Date of Award
Josef Korbel School of International Studies
Cyber warfare, Cybersecurity, Elinor Ostrom, Geneva conventions, Law of armed conflict, New institutional economics
Allusions to death delivered by bits and bytes have been in vogue since the Reagan administration. Yet, as the internet and its connected devices have since proliferated, cyber violence remains far more fiction than fact. Nevertheless, prominent U.S. officials have all but assured the eventuality of a devastating attack. In anticipation, political, legal, and industry experts are now seeking to codify and inculcate international norms to govern acts of war prosecuted via cyberspace. Two of the most prominent governance models to emerge are the Tallinn Manual and Microsoft’s Digital Geneva Convention. The driving thesis of this research argues that within the monolith of the internet, there lie situations that can be examined through the lens of New Institutional Economics and commons governance, lending to rigorous and outcomes-based policy analysis. Through the application of Ostrom’s Institutional Analysis and Development framework, this paper individually evaluates the two governance models in question and offers a theory as to the likely efficacy of each approach. This research ultimately finds that the Tallinn Manual achieves its narrow and explicit aims of demonstrating how international law applies to cyberspace while falling short of reaching its full potential as a governance institution. The Digital Geneva Convention is unlikely to meet its objective of becoming a binding international agreement, though the associated, newly founded CyberPeace Institute could breathe life into the initiative.
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Kelleher, Kevin M., "An Economic Analysis of Cyber Warfare Governance Models" (2020). Electronic Theses and Dissertations. 1779.
Received from ProQuest
Kevin M. Kelleher
International relations, International law, Economic theory