Publication Date

1-1-2011

Document Type

Article

Organizational Units

Sturm College of Law

Keywords

World Trade Organization (WTO), Dispute settlement, Cessation, Compensation, Suspension of concessions, Retaliation, Class action lawsuits, Developing nations

Abstract

At the heart of the WTO lies a set of rules and negotiated trade terms, such as tariffs, designed to promote trade liberalization or the removal of barriers to free trade. When a WTO member nation violates a rule or trade term, the affected nation or nations may bring a complaint under the dispute settlement procedures of the WTO.2 When nations win cases at the WTO, the preferred remedy is that the losing nation withdraws the offending measure or rule. This action is akin to stopping the embezzlement going forward. The remedy is purely prospective. If withdrawal occurs, the suit ends. If withdrawal does not occur, then the parties negotiate for compensation—but only if the offender agrees to pay. Fines or punitive damages are off the table. The remedy of last resort is the imposition of tariffs and import restrictions on the losing nation. However, this remedy is not helpful for developing nations that do not possess sufficient economic power to meaningfully use the remedy. For some WTO nations, the only real remedy is prospective withdrawal.

Publication Statement

Copyright held by the author. User is responsible for all copyright compliance.

Rights Holder

Phoenix X.F. Cai, Emory International Law Review

File Format

application/pdf

Language

English (eng)

Extent

46 pgs

File Size

264 KB

Publication Title

Emory International Law Review

Volume

25

Issue

1

First Page

151

Last Page

196

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