that leadership role by the United States (Woodward 1995, 153). Foreign expectations in the form of shaming criticism conveyed during and after the Persian Gulf War amplified the power of the social message to change role behavior. Conservative politicians had begun to promote external expectations, trying to find a middle ground between the role of hegemonial power and normal expression of natural capabilities. They encouraged a redefinition of the behavior associated with reliability and calculability in German foreign policy. The key argument they used was one of solidarity with Western allies and the avoidance of foreign policy
singularity. Foreign expectations should have produced compliance with international norms upholding sovereignty and Germany should have exhibited its new leadership role in the form of foreign policy initiatives designed to coordinate a general consensus on withholding recognition until orderly and peaceful secession processes could be negotiated. A number of factors made this impossible and help explain German non-compliance in this episode.

The first factor is the context provided by Germany’s unique strategic culture. Antimilitarism created a compelling urgency for German politicians to address the levels of violence unseen in Europe since World War II. The value of human rights put Germany at odds with a regime that used its massive army against its own people and that deployed its state-run media in classic totalitarian fashion to demonize its political opponents. Antimilitarism in both culture and institutions also constrained elite actions. Arms transfers to regions of instability were prohibited and military involvement even in the form of multilateral responses was unacceptable both for elites as well as the general public. It was not until February 1992, that the Bundeswehr even received authorization to participate in operations outside Germany but within NATO treaty area (Asmus 1994, 62). This left a diplomatic response to the crisis as the only option and the vehement push for recognition can in part be understood as an attempt at crisis resolution through the internationalization of the conflict (Genscher 1998, 510). As such, recognition may be understood both as a response to violence that was viewed as particularly appalling due to

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227 Former Foreign Minister Genscher gives this as the main reason for the German policy drive towards recognition when he writes: “What, I asked myself over and over, can end the bloodshed? More and more it seemed as if recognizing Slovenia and Croatia and thus turning the conflict into an international matter was the only remaining political means” (1998, 510).
the antimilitarism of Germany’s post-war culture as well as an attempt to address a foreign policy issue with as yet underdeveloped means. Antimilitarism may also have influenced the key element of multilateralism that is so prominent in the traditional role conception.

While the German public was not any more in favor of self-determination than that of other countries, an important element of the civilian power role, mainly the widespread support for multilateralism was experiencing a significant decline as violence escalated in Yugoslavia. Initial public support for the multilateral conflict resolution efforts undertaken by the EEC during the summer of 1991 was high but criticism of the EC mediation efforts soon began to increase (Libal 1997, 15). In fall, at the time of the fighting in Vokovar and Dubrovnik, a Eurobarometer poll found the German public rapidly losing faith in the ability of the ongoing mediation efforts to restore peace to the region.228 The growing disenchantment with multilateral conflict resolution initiatives through EEC and UN was shared by the parliamentary elites with even the opposition pushing for early recognition lest the government wanted “to recognize only corpses and ruins”.229

A second important factor explaining noncompliance was the ambiguous normative context provided by conflicting standards of state sovereignty and self-determination which provided a permissive condition allowing for national interpretations and, hence, unilateral diplomacy. Both the Helsinki Final Act and the UN

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228 Over 65 percent of those surveyed saw the EC efforts as either not very useful or not at all useful (Eurobarometer 36, Fall 1991, 128).

Charter provide equally for the inviolability of borders and the right to self-determination, as Germany was quick to point out (Crawford 1996, 500). The legitimacy of multilateral standards regarding state recognition was also undermined by the EEC’s selective enforcement of the principles of conditional sovereignty based on human rights considerations. For instance, while the four nuclear republics of the former Soviet Union were recognized on the basis of their promise to ensure human rights, Croatia was expected to implement these rights before recognition was even considered. Macedonia, which met all conditions established by the EEC, was not recognized at all due to vehement Greek objections. Thus, the normative environment governing role expectations provided mixed messages. During his diplomatic initiative, Genscher was able to persuade a number of states to support the German pro-recognition group—no doubt in part due to the widespread conviction that self-determination represented an important principle worth honoring. The fact that the position of the EEC shifted increasingly to accommodate that of Germany indicates the ambiguity of the normative context. Germany was able to ‘bend’ the rules because the rules governing the recognition of state sovereignty were ambiguous and allowed themselves to be interpreted. This allowed German elites to deploy self-determination norms in instrumental fashion as dictated by their electoral interests at the time. Thus, Chancellor Kohl was proud to present German actions as “great success for us [the CDU] and German politics” at the CDU Party Congress in Dresden. Foreign policy elites did

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230 For instance, the Danish Foreign Ministry stated after the Slovenian and Croatian referenda indicating a clear desire for independence that “it is now time to fulfill the desire their people have expressed” (Stephen Kinzer, “Europe, Backing Germans, Accepts Yugoslav Breakup”, NYT, January 16, 1992).

engage in an effort of international persuasion of their own through forceful leadership within the EEC and communication with the UN and US but ultimately failed to receive international affirmation for the country’s assertive leadership style.

Taken together, the various factors impacting this role episode allow the following conclusions to be drawn about German foreign policy behavior. Germany, which had been encouraged to play a more prominent role in world politics after the Persian Gulf War, encountered an extremely violent situation in its backyard which required immediate attention. Violence projected from the totalitarian regime in Belgrade predisposed German elites to take sides for the besieged breakaway states. Initial German support of multilateralism was reflexive and immediate. But as EEC and UN efforts at mediation failed to stop violence in the region, German elites and the public lost faith in the ability of these efforts to stop the violence. They then began to support recognition as means of deterring further Serb aggression because it was the only proactive means in the diplomatic toolbox. The final break with multilateralism can be explained through the developing spiral of distrust towards multilateral processes. The compromise on January recognition achieved at Brussels on December 16, 1991 was hard-fought and remained subject to the findings of the Badinter Commission. The outcome was not guaranteed and elites preempted recognition to force the community to comply. This also allowed elites to reap the domestic benefit of scoring points with the electorate.

Overall, the recognition of Croatia and Slovenia constituted a role episode in the evolution of German role conceptions that was to be followed by the challenges created by the unfolding tragedy in Bosnia. Each time Germany was forced to address the
situation in Yugoslavia, it faced the pressure of complying with international expectations. The recognition case suggests that German elites and the public were getting ready for a larger role within the international system but strategic culture and institutions were hampering the effort. Germany led the world without the cultural or institutional ability to back up its diplomacy. The result was inconsistent diplomacy that emphasized the civilian power preference for multilateralism on one hand and the desire for the policy autonomy of a great power addressing its national interests on the other.

The change in the security environment after the Cold War was also reaffirmed. Contrary to the claim made by President von Weizsäcker that the Persian Gulf War had been an exception, the war would prove to be an indicator of changes in the international security environment which was further confirmed by the unfolding events in Yugoslavia. The central message emerging for elites struggling with role adaptation after reunification was that the new security environment required the strengthening of international institutions through full German participation as an equal partner and that diplomatic singularity was to be avoided.
CHAPTER V

THE BOSNIAN CIVIL WAR

Introduction: Script Change

Parliamentary elites drew important social lessons from the international response to unilateral behavior over the recognition of Croatia and Slovenia. For the most part, the response to Germany’s more assertive stance in international politics had been negative and marked by a “growing disquiet”. A fundamental break with consensus-oriented policy behavior and normalization towards a more nationalistic policy stance had clearly been rejected by the international community. Self-critique of the unilateral ‘adventure’ also erupted in Germany as fears of political isolation emerged and the possibility of having contributed to violence in Yugoslavia was considered. German elites quickly tried to minimize the significance of the policy behavior by claiming that worries about aggressive behavior after reunification were exaggerated.


233 Habermas and Fischer were among the more notable critics.

234 Claiming that the united Germany’s energies would be spent rebuilding the East, Chancellor Kohl dismissed suggestions that Germany had any intention of seeking a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council, content with the fact, that the United Kingdom and France adequately represented European interests. At the same time, Kohl indicated that a newly expanded role stemmed from reunited Germany’s size and its position as “No. 1 in Europe in economic might” (Ibid.).
The behavior associated with a ‘natural’ role for Germany after the Cold War remained highly contested within the country. The need to show greater responsibility for global stability after reunification and to act commensurate with capabilities was widely acknowledged among elites and the public but what type of behavior this ‘normalization’ entailed was less clear. Against the backdrop of the domestic debate about future German responsibilities within international society, Europe’s worst violence since World War II began to unfold in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The Bosnian Civil War would dramatically illustrate and confirm the new threat perceptions held by policy-making elites. It was a prime example of the new security problems characterizing the more complex security environment arising after the end of the Cold War. The conflict would repeatedly test the network of European and global institutions addressing international conflict and play a substantial role in prompting the redefinition of strategies and missions of international institutions. As UN, NATO, OSCE and EU moved irrevocably towards the adoption of out-of-area missions, the obligations of member states including Germany, which was at the heart of this institutional structure, took on concrete form and the process of role socialization became much more intense. Increasingly, Germany would be called upon to contribute to multilateral peacekeeping missions in line with its economic and military wherewithal. The international community began to decisively reject the cultural or institutional argument that limited Germany’s contributions to the use of force. This would provide domestic role entrepreneurs with ample opportunities to promote the adaptation of role behavior.
The escalating horrors in Bosnia also shook the remaining support for a position of radical pacifism, particularly after the large scale violations of human rights committed in Žepa and Srebrenica. These atrocities empowered role entrepreneurs further by undermining the credibility of radical antimilitarism on the left and reducing the moral credibility of positions promoting the purely civilian role of the Federal Republic. Role entrepreneurs would effectively turn the accepted interpretation of Germany’s historical burden on its head by promoting the efficacy of force to help victims of genocide and by casting neutrality and antimilitarism as accessory to crime. This was both tricky yet ultimately effective within the Balkan context with its strong historical association with previous German aggression.\(^{235}\)

The effect of the Bosnia civil war on German views on the efficacy of force and subsequent possibilities for security policy reorientation was significant. The policy challenge represented the final stage in policy reorientation towards the renewed adoption of the use of force. Other actions would follow by which troops would eventually conduct combat and even secret missions in faraway places such as Afghanistan. The beginning of the Bosnian civil war found German elites generally adhering to the traditional civilian power role in which a military role for Germany besides territorial defense was generally rejected as unthinkable for reasons of history and strategic culture. By the time of the Dayton Accords in 1995, Germany had provided soldiers for

\(^{235}\) Parliamentary elites agreed on the importance of the historical burden during the out-of-area debate. Germany’s first steps in contributing to humanitarian missions outside of its territory were in Iraq, Cambodia and later Somalia. There areas were considered untainted by the burden of history. The deployment of troops on the territory of the former Yugoslavia, however, produced additional problems for it had been invaded and occupied by the Wehrmacht during World War II. Even members of the cabinet were hesitant about intervention in the Balkans even though they were inclined to accept increased responsibility. The cabinet consensus on avoiding intervention in the Balkans was informally referred to as the Kohl Doctrine.
monitoring missions, contributed Luftwaffe Tornado fighter jets that had engaged in bombing missions over Bosnia and through its support of NATO’s implementation force (IFOR), deployed ground troops outside of German territory for the first time since World War II. During the IFOR vote on December 6, 1995, 543 out of 656 parliamentarians voted in favor of German participation to enforce the Dayton Peace Accords. This was widely perceived to be a historical turning point in Germany’s foreign policy. It signaled the completion of post-war Germany’s rehabilitation into the community of nations (Ramet and Coffin 2001, 55). Germany left behind its non-military identity as an international actor (Zehfuss 2001, 32).

The following chapter will present the context of the Bosnian civil war and the international response, the concretization of strategic doctrines and the behavioral expectations this generated. Social pressure on German elites and the reactions of domestic role entrepreneurs are investigated next with particular emphasis on the way in which role entrepreneurs used foreign expectations to persuade others that maintaining the country’s role as predictable and reliable partner required role adaptation. The domestic concerns of parliamentary elites and coalesce of these concerns on the basis of external expectations are addressed. As in previous chapters, German strategic culture is investigated for any notable changes.

236 PB 13/76, December 6, 1995, 6673-5; Ramet and Coffin 2001, 55.

237 The journal Focus used the headline ‘At the Rubicon’ to underscore the significance of the vote for the Bosnia Deployment: The journal wrote that “step by step, the population and the army are being led to the threshold of combat missions” (“Am Rubikon”, Focus, December 22, 1995).
The Bosnian Civil War and the International Response

Hostilities in Croatia ended in spring 1992 when Serbs and Croatians honored a ceasefire negotiated in The Hague in November 1991. Cyrus Vance was able to expand the agreement into a comprehensive truce monitored by the United Nations. The ethnic atrocities committed and the hitherto unthinkable levels of violence of the conflict had ruptured the sense of continuity of the old Yugoslavia. Nowhere had this been felt more severely than in the heart of Yugoslavia, the multiethnic province of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

In 1991, Bosnia-Herzegovina constituted an ethnic mosaic made up of 43.7 percent Moslem, 31.4 Serb, 17.3 percent Croat and 5.5 percent Yugoslav (Cohen 1995, 241). Ethnic concentrations existed with Serb enclaves surrounding a generally Muslim center. Frequently, however, the different ethnic and religious groups lived side-by-side with Sarajevo being a multiethnic city characterized by fairly advanced levels of integration. However, anxiety and distrust between the groups had increased steadily with the intensification of interethnic hostilities in Croatia. During the six months following Croat and Slovenian secession and the states’ subsequent recognition, the leader of Bosnia, Alija Izetbegović had warned repeatedly that the fragmentation of Yugoslavia and the international recognition of its individual parts would spell disaster for multiethnic Bosnia-Herzegovina. That it would, should have been clear to all parties observing the drift into the abyss of total ethnic war: The international community had followed Germany’s leadership in recognizing Croatia without establishing adequate protections for the sizable Serb minority located in the republic’s Krajina region. Nationalists in Croatia and Serbia had openly declared their territorial ambitions in
Bosnia with Croatia issuing an economic blockade and supporting the formation of an army among autonomous Croats in Western Herzegovina (Woodward 1995, 276). Autonomous Serbs had declared regional governments in at least four areas (Ibid.). Lastly, interethnic hostilities including barricading and sporadic assassinations had been occurring throughout the summer and fall of 1991.

Map 1: Ethnic Composition of Bosnia Herzegovina Prior to the Civil War (Source: Wikipedia Commons)

Repeatedly failing to secure support for a plan based on the continued existence of Yugoslavia as a loose federation of independent states and faced with the realities of

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238 US ambassador Zimmermann (1996, 181-184) learned in his meetings with Tudjman that the Croatian leader’s territorial claims to Bosnia were based on the rejection of Bosnia’s legal right to exist since it had been formed under communist rule. In addition, he justified the partition of the state between Croatia and Bosnia by conjuring up the paranoid claim of the rise an Islamic fundamentalist state threatening the region.

239 Woodward (1995, 277) claims that in October, 1991, both the Yugoslav leadership which was now dominated by Serbia, as well as the government in Sarajevo repeatedly appealed to the UN for monitors in Bosnia to stop ethnic violence from terrorist gangs in the villages of eastern Bosnia.
Croat and Slovenian independence, Alija Izetbegović began to embrace the idea of independence of an undivided Bosnia by the autumn of 1991.\textsuperscript{240} This objective clashed with that of the Serb minority which feared being reduced to minority status in what they considered to be their own state. Serbs in Bosnia considered their link with Serbia as guarantee of their ethnic survival and political freedom.

In October 1991, Muslim and Croat legislators, over Serb protests, decided to initiate the process leading to Bosnian independence by approving documents allowing for secession (Cohen 1995, 241). In December, Bosnia under President Izetbegović formally sought EEC recognition as independent state. An important consideration in the hurry towards independence had been the establishment of a one-week window during which the European Community would consider requests for recognition (Woodward 1995, 276).\textsuperscript{241} In compliance with EEC rules governing recognition of break-away provinces of Yugoslavia, a referendum was held in February 1992 in which Muslims and Croats overwhelmingly supported independence. The vote was boycotted by Bosnia’s Serbs. Interethnic violence flared up in March following an attack on a Serb wedding in Sarajevo and quickly spread throughout the province (Cohen 1995, 242). On March 3, 1992, the Bosnian parliament declared independence without the support of the Serb party and its leader, Radovan Karadžić. On April 7, 1992, Serb party representatives on the Bosnian collective presidency resigned and an assembly composed of Serb SDS and SPO parliamentarians proclaimed the independence of a Serb republic in Bosnia

\textsuperscript{240} On March 16, 1991, Milošević declared Serbia to be independent during a television address.

\textsuperscript{241} Woodward (1995, 278) considers this to have been a major mistake. One week was too little time to make such a momentous decision for a deeply divided political entity.
In July of that year, a separate Croatian entity in Bosnia, aided by Croatia was also proclaimed. In spite of the escalating violence and the questions that should have been raised about the viability of the Bosnian state, the European Community recognized Bosnia on April 6, 1992 with the US following suit the following day.\footnote{Preoccupied with the situation in Croatia, the European Community had largely ignored events in Bosnia until January and February 1992. The Badinter Arbitration commission had been mostly concerned with questions of human rights and democratic standards in the new republics that were beginning to replace Yugoslavia. Among the provisions governing recognition established by the commission were requirements of constitutional guarantees for human rights and referendums on independence.\footnote{It did not help international relations with Serbia that the recognition date fell on the anniversary of the Nazi bombing of Belgrade in 1941.}}

Preoccupied with the situation in Croatia, the European Community had largely ignored events in Bosnia until January and February 1992. The Badinter Arbitration commission had been mostly concerned with questions of human rights and democratic standards in the new republics that were beginning to replace Yugoslavia. Among the provisions governing recognition established by the commission were requirements of constitutional guarantees for human rights and referendums on independence.\footnote{Although the commission specifically found in regards to Bosnia, that referenda should include ‘respectable numbers’ from all three major ethnic groups within the province (Woodward 1995, 280).}

Germany’s unilateral recognition of Croatia and Slovenia and the wave of recognitions the action prompted set a dangerous precedent for the international recognition of national sovereignty even in the absence of a resolution of fundamental questions of national identity. Viewing sovereignty in terms of national identity which, in turn was linked to territory, the European Union brokered a peace agreement between Muslim, Serb and Croat groups in Lisbon in March 1992 that divided Bosnia into three separate territorial units and provided for power sharing between the groups (Cohen 1995, 243). However, the agreement fell apart within weeks when Izetbegović reneged, suddenly concerned about the issue of territorial division. Croatian leader Mate Boban also rejected
the accord because he saw a possibility for his group to gain additional territory in new talks (Woodward 1995, 281).

Violence between the groups erupted into full-fledged civil war as the April 6 recognition date drew near. The Bosnian government had ordered a general mobilization of National Guard troops and reserves in preparation for a Serb attack on Sarajevo which took place on April 5 when Serb forces began shelling the city from the surrounding hills. A number of Bosnian and international observers had called for the UN to make Bosnia a protectorate in order to stop the escalation. However, the new Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali had concluded that conditions were not appropriate for UN involvement (Woodward 1995, 285). In June, Boutros-Ghali further expressed his view that the position of the UN as conflict management after the Cold War being foremost the responsibility of regional organizations. The UN did establish a presence in Sarajevo—UNPROFOR, which was actually the headquarters for the mission in Croatia, the implementation of which had been delayed due to wrangling by state governments over the financing of the operation. This mission was soon forced to address the situation in Bosnia but its size was dramatically reduced as fighting intensified. Overall, the international community had begun to view the violence in Bosnia as a civil war in which inviolably borders were given priority and only humanitarian aid should be provided. In any case, the United States, the United Kingdom and France were not inclined to commit troops to pacify the situation.

244 It is unclear why Izetbegović reneged on the agreement so soon. Cohen (1995, 243) offers a range of possible explanations.
International diplomatic pressure mounted on the warring groups as a humanitarian catastrophe of a scale not seen since World War II rapidly unfolded. As heavy fighting ensured, even the International Red Cross was forced to pull out of the province and a stream of refugees began to leave the province for safer countries in Europe. Even though the UN deployed a small force of about 1100 troops from Croatia in June to open the airport of Sarajevo for humanitarian purposes, overall the number of international monitors in Bosnia dramatically declined.

Yugoslavia, now composed of just Serbia and Montenegro, was increasingly seen by many countries as the villain in the escalating Bosnian civil war. Serbia was directly and indirectly aiding the Bosnian Serbs who had begun to conduct an utterly repugnant campaign of ethnic cleansing in eastern Bosnia. The United States took the lead in seeking harsh international measures against Serbia. Severe economic sanctions were imposed on the country in the end of May 1992 and in November, the UN Security Council imposed a no-fly zone over Bosnia designed to keep the Serb air force from aiding Bosnian Serb forces. The first serious enforcement of the no-fly zone by NATO planes began in March 1993 with Operation Deny Flight. The monitoring mission required the use of NATO AWACS planes and naval forces. Later that year, the United Nations provided protection under Chapter 7 of its charter to so-called safe havens starting with Srebrenica.

During the escalating civil war, a number of peace talks were sponsored by multilateral institutions.\textsuperscript{245} The most notable of the early efforts to achieve peace was the

\textsuperscript{245} The first multilateral attempts at resolving the situation within Bosnia took place in Brussels on March 30 and 31, in Sarajevo on April 12 and in Lisbon at the end of April 1992.
Vance-Owen Plan from spring 1993 which proposed a division of the Bosnia into ten semi-autonomous cantons with an ethnic power-sharing type of government. This plan was soon rejected by the Bosnian Serbs who favored a firm territorial and administrative division, thereby rejected the membership in any potential multiethnic entity. A key issue explaining the failure of the many attempts at conflict resolution was confusion over leadership. Individual actors including the United States, France and even Germany and the UN, OSCE and the EU would repeatedly initiate some kind of action involving mediation or the coordination of relief efforts aimed at addressing the humanitarian disaster but leadership from the international community would prove to be sporadic without conviction or follow-through. Woodward blames this on a general absence of a major powers’ strategic interests in the region as well as the as-yet underdeveloped nature of conflict resolution institutions and mechanisms after the Cold War.246 Another issue was the ever-changing power constellation between the fighting groups. The constant fluctuation in relative group power must have influenced the pay-off matrixes of ethnic negotiators, determining their preferences for compliance with or defection from agreements.247

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246 Bosnia was fully contained within former Yugoslavia. The fact that the state did not share borders with outside states like Greece reduced the destabilizing impact of the refugee crisis and the fighting. This was a very different situation from the one that would develop in Kosovo in 1999 where there were significant security implications for neighboring countries (Woodward 1995, 316-25).

247 For instance, the initial arms embargo against Bosnia had the effect of reducing Muslim power, the no-fly zone established over Bosnia and later NATO airstrikes against Serb positions reduced Bosnian Serb capabilities, the fluctuating military allegiance of the Bosnian Croats controlling an area they called the state of Herceg-Bosna and the vacillating support offered Croatia and Serbia for the parties in of the conflict which was itself a function of international pressure or lack thereof. Finally, international arms embargoes of Serbia and Montenegro also affected relative power.
And so Europe worst violence since World War II continued on. The year 1993 saw major territorial gains by Izetbegović’s Bosnian Army against the Croat forces. These losses would soon compel the Bosnian Croats to question the tutelage of their supporter Tudjman in Croatia and open the door for an alliance with the government in Sarajevo. The bloody civil war would grab the international headlines again in the spring of 1994 when a mortar shot fired into a market square in Sarajevo killed 68 people and wounded many more. The incident prompted NATO to force the Bosnian Serbs to end the siege of Sarajevo. In May of 1994, fresh mediation efforts led to the establishment of a contact group comprised of representatives from the United States, Britain, France, Germany, Italy and Russia. Under the leadership of the United States, the group was to work out a general peace agreement between the newly formed Bosnian-Croat federation and the Bosnian Serbs but it failed its first major test when the Serbs rejected the plan (Burg and Shoup 2000, 322). The rejection of the plan accelerated a growing rift between the Bosnian Serbs and their protector in Serbia, President Milošević, who decided to break off relations on August 4, 1994 (Ibid., 309).

In July 1995, the hitherto unrivaled levels of brutality in post World War II Europe reached yet new stages in abject human depravity when Bosnian Serb forces overran the UN declared safe areas of Srebrenica and Žepa, two of four remaining Muslim enclaves in the ethnically cleansed eastern Bosnian Serb corridor. In Srebrenica, thousands were murdered in what became the largest mass murder in Europe since World War II. With that, the international community finally had had enough and in August and September 1995, NATO conducted a major bombing campaign against Bosnian Serb positions called Operation Deliberate Force. That summer, the Serbs were also
experiencing major military and territorial losses against the Bosnian-Croat Federation and in Croatia, where a newly trained and equipped Croat army emerged as an effective fighting force. Serb resistance in Croatia’s Krajina was quickly crushed and the majority of the Serb population expelled from the region. The various military and alliance developments in the crisis set the stage for the final diplomatic effort to end the hostilities. In November 1995, President Clinton invited all parties to the conflict to Dayton, Ohio in November 1995 where they negotiated a lasting peace agreement. After the peace accords were formally signed in Paris in December 1995, the three and a half year long civil war finally came to an end.

The German Response to the Civil War in Bosnia

Germany initially remained relatively reticent during the escalation of the war in Bosnia, ceding the diplomatic initiative to other powers like the United States, France and the United Kingdom. International criticism of the prominent role the country had played during the recognition of Croatia and Slovenia had had a stinging effect (Duffield 1998, 212; Maull 1995, 105; Ramet and Coffin 2001, 53). A number of international observers and negotiators were quick to blame German pro-recognition diplomacy for the international rush to recognize Bosnia which, in their opinion, caused the ethnic powder keg to ignite (for instance, Horsley 1992; Zimmermann 1996). When the issue of lifting the arms embargo on Bosnia-Herzegovina caused controversies between European states in 1992, German Foreign Minister Kinkel declared: “No matter what, there will be no unilateral German decision …”.248

248 Quoted in Axt 1993, 354.
But major issues developed that forced the hand of the government. The first one was the humanitarian catastrophe unfolding at an alarming rate which dramatically increased the number of refugees arriving in Germany. By July 1992, Foreign Minister Kinkel\textsuperscript{249} reported to parliament that the country had taken in about 200,000 refugees from the former Yugoslavia with 140,000 requesting asylum (Kinkel, PB 12/101, July 22, 1992, 8610). The Federal Republic began to contribute aid to address the situation, promised to take in specific numbers of refugees from Bosnia and the Luftwaffe contributed two of the transport planes for the humanitarian air lift operation to Sarajevo.\textsuperscript{250} The government also advanced a quota system for the European distribution of refugees at an EC summit of foreign ministers although it received little support for this position (Woodward 1995, 295).

The second major foreign policy issue arose from the growing conviction among the international community that Serbia and Montenegro were chiefly to blame for the escalating violence. On May 30, 1992, the United Nations Security Council adopted resolutions 713 and 757 which established harsh military and economic sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro. The Federal Republic strongly supported the sanctions\textsuperscript{251} because parliamentary elites shared the view that Milošević’s Serb government was

\textsuperscript{249} Germany’s longest-serving Foreign Minister Genscher departed from the scene in mid-May 1992. He was succeeded by Klaus Kinkel from the FDP. Kinkel had been Minister of Justice for a year prior to his appointment and would maintain Genscher’s foreign policy stance.

\textsuperscript{250} Kinkel estimated the amount of humanitarian assistance payments rendered by July at 57.6 Million along with an additional 92 million provided as part of EC contributions (PB 12/101, July 22, 1992, 8610).

\textsuperscript{251} PB 12/101, July 22, 1992, 8609.
primarily to blame for the violence. When NATO and WEU began to enforce the sanctions through air and sea patrols in the Adriatic Sea, Germany faced allied pressure to contribute militarily (Duffield 1998, 195). The Kohl government dispatched a destroyer and three marine patrol aircraft. The action sparked a major debate in the Bundestag indicating that parliamentary elites were as yet divided about the future military role of the country. However, the Bundestag did pass a resolution supporting government actions with the limitation that further actions in this regard would require the consultation of parliament. When the United Nations Security Council approved the interception and searches of ships violating the sanctions in November 1992, neither Defense Minister Rühe nor Foreign Minister Kinkel thought it politically feasible to push the parliament beyond monitoring missions. Even though they were willing to comply with foreign expectations and also saw major diplomatic and political advantages of such compliance, they chose to not pursue the normative agenda given political realities. This indicates that interests constantly influence the use and subsequent evolution of normative standards. However, the country’s failure to comply with NATO expectation prompted a new round of international criticism (Duffield 1998, 196).

When the UN Security Council imposed a no-fly zone over Bosnia in October 1992 with the possibility of NATO AWACS planes being called upon to monitor the airspace above former Yugoslavia, Germany was again confronted with international

252 Kinkel used the following words in parliament to explain the origins of the violence in Bosnia: “These are the methods and the aims with which the Serb extremism is fighting this war…the shadow is falling upon the entire Serb nation which is allowing this to be done in their name…the responsibility for this war and especially the means by which it is fought rests predominantly with Serbia’s military and political leadership…” (PB 12/101, July 22, 1992, 8608).

253 Initially, the destroyer “Bayern” was deployed which served in the Mediterranean as part of routine NATO operations. It was relieved by the frigate “Niedersachsen” on July 31, 1992.
expectations of contributing to the military mission. In this case, participation was considered vital to the success of the monitoring operation because more than a quarter of the highly trained flight crews were German.254 The UN Security Council decision to enforce the ban in March 1993 caused a major controversy in parliament and more importantly, among the cabinet elites themselves. Even though AWACS planes perform non-combat surveillance missions, their information is relayed to command centers or fighter pilots and could lead to decisions involving the use of force against aircraft violating the no-fly zone. In addition, the planes themselves could be attacked, placing their German crews in danger.

The resulting parliamentary controversy over whether to leave German flight crews on the AWACS planes created major strains within the government coalition. CDU politicians supported the move while FDP politicians continued Genscher’s tradition of rejecting any use of force. Members of the opposition parties as well, opposed any change in Germany’s long-standing policy of not participating in international actions, including multilateral ones that could involve the use of military force. Squeezed simultaneously by international expectations to contribute to the enforcement of the flight ban and domestic pressures for continuity in policy, cabinet elites devised a rather clever if politically embarrassing solution: The cabinet voted to support the mission by leaving German flight crews on the AWACs planes while the FDP Bundestag faction filed for an injunction with the Constitutional Court to stop participation. In effect, the government was filing suit against itself. The court was quick to render its verdict which it pointed out

254 Maull (1995, 110) provides a number of 161 out of 620 AWACS plane crew members and up to a third of all personnel for some functions.
addressed this particular government decision only. It let the cabinet action stand, rejecting the request for an injunction. As a powerful indication of the importance of external expectations for German domestic processes and controversies, the court found that “a loss of confidence by the allies and all European neighbors would be unavoidable, and the resulting damage irreparable”. Thus, the court considered alliance solidarity to be more important than a potential violation of constitutional principles. The court also found that future missions required parliamentary approval (Ramet and Coffin 2001, 53).

When the UNSC decided to enforce the flight ban with resolution 816 on March 31, 1993, German AWAC crews participated in the monitoring missions.

The next important challenge on the path to German security policy reorientation occurred in December 1994, when the German government was confronted with a request by the NATO commander in Europe, General George Joulwan, for aerial support (Ibid., 54). The request constituted a significant escalation in the demands for an increased German military role because of the possibility of German pilots getting involved in air-to-air and air-to-ground combat. In addition, the deployment of sophisticated fighter jets like the Tornado would require the accompaniment of logistical as well as combat-ready support units.

Amid parliamentary disagreements, the government announced that it had agreed to the deployment of six to eight jets by the end of the year (Ramet and Coffin 2001, 54).

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255 The court did not rule on the constitutionality of the missions but rather on the political consequences of upholding or denying the request for an injunction by the FDP Bundestag faction. Indicative of the moral and value-based struggle going on between the elites, the court considered the negative consequences of allowing German flight crews to remain on board the AWAC planes to be smaller than the potential for violating the constitution. The court’s willingness to risk violating the constitution demonstrates the power of external role expectations in the elite debate about foreign policy reorientation (Der Spiegel, April 4, 1993).
The move was strongly opposed by the SPD with vice chairman Oskar Lafontaine rejecting NATO’s role as the world’s policemen as incommensurable with German foreign policy (Interview in Spiegel/Reuters, January 2, 1995) and federal manager Verheugen categorically ruling out the use of the Bundeswehr (Reuters, February 22, 1995). The deployment was eventually approved by parliament on June 30, 1995 by a narrow majority.256

In the fall of 1995, a lasting peace agreement for Bosnia finally became a distinct possibility. The peace would have to be enforced by UN and NATO forces. In September 1995, Foreign Minister Kinkel indicated that Germany might be part of such a peacekeeping mission and that the United Nations had asked Germany to contribute to such an operation.257 Military contributions to the force protecting the Dayton Peace Accords represented the final link in the chain of escalating German participation in extraterritorial missions. When parliament voted with a vast majority supporting the action in December 1995, German security policy had effectively been reoriented from its non-military character to the support of out-of-area mission with the possibility of both inflicting and taking casualties. The parliamentary and extra-parliamentary discourse surrounding German contributions to the 50,000 strong NATO peacekeeping force (IFOR) enforcing the Dayton Accords would prove decisive in establishing a new policy context enabling the use of military force for future governments.

256 During the Bundestag vote on June 30, 1995, 258 of the parliamentarians opposed the action (Focus, December 22, 1995).

257 In Welt am Sonntag, September 24, 1995, quoted in Ramet and Coffin 2001, 54. The government tried to delay the decision to deploy troops but foreign pressure was strong, particularly from France. The French foreign minister Herve de Charette had in effect preempted the German decision by announcing that France was going to send the German-French Eurocorps to the Balkans (Der Spiegel, October 10, 1995, 36b-37a).
Table 4: The Role Episode of the Bosnian Civil War 1992-1995: Important Events

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>January 15: EC recognizes Croatia and Slovenia</td>
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<td></td>
<td>February: Referendum in Bosnia in support of independence, Serbs abstain</td>
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<td></td>
<td>March 3: Bosnian parliament declares independence over Serb objections</td>
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<td></td>
<td>May 30: Economic sanctions enforced against Serbia; Germany deploys Navy</td>
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<td></td>
<td>July 3: Sarajevo airlift begins; German planes participate</td>
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<td></td>
<td>October 9: UN imposes no-fly zone over Bosnia; German AWACs crews participate</td>
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<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>March 16: Bundestag debates German responsibilities to global society and alliance</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>April 12: Constitutional Court rules that AWAC deployment is constitutional</td>
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<td></td>
<td>March 31: Operation Deny Flight commences</td>
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<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>April 26: Formation of the Contact Group</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>July 12: Constitutional Court rules ‘out-of-area’ missions as constitutional</td>
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<td></td>
<td>December: NATO formally requests German aerial support, Kohl cabinet consents</td>
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<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>June 30: Bundestag approves Tornado deployment, SPD objects but party discipline breaks down with many members voting for the action</td>
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<td>Summer: Fischer writes open letter to Green Party advocating use of force</td>
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<td></td>
<td>November: Dayton Conference</td>
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<td></td>
<td>December 2-3: Green Party congress rejects potential military role in Bosnia</td>
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<td></td>
<td>December 6: Bundestag debates and approves German military contribution for IFOR</td>
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<td></td>
<td>December 14: Dayton Peace Accord signed, IFOR deployment commences</td>
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</table>

Role Expectations and Social Pressure

The period between 1992 and 1995 would prove decisive in altering international conceptions of security that had existed during the Cold War. It was during this time that the debate about the future of NATO was settled in favor of maintaining the organization, expanding its reach by incorporating former members of the Warsaw Pact in Eastern Europe and to redirect the emphasis of its missions from territorial defense to rapid reaction and out-of-area missions designed to address instabilities arising from the less
structured security environment of the Post-Cold War era. NATO’s important London summit of July 1990 had already characterized the new security threats as

multi-faceted in nature and multi-directional... hard to predict and assess...less likely to result from calculated aggression against the territory of the Allies, but rather from the adverse consequences of instabilities that may arise from the serious economic, social and political difficulties, including ethnic rivalries and territorial disputes.\(^{258}\)

The new Strategic Concept articulated the goal of creating multinational rapid reaction forces to support the increasing scope of United Nations peacekeeping missions pursued in accordance with Chapter VII of its charter.\(^ {259}\) The Rome Summit of November 1991 was also very significant in the process of “the Alliance's transformation and … [the redefinition] … of its role and missions in the new Europe” (Wörner 1991). This was followed by a declaration to contribute to peacekeeping operations under the auspices of the CSCE at the May 1992 Ministerial Meeting of the Defence Planning Committee and the Nuclear Planning Group (Baumann 2001, 165). The Brussels summit of January 1994 again affirmed NATO’s willingness to conduct out-of-area missions within the limits of mandates established UN or CSCE.\(^ {260}\) The European Union pursued a similar course of action as indicated by the members’ concerted efforts at elevating the European Political


\(^{259}\) Ibid., Paragraphs 46 and 47.

\(^{260}\) Article No. 7 of the Brussels Summit Declaration from January 11, 1994 reads. “In pursuit of our common transatlantic security requirements, NATO increasingly will be called upon to undertake missions in addition to the traditional and fundamental task of collective defence of its members, which remains a core function. We reaffirm our offer to support, on a case by case basis in accordance with our own procedures, peacekeeping and other operations under the authority of the UN Security Council or the responsibility of the CSCE, including by making available Alliance resources and expertise. Participation in any such operation or mission will remain subject to decisions of member states in accordance with national constitutions” (NATO On-Line Library, http://www.nato.int/docu/basicxt/b940111a.htm, accessed February 6, 2009).
Cooperation procedure which had existed since the 1970s to the level of Common Foreign and Security Policy and by revitalizing the Brussels Pact organization Western European Union.

The Maastricht Declaration on the Western European Union from February 7, 1992 noted that “WEU Member States agree on the need to develop a genuine European security and defence identity and a greater European responsibility on defence matters”. These new responsibilities were defined more thoroughly at the important Petersberg meeting on June 19, 1992 which took place at roughly the same time as the dramatic escalation of the Civil War in Bosnia. The meeting led to the establishment and declaration of the so-called Petersberg Tasks which involved developing the capabilities to rapidly deploy–mobile forces for peacekeeping missions in response to the “significant changes that had taken place in the security situation in Europe since [the] last regular meeting in November 1991” (Petersberg Declaration, art. 1).

WEU Secretary-General Jose Cutileiro later considered this time period to be crucial for the formation of a real operational role for the organization in defining new missions, such as crisis management and peacekeeping, that “matched the specific challenges of the Post-Cold War world” (Cutileiro 1995). A draft recommendation of the EU’s Political Committee on European Security Policy from 1993 also emphasized the range of domestic instabilities now being

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262 “The WEU seeks to develop its operational capabilities, the effective implementation of conflict-prevention and crisis-management measures, including peacekeeping activities of the CSCE or the United Nations Security Council” (Petersberg Declaration, art. 2).
perceived to be the primary security threats after the Cold War.\footnote{“European Security Policy”, Draft Recommendation on European Security Policy, Submitted on behalf of the Political Committee by Mr. Marshall, Rapporteur. 24th May, 1993. http://www.cec.lu/pub/history/military/a-weu/document (accessed on April 22, 1996).} Thus, threat perceptions established a decisive and permanent basis for the need of new roles for international institutions and their missions that would address the regional insecurities emerging after the Cold War. The new missions required new capabilities and member contributions leading to the definition of new actor responsibilities or behavioral scripts. The meaning of alliance responsibility now shifted towards actors’ embrace and contributions to NATO non-article V missions. The old meaning of responsibility that had been associated with contributions to territorial defense was no longer applicable.

For Germany, the new emphasis on extraterritorial deployment of combat-ready troops produced significant tensions not only because of the antimilitarism associated with the civilian power role but, perhaps more importantly, because German elites were critically involved in the process of redefining the raison d’être and mission objectives of NATO, the OSCE, and the European Union. Elites supported this process both because they shared the prevailing threat conceptions and because they wanted for Germany to remain a predictable and calculable actor. The concretization of standards and state obligations in conjunction with the escalating Bosnian crisis dramatically increased the social pressure on German elites to comply with the expectations to play a more prominent role which included the acceptance of the use of force.

The Bosnian civil war caused the steady trickle of pleas for greater German involvement to turn into a torrent of requests which increased the foreign pressure on elites to adapt German role behavior. Foreign leaders attempting to resolve the Bosnian
crisis became increasingly less tolerant of Germany’s antimilitary culture and traditions which they viewed as anachronistic or as an excuse for inaction. During a visit to Bonn in January 1993, UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali repeatedly and publicly called for full German participation in the entire range of United Nations missions, arguing that without an unrestricted German contribution the UN would be unable to fulfill its tasks.\(^{264}\) US Secretary of State Warren Christopher also called on Germany to increase its support of NATO initiatives (Lantis 2002a, 93). In a closed meeting with SPD leaders in January 1995, fellow social democrat from Norway and chief Bosnia negotiator Thorvald Stoltenberg could hardly conceal his impatience and frustrations with German attitudes regarding the use of force when he argued that nobody abroad understood the internal discussion about the deployment of Tornado fighter jets. Since Germany had the military means, it should use them.\(^{265}\) NATO commanders, including General George Joulwan, repeatedly requested German aerial support in the fall of 1994 (Ramet and Coffin 2001, 54; Zehfuss 2002, 30). Pressure to conform to expectations came from President Clinton who, during a state visit to Germany in July 1994 said: “I do not see how Germany, the third-biggest economic nation in the world, can escape a leadership role…[it] has no other choice but to assume a leadership role. Germany cannot withdraw from its responsibility”.\(^{266}\) Foreign leaders also used peer pressure in an attempt to convince German elites to get more involved. For instance, when Chancellor Kohl tried to delay the decision to deploy German troops in the fall of 1995, France’s foreign minister Herve

\(^{264}\) FAZ, January 12, 1993.


\(^{266}\) SZ, July 4, 1994.
de Charette asked his counterpart during a short visit “are you ready?” after which he officially announced that France was going to send the ‘German-French’ Eurocorps to the Balkans.\textsuperscript{267}

Effective social pressure to change Germany’s stance on the use of force also came from members of the parliamentary elite who, through the country’s enmeshment in international institutions, were actively involved in the process of restructuring international security organizations after the Cold War. Foremost among them was NATO’s influential Secretary General, Manfred Wörner\textsuperscript{268} who became one of the chief advocates of the organization’s regional stabilization role and the development of rapid reaction forces deployable for out-of-area missions.\textsuperscript{269} Advocating a forceful and militant stance in Bosnia, Wörner repeatedly criticized non-interventionist attitudes in the United States and Europe.\textsuperscript{270} Concerned about the effectiveness of NATO’s new mission objectives he himself had advocated, the CDU politician applied public and personal pressure to increase German participation in an effort to bolster NATO capabilities.\textsuperscript{271}

SPD politician Hartmut Soell, who held the post of Secretary General of the assembly of

\textsuperscript{267} Der Spiegel, October 10, 1995, 36b-37a.

\textsuperscript{268} Manfred Wörner was NATO Secretary General from 1988 – 1994. His impact on the alliance was significant. Hendrickson concludes that “Analysts of NATO who attempt to explain the alliance’s transformation without giving some attention to the Secretaries General…in Wörner’s case, have missed a critical leader who helped shape NATO’s post-Cold War mission in the Balkans” (Hendrickson 2004, 524).

\textsuperscript{269} In a speech to the National Press Club in July 1993, Wörner stated with conviction that “we cannot afford passivity…if we are surrounded by chaos…NATO’s job was to prevent major crisis, address new kinds of [security] risks and prevent Europe from sliding back”.

\textsuperscript{270} In a speech in Rome, Wörner stated that “we all wish that diplomatic means alone would succeed. But diplomacy needs to be backed up with a determination to use force if it is to be credible…As Frederick the Great used to say: Diplomacy without the sword is like music without instruments” (Speech at the Centro Alti Studi Difese, Rome, May 10, 1993. Quoted in Hendrickson 2004, 515).

\textsuperscript{271} Interview in SZ, quoted in Duffield 1998, 339 (footnotes). Wörner also issued an official request for military assistance in July 1992 to monitor the embargo against Serbia and Montenegro (Lantis 2002a, 89).
the WEU during the time of the Petersberg Declaration, also promoted greater
international engagement of the Federal Republic within his own party.\textsuperscript{272} Hans
Koschnick from the SPD who served as EU Administrator in Mostar implored fellow
party members to not remain passive as troops from allied countries incurred
casualties.\textsuperscript{273}

The requests coming from national leaders, heads of important security
organizations and chief negotiators in Bosnia as well as from Germans involved in
international security organizations created significant social pressure on German elites to
support military operations in Bosnia unless they risked being seen as unreliable partners.
As such, the requests coming from important actors and over a significant period of time
constituted a kind of socialization process aimed at changing German foreign policy
behavior. Allied leaders reminded Germany of its responsibilities on the basis of the
country’s extraordinary capabilities within the system. To further increase social
pressure, they treated Germany as if it had already embraced the desired role.\textsuperscript{274}

\textbf{Role Conceptions and Contestation}

The foreign policy challenges of the Bosnian Civil War strongly underscored the
conflict between external role expectations and the domestic debate about what that role
and its conduct should be given the strong desire to remain true to the civilian power role

\textsuperscript{272} Soell had opposed a policy of neutrality towards Yugoslavia. He had called for a European security
order and the creation of safe areas in Bosnia at a time when many SPD members were not willing to
follow that course (\textit{Sozialdemokratischer Pressedienst} 48/124, July 5, 1993, 1-2).


\textsuperscript{274} Wendt uses the term ‘altercasting’, to denote a social process by which one actor induces another actor
to take on a new identity by treating that actor as if it already had that identity (1999, 326-332).
conceptions that had characterized the country since World War II. Conservative elites promoted the adaptation of role behavior towards that of a ‘normal’ great power. A normal state was perceived as one that accepted its “natural role in the great distribution of capabilities dutifully and rationally” (Bach 1999, 78). Normal states had the right to autonomously develop their national interests which they were free to pursue and maintain through a variety of means including the use of force. Normal states were characterized by national pride and ‘healthy’ patriotism (Kohl, PB 12/5, January 30, 1991, 90). Conservative and liberal role promoters presented Germany as a great power in a new context where power was freed from its traditional association with brutality and arbitrariness (Willkür) and instead was seen as logically associated with actor responsibility (Bach 1999, 79). The normalization of Germany’s role behavior was promoted as necessary for the country to remain a predictable and reliable ally. In Kinkel’s words: “by contributing to the international peace force, Germany has gained a degree of normality…Germany is practicing responsibility and joint responsibility” (PB 13/76, December 6, 1995, 6650). CDU foreign policy spokesperson Lamers wrote in April 1991 that if Germany “were to act oblivious to her power this would be irresponsible and raise mistrust, and that Germany, without forgetting history, must move to being as normal as possible”. In 1996, Defense Minister Rühe would express his personal satisfaction over the fact that the country had given up Germany’s political and military special role which Germany had played for half a century due to its history; the later also serving as pretext for a policy after

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275 An example of normal state behavior in this conception would be the tendency of the United States to proclaim strategic interests in the form of doctrines about its national interests in other parts of the world.

unification which neither matched the realities of world politics, nor Germany’s new position and increased weight.  

In addition to invoking position and ‘weight’ within the system, conservatives also supported the argument of role adaptation through the notion of demonstrating solidarity with the “Euro-Atlantic community of shared values with a common fate.” Membership in that community was seen as coming with obligations. During the first IFOR debate in November 1995, CSU politician Theo Waigel reminded politicians that “for more than four decades, the freedom and peace of our country has been protected by our NATO friends”. Adopting the use of force as expected by friends and allies was presented as a way to preserve the traditional role based on the values of reliability, predictability and calculability. Not showing responsibility would risk diplomatic isolation through the divergence from expected role behavior. In effect, Germany would again be playing a ‘special’ role which had to be prevented at all costs (Kohl 2007, 569).

Along with solidarity, status considerations within the alliance also were important for conservatives with Defense Minister Rühe presenting German participation as a necessity lest the country risk compromising its position within the alliance or cause the alliance itself to fail and the chairman of the CDU/CSU parliamentary group

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277 Stichworte zur Sicherheitspolitik 3 (March 1997), 48.


279 In German: “Vergessen wir nicht: Seit über vier Jahrzehnten schützen unsere Freunde in der NATO die Freiheit und den Frieden unseres Landes” (Waigel, PB 13/74, November 30, 1995, 6654).

280 Practically all parliamentary elites were in agreement on preventing diplomatic isolation with the exception of members from the reformed communist party. PDS members rejected the need for Western integration including NATO membership and had even argued for relinquishing NATO membership.


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Schäuble arguing that Germany “would jeopardize its future and opportunities… if it was unable to show itself to be a reliable friend, partner and ally”.\textsuperscript{282} Newly elected President Roman Herzog, former chief justice of the constitutional court, presented a similar argument for increasing German responsibilities in a more insecure world in March 1995.\textsuperscript{283}

In his widely quoted and discussed speech on ‘the basic outlines of German Foreign Policy’, President Herzog rejected Fukuyama’s optimistic statement about the end of history and the rise of a liberal world order and instead, viewed the changes in the international environment as having brought about greater uncertainty. Enumerating security concerns such as “population explosion, climate change, poverty-induced migration, atomic smuggling, drug trafficking, fundamentalism of all shades, genocide, [and] the disintegration of domestic order”, the President viewed the evolving system as entailing greater security risks than that of the era of deterrence (Herzog 1998, 26). In response to greater uncertainty, the President advocated an active, involved and global role for Germany. Invoking traditional key values such as responsibility and solidarity he stated:

\textsuperscript{282} In German: “Deswegen würden wir unsere eigene Zukunft, unsere Möglichkeiten angesichts aller Umstände und aller denkbaren Entwicklungen und Gefährdungen… gefährden, wenn wir uns nicht in der Lage sehen würden, auch verläßliche Freunde, Partner, Verbündete zu sein” (Schäuble 1995, PB 13/48, June 30, 1995, 3970).

\textsuperscript{283} Speeches and statements by German Presidents constitute strong indicators of German role conceptions. The institution of the Federal Presidency is one of primarily symbolic importance. Presidents act above the fray of party politics – seeking to promote unity by seeking to develop a national consensus on important issues. In foreign policy, Presidents are free to engage abstract ideas about the course of foreign policy. In setting the national agenda, they are able to directly influence the range of foreign policy options and, among other courses of action, suggest reorientations. This speech is from March 13, 1995, given to the German Society for Foreign Affairs.
We have finished being a free rider\textsuperscript{284}; Germany is now a part of the concert of the great democracies, whether it wants to be or not, and if any one of these democracies stands back, it inevitably not only damages the others, but ultimately itself, as well (Herzog 1998, 27).

Further acknowledging special role-related responsibilities arising from the changed nature of the structure of the international system, Herzog stated that “the quality of our commitment must accord with our greater weight, for otherwise we will no longer be taken seriously in the world in the long run (Ibid. 29). The statement’s reference to the national interest as being taken seriously also indicates a strong desire to for equal status and prestige.\textsuperscript{285} Further pursuing this point, Herzog stated that “German interests and Germany’s share of responsibility for the world community thus largely coincide. And if we do not wish to be at the mercy of developments in world politics, we will have to play an active role in global domestic policy” (Ibid., 33).

An important element in Herzog’s speech was the implicit challenge to the civilian power role when Herzog stated that “the checkbook does not always suffice and that service at the risk of one’s life may one day be called for” (Ibid.). The President is clear that the appreciation of the efficacy of force is to be seen in the context of multilateral institutions such as NATO and in the interest of international peace and only as last resort after moral and economic means of influence had been exhausted (Ibid. 29).

\textsuperscript{284} The President used the terminology of ‘the end of riding on the car step’ (Ende des Trittbrettfahrens) which roughly translates into free riding but also indicates the desire to be in the car with all responsibilities including the right to steer the car.

\textsuperscript{285} Interestingly enough, Herzog (1998, 29) states that “neither the deployment of the Bundeswehr, nor a seat in the Security Council, should be status issues for Germany. We must focus on the substance of the problems alone”. Here, Herzog is making instrumental use of a normative argument. Not status-seeking is the goal but contributing to the resolution of problems arising from the new structure of international politics. It is reasonable to assume that status and prestige do represent important objectives in addition to contributing to the resolution of problems.
Elsewhere, he had insisted that the central foreign policy parameters of the Bonn Republic, defined as “moderation in style, predictability, preparedness for dialogue, and readiness for compromise, would not change under the Berlin Republic” (Ibid. 33). In conjunction with other passages however, in which the benefits of hard power are acknowledged we can infer him to have indicated a preference for the normalization of foreign policy.  

Conservative positions on normalization were shared to a considerable extent by their liberal-democratic coalition partners.

FDP politicians continued to cling to the rejection of force that was part of the traditional civilian power role and therefore insisted on legal clarification of the issue of Bundeswehr participation. However, party leaders including Foreign Minister Kinkel fully accepted the conservative argument of increasing responsibility as part of the Germany’s new role obligations. During the summer of 1992, Kinkel criticized the traditional German role, stating that the country could no longer behave like “an impotent dwarf”.  

In the minister’s situational brief on Yugoslavia presented to parliament on July 22, Kinkel argued that “in a world with an urgent need for international action, a constructive and active German contribution is required as well…the international political responsibility of the Federal Republic has grown since reunification”.  

Liberals also shared the conservative concern with status and reputation. For instance, Kinkel

286 We need a foreign policy that lacks snarling and bluster, but also one that is not tensely self-conscious either (Herzog 1998, 33).


288 In German: “In dieser Lage, da alle Welt einen dringenden internationalen Handlungsbedarf sieht, ist auch ein konstruktiver und aktiver deutscher Beitrag gefordert…Die internationale politische Verantwortung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland ist seit der Wiedervereinigung gewachsen…Dies gilt namentlich…die in der UN-Charta angelegten Instrumente kollektiver Friedenssicherung nach Kräften zu unterstützen” (Kinkel, PB 12/101, July 22, 1992, 8609).
linked reliability to equality in status by stating that “we must and want to be a reliable and equal (vollwärtiger) European and transatlantic partner in the area of maintaining peace” (PB 13/74, November 30, 1995, 6426). A frequently-used argumentative concept employed by both conservatives and liberals alike was teleological. In their view, German was ready to play a new role because the country had “matured enough to be able to take on her natural responsibilities in upholding international law” (Gerhardt, PB 13/74, November 30, 1995, 6441).

Acceptance of the need for role adaptation as promoted by the conservatives while adhering to the party’s long-standing support for antimilitarism produced considerable role conflict within the party and tensions with the conservatives. The AWACS controversy in April 1993 is a good case in point. Here, the FDP was not prepared to allow German crews to remain on NATO planes even though Kinkel had promised UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali in January that Germany would start to play a greater role in peacekeeping missions (Lantis 2002a, 93). The inconsistency of the position made it difficult to maintain, particularly when the CDU/CSU began to win the judicial battle at the Constitutional Court which first allowed German participation in AWACs missions and in July 1994, rendered a defining ruling that allowed for ‘out-of-area’ missions of the NATO, WEU as well as peacekeeping missions of the UN. Argumentative inconsistency also exposed the FDP to criticism from their conservative coalition partners. For instance, CSU chairperson Waigel publicly blasted the liberal democrats over their AWACs stance, calling them ‘whiners’ and that “the FDP is always like that”.289

nonetheless susceptible to the argument of role normalization made by conservative elites because of their willingness to accept the need for a more active role after the end of the Cold War.\textsuperscript{290} Not consenting to one while promoting the other undermined the party’s public credibility and reliability within the coalition.

SPD politicians generally opposed the modification of the country’s stance on the use of force. Humanitarian mission were seen as only acceptable option. Rejecting the use of force as adequate means to address conflict, party whip Klose argued during the debate on German naval and aerial participation in the Adriatic Sea in July 1992 that “military deployment…will most likely lead to even more bloodshed than that that we have to witness daily on television”.\textsuperscript{291} The Tornado deployment debate in July 1995 saw Rudolph Scharping arguing that “a military solution to the conflict in Bosnia cannot be achieved” (PB 13/46, June 28, 1995, 3950). Invoking elements of the civilian power role conception, he goes on to argue that the ongoing German humanitarian efforts in Bosnia create a “more preferable image of Germany as a country that is peaceful and concerned, characterized by assistance-rendering and human compassion” (Ibid). In essence, Social Democrats viewed Germany as being fundamentally unable to contribute to armed

\textsuperscript{290} Former Foreign Minister Genscher (1998, 521) reflects on Yugoslavia by stating that “from the very beginning German policy set the prohibition of the use of armed force to solve political issues as an important criterion….One of the essential lessons to be learned from the course of events in Yugoslavia must be the continued renunciation of force. Because the debate on justifiable and unjustifiable aggression results in old patterns of behavior, renunciation of force must remain the unalterable basis for peaceful coexistence in Europe.” Written at the time that the Bosnian Civil war should have made apparent the drawbacks of antimilitarism in deterring actors committed to policies of massive human rights violations, the statement indicates the strength of the cultural commitment to non-violence.

\textsuperscript{291} In German: “Ein Kampfeinsatz im ehemaligen Jugoslawien würde mit hoher Wahrscheinlichkeit zu einem noch größeren Blutbad führen als jenem, das wir Tag für Tag im Fernsehen mit ansehen müssen” (Klose, PB 12/101, July 22, 1992, 8614).
peacekeeping missions because of its militant past. Both Klose and Scharping were attempting to counter the government’s argumentative scheme based on the country’s increased international responsibility by proposing the need to remain true to the traditional civilian role and emphasizing that anything else would damage the reputation of the Federal Republic. Thus, they resisted the government’s intention to adapt role behavior through the inclusion of the use of force by trying to rhetorically link antimilitarism to reliability and predictability and by denying the nature of external expectations. For instance, Günter Verheugen, reacting to Karl Lamers’ (CDU) argument that AWACS participation was required to maintain Germany’s reputation as reliable NATO alliance partner in the charged debate on German responsibilities in March 1993, argued that NATO as defensive alliance should have no business conducting out-of-area interventions and that the organization’s objectives should not trump the constitution. Almost stubbornly, the SPD politician went on to question the importance and validity of foreign role expectations by claiming that the government had ulterior motives:

You … continue to tell us that the whole world is just waiting for the time that the Germans finally send soldiers to military confrontations ... why don’t you finally provide us with an example of a government that demands that the

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292 The government’s desire to deploy the Bundeswehr for peacekeeping missions in Yugoslavia was seen as tarnishing the international reputation of the country and further, states that the majority of Germans are against a new role for Germany out of a sense of responsibility for the recent past. Sozialdemokratischer Pressedienst, November 30, 1991 (http://library.fes.de/cgi-bin/digibert.pl?id=022984&dok=44/022984, accessed on January 24, 2009).

293 For instance, Klose quoted the comments of the Milano newspaper Il Giorno that viewed Germany’s participation in the Adriatic Sea as an indication of the country’s return as military power (Klose, PB 12/101, July 22, 1992, 8617).

294 In German: “Und kommen Sie uns bitte nicht mit Bündnisverpflichtungen! Erstens steht auch das Bündnis nicht über der Verfassung, und zweitens ist die NATO ein kollektives Verteidigungsbündnis. Sie ist kein Interventionsinstrument, nicht aus eigenen Recht und auch nicht im Auftrag der UNO. Ob die NATO bei der Erfüllung von Mandaten der Vereinigten Nationen eine Rolle spielen kann oder soll, ist eine ganz schwierige Frage” (Verheugen, PB 12/150, March 26, 1993, 12872).
Bundeswehr be send to military missions. I really would like to get to know this pressure.295

The rhetorical differences between parliamentary elites masked a central point of agreement that made Social Democrats vulnerable to persuasion by role promoters. They, like members of the FDP, shared the perception that the international security environment had changed with the end of the Cold War and that some kind of a redefinition of role behavior was required. In Klose’s words:

It is your prerogative … to want a new foreign and security policy. The world has changed, and the security situation today is different from the one three years ago…We are certainly prepared to help develop a new orientation through discourse.296

Social Democrats also accepted another central aspect of the cabinet elite’s argumentative scheme—the “increased importance of the role of Germany and the special responsibility that arises from it” after reunification.297 Thus, Scharping, as leader of the opposition who opposed the deployment of German troops in Bosnia and who would hold on to the nonmilitary role of the country, nevertheless accepted the need for a greater role based on responsibility and that this responsibility was based on solidarity with NATO allies.298 Social democrats also shared the view that the country was ready


296 In German: “Es ist Ihr gutes Recht...eine neue Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik zu wollen. Die Welt hat sich verändert, und die Sicherheitslage ist heute anders als vor drei Jahren...Wir sind durchaus bereit…um im Diskurs eine neue Orientierung zu gewinnen” (PB 12/101, July 22, 1992, 8618).


take on a new role because it had matured and it had learned from history.\(^{299}\) Again, this undermined the position of elites who opposing role adaptation. Actors’ responsibilities towards the collective are primarily defined by the collective—not the actors themselves. In effect, the social democrats were trying to link their behavioral preferences to past role expectations which conservatives elites exploited gleefully. During the AWACS debate, for instance, Verheugen’s critique of the government position encountered the telling outcry “you are standing still” from the conservatives who presented the need for change as a necessary response to current conditions while casting social democrats as being out of tune with the political realities that developed after the end of the Cold War.\(^{300}\) This argument generated substantial pressure on social democrats to change their position because the main elements in Germany’s role conception – reliability, calculability and predictability–are subject to externally generated social expectations as is the appropriate behavior associated with these values. By not allowing role adaptation, social democrats were risking the country’s reputation and status within international society. Green party politicians, who had an even more restrictive view on the use of force, also encountered this dilemma.

Germany’s Green Party had traditionally maintained a pacifist stance which ruled out foreign military deployments for any reason. Party leader Joschka Fischer strongly supported Germany’s traditional emphasis on antimilitarism by repeatedly emphasizing

\(^{299}\) Verheugen (PB 13/76, December 6, 1995, 6666) and Schulte (PB 13/74, November 30, 1995, 6653). The metaphor of growing up had become an important element of the foreign policy discourse (Hellmann 2004).

\(^{300}\) In German: “Sie sind stehengeblieben” (PB 12/150, March 16, 1993, 12872).
his conviction that only political solutions can lead to peace.\footnote{Fischer, PB 13/48, June 30, 1995, 3972.} Fischer was clearly uncomfortable with the Tornado deployment in June 1995, critiquing it as a dangerous water-shed in German foreign policy in that German troops stood to be deployed outside of NATO areas with orders to shot.\footnote{In German: “Es geht um eine historische Zäsur in der deutschen Außenpolitik. Die Zäsur besteht darin, daß zum erstenmal seit dem Ende des Zweiten Weltkriegs heute mit hoher Wahrscheinlichkeit eine Mehrheit des Deutschen Bundestags beschließt, daß deutsche Kampfverbände jenseits der NATO-Bündnissgrenzen eingesetzt werden und den Auftrag haben, notfalls – ich muß hier aus meiner Sicht hinzufügen: hoffentlich kommt es dazu nicht – auch zu schießen. Das ist eine Zäsur, die wir fürchten....” (Fischer, PB 13/48, June 30, 1995, 3971).} A few days before the Bundestag would decide on full participation in IFOR, the Green party congress would continue to reject German participation in missions that involved the use of force. Green party members also did not share the pro-Western orientation maintained by conservatives and, to a lesser extent, the social democrats. NATO membership had been questioned by more radical members and international organizations were generally not viewed in solely positive ways because Greens considered the impact of superpower influence on organizational decision-making procedures and formulation of objectives. The party’s stance on pacifism and its cautious stance towards international organizations placed it outside the mainstream of elite thinking. But the party was diverse and the realist wing constantly quarreled with the more radical elements. The escalation of violence and the turn to systematic genocide in Bosnia produced a major dilemma for the party in that the initially plausible ethical position on the rejection of force began to be viewed as morally unsustainable. The fall and international inaction over the fall of UN Safe Heavens Žepa and Srebrenica, in particular, severely damaged the credibility of the German peace movement. This allowed role promoters to challenge the position of the Green politician by maintaining
that he, [Fischer], “lacks the ethical dimension of international responsibility and thereby a part of the capacity to fundamentally [re]orient German foreign policy, which is what this country needs’’.  

On the extreme left, Germany’s reformed communist party also rejected the deployment of armed forces outside of German borders. Party leader Gysi argued that Article 87, paragraph 87 of the Basic Law clearly limited the use of force to self-defense. Recognizing that the growing international engagement of the Bundeswehr through humanitarian missions was part of the government’s strategy to promote a new role for the country, Gysi added his conviction that

we are witnessing a process by which we are getting used little by little (slice-by slice) to the international deployment of the Bundeswehr and the militarization of foreign policy. We are supposed to get used to the fact … that the great power role of Germany requires support through military missions.

Other parliamentarians on the left added that “we have said after the war: Never, never do we want to carry weapons, never, never do we want war, let those at the top fight it out along, we simply will not participate”. The rejection of military forces was also revealed in statements like “history teaches us that the attempt to defend peace with violent means is accompanied by streams of blood…It is historically prudent to promote

303 In German: “…Ihnen im Kern die ethische Dimension internationaler Verantwortung und damit ein Stück Fähigkeit zur Grundorientierung der deutschen Außenpolitik fehlt, die diese Land braucht” (Gerhardt, PB 13/74, November 30, 1995, 6441).


305 Gysi, PB 13/76, December 6, 1995, 6647.

306 In German: “Wir haben damals nach dem Krieg gesagt: Nie, nie wollen wir Waffen tragen, nie, nie wollen wir wieder Krieg, laßt doch die oben sich alleine schlagen, wir machen einfach nicht mehr mit” (Heuer, PB 13/76, December 6, 1995, 6672).
The communist opposition also tried to present the argument of ulterior motives behind the reorientation effort by the government: “I fear that we will find new justifications for such actions … it has already been mentioned today that…[security] policy is about access to global markets and resources.” The rhetorical support for antimilitarism notwithstanding, the party’s political isolation within the *Bundestag* as well as the electoral precluded it from having any significant influence on the process of role adaptation.

The rhetorical exchanges during the Bosnian Civil show parliamentary elites engaged in persuasive attempts to adapt role behavior. In essence, both role promoters and those resisting adaptation attempted to express their preferences for foreign policy behavior on the basis of a socially acceptable logic of appropriateness linked to different elements of the country’s role conception. Conservatives and Liberal-Democrats presented the use of force as being within the existing framework of the role conception by emphasizing reliability and solidarity as defined by external expectations. SPD and Alliance 90/Green politicians viewed antimilitarism as integral part of role behavior that could not be changed.

The presence of external expectations serving as guidelines for appropriate foreign policy behavior strongly supported the agents intend on role adaptation.

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Opponents of adaptation congruent with external standards could be shamed because they risked central elements of the role conception including reliability and calculability. They could be accused of risking the all-important relationship with other NATO members within the alliance as part of the membership within a community that shared the democratic values of Western civilization (Breuer, PB 13/76, December 6, 1995, 6659). Worse, opponents of adaptation could be cast as advocating a special role that risked policy singularity. This cast the position of the opposition as lying outside of the socially acceptable elite consensus intend on avoiding the country’s isolation for fear of its own past identity. The intensification of violence in Bosnia allowed for the moral arguments supporting the strong antimilitarism of the traditional role to be turned on their head. Inaction was portrayed as morally inferior and tantamount to aiding the objectives of the perpetrators of human rights violations. To sum up, the debates show that elites promoting role adaptation leading to security policy reorientation produced a more effective argument for their desire to embrace the use of force because this position could be externally validated by foreign role expectations based on a shared understanding of appropriate behavior among NATO members responding to the new security environment. Thus, a ‘persuasive argument’ was one that involved adapting role behavior to role conceptions after the Cold War even if that meant violating antimilitarism as core element of German strategic culture since 1945.

The Domestic Concerns of Parliamentary Elites

The debate about adjusting the country’s role behavior taking place among parliamentary elites interlinked with important concerns at the time. Role adaptation
towards normal great power conduct helped parliamentary elites address a number of critically important issues. For conservative elites, the primary issue had been federal expenses and the dramatic influx of political and economic refugees which roughly coincided with reunification. Requests for asylum reached a preliminary peak in 1992 at which point the number of refugees from Yugoslavia reached an estimated 500,000.

Social democrats and Alliance 90/Greens were concerned with regaining control over the government. The SPD had been out of power since Helmut Kohl became Chancellor in 1982. The Alliance 90/Greens, after experiencing a promising run between 1982 and 1987, incurred a devastating defeat at the polls in 1990. In search of a formula for regaining power, both opposition parties were struggling with the public image of being unfit to govern. Their stance on the use of force would turn out to be an important element in their quest to be seen as trustworthy by the electorate.

An important domestic issue occupying parliamentary elites during the Bosnian Civil war was that of asylum reform. Since the end of World War II, Germany had maintained one of the most liberal asylum laws among Western democratic states. The willingness to take in people who were escaping persecution was due to a concern with human rights born from the barbarism of the Nazi regime. The openness served to differentiate the Federal Republic from its inhumane predecessors. It was also unusual when compared with asylum policies of other states which tended to be far more restrictive. As such, the liberal asylum provision was part of the traditional role conception that had emerged after World War II. Support for openness and the willingness to absorb asylum seekers dropped dramatically after the end of the Cold War when the rise of global instability coupled with the openness of borders created a refugee
problem of hitherto unseen proportions. At its peak in 1992, Germany received 430,000 applications for asylum. The severity of the problem was exacerbated by Germany’s generous welfare provisions, reunification costs and an outdated citizenship law based on the principle of *jus sanguinis* or right of blood which made the assimilation of foreign citizens difficult and prolonged their existence in the unproductive and socially demeaning status of an asylum seeker.\(^{309}\) The civil war in Yugoslavia significantly added to the severity of the refugee problem with Germany taking in the majority of displaced persons (see Map 2). The influx of foreigners created considerable costs for Germany. It also fuelled right-wing violence against foreigners which reached an all time high between 1992 and 1993 (Marshall 2001, 160).

Map 2: Refugees and displaced people from the former Yugoslavia

\(^{309}\) The principle of *jus sanguinis* (Right of Blood) establishes membership in the national group on the basis of cultural or genetic affiliation with the nation while *Jus Soli* (Right of Territory) creates such membership through affiliation with the state, its territory and adherence to its laws. The Citizen Act of 1913 would continue to inform immigration issues until the reforms passed by the Schröder cabinet in the late 1990s.
To conservatives, immigration and asylum issues were of paramount importance. Party members had for many years supported conceptions of citizenship based on the principle of *jus sanguinis*. This resonated with the population of a country that had traditionally not viewed itself as an immigrant nation. Party leaders had concluded that a firm stance on the “foreigner issue would stave off electoral gains by the extreme right” (Marshall 2001, 145). With its opposing stance emphasizing the open nature of the nation in line with the unlimited constitutional status of asylum, the SPD had repeatedly paid an electoral price. Under the impact of the growing resonance of the issue with the electorate during the early 1990s, conservatives began to vehemently push for changes constitution’s asylum provisions. Role normalization supported the resolution of the problem of immigration through constitutional changes limiting asylum. As a ‘normal’ state Germany would be allowed to assert its national interests more prominently and the ‘unique’ asylum provisions could be amended. Institutional normalization offered the additional benefit of closing a chapter in German history. In effect, the historical burden of the country’s past could finally be left behind.

Conservatives promoted the change on the basis of responsibility and prudence. For instance, CDU/CSU chairperson Schäuble argued that Germany was in fact aiding and abetting perpetrators of ethnic cleansing by continuing to take in asylum seekers instead of precluding such population movements by making emigration to Germany more difficult.\(^{310}\) Conservatives also offered tangible solutions to the refugee crisis with Finance Minister Waigel pointing out that the country’s military contributions to the IFOR deployment and the peace thus created would allow some of the approximately

\(^{310}\) PB 12/101, July 22, 1992, 8620.
400,000 Balkan refugees to return home (PB 13/76, December 6, 1995, 6655). Thus, the
conservative effort to promote role adjustment to include the use of force complemented
the interest of asylum reform because it allowed a break with past traditions. SPD
politicians would eventually give in and a compromise was produced by the end of 1992.
This involved the tightening of asylum laws by rejecting applicants who had passed
through adjoining ‘safe’ countries, by establishing tougher standards in the definition of
safe and unsafe countries and by introducing a fast-track return procedure. While the
issue of asylum reform was on the minds of conservatives to address the refugee problem
while shoring up support amongst some voting groups, members of the opposition were
struggling to increase prospects for gaining government control. Increasingly, the stance
on role obligations in the new security environment would become intertwined with
electoral prospects because it influenced both public views of being fit to govern
(Regierungsfähigkeit) and the viability of parties as coalition partners.

Social Democrats had been out of power since 1982. The losses during the
reunification election of 1990 had been substantial and unexpected. The election of 1994
again ended in defeat. The early 1990s were important years for reorientation as the
party sought new leadership and redefined its stance on important issues. The SPD’s
position on the use of force would turn out to be of crucial importance. A major problem
for the party was its contradictory stance on the future role of Germany which expressed
itself both in a desire to take on greater responsibility through a permanent seat on the
UN Security Council while trying to maintain the special role of a civilizing influence in
world politics. This ideational conflict was taken up by traditionalist and pragmatist
groups who competed over control within the party.
Leaders of the left wing including Oskar Lafontaine and Heidemarie Wieczorek-Zeul lay claim to the party’s pacifist traditions in support of the pure civilian power role conceptions. Only the deployment of humanitarian and logistical troops was viewed as appropriate and as late as June 1995, Lafontaine claimed that he would rigorously enforce the party’s official position against non-compliant party members. 311 Initially, support for the antimilitarist position within the party was very strong. The Bremen Program of 1991, while accepting a greater role for Germany, proposed strict limitations on Bundeswehr use for blue helmet missions. The use of force through the acceptance of combat missions continued to be ruled out categorically and participation in the rapid intervention tasks as outlined by the WEU’s Petersberg Declaration of June 1992 was rejected. A special meeting of party leaders convened by moderate Björn Engholm in August of 1992 ended on an agreement on Bundeswehr participation under UN auspices that was again highly restrictive in nature (Duffield 1998, 202). The principle elements of the SPD Sofortprogramm reveal that Social Democrats wanted to influence international relations positively through support of international organizations but saw Germany’s appropriate role as providing civilian rather than military contributions to international security. 312

Moderate party leaders were concerned that the strict insistence on Germany’s traditional role and the emphasis on maintaining the country’s civilizing impact on world politics would harm the party’s reputation and hence its ability to regain governmental


control. The ‘separate but equal’ position by which German could remove itself from military responsibility to serve a ‘higher cause’ and yet remain equal in status with other powers was viewed as unrealistic. Also considered unrealistic was the attempt to develop a precise distinction between humanitarian and combat missions in peacekeeping operations. The party’s attempts to distinguish one from the other through a series of briefs and declarations only undermined the party’s credibility in the eyes of the public. The fact that the party position advocated the pursuit of a permanent seat on the UNSC while ruling out military contributions further increased the problem of credibility.\(^{313}\) It also undermined the professed goal of “strengthening the UN and actively help shape it”\(^{314}\) by jeopardizing the international status of the Federal Republic. In light of the move towards military missions, the maintenance of a pure civilian power role conception would increase the possibility of policy singularity\(^{315}\) and make Germany susceptible to arguments from alliance partners charging unfairness: The soldiers of other countries would die in faraway places while Germans would help them get there and carry the dead. Without equality through full participation in combat missions, equal diplomatic

\(^{313}\) For instance, after an extraordinary congress in Bonn in November 1992, the party maintained the rather nonsensical position that Germany would be able to contribute to between 90 and 95 percent of all possible UN missions (Duffield 1998, 203).


\(^{315}\) Vice Chairperson of the SPD Lafontaine referred to the supporters of troop deployment within the ranks of the SPD as ‘Kinkelchen’ in reference to Foreign Minister Kinkel support for foreign missions. He viewed increased responsibility after the Cold War as involving a reduction in weapons exports to areas outside of NATO areas. He rejected the interpretation of President Herzog’s ‘Trittbrettfahrer’ speech (Interview in Der Spiegel, March 20, 1995, 22-25).
status for the country could not be accomplished. For these reasons, Hans-Ulrich Klose, for instance, thought that “the Bremen platform makes us look ridiculous.”

The party’s apparent inability to win public confidence and electoral support became a major concern for moderate party leaders including Rudolf Scharping, Hans-Ulrich Klose, Norbert Gansel and Karsten Voigt. Chancellor Kohl’s coalition between CDU/CSU and FDP had won the 1994 federal elections only narrowly but by early fall 1995, surveys again showed poor results for the SPD. Party support was at 28 percent and with only 26 percent in Berlin which spelled trouble for the October election (*Der Spiegel*, September 10, 1995).

Under the impact of external expectations, solidifying rapid reaction doctrines and the violence in Bosnia, the pragmatic position of the moderates continued to gain traction throughout 1995 even under party leader Scharping’s notoriously indecisive leadership style. In early 1995, Scharping, who was also concerned about the growing influence of contender for leadership Gerhard Schröder, had appealed to party members to support the reorientation of foreign policy principles to be able to honor German alliance obligations towards NATO. Foreign policy expert Norbert Gansel supported the deployment of combat troops “because…the lives of human beings in the former Yugoslavia, the possibility for peace, strengthening the capabilities of the UN,”


317 Rudolph Scharping was widely considered to be an ineffective leader. *Der Spiegel* wrote about him that “behind his back, the perception that he is the wrong man at the wrong time is gaining in strength” (“Demütigungen ohne Ende”, *Der Spiegel*, October 9, 1995, 22-23).

international solidarity, [were]...higher goods” \textsuperscript{319}. By June 1995, about a quarter of the SPD parliamentarians broke with party discipline by supporting the deployment of Tornado jets (Ramet and Coffin 2001, 54). By the time of the Dayton Agreement, party support had decisively shifted towards the pragmatists. Last attempts to at least amend the developing security course in line with civilian power conceptions by placing restrictions on the potential use of the deployed Tornado fighter jets were defeated as well when moderate party leaders like Verheugen pleaded with potential dissenters that ‘technicalities’ should not influence the party’s decision to support the deployment.\textsuperscript{320} In the eyes of the moderates it was essential that “Germany contribute military to the protection of peace in Bosnia as had other allied states” (Ibid.). The SPD’s credibility problem that arose from the principled rejection of the use of force similarly affected the Alliance 90/Green Party and hampered both its electoral chances as well as its ability to be considered as coalition partner. This prompted attempts to achieve \textit{Regierungsfähigkeit} by settling the differences between traditionalists and pragmatists within the party.

With its categorical anti-war stance born out of the ideological traditions of the European Left, the Alliance90/Greens Party had the most restrictive positions on the use of force among the parties perceived as capable of partaking in governance. Green Party Congresses throughout the early 1990s found most delegates supporting non-violent means to address the Bosnian Civil War (\textit{Der Spiegel}, August 7, 1995, 32-33a). The

\textsuperscript{319} “Selbst Geleimt”, \textit{Der Spiegel}, June 19, 1995, 37.

historical burden, in particular in regards to Yugoslavia, was widely viewed as precluding the possibility of German military involving in the Balkans. However, the emergence of genocide in Bosnia helped change that stance and increasingly pitted the party’s pragmatist wing against that of the traditionalists.

By May 1995, party speaker Krista Sager admitted that a new perspective on foreign deployment was needed although the country’s history precluded German participation in a Yugoslavia mission. Other pragmatists or ‘realos’ included Hubert Kleinert and Joschka Fischer also began to question the logic of opposing combat missions in the face of genocide. The tragedy of Srebrenica became crucial in this regard.\(^\text{321}\) It exposed the dangers of pacifism and underscored the necessity to contribute militarily to international institutions to strengthen the commitment to prevent genocide. Fischer argued that “reality has changed since 1989. With the end of the Cold War, genocide has again become a reality in international politics”.\(^\text{322}\) This required that “even as pacifists [the Greens] will have to redefine themselves in a violent world.”\(^\text{323}\) In the summer of 1995, Fischer wrote an open letter to his party calling for the military protection of the UN safe areas, arguing that “the left was in danger of losing its moral

\(^\text{321}\) Admitting that he used to be opposed to interventions, voting against German participation in rapid reaction forces, Fischer went on to say that “the mass murder of Srebrenica was a turning point which compelled him to give his previous position and that the prevention of genocide requires military intervention” (Interview with Nicola Brüning and Olaf Opitz, “Bei Völkermord eingreifen”, Focus, November 27, 1995, 40).

\(^\text{322}\) Genocide was not a phenomenon that first appeared after the Cold War. Nevertheless, it was Fischer’s perception that it had ‘reemerged’ and as such, the perception was important in influencing his decision to support the use of force to stop such processes (Interview with Nicola Brüning and Olaf Opitz, “Bei Völkermord eingreifen”, Focus, November 27, 1995, 40).

soul if it allowed the Balkan fascism its way”.\textsuperscript{324} The letter indicates the concern with moral consistency and represented a major shift in position on the use of force even though it did not explicitly advocate the deployment of German forces at that time.

Another major concern for Fischer, shared by other prominent left-leaning intellectuals including Jürgen Habermas was “the inconsistency of sending only the soldiers of other nations to Bosnia [which] cannot be justified”.\textsuperscript{325} Accepting external expectations of role-specific responsibilities for Germany, Fischer stated that “a country as large [in capabilities] as Germany has to make its contributions within UN parameters” (\textit{Focus}, November 27, 1995, 40-42). Thus, crucial factors explaining the change in the pragmatist position were the acceptance of the view that the security environment had changed and that Germany had an obligation to militarily contribute to the resolution of international conflicts just as other countries were prepared to. However, the moral position was not the only consideration.

A major concern for Green Party Chairman Joschka Fischer, who at that time enjoyed the status of a political celebrity, was the attempt to shift party principles in order to position the party for future electoral gains and a coalition with the social democrats.\textsuperscript{326} Garnering 7.3 percent of the vote, the Green Party had regained full parliamentary representation after the 1994 \textit{Bundestag} elections. At the time that he wrote his open letter to the party promoting the use of force against genocide, Fischer was advised by a

\textsuperscript{324} “Gefeiert oder gefoltert”, \textit{Der Spiegel}, August 7, 1995, 32-33a.


\textsuperscript{326} During an interview with Der Spiegel, the interviewers hint at Fischer’s desire at programmatic reorientation to prepare the Greens for their first governmental role. Fischer rejects that claim but admits that the issue would have to be resolved to allow for a potential Red-Green coalition in 1998 (“Das wäre Zynismus”, \textit{Der Spiegel}, August 21, 1995, 27a).
group of professors close to his party who recommended that the party abandon the radical pacifism to avoid being politically sidelined.\textsuperscript{327}

Fischer’s concern with electoral viability clashed with the desire of many party members to maintain the party’s traditional stance on the categorical rejection of war and intervention. Influential party members opposed to Fischer’s intended course change used the popularity of the traditional stance on the use of force to shore up support within the party. Spokesperson Jürgen Trittin and Kerstin Müller, the party’s spokesperson of the parliamentary faction, coauthored a counterproposal to Fischer’s open letter in which they wrote that “saying yes to combat missions is not a passport to Regierungsfähigkeit but a declaration of bankruptcy for a pacifist party.”\textsuperscript{328} Rejecting intervention, Trittin warned Fischer and 98 other prominent Green politicians that German participation in international combat missions entailed an about-face of the party’s foreign and security program (\textit{Focus}, November 27, 1995, 40-45). Invoking the traditional stance on the rejection of force, Trittin and Müller were able to regain leadership over party members who, just having been swayed by Fischer’s arguments, were reconsidering their position after new SPD leader Oskar Lafontaine, a declared opponent of the use of force had publicly rejected alliance solidarity as an argument for the use of force (Ibid.). They would prevail in the short run when the party voted to oppose both the deployment of Tornado jets in July and the deployment of \textit{Bundeswehr} troops as part of IFOR operations in early December 1995. But within the party, support for radical pacifism

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\textsuperscript{327} “Selbst Geleimt”, \textit{Der Spiegel}, June 19, 1995, 37.
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was eroding with a few party members already breaking discipline during the December vote. Views of the efficacy of force in international relations were being shifted and would prepare the Green Party for the embrace of a full UN and NATO mission spectrum during the years that followed.

Observers of German politics remarked in 1995 that in both the Alliance 90/Greens and the Social Democratic parties, the desire to achieve party unity appeared to be a more important concern than the plight of Bosnia itself.\footnote{329} The concern with public credibility trumped other issues and this required a common understanding upon which a new elite consensus could be socially constructed. In this process, the shared normative understandings of the post-Cold War security environment and the subsequent role expectations of Germany were crucial components as was the desire to continue to adhere to established values of reliability and calculability understood here as solidarity with other allies. Maintaining the country’s role required a shift in behavior in line with the new expectations. The norms provided a logical and socially attractive point of convergence of actor interests. Not supporting the Dayton peace through the use of force was, in Kinkel’s words directed at potential dissenters within the ranks of all parties, to “act immorally” since France alone had already suffered 50 casualties and about 300 wounded.\footnote{330} Defense Minister Rühe and Finance Minister Waigel argued similarly when


they claimed that “those who do not help even though they could, act immorally and are guilty just the same”. ³³¹

For the opposition parties SPD and the Alliance 90/Greens, party unity was integrally linked to the pursuit of Regierungsfähigkeit. The relatively low levels of support for the SPD during the early 1990s necessitated the search for a viable coalition partner. The prospects for a coalition between SPD and the Alliance 90/Greens increased as both parties reluctantly moved towards normalization on the use of force. External expectations of German role behavior thus established a logical point of convergence for cooperation between the two parties.

**Strategic Culture: Reticence and Antimilitarism**

A series of RAND studies conducted between 1990 and 1994 show increased levels of public support for expanding NATO’s role after the Cold War to address the new security challenges (Asmus 1994, 34, Figure 6). In addition, large parts of the public, like the political elites, clearly accepted the normative expectation of an increased role of Germany in contributing to international peace and stability after reunification. From 1990 to 1992, there were even some indicators to suggest that Germans were ready to embrace a more active role for their country with over half of the respondents supporting a more active international role (Figure 7). However, and perhaps due to the international reaction to the assertive stance over the recognition of Croatia in 1992, there is a return to the traditional reticence of the culture in 1993. ³³²

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³³¹ Waigel, PB 13/76, December 6, 1995, 6654.

³³² The declining support for UN missions in Bosnia throughout 1992 and 1993 indicated by other questions of the RAND survey indicates that even though the violence in Bosnia ranked high on the list of
At the same time, the RAND findings confirmed the main elements of the country’s antimilitant culture and the persistence of political and psychological barriers to combat missions outside of Germany (Asmus 1994, 62). By a wide margin, the public perceived the country’s increased responsibilities after the Cold War on the basis of the traditional civilian power conception of the country’s role by favoring humanitarian responses and other types of non-military actions over the use of force (Figures 8 and 9).

Concerns, it did not have the effect of prompting the general public to abandon its negative views on the efficacy of force.
Intervention for the sake of addressing human rights violations such as the ones witnessed on a massive scale in the former Yugoslavia was still rejected by a significant number of German citizens (Figure 6).

**Figure 10: Attitudes toward Foreign Policy Goals**

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<td>Prevent proliferation</td>
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<td>26</td>
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<td>Improve global environment</td>
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<td>35</td>
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<td>Prevent illegal immigration</td>
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<td>Secure foreign markets</td>
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<td>Secure energy supplies</td>
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<td>Prevent ethnic conflict</td>
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<td>Preserve human rights</td>
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<tr>
<td>Strengthen UN</td>
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<td>Protect weaker nations against foreign aggression</td>
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<td>Defend our allies’ security</td>
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<td>31</td>
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<tr>
<td>Maintain balance-of-power vis-à-vis Russia</td>
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<td>17</td>
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**Source:** RAND.

The findings supporting the predominance of the main elements of the traditional civilian power were confirmed by surveys about how the public prioritized foreign policy concerns. Here, ‘soft’ concerns including proliferation, the global environment and arms control dominated the goals of protecting weaker nations against foreign aggression and defending our allies’ security by a wide margin (Figure 10). Only about one out of five Germans (eighteen percent) considered the defense of allies a very important foreign policy goal which compared to nearly six out of ten Americans who were asked the same question (Asmus/Rand 1994, 64, Figure 10).

Overall, public opinion did not support the increased military engagement of the *Bundeswehr*. Increasing levels of violence in Bosnia and the massive human rights
violations were not widely understood to validate the efficacy of the use of force in international conflict resolution processes. If anything, increasing bloodshed, ethnic cleansing and the repeated failure of international institutions to bring end to the conflict seemed to cause more of a disillusionment with the use of force and with the utility of multilateral peacekeeping interventions in general. In that regard, public opinion differed greatly from that of the elites.

As has been shown through the chronicling of pacifist positions on the part of the left, elites were concerned about the violence in Bosnia. They understood this violence in terms of the efficacy of the United Nations and they seemed to draw different conclusions from the failures of UN missions in Bosnia and Somalia. While the public grew increasingly disenchanted with the ability of the UN to contribute to a lasting peace, elites seemed to grow more concerned with the need to support the UN which they began to perceive to be a function of Germany’s military contributions. In 1993, for instance, an editorial in the Hamburg weekly Die Woche, read “I must…plead for an intervention in Bosnia. Pacifism per se can no longer exist…this would be a wonderful change of roles if we could do something to help the cause of peace”.

333 Of course, the concern with United Nations effectiveness was a natural outgrowth of the value system of elites since World War II which had mostly been characterized by an unusually strong commitment to multilateralism. The possibility of international institutions and multilateralism failing over Bosnia seemed to have represented an unacceptable outcome.

333 Lea Rosh, Die Woche (Hamburg), February 18, 1993, 2.
Conclusion: Explaining Compliance

During the three and a half year long civil war in Bosnia, German parliamentary elites were repeatedly forced to confront the country’s role obligations. The increase in global trouble spots after the Cold War and the consistent expansion of United Nations peacekeeping operations transformed the generally acknowledged responsibilities of important system actors. The seemingly intractable situation in Bosnia greatly influenced the shared conceptions of a new security environment as well as the evolution of the role of the international institutions themselves. As UN and NATO involvement in Bosnia grew, Germany was repeatedly asked to contribute to the missions.

Initially, international and state actors showed a certain level of respect for the anti-militarist outlines of Germany’s unique strategic culture. International expectations of German military contributions increased as institutional adaptation to the new security environment culminated in the solidification of new strategies, mission types, force structures and subsequently, the articulation of new responsibilities of the member states. These responsibilities were based in part on internal role conceptions as well as external expectations. Germany, as great power was perceived to carry substantial responsibility for the maintenance of peace and stability. This responsibility was widely acknowledged among parliamentary elites as was the change in the security environment after the Cold War. Leaders of the SPD and the Green Party shared in the widespread acknowledgment of the changes in the security environment and the need for a reorientation of German foreign policy. \(^{334}\) Parliamentary elites from a wide political spectrum also accepted the

\(^{334}\) Fischer saw genocide, ethnic war and fascism as reemerging phenomena after the Cold War, forcing him to reluctantly accept the use of force as last resort. See, for instance, his interview with Olaf Ihlau and Paul Lersch, “Das ware blutiger Zynismus”, *Der Spiegel*, August 21, 1995, 27a.
need for greater German contributions after the reunification. Indicating the importance of these external expectations, Chancellor Kohl repeatedly supported security policy reorientation to meet the “expectations of the community of nations of a reunited Germany” and Defense Minister Rühe stated that “we don’t have the right to deny solidarity”. The July 1994 ruling of the Federal Constitutional Court which allowed for German participation in multilateral combat missions was also based on considerations of alliance solidarity.

While the concept of German responsibility enjoyed wide consensus among elites, disagreement existed over the nature of this responsibility with cabinet elites pursuing a normalization course and opposition elites holding on to the non-military civilian power conception. In the persuasion process between elites, foreign role expectations played a crucial function. As standard of appropriate behavior, they legitimized the efforts of those individuals that sought the reorientation of security policy to include the use of force. Conversely, external expectations undermined attempts by opposition parties to maintain traditional role conceptions based on the civilizing influence of Germany as a unique state that had learned from history. Elite conceptions of their country’s role were also influenced by their view of the efficacy of force.

The extraordinary levels of violence in the Bosnian conflict undermined elite faith in international law and led to the growing acceptance of the use of force to stop determined adversaries. The deterrence value of the use of force was particularly

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335 In German: “Die Erwartungen der Völkergemeinschaft an das wiedervereinte Deutschland…unseren Beitrag für die Sicherung des Friedens in Europe [zu] leisten” (Kohl, PB 13/76, December 6, 1995, 6632).

emphasized by conservatives including former President Richard von Weizsäcker and chairman of the CDU/CSU faction in parliament Wolfgang Schäuble.  

Conservative and liberal promoters of role adjustment also displayed a growing appreciation of the value of power and influence. These elements had long been taboo in the German political discourse after World War II. Role promoters linked influence to status and reputation. Although unwilling to contribute militarily, Germany had become a member of the Contact Group through its six month presidency of the European Council which fell in the time that the contact group was formed. After its presidency, it simply held on to its membership in the group, supported by the United States which probably saw it as a counterweight to British and French interests which tended to favor Serbia. German elites enjoyed the equality in diplomatic status provided by its membership in the Contact Group and it allowed the country to participate in the discussion of central security questions in Europe. Germany’s need to participate militarily in Bosnia can be seen as logical outgrowth of the country’s membership in the group which conferred a social

337 Schäuble summed up his position with the words: “those not prepared to fight, will not preserve the peace”. In German: “Man darf nicht nur auf den guten Willen bauen. Die Menschen sind leider nicht so. [...] Wer nicht bereit ist, zu kämpfen, wird den Frieden nicht sichern”. Further explaining the logic of deterrence, Schäuble said that “this is about convincing anyone that the use of military violence will not pay off”. In German: “Es geht darum, jeden davon zu überzeugen, daß sich der Einsatz militärischer Gewalt für ihn selbst nicht lohnen wird” (Schäuble, PB 13/76, December 6, 1995, 6639).

338 For instance, referring to the ability of the United States to broker the peace of Dayton, Foreign Minister Kinkel stated appreciatively “without doubt, it was the political and military engagement and power (Gewicht) of the United States that made the difference in achieving the current peace settlement” (Kinkel 1995, PB 13/76, December 6, 1995, 6426).

339 The journal Der Spiegel alludes to military involvement being the result of the government’s desire to not lose the ability to partake equally in decisions regarding European security within the Contact Group (“Dabeisein ist alles”, Der Spiegel, June 26, 1995, 22-23a, "Länger verheddern”, Der Spiegel, October 2, 1995, 36b-37a).
status which elites did not want to surrender.\textsuperscript{340} Focusing on reputation and invoking role terminology, Chancellor Kohl considered, in the \textit{Bundeswehr} White Paper of 1994 that “the reliability and predictability of German defence and alliance policy are a major prerequisite for our ability to act on the international stage”.\textsuperscript{341} The desire for greater status also explains the growing support among elites for the campaign to acquire a permanent seat in the UN Security Council which Chancellor Kohl had initially dismissed as unnecessary in early 1992.\textsuperscript{342} Increasingly, the achievement of the seat as a symbol of equal status and the ability to influence important decisions was seen as a logical function of being able to participate in the organization’s full mission spectrum.\textsuperscript{343} Unlike the European Union, which Germany had been able to shape through reflexive multilateralism, full equality within the UN Security Council could not be achieved without military contributions to peacekeeping missions.\textsuperscript{344}

Very important in explaining the policy shift towards the use of force was the change on the left which occurred after the human rights violations in Srebrenica when prominent politicians and intellectuals reluctantly endorsed the use of force. The

\textsuperscript{340} Der \textit{Spiegel} quotes a gloating British NATO diplomat: “Foreign policy in Europe is written by those who have the desire and the capability to act, Germany remains excluded from that game (“Dabeisein ist Alles”, \textit{Der Spiegel}, June 26, 1995, 22-23a).


\textsuperscript{342} John Tagliabue, “Kohl Seeks to Fend Off Criticism Of His Assertive German Politics”, \textit{NYT}, January 11, 1992.

\textsuperscript{343} Der \textit{Spiegel} quotes an unnamed member of the foreign ministry as insisting that “Germany has to make a significant contribution unless it wants to bury all hope of getting a permanent seat in the UNSC” (“Länger verheddern”, \textit{Der Spiegel}, October 2, 1995, 36b-37a).

\textsuperscript{344} The argument of reflexive multilateralism is based on the assumption that German federal and European institutions are very similar. The congruence of institutions explains the congruence of interests which, in turn, allows German foreign policy to be subtle, multilateral and consensus-oriented (See, for instance, Bulmer 1997).
genocide shook elite perceptions about the efficacy of international law and UN actions such as the establishment of safe havens. Politicians on the left reacted to the challenge to the capabilities of international institutions to guarantee human rights by embracing the more active German role. Individuals like Fischer saw German contributions to peacekeeping as necessary to protect human rights and to strengthen and extending the scope of global governance. In that way, the embrace of the use of force served to support the failing efforts of multilateral institutions which Germans had helped construct before and after the end of the Cold War. The moral argument for the use of force to protect human rights also weighed heavily in a culture still resonating with the impact of the Holocaust and the generational guilt generated by the failure of most Germans to resist the Nazi regime.

The Bosnian role episode thus supports important elements of the proposed model of foreign policy reorientation. Internal debates played out among elites within the context of continuous social pressure about contributing in line with the perceived increase in Germany’s capabilities after reunification. The case shows that elites shared the understanding of increased German responsibility for global peace and stability as well as the need for a reorientation and engaged in a debate about the nature of appropriate behavior for the country’s new role. The debate was decided in favor of the group that managed to present its policy recommendations as closely matching the international expectations of the appropriate behavior of a great power supporting the system. Elites opposed to reorientation attempted to present an alternative role model

345 For instance, Kinkel declared in parliament that “The end of the East-West Conflict had freed the United Nations from decade-long paralysis. For the first time, an opportunity presents itself to turn this organization…into the central guarantor of peace of humanity” (PB 12/151, April 21, 1993).
based on the traditional civil power conception in which responsibility within the new security environment was understood as resisting the power-political re-socialization of Germany’s foreign policy. The advocates of the traditional stance rejected the use of force as part of the civilian role perception and proposed that Germany play a special role in which the country’s capabilities were deployed in civilizing and humanitarian capacity. As such, responsibility was understood as rejecting the influence of the country’s natural capabilities that predisposed it to play the role of a normalized great power. This position was untenable because it clashed with the requirements imposed by the new security environment and the role-specific expectations this generated. As civilizing power, Germany would have played a special role that was not affirmed by the external environment which was pushing for Germany to embrace the use of force. The country’s foreign policy would no longer be reliable, predictable or calculable and this proposition was clearly unacceptable to a majority of parliamentary elites. In the words of Foreign Minister Kinkel: “[The only lesson from history can be]: Never again to leave the community of Western nations, never again special paths (Sonderwege), not even out of a sense of moral superiority…”

Germany’s traditional role conception that eschewed the pursuit of openly nationalist interests, also inhibited the resolution of major domestic issues foremost of which was that of asylum reform. Throughout the 1990s, pressure was building on SPD politicians who had generally supported liberal asylum policies, to agree to measures that

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346 This a phrase used in title of an article written by Hellmann who proposed that Germany pursue the alternative course of ‘offensive idealism’ (Hellmann 2004).

would reduce the massive influx of asylum-seekers. Role normalization allowed for the changes in the asylum law to be pursued within the framework of appropriate behavior as conceptualized under the role of a great power. A normalized great power had the right to pursue its national interests, even at the cost of its neighbors or the detrimental evolution of global standards. Politicians in the United Kingdom, France or the United States certainly reserved for themselves the right to shape asylum policy in a way conducive to their own national interests.

Social Democrats had for years struggled with the right concept providing for their return to power. Party leaders had effectively played on antimilitarist tendencies of the public to win regional elections but throughout the early 1990s, public support was declining, particularly as the SPD appeared increasingly out of touch with the new foreign policy agenda. The party platform was anachronistic and inconsistent. It emphasized a desire to partake in reshaping the world as indicated by the support of the quest for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council yet tied greater participation to reservations about the use of force. Social Democrats appeared as unreliable and unfit to rule. Diametrically opposed positions on the use of force within the party held by moderates and traditionalists undermined party unity. The concept of role normalization promised the reestablishment of party unity as a first step towards a consistent and viable party platform enjoying widespread electoral support. Moreover, the reorientation of party principles produced a principled basis on which Social Democrats and Alliance 90/Greens could be welded together in a Red-Green coalition. Within the Alliance 90/Greens, similar problems of discord were addressed by pragmatic leaders like Fischer who steadily gained influence given the party’s desire for power and its increasing
attractiveness to the ailing Social Democratic Party. The parties’ slow move to accommodate the normative context created by external expectations allowed for the fusion of interests between domestic actors. It also explains why the Red-Green coalition, when it eventually did take power in 1998, did not miss a beat but would commit German fighter jets to the first military combat since World War II during the Kosovo Crisis in 1999. Thus, the normative canvas established by role expectations converged with important interest of the principal actors on the domestic level to allow for the reorientation of foreign policy.

All that remained was to convince the general public of the necessity to embrace the use of force and accept the possibility of casualties in faraway lands for reasons not directly related to territorial security. The German public remained stubbornly antimilitaristic throughout the entire period of reorientation. Parliamentary elites appealed to alliance solidarity. They consistently invoked the argument of greater responsibility and the need to support human rights which found resonance within the public. They also conjured up the specter of political isolation. However, they were ultimately unsuccessful in persuading the public and antimilitarism would remain as powerful constraint on elite actions to the present day. Germany had started to contribute to combat missions but contentious public and parliamentary debates accompanying each deployment since indicate that the process of reorientation is neither complete nor reversible.
CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION: FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS

Introduction

This dissertation asked the question of what caused Germany to reorient its security policy by embracing the use of force during the mid-1990s. Foreign policy reorientation was defined as a noticeable departure from a state’s central policy stance. In the case of German security policy, this central stance was the rejection of the use of force for non-defensive missions outside of German territory. Explaining changes in the policy stance on the use of force was particularly significant in Germany because of constraints on elite action imposed by strong antimilitarism in strategic culture which predisposed elites and public to oppose reorientation. Strategic culture also should have rendered the actions of role promoters seeking a change in the stance of the use of force as inappropriate social behavior while empowering individuals, groups and institutions standing for the preservation of the traditional policy orientation. The investigation of the puzzle of German security policy reorientation offers insights on three central questions in foreign policy analysis: The question of whether internal or external variables explain state foreign policy, the utility of the concept of strategic culture and the degree of elite autonomy in the realm of foreign policy-making. This final chapter will provide a brief restatement of the theory, followed by the presentation of the findings of the dissertation. Contributions to knowledge in the fields of international relations and foreign policy
analysis are addressed next with particular attention devoted to the central questions above. I close by making suggestions for further research.

Restating the Theory

This dissertation employed cultural variables to explain security policy reorientation in Germany during the mid-1990s. The relevance of social and ideational variables had been suggested both by the social terminology appearing in the elite discourse as well as the many claims of scholars and foreign observers that Germany changed course as a result of outside pressure and demands. The focus on ideational variables and processes of socialization enabled the study to contribute to the ongoing constructivist debate on the significance of norms, values and identity in determining the foreign policy behavior of states. An important secondary objective was to gain a clearer understanding of social processes of persuasion occurring between leaders of states and international organizations on one hand and among parliamentary elites within domestic politics on the other. The central cultural concept used to investigate the process of German security policy reorientation was that of a social role applied to states within international society.

The international environment constitutes a cultural environment characterized by shared security understandings, norms and behavioral expectations of important member states. The social environment under investigation was that of the early post-Cold War era with specific focus on shared understandings of new security threats and necessary responses by international organizations. Within the environment, the concept of role encapsulates the understanding of a member’s status and behavioral obligations. State
roles within the social environment guide the policy preferences of political elites by providing conceptual maps for decision-making. These ‘cognitive maps’ of appropriate state conduct held by decision-makers are called role conceptions.

As normative standards in the early post-Cold War environment changed and member obligations became more concrete, Germany was perceived to have special responsibilities for the maintenance of global peace and stability because it possessed the wherewithal of a great power. Within the context of an altered threat and response perception after the Cold War, these responsibilities could only be met through the ability to deploy the *Bundeswehr* in combat missions outside of the country’s territory. Since Germany’s traditional role conception of a civilian power had specifically ruled out such behavior as inappropriate, socialization took place to adjust role behavior. Socialization of the Federal Republic to contribute forces to multilateral peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions occurred through role adjustment processes during which domestic actors reacted to external pressure by promoting the role suggested by international society.

Role adaptation occurs through role episodes which are message-sending processes during which role senders convey community expectations of behavior to a focal actor. This role pressure is designed to make an actor adapt role behavior in line with expectations as based on socially appropriate standards of behavior. By complying, an actor not only validates the norm generating the expectation but adds to its strength and diffusion throughout the environment. Alternatively, non-compliance may involve challenges to role senders and system norms and force the adjustment of expectations and
norms, respectively. Thus, the responses of focal actors also have effects on role senders and the normative context that generated their behavioral expectations.

Within the domestic environment of the state actor, groups and individuals may promote the role expectations from the international environment through a range of strategies designed to persuade others. The primary means of persuasion investigated in this dissertation was social persuasion through effective argumentation and speech acts in the social environment created between Germany’s parliamentary elites. Within this environment, conservative elites acted as role entrepreneurs by persuading politicians from opposition parties that the maintenance of the role conception as reliable ally and supporter of Western values necessitated a reorientation of behavior towards the acceptance of the use of force in missions beyond German territory. Shared elements of the elite role conceptions and generally accepted threat perceptions allowed role entrepreneurs to successfully present their case for reorientation. Role entrepreneurs also used the two important organizational platforms under their control—the government and the Bundeswehr—to promote and lock-in desired changes by incrementally committing Germany to the desired behavioral parameters. These high-profile commitments made maintenance of the traditional stance rejecting foreign involvement more difficult as foreign involvement began to assume the mantle of normalcy. Growing Bundeswehr capabilities and experience also served to undermine the opposition’s argument that Germany’s armed forces were both unprepared and unsuitable for the military tasks expected of them. Moreover, by consenting to humanitarian missions, the opposition found itself in a social trap from which it ultimately could not extricate itself without significant reputational losses to parties and the country within international society.
External expectations and internal persuasion processes unfolded differently in each one of the considered role episodes.

Findings: Role Episodes from 1990 to 1995

The Persian Gulf War

The Persian Gulf War role episode between the fall of 1990 and spring 1991 is considered the first major crisis of the post-Cold War era. Iraq’s invasion and annexation of Kuwait prompted a military response led by the United States and thirty-one other states many of which sent combat units that saw action in the conflict. In insisting on the territorial integrity of Kuwait, the international community chose to uphold norms of sovereignty with human rights coming in as secondary consideration when allegations of massive violations became known. The United States and the UN formally and informally requested military assistance from Germany. The German government turned down the request and supported coalition efforts through ‘checkbook’ diplomacy. Germany also honored Turkey’s request for military support when that country invoked the solidarity provisions of the NATO treaty but only after considerable and contentious domestic debate. Parliamentary elites reacted to the international crisis in ways consistent with the behavior of a civilian power. They turned down requests for military assistance and supported mediation efforts through the United Nations. They also supported sanctions against Iraq to force compliance with UN resolution 660 and were willing to dispatch naval units to the Mediterranean to relieve coalition forces naval units once hostilities ceased. Thus, Germany reacted to international expectations of militarily
contributing to the restoration of Kuwaiti sovereignty by *partially complying*. How do role conceptions and elite concerns explain this foreign policy action?

The Persian Gulf War occurred at a time of extraordinary political transitions. Global perceptions of new security threats and necessary responses were only just beginning to develop into a firm social system of state roles and behavioral expectations. This created ambiguity about the appropriate course of action to address the invasion of Kuwait. Strategic interests in the Gulf region were important reasons for the United States, France and the United Kingdom to act decisively. Having the role conception of a civilian power, Germany’s elites were unaccustomed to the idea of national or strategic interests and the open articulation of such concerns was considered inappropriate. Indirect strategic interest existed in the form of concerns with guaranteeing oil supplies and maintaining international law but these did not significantly affect elite discourse. Opposition elites also suspected that the national interests of major powers rather than a concern for international security constituted the core of the motives for the liberation of Kuwait. The absence of direct interests in the region and strong antimilitarism in strategic culture imposed strong restraints on elite actions.

Conservative elites pursued role normalization at this early time. They were willing to act as role entrepreneurs by honoring external expectations but quickly realized the futility of their actions given the absence of elite and public support for role adaptation. Social Democrats and Alliance 90/Greens had been able to successfully exploit antimilitarism during the January 1991 elections in Hessen. The lost election sent a clear message of the potential electoral costs of behavioral adaptation at that time. Role
adaptation also threatened consensus within the coalition which could best be preserved through the traditional role behavior.

Maintaining the civilian role also served the paramount foreign policy objective of negotiating the Two-Plus-Four Agreement leading to full sovereignty. Concerns about renewed German power and strategic interests existed in many European capitals. The Gulf War also created stresses for US-Soviet relations as Moscow was asked to abandon a traditional ally in the region. Acting out the civilian power role that the country had played throughout the Cold War era solved a number of problems for parliamentary elites. Elites were able to ease fears about the increasing power of their country after reunification by reaffirming the traditional antimilitarism. The renunciation of weapons of mass destruction, reductions in troop size, and the intensified commitment to multilateral institutions all fall within the behavioral pattern of the civilian power. Maintaining the traditional role also allowed Germany to act as mediator between the United States and the Soviet Union.

In sum, partial compliance as based on pure civilian power role behavior represented a logical point of interest convergence between elites. It also enabled elites to successfully achieve the most important national objective since World War II–that of achieving reunification and full sovereignty–during a major international crisis with the potential for profound diplomatic disagreements between the quadripartite powers. German elites catered to the expectations of important state actors including the United Kingdom, France and the Soviet Union that were concerned that sovereignty would increase German power and unilateral behavior while partially rejecting demands of the United States and the United Nations. The rejection is considered partial because German
contributions to alliance efforts were not insignificant and indicate that elites were susceptible to external pressure.

Figure 11: Persian Gulf War Role Episode: Expectations, Elite Interests and Role Performance

The Persian Gulf War represents the beginning of the process of role adaptation through external socialization. Germany’s mixture of haphazard and belated foreign policy responses to the crisis and the internal debates indicated a high level of indecision and ambiguity among parliamentary elites about the role that Germany was expected to play after the Cold War. The traditional role was one of a reliable and calculable ally. The intense criticism the country faced over the rejection of the use of force indicated that this role in international society could not be maintained through behavior based on a pure civilian power conception. Germany had followed the old script in a new play. Foreign demands and criticism initiated the search for the appropriate script given altered security circumstances.
Unilateralism in Yugoslavia

This role episode took place between the fall 1991 and the spring of 1992. It represents an example of an actor’s maladaptive response generated primarily by internal factors. International structures including standards and institutions were as yet underdetermined within a transitioning social environment. The establishment of a consensus on humanitarian intervention was hampered by the general adherence to the principle of state sovereignty which had served to protect the uneasy peace between the superpowers during the Cold War. But sovereignty norms were being challenged by the new realities marked by the internal insecurities arising from the rapid disintegration of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. The underdeveloped nature of the international consensus on state recognition produced mixed external messages which allowed for domestic factors and micro-level interests to drive German foreign policy during this episode. Public opinion indicated a profound concern with the horrors of the escalating civil war together with the demand for some kind of governmental action. Influential media in print and television heightened the saliency of the issue and quickly began to suggest recognition as solution. Croatian nationalism, the advanced degree of political organization that characterized the Croat immigrant community in Germany and religious affinities of that group with the Bavarian CSU may also have been contributing factors.

Pressed by public sentiment, elites seized the opportunity for electoral gains as they dropped their initial reservations about recognition and began to bandwagon on the pro-recognition train. Politicians from the Alliance 90/Green Party were crucial in setting both course and tone on recognition. At the time, the parliamentary faction was run by activists from the former East Germany, who had transformed the authoritarian system of
their country through a successful campaign centered on civil rights issues. These politicians brought with them a profound distaste for totalitarian systems and a principled emphasis on human rights standards. The West German Greens were reeling from their worst electoral showing in the party’s short history with moderate leaders like Joschka Fischer decisively moving the platform towards the center. Among the changes was a renewed focus on core issues which included the support for peaceful self-determination and civil rights. Not to be outdone by the smaller party, most conservative and social democratic elites quickly followed pace.

Backed by broad electoral and parliamentary support, cabinet elites aggressively constructed a European coalition in favor of self-determination even though the experienced Foreign Minister Genscher should have understood the dangers of setting a diplomatic precedent for states struggling with ethnic diversity including Bosnia-Herzegovina. The unilateral policy stance also undercut the effectiveness of ongoing negotiations in Croatia. Without recognition as incentive, negotiators like Lord Carrington or special UN envoy Cyrus Vance had little in the form of diplomatic leverage to force Croatia to protect the minority rights of its Serb citizens which insiders suggest was a major reason for the escalation of interethnic hostilities in Croatia and other parts of former Yugoslavia.
Germany’s aggressive foreign policy stance leading to the unilateral recognition was met by widespread criticism from abroad. International criticism was particularly effective because it frequently involved the accusation that Germany was redeveloping its great power role by reasserting its historical sphere of interest in the Balkans. Germany’s policy singularity had exposed it to the threat of social isolation from its reference group of Western democracies. German elites were faced with the prospect of having their country play a special role that was not affirmed by international society. The prospect of isolation was unacceptable to policy-makers who drew the important lesson that their country would have to develop a different type of role in order to be accepted—a role that would have to be in compliance with international expectations. Nevertheless, in challenging Yugoslav sovereignty and supporting norms of self-determination, Germany may actually have contributed towards the establishment of growing consensus.
supporting norms of humanitarian intervention within European security organizations after the Cold War. Soon, international support for the norm of sovereignty and non-interference would be challenged by the fast-paced dissolution of the Soviet Union. Attempts to keep Yugoslavia together appeared increasingly out of sync not just with the escalating levels of violence but the normative structure of the Cold War which had emphasized the inviolability of borders and state sovereignty in Europe. Since the recognition episode also taught German elites a lesson on the limits of non-military diplomacy towards determined and ‘uncivilized’ adversaries, the episode may be regarded as an important milestone in Germany’s eventual adoption of the use of force over Bosnia. Overall, German elites grabbed the mantle of a greater role for the country without knowing how to act or understand that their country lacked the institutional capacity to act out the role. The result was a rather awkward performance.

The Bosnian Civil War

The Civil War in Bosnia between the summer 1992 and November 1995 represented the final episode in Germany’s role adaptation process. In what really constituted a series of smaller episodes, parliamentary elites were pressured repeatedly to contribute militarily as the conflict produced challenge after challenge for international organizations after the Cold War. During this episode, security organizations including NATO, the UN, the EU and the WEU moved decisively towards rapid reaction doctrines and force structures designed to address instability as part of a general recognition that the international security environment had become more volatile, unpredictable and that threats increasingly emanated from processes internal to states. Events in Bosnia
profoundly influenced the development of organizational threat perceptions, doctrines and capabilities. German elites were intricately involved in this process of institutional adaptation which increased the pressure on Germany to change its civilian power role to contribute equally to the missions by embracing the use of force. The solidification of security norms increased the social impact of foreign expectations, especially since German elites had contributed to the formulation of the norms through their participation in international security organizations. Elites had a major interest in maintaining and extending the capabilities of the organizations they had helped develop. In addition, they developed a liking for the increase in international status that joint responsibility in diplomacy including participation in the Contact Group and IFOR bestowed upon their country. But elite interest was not just motivated by instrumental logic. Actors who participate in the formulation of group standards risk their reputation within the group if they do not comply with those standards of behavior. Even if their interests should change, they are caught in a social trap of obligations which makes defection less likely. German elites found themselves in exactly such a position when the United Nations and NATO began facing determined resistance by domestic actors who committed blatant violations of human rights in Bosnia.
At the micro-level, parliamentary elites struggled with *Regierungsfähigkeit* or electoral viability during the federal elections of 1994 and regional elections before and after. Conservative parliamentary elites of the CDU/CSU had pursued the country’s role normalization since 1990. But this course did not enjoy a parliamentary consensus and produced repeated friction within the CDU/CSU-FDP ruling coalition. Under the constant pressure generated by external role expectations, the old role of the civilian power with its restrictive views on the use of force began to be perceived as inappropriate political position; particularly, since most party leaders shared the threat perceptions and were concerned about the effectiveness of international security organizations. The position that Germany would be an equal partner in global peace and stability by avoiding contributions to combat missions became unsustainable. Thus, throughout 1994 and 1995, leaders from the SPD and the Alliance90/Greens began to reluctantly embrace...
the use of force. As they increasingly began to accept the argument that a great power like Germany could not exclude itself from participating militarily without being irresponsible, they moved closer towards one another in anticipation of the Red-Green coalition that would take power in 1998. Thus, external pressure made elite interests coalesce around Germany’s new role conception.

Summary of Findings

The findings of the dissertation support the original model. Role entrepreneurs used a variety of strategies to force role adaptation. The persuasive power of role entrepreneurs increased as external demands intensified on the basis of firmed up intervention standards after 1992. Even though Germany embraced the use of force, its strategic culture remained characterized by the central value of antimilitarism throughout the investigated period. Thus, the time lag between the creation of normative standards and compliance can be explained through constraints imposed by the culture which reduced the resonance of the external norms. Politicians from the FDP and SPD would continue to interpret the German constitution in ways prohibiting the use of force until the ruling of the Constitutional Court in July 1994.

In terms of role conceptions held by elites, the study finds that Germany remained a civilian power in each episode. However, variations of the civilian power role were detected: During the Persian Gulf War, Germany shows diplomatic reticence, financial support and eschewing of military force as central aspects of behavior. During the recognition episode, diplomatic leadership and support for Croatia and Slovenia and eschewing of military force are the defining characteristics. Finally during the Bosnian
Civil War, leadership and military force exhibit policy behavior. The variations are tentatively called pacifist, assertive and militant civilian power roles. The adjustment in role behavior indicates that German elites first took on greater leadership functions as demanded and then added the use of military force. The fact that use of force was embraced in spite of antimilitarism in strategic culture suggests that leadership functions in international society are associated with the ability to deploy military force and that German elites learned this during the early 1990s. Several important findings pertain to the civilian power concept.

Maull (1990) has suggested that civilian powers mainly rely on non-military means to resolve differences in international relations but will deploy military force in multilateral fashion to uphold international law. This means that German actions during the Persian Gulf War may have been indicative of an incompletely developed civilian power role which explains the pressure to adjust through the inclusion of the use force. This also suggests that Germany developed a more stable role during the mid 1990s and that no further behavioral changes are to be expected. This is confirmed by foreign policy behavior since reorientation. Germany has not taken on the full mantle of a normal great power. In other words, normalization occurred but within the contours of the civilian power role.
Table 5: Summary of Case Study Findings

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<thead>
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<th>Persian Gulf War</th>
<th>Unilateral Recognition</th>
<th>Bosnian Civil War</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Behavioral Expectations</td>
<td>Military Contributions</td>
<td>Maintaining Yugoslav Sovereignty</td>
<td>Military Contributions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Policy Behavior</td>
<td>Partial Compliance (checkbook diplomacy)</td>
<td>Non-Compliance (unilateral Recognition)</td>
<td>Compliance (multilateral use of force)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promoters of Expectations</td>
<td>CDU/CSU politicians</td>
<td>FDP politicians (not Genscher) Foreign Ministry Green politicians</td>
<td>CDU/CSU politicians SPD pragmatists Green ‘reals’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic Concerns</td>
<td>Electoral Viability Two-Plus-Four Treaty</td>
<td>Electoral Viability</td>
<td>Electoral Viability Maintaining Party Unity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominant Strategic Culture Value(s)</td>
<td>Antimilitarism</td>
<td>Antimilitarism Human Rights</td>
<td>Antimilitarism Human Rights Multilateralism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role Expectation</td>
<td>Reliable Ally</td>
<td>Reliable Ally</td>
<td>Reliable Ally</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role Behavior</td>
<td>Diplomatic Reticence Non-Military Action</td>
<td>Diplomatic Leadership Non-Military Action</td>
<td>Diplomatic Leadership Military Action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role</td>
<td>Pacifist Civilian Power</td>
<td>Assertive Civilian Power</td>
<td>Militant Civilian Power</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Role adaptation occurred on the basis of structural as well as symbolic interactionist processes. Parliamentary elites were subjected to external expectations that were based on Germany’s social position as great power within the system. However, elites attempted to maintain as much of the original role behavior as possible which indicates the presence of a ‘state identity’ defined by the parameters of strategic culture. Role performance was a function of German responses to structural guidelines as well as a desire to interpret and shape these guidelines as symbolic interactionist role theory would suggest.

Contributions to Knowledge

International Socialization and Domestic Resonance

The primary objective of this study was to test the usefulness of a cultural model in explaining processes of foreign policy formulation. Of particular interest was the
question of whether cultural models which are routinely employed to explain stable political conditions may also be utilized to explain political conditions undergoing transformation. The central cultural concept used was that of the role conception and the reorientation of German foreign policy therefore is conceptualized as a function of a role adjustment process. Role conceptions were defined as elite understandings about their country’s appropriate function and behavioral obligations within international society. Changes in role conceptions allow for different policy options. In response to foreign pressure, German elites adapted role conceptions and were able to embrace the use of military force in support of peace enforcement missions. The broad cultural model was combined with an investigation of the micro-interests of sub-state actors to bridge the divide between reflective and rational approaches as well as provide greater clarity on the relationship between agents and structures. Thus, an important corollary puzzle investigated here was the relationship between role expectations and the micro-level interests of parliamentary elites including the process by which elites contribute to the evolution of social environments through role performance, role avoidance or role challenges. I proposed that a combination of insights culled from role theory, norm diffusion literature, strategic culture and foreign policy analysis would generate insights on the important phenomenon of foreign policy reorientation. What can be learned about the proposed relationship between external socialization, the domestic web of constraint imposed by strategic culture, institutions and public opinion and how do the findings relate to the study of foreign policy analysis?

The three case studies covering the time period 1990-1995 produced findings that were consistent with the original theoretical expectations. The impact of foreign
expectations on German foreign policy reorientation is evident throughout the
investigated time period as German elites could be shown to have been acutely and
consistently aware of the demands generated by global and regional security
organizations and national actors from the external environment. The speculations made
by researchers about German foreign policy being affected by outside demands are
shown to have been correct. Over the covered time period, conservative elites acted as
norm entrepreneurs for the use of force by repeatedly reminding other parliamentary
elites of German obligations towards the alliance and by holding out the specter of
political isolation should German fail to fulfill its responsibilities towards the Western
value community. As the model predicted, the power of conservative elites to act as norm
entrepreneurs by persuading others to accept the use of force outside of German territory
increased as post-Cold War understandings of necessary doctrines and military response
mechanisms as well as the contributions of individual actors towards the maintenance of
peace and stability solidified into an increasingly more established regime. Thus, the first
role episode of the Persian Gulf War finds conservatives attempting to comply with
foreign expectations but ultimately failing to convince their coalition partners from the
FDP and the left-of-center politicians that German military contributions to the effort to
liberate Kuwait were necessary. Conservative elites backed down and compensated with
‘checkbook diplomacy’ through which they validated the external demands. In addition,
they promised that they would pursue the internal changes necessary to be able to comply
with future demands for German contributions. By the end of the Bosnian Civil War
episode, the power of conservatives to change policy had grown considerably.
International norms supporting intervention and rapid reaction doctrines had been
established by UN, NATO and the European Union. Understandings of a more volatile security environment had replaced the initial euphoria surrounding the end of the Cold War with the violence in Yugoslavia constituting an important series of learning events. FDP politicians including foreign ministers Genscher and Kinkel had already moved towards a more assertive policy orientation during the recognition of Croatia and Slovenia during which Germany’s rejection of military force had been shown to have been a major limitation on effective diplomacy. During the Bosnian role episode, international pressure on German elites to comply with solidifying humanitarian intervention norms intensified. The last holdout against role adaptation, politicians from the Social Democratic Party and the Alliance 90/Greens, caved in as concerns over human rights violations, the efficacy of multilateral peacekeeping operations to address regional instabilities and Germany’s diplomatic isolation coalesced with electoral interests. The combination of external expectations and electoral interests strongly supported policy normalization as a means to rebuild public confidence in the ability of Social Democrats and Greens to assume governmental control in post-unification Germany.

To sum up, role behavior pressure was greatest on German elites when threat perceptions and normative expectations of national actor contributions had solidified into institutional guidelines and doctrines such as the WEU’s Petersberg Tasks from 1992. As such, the social environment exerted its greatest pressure between 1992-1995 with noticeable effects on elite debates and subsequent changes in foreign policy behavior. The logical conclusion is that the effectiveness of role socialization through group expectations tends to increase when normative standards emanating from the external
environment are clear, consistent, and unchallenged. An important finding in regards to
the existence of unclear norms and variation in the degree of actor compliance pertains to
the effect of dyadic relations.

As intermediate variable, dyadic relations increase the complexity of the
expectations generated within the social environment. This is particularly noticeable
when the expectations of important states within the group exerting pressure on the focal
actor are still based on older role conceptions. For instance, during the Persian Gulf War,
French, British and Soviet foreign policy circles showed profound apprehension about
German power after reunification while the United States and the UN already insisted
that Germany contribute in line with its capabilities. In essence, Germany was exposed to
two mutually exclusive roles expectations and elites showed great policy ambiguity as
they tried to meet divergent expectations of the role of a predictable and reliable state.
During this time, regional security organizations which could have offered an
authoritative role definition were still undergoing redevelopment processes and could not
offer a clear social definition of what constituted appropriate behavior. Towards the end
of the Bosnian role episode in 1994, role expectations and obligations were more clearly
defined. The social ‘noise’ created by dyadic relations gave way to a clear group message
on appropriate great power contributions to international peace and stability.

Culture, Institutions and Public Opinion

During the time period covered by the investigated role episodes, German
strategic culture remained consistently antimilitant. Elites remained hesitant to deploy
force outside of German territory and eventual compliance with external demands to
contribute forces came only after much soul-searching. Once the Bundeswehr was committed to supporting peacekeeping activities in Bosnia after the Dayton Accords, care was taken to deploy forces in areas least likely to see conflict. The trend to seek out the least dangerous areas for troop deployment continues to this day. Public opinion also remained largely pacifist during the studied cases. The detailed RAND studies covering the period 1990-1994 analyzed by Asmus (1992; 1994; 1995) indicate minor increases in support levels for a more assertive role for Germany. But public opinion clearly continues to favor multilateralism and activities centered on peaceful contributions to the maintenance of international peace and stability. As such, the set of values that characterizes strategic culture since World War II can be said to have remained largely intact after reunification. The fact that elites were able to change security policy in spite of cultural constraints has important ramifications for the research paradigm of strategic culture.

Strategic culture should be understood as a dependent or intermediate rather than independent variable. Many scholars who emphasize the independent effect of strategic culture have viewed Germany’s resistance to become a ‘like unit’ under anarchy as a function of the persistence of the value of antimilitarism. German elites certainly resisted pressure to conform to external expectations by invoking their country’s antimilitant institutions and culture. But the existence of a cultural and institutional web of constraint on the use of force did not prevent political elites from reorienting their country’s stance on the use of force in response to external stimuli. An emphasis on strategic culture as independent variable would not necessarily have suggested the change

in security policy. The interaction between the external and internal normative contexts is crucial for understanding the reorientation. In changing security policy, elites did not ignore cultural values but chose to reinterpret them. The values of predictability and calculability remained very important to elites as indicated by the continual rhetoric of alliance solidarity. As the nature of alliance solidarity and corresponding behavioral expectations changed, so did the views of German elites about the necessity of contributing militarily. In addition, strategic culture did influence the nature of compliance with external demands. Military force was deployed but with the attachment of important qualifications to minimize exposure to combat. Thus, Germany’s antimilitant web of constraint continues to persist and influence German security policy in important ways by delimiting the scope of elite action. The cultural and institutional context will delay and possibly prevent the full development of a ‘normal’ great power role as predicted by realist scholars. A nonassertive diplomatic style and a strong preference for multilateralism will continue to characterize German foreign policy in the foreseeable future. In sum, the findings of studies on German strategic culture are generally confirmed here with the important caveat that an understanding of elite foreign policy preferences requires both cultural analysis and a consideration of the normative context of the external environment.

On a final note on institutional research paradigms, the findings of the dissertation are also supporting key assumptions of the approach of historical institutionalism in comparative politics. On the question of the relationship between agents and structure, historical institutionalists generally assume a mutual constitution of actor preferences and institutions and an equally interactive process between institutions and culture (Spehn
2006, 195). Threshold events and path-dependencies are important components of this view of the impact of institutions in which agents possess partial autonomy from structures, varying amounts of power and somewhat independent preferences. This explains their desire and ability to transform institutions during critical times.

The end of the Cold War and the emergence of a new security environment represented a critical juncture which forced elites to redirect security policy during the 1990s. Elites reinterpreted the country’s antimilitant constitution on the basis of alliance solidarity and began to reorganize the *Bundeswehr* to allow for deployment in missions outside of German territory. Throughout the process of reorientation, individuals adapted institutions and interpreted central values according to their own instrumental designs but generally guided by the limitations imposed by the broader strategic culture that enveloped all decision-making. The important lesson for historical institutionalism is that external normative elements may influence domestic interest formation in establishing an acceptable convergence point for elite interests. Thus, the design of domestic institutions is significantly affected by elite interactions with the external environment.

**Internal and External Factors in Foreign Policy Formulation**

Micro-level interests of elites constitute another important intermediate variable. Domestic contexts, institutions and actors have long been recognized as important variables in explaining variations in norm diffusion. This study adds to the tradition that finds internal actors pursuing both instrumental and normative interests with the likelihood of norm adoption increasing when the two are congruent. Between 1990 and 1995, German elites strongly contributed to the evolution of institutional capacities after
the Cold War. Even committed pacifists including Fischer began to act when they saw
the survival and effectiveness of those institutions threatened over the conflicts in
Yugoslavia. Shared threat perceptions, humanitarian intervention norms and concern over
institutional effectiveness came together in a powerful mix driving role adaptation. What
is novel here is that elite concerns like electoral interests may also be relatively unrelated
to the international normative expectations. Yet the norm may still function as a logical
point of interest convergence between the positions of parliamentary elites. Interest
convergence points are also influenced by central values derived from strategic culture.
These establish general parameters of acceptable conduct. As such, elite decision-making
logic is determined by both instrumental as well as social considerations. Germany’s role
shift towards the incorporation of the use of force was facilitated by the emphasis on the
value of multilateralism and the avoidance of political isolation. The relevance of
strategic culture in determining convergence points may indicate that effective role
adaptation requires congruence between external normative expectations and at least one
central tenet of strategic culture. This confirms a hypothesis by Cortell and Davis (2000)
that domestic salience through cultural match increases the likelihood of norm adoption.

This study finds significant evidence for the initial proposition that Germany as
focal actor adopted a new role understanding through the process of socialization.
Without external socialization, strategic culture probably would have predisposed
Germany to adhere to the traditional civilian power role conception. An important puzzle
in the constructivism research agenda remains the process of norm diffusion between
states. This requires a focus on the interaction between external demands, domestic actors
and processes of norm adaptation. This study has focused on persuasion processes
between political elites. Persuasion occurred between leaders of foreign states and heads of organizations on one hand and German political elites on the other. Persuasion processes also took place among parliamentary elites.

At the systemic level, Germany’s political elites indicated through discursive statements, public announcements and interviews that they were concerned about how their country’s role behavior was evaluated abroad. Elites complied with external expectations as they became supported by clear and consistent international security doctrines. The terminology ‘partners’, ‘allies’ and ‘Western value community’ appeared in conjunction with perceived role obligations of having to demonstrate solidarity and responsibility. The importance of the social reference group of Western states also appeared in the discourse associated with status considerations which acted as positive reinforcement for role adaptation. Here the consensus shifted from the reference to the smaller states in Europe to great or middle power although the status objective frequently was presented in the language of obligations. In other words, German elites were concerned about their standing and influence within the group of great powers. The desire to maintain both status and avoid shame through compliance got stronger throughout the early 1990s.

The evidence shows that socialization between governmental elites takes place routinely, that it may affect foreign policy outcomes and that even security policy as preeminent domain of the state is not immune to external socialization. This refutes realist perspectives which view socialization as a type of natural selection process. Policy adaptation in security issues may occur because states adjust to social expectations of
appropriate foreign policy conduct. This suggests that Germany is normalizing, but for social rather than competitive reasons. Germany continues to confound realism.

At the domestic level, parliamentary elites engaged in attempts aimed at political persuasion. Conservative elites invoked elements of the traditional role conception to affect a change in security policy. Thus, they emphasized responsibility, solidarity, and the idea of Germany having reaching maturity to rhetorically persuade opposition elites that maintaining the old role required the change of behavior. Social Democrats and Greens invoked a very different role conception in which they viewed the renunciation of international violence as central element of a special role for Germany. They understood responsibility in a wider sense as Germany’s obligation to help establish a more civil world order in which the use of force was systematically abolished and differences were settled through law-based procedures. Germany’s past was viewed as obligating the country to reject any behavior that resembled great power politics. Even international organizations were suspect if they appeared to be used for that purpose. The moral conviction of opposition elites that Germany should continue to play the special role of a civilizing country in world politics, a role somewhat comparable to the mediator role played by Sweden, was untenable given external expectations. Given these expectations, a civilizing role for a great power with alliance obligations would have been abnormal. Such a special role would have carried the risk of political isolation from the reference group of Western allies. The prevention of Germany’s isolation served as ‘preferred premise’ among parliamentary elites.\(^{349}\) The existence of this preferred premise allowed

\(^{349}\) Greenhalgh and Russell (2005) argue that policy debates tend to start with premises shared by actors which are the product of values, value hierarchies and preferences of one abstraction over another.
conservative elites to act as norm entrepreneurs by connecting foreign expectations of military engagement with their desire for normalization and present policy reorientation as way of forestalling the threat of diplomatic isolation.

Public policy is made of language and argumentation is central to understanding political processes. “Argumentation is the key process through which citizens and policymakers arrive at moral judgments and policy choices. … Each participant [in policy debates] is encouraged to adjust his view of reality, and even to change his values, as a result of the process of reciprocal persuasion” (Majone 1989, 8). The main argumentation scheme used by role entrepreneurs was that of association. Association combines elements that were previously regarded as being separate through metaphor or analogy (Greenhalgh and Russell 2005, 36). Economic power and use of force had been regarded as separate and incompatible during the Cold War. The former behavior had been associated with the civilian role. The latter conduct had been viewed as part of a more assertive, great power role reminiscent of Germany’s role in the past. During the out-of-area debates of the 1990s, role entrepreneurs argued for the merger of the two role conceptions under the heading of normalization. They emphasized necessity due to the transformed nature of the security environment and appropriateness due to external expectations. Conservative elites cleverly argued that security policy reorientation was required to preserve responsibility, calculability, predictability and solidarity—the key values of the traditional role conception. Without behavioral adaptation, so they argued, parliamentary elites would actually risk violating the central premises of the role their country had adopted after World War II. The argument became increasingly more convincing as the international agreement on addressing domestic instabilities through
out-of-area interventions became essentially uncontested. The moral position of pacifism defended by more radical opposition politicians became untenable when violence increased in the Yugoslav civil war and German inaction was increasingly perceived as tantamount to being a bystander to a crime. As external normative expectations began to trump the key value of antimilitarism among parliamentary elites, Germany’s role behavior was adapted to include the use of military force for peace enforcement missions.

The Utility of Role Theory in Foreign Policy Analysis

Since the landmark study by Holsti (1970), roles in foreign policy analysis have repeatedly been viewed as useful concepts to understand, categorize and possibly predict the behavior of national actors. This has not been an easy undertaking and the initial development of rigid categories of roles based on functional assumptions within stable social environments failed to yield useful results. The theory used in this dissertation falls into the category of symbolic interactionism which assumes a more fluent situational context in which roles are established through a range of social processes including but not limited to negotiation, persuasion and affirmation. The focus on processes of social interaction—the role episode—allows us to view security policy reorientation as a type of social phenomena distinct from individual and group decision-making processes, the impact of organizational processes, bureaucratic politics or state-society networks. As a decidedly social account of foreign policy change, role episodes are useful in that they help uncover a process of change through social messages and responses. The focus on the process of change as social series of interlinked episodes emphasizes the overall connection between events through the shared understandings of elites.
occurs through events but also through altered understandings which can be traced by considering the aftermaths of role episodes. In sum, foreign policy making ceases to be a series of haphazard events and responses but can be conceptualized as exhibiting significant continuity.

By conceptualizing states as social actors, role episodes and the focus on elite conceptions contribute to the current constructivist research agenda in adding to our knowledge on processes of socialization and norm resonance. Role episodes add detail and depth to accounts of change and norm compliance. But the focus also exhibits limitations: Material conditions such as the distribution of power within the international system influence actor decisions and those factors are considered only indirectly in the model in the form of perceptions of material capabilities. The straightforward focus on elites leaves out a range of other domestic factors that could potentially influence foreign policy formation. While an attempt has been made to include public opinion, this was done only indirectly with public opinion being considered sporadically when figuring in elite calculations of electoral interests. In addition, the public’s preferences were viewed as predetermined by strategic culture. The model also excluded other types of structural determinants at the domestic level including but not limited to state-society relation models suggested by Katzenstein, Risse-Kappen and others.

The main deficiency of the presented model of foreign policy reorientation is that it is characterized by relatively low levels of parsimony. The in-depth analysis of security policy reorientation through normative expectations at the international and the interest formation of elites at the domestic level produced a rich account that incorporated a number of important elements at different levels of analysis that are usually not
investigated in conjunction with one another. This combination yielded an account of change that has relatively limited applicability to other cases, times and countries. While this may appear as a disappointment to international relations theorists, scholars in foreign policy analysis have long learned to live with the dilemma. McClosky wrote in an early work about foreign policy analysis that its “inordinate complexity … is unquestionably its greatest shortcoming…” with the scholar “having to collect data about a great number of variables whose relative importance he can only guess at and whose influence he cannot easily measure in any event” (1962, 201). The presented model attempts to retain as much parsimony as is prudent while adhering to the need for an actor-specific orientation of the field as articulated by Alexander George (1993). As such, the emphasis on role episodes offers a way to bridge the gap between theory and thick description.

Agenda for Future Research

Suggestions for further research arise logically from the limitations of this study. An important methodological concern would involve complementing the current research based on document analysis with a series of structured interviews with decision-makers. This would help reveal underlying motivations for particular policy actions. In addition to the key decision-makers, interviewing individuals engaged in policy implementation at lower levels may prove to be especially rewarding because these individuals may be more inclined to truthfully disclose social and utilitarian concerns influencing German politics at the time. Social interaction processes including persuasion affect individuals in both formal and informal settings. Including information from interviews would reveal
informal social pressure on decision-makers from their peers in other countries and from international organizations.

A second methodological suggestion for further research would be the extension of the study to include a comparison of several incidents of security policy orientation. This dissertation examined one reorientation over a five year period and the findings represent only a first cut at the information that could be garnered on the understudied phenomenon of foreign policy reorientation through social pressure. Multiple case studies should help answer questions about the relative weighting of social and instrumental motivations of decision-makers. Numerous cases should also assist in the effort of improving role theory.

Social roles of states are largely the product of the international environment which means that expectations of appropriate role behavior are based on systemic characteristics. The precise definition of social expectations ultimately requires the formulation of a comprehensive role theory for the international system. This has turned out to be a difficult enterprise. Tentative role categories for international relations were developed by Holsti (1970) and Walker (1987) but no full systemic theory has been formulated as yet. This dissertation loosely applied assumptions of both structural and symbolic interactionist role theory to make the claim that Germany had its role behavior imposed on it by international society due to its social position but also continued to negotiate its role behavior on the basis of its identity as indicated by the reservations that continue to be attached to deployments of the Bundeswehr. Thus, the dissertation sidestepped the question of how the international system creates and confers roles on
The specification of roles and the explication of their origin on the basis of cultural or material system factors would present a worthwhile venue of future exploration.

Another question that was largely bracketed was the issue of situation-specific roles. The conceptions of appropriate German behavior in the Persian Gulf region held by elites would have differed from those in Yugoslavia where involvement was tainted by the burden of history. Future studies should devise models that take into account both regional and situational contexts on role conceptions held by state actors.

The final suggestions for future research are addressed to the civilian power research paradigm. The basic premise of the paradigm resting on the work of Rosecrance and Maull was that the evolution of international relations towards greater interdependence influenced state roles within the system. The new category of the civilian power emerged because states relying on international law instead of military capabilities were better adapted to system characteristics. But the ‘ideal type’ of the civilian power seems to have been associated with the more stable bipolar world order. This ideal type appears to be undergoing changes for great powers in the more unstable context emerging since the end of the Cold War. Germany and Japan will face pressure to act in military ways to preserve international peace and security. This suggests that social position and status as well as systemic parameters have to be more fully included in future studies of civilian power conduct. At the very least, it appears that the behavior of great civilian powers has to be distinguished from that of lesser civilian powers.
Conclusion

The evolution of Germany’s contributions to multilateral efforts that involve the use of force since the policy reorientation of the mid-90s indicate that policy elites have decisively shifted their country’s role in line with international expectations. In 1996, the Federal Republic contributed to NATO’s stabilization force (SFOR) in Bosnia which succeeded the IFOR deployment. As part of this operation, 1500 Bundeswehr soldiers including infantry and armored reconnaissance troops were deployed for monitoring and security functions as part of larger French-German unit (Duffield 1998, 216). At the time, Defense Minister Rühe commented that Germany had finally assumed the same risks and responsibilities as other allies (Die Welt, October 5, 1996). In the Bundestag, the mission received widespread support with 499 parliamentarians supporting the deployment (Duffield 1998, 216). In a dramatic expansion of German military responsibilities since reorientation, Luftwaffe jets participated in full combat missions over Kosovo in March 1999. Germany’s contributions to peace enforcement in Kosovo included 5000 ground troops, making it the largest deployment of the Bundeswehr since World War II. German politicians also played a leading diplomatic role during the conflict. The action was the more remarkable because it took place during the rule of the Red-Green coalition government headed by Chancellor Schröder. Left-of-center elites including Foreign Minister Fischer who had opposed role adaptation during the early 1990s now supported Germany’s new role and the use of force. They risked their own political futures and overcame public and inner-party opposition in the interest of maintaining alliance solidarity and demonstrating responsibility for international peace and stability. Struggles between pragmatists and traditionalists within the Alliance 90/Green party
continued and the party barely survived a fundamental split. Public opinion remained antimilitant and domestic tension mounted as it became clear that the German public would not accept *Bundeswehr* participation in a potential escalation towards ground combat. In 2001, Germany contributed to the NATO operations in Afghanistan (*ISAF*) with about 1000 *Bundeswehr* soldiers who were deployed in the northern part of the country. Again, the desire to demonstrate solidarity and responsibility remained a vital factor in explaining the use of force with Foreign Minister Steinmeier stating like his predecessors that “the Tornado Deployment is an indication of our support of ISAF and NATO in Afghanistan in difficult times…I say, in my opinion we owe this solidarity to the alliance”.

In another noteworthy action during the process of role adaptation, the Federal Republic was willing to commit troops and the Federal Navy in its most significant deployment since World War II in 2006. The forces were dispatched to patrol the Lebanese-Syrian border as part of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon after the end of hostilities between Israel and Hezbollah.

In their military commitments since reorientation, policy elites have shown greater compliance with international expectations when these demands came from an authoritative organization enforcing a clear and coherently applied normative standard. Thus, Germany declined to comply with US pressure to partake in the military campaign against Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein in 2003. Without the support of the multilateral United Nations, expectations were unclear and allowed German elites greater policy latitude. Cases since 1995 also show a German tendency to support peacekeeping missions rather than the more challenging tasks of peace-building. Military contributions

since reorientation continue to be associated with complex limitations on the use of the
provided troop and equipment contingents. The reduction of combat risk continues to be
a major issue in securing cross-party support for the use of force. In Afghanistan, for
instance, German forces were deployed in the areas least likely to see extensive combat.
German elites, despite considerable prodding by allies, have also not shown much of an
inclination to increase national defense spending which continues to lack behind those of
other great powers except Japan by a considerable margin. These factors suggest that
powerful constraints on the use of force continue to exist that will delay or prevent full
normalization of German role conceptions. The first one of these constraints clearly is the
value of antimilitarism contained in strategic culture which has public opinion showing
no pattern towards the increasing acceptance of the use of force. A second factor is
institutional in nature. The Constitutional Court ruling of 1994 allowed for the use of
force but also limited the government’s ability to deploy the Bundeswehr unless
supported by a Bundestag majority. Coalition politics in the multiparty system of the
Federal Republic will act as break on too ambitious an escalation of Bundeswehr
deployments. The traditional institutions of German civil-military relations will further
limit normalization through the integrative functions they perform in linking state with its
antimilitant society.

In a final word addressed to policy-makers and those interested in contemporary
German foreign policy, major deviations from current parameters in German security

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351 Duffield (1998, 217) argues that agreement on the critical IFOR deployment decision was possible
because of provisions limiting the combat risks of German soldiers.

352 In 2006, Germany spent 1.3 percent of GDP on military expenditures which compared to 2.4 percent for
France, 2.6 percent for the United Kingdom and 4 percent for the United States (Stockholm International
Peace Research Institute, http://milexdata.sipri.org, accessed March 24, 2009). With that number, the
country is voluntarily approaching Japan’s constitutionally imposed 1 percent barrier.
policy are not to be expected. Policy will remain predominantly multilateral and military force will be applied on the basis of a mandate established by authoritative international institutions. Even though external pressure allowed for reorientation, the country’s unique burden of history continues to profoundly shape the political possibilities of the present.
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APPENDIX

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AWACS  Airborne Warning and Control System
CDU   Christlich-Demokratische Union Deutschlands (Christian Democratic Party)
CSU   Christlich-Soziale Union (Christian-Social Union Party)
CSCE  Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
DPA   Deutsche Presse Agentur (German Press Agency)
DW    Die Welt
EEC   European Economic Community
EMU   Economic and Monetary Union
EPC   European Political Cooperation
EU    European Union
FAZ   Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung
FBIS-EEU  Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Eastern Europe
FBIS-WEU Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Western Europe
FDP    Free Liberal Party (Freie Liberale Partei)
GDR    German Democratic Republic (East Germany)
IFOR  (NATO) Implementation Force
NATO  North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NYT   New York Times
OSCE  Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PDS   Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus (Party of Democratic Socialism)
PB    Plenarprotokoll Bundestag (Plenary Transcript of the Bundestag)
SACEUR Supreme Allied Commander Europe
SFOR  (NATO) Stabilization Force
SED   Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands (Socialist Unity Party of Germany)
SPD   Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands
SZ    Süddeutsche Zeitung
UN    United Nations
UNSC  United Nations Security Council
UNOSOM United Nations Operation in Somalia
UNPROFOR United Nations Protection Force in the Former Yugoslavia
UNTAC United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia
WEU   Western European Union
WMD   Weapons of Mass Destruction
WP    Washington Post
WSJ   Wall Street Journal