Publication Date
3-14-2022
Abstract
In 2018, Cyrus Vance Jr., the New York County District Attorney for Manhattan, opened a criminal investigation into then-President Donald J. Trump on suspicion that he violated state law. Vance served a subpoena duces tecum on Mazars USA, the financial accounting firm for then-President Trump, directing it to produce then-President Trump’s personal and business-related financial information. In response, then-President Trump asserted that his status as President of the United States entitled him to categorical, absolute immunity from the subpoena because compliance with said subpoena would unduly distract him from his constitutional duties. Although this was not the first time that a president had been subject to a subpoena duces tecum, the unique action of a state prosecutor serving a sitting president through a third-party accounting firm raised novel constitutional issues for the U.S. Supreme Court in Trump v. Vance, which was a case of first impression for the Court. The case involved two legal issues: (1) whether a sitting president is entitled to absolute immunity from state criminal process; and (2) whether a subpoena duces tecum served by a state prosecutor must satisfy a heightened showing when served on a sitting president. The U.S. Constitution’s Framers recognized the danger of granting broad immunity for a sitting president because of their experiences with the English monarchy’s abuse of unilateral and largely unchecked authority. The Constitution does not permit the criminal indictment of a sitting president, mainly to ensure that the executive is not unduly distracted from executing the vital functions of the presidency. However, the Framers sought to limit the President’s ability to evade judicial compliance by directing the executive to comply with judicial process as any ordinary citizen would. Since the birth of our Nation, the Court has consistently upheld this intent in their presidential immunity jurisprudence by compelling a president’s compliance with criminal process as necessary for the needs of justice. In yet another affirmation of the Framers’ intent, the Vance Court came to the unanimous and resounding conclusion that a sitting president is not categorically nor absolutely immune from complying with a state criminal subpoena duces tecum. Moreover, the Court held that such a subpoena does not require a heightened showing for service on a sitting president. The Court came to these conclusions from an analysis of two cases that most closely resemble the facts of Vance: United States v. Burr and United States v. Nixon. In all three cases, the Court ruled that a sitting president must comply with judicial process as any citizen would be required to do and that distraction is not a viable argument for a sitting president seeking to avoid such compliance. Accordingly, this Comment argues that the Vance Court properly adhered to its presidential immunity precedents in a manner consistent with the Framers’ intent of the presidency. This Comment then argues that then-President Trump’s distraction argument failed because New York’s interest in criminal investigations outweighed then-President Trump’s Article II interest in executing his duties without undue interference. Next, this Comment argues that the Court should have applied the “demonstrated, specific need” standard from Nixon to solidify a standard for serving a subpoena duces tecum on a sitting president even though its choice to not apply such standard did not affect the outcome of Vance. Finally, this Comment concludes with an update on the case’s subject matter as then-President Trump lost the 2020 presidential election, changing his status from President to U.S. citizen and therefore, negating any constitutional protections he had with respect to criminal due process.
First Page
201
Recommended Citation
Mitchell Lewis Blackstone, Trump v. Vance: The Distraction Argument and Absolute Presidential Immunity, 99 DENV. L. REV. 201 (2021).