Date of Award
Dr. Tracy Mott
This paper analyzes the empirical events of capital market liberalization in Russia and refers to the procedure of capital market liberalization described in theory as a benchmark to assess the magnitude of events shaping the capital market liberalization in Russia.
The reformers of Russian regime change did not take a gradual approach of adjustments toward a successful socioeconomic transition. The state failed to create market-supporting institutions and instead rather proceeded with an ambitious program of synchronized application of policy changes and the economic liberalization. Lack of market-supporting institutions and an underdeveloped legal system in Russia have been the key tools through which politically well-connected managers and politicians themselves seized the opportunity and established ownership of former state-owned enterprises. Russian privatization did not provide efficiency incentives to produce new wealth, rather is has redistributed the already existing wealth through dubious methods.
Clearly, the ultimate goal of capital liberalization in Russia was not to disperse ownership of former state-owned enterprises among the people of Russia, but to create a powerful support group that would ensure the second mandate of President Yeltsin's administration. The class of newborn `oligarchs' in Russia became the ruling minority that was not interested in creating value; rather, they were interested in stealing the value that has already existed. Weak and vaguely defined laws as opposed to explicit legal foundations and the ability to enforce contracts at proper institutions make an enormous difference in development of capital markets.
Smole, Nejc, "Liberalization of the Capital Market in Russia" (2008). Electronic Theses and Dissertations. 613.
Recieved from ProQuest
Finance, Economic history