Date of Award
Josef Korbel School of International Studies
Arms control, Institutional design, Nuclear, Nuclear weapons
The technical institutional design of arms control agreements remains a rather unexplored area of arms control. But the increasing uncertainty of future arms control efficacy requires a re-examination of the agreements’ institutional design to determine which components contribute positively to their longevity. This research examines the role of dispute settlement bodies as specific outside consultative bodies, verification regimes, membership as at least one nuclear-armed state party to the agreement, and technology transfer mechanisms in arms control agreements. It found that membership and a lack of technology transfer mechanisms are necessary to positively impact the longevity of an arms control agreement, meaning agreements are longest when at least one nuclear-armed nation is involved. Technology transfers were present in only a few agreements, but may have complicated agreements or made empty promises, impacting the duration of those agreements. Dispute settlement bodies and a lack of verification regimes are sufficient but not necessary conditions to positively impact longevity in this research. The relationship between a lack of verification regimes and longevity is the most interesting and suggests there may be an ideal level of verification.
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Budlong, Jessica, "The Institutional Design of Arms Control: To What Extent Does Institutional Design Increase the Longevity of Arms Control Agreements?" (2021). Electronic Theses and Dissertations. 1921.
Received from ProQuest
International relations, Economics