Publication Date
2-10-2023
Abstract
Hiding under the guise of the fundamental purposes of tort law, the theory of negligence in the United States holds defendants with mental disabilities liable for their actions despite the real possibility that they may be incapable of exercising the required level of care. While individuals with mental disabilities are required to exercise the same level of care as the reasonable, prudent person under the circumstances, the law allows concessions for children and individuals with physical disabilities. For these exceptions, the age and intelligence or physical disability of the defendant are considered part of the circumstances under which the defendant must exercise care. Courts and commentators provide many public policy arguments for why the subjective standard is necessary for children and those with physical disabilities; however, many of the arguments supporting the exceptions are applicable to defendants with mental disabilities. Though the law is intended to provide compensation to injured parties, it strongly disfavors holding someone liable for actions they cannot control. Accordingly, this Comment proposes subjectivizing the reasonable person standard for defendants with mental disabilities to consider how their mental disabilities affect their capacity to act reasonably. As support for a subjective standard, this Comment draws parallels to contributory negligence and tort liability in other countries where individuals are not expected to exercise a level of care that they are incapable of. Additionally, this Comment urges that the societal and scientific understanding of mental disabilities no longer supports the traditional policy reasons for holding individuals with mental disabilities liable for torts without consideration of their ability to exercise the required level of care.
First Page
281
Recommended Citation
Mackenzie Coupens, Subjectivizing the Negligence Reasonable Person Standard for Persons with Mental Disabilities, 100 DENV. L. REV. 281 (2022).