Violence After Victory: Explaining Variation in State Repression Following Contentious Politics
Date of Award
Josef Korbel School of International Studies
Marie E. Berry
Civil-military relations, Democratization, Human rights, Nepal, Post-conflict, State repression
If conflict onset leads to increases in human rights abuse, how can these abuses be curbed once conflicts have ended? To answer this question, researchers have traditionally focused on a country’s regime type and leaders’ incentive structures. This is insufficient, I argue, because many regimes with obvious incentives to curb repression (especially democracies) fail to do so. In addition to regime-type, therefore, the answer depends on whether a given regime can count on the cooperation of its military and law enforcement institutions, which I refer to collectively as the security apparatus. This is because security agents’ prior experiences usually create strong proclivities for violence, and these proclivities must be actively counteracted before agents adopt restraint instead. While some regime leaders have sufficient authority and power over the security apparatus to compel this restraint, many do not. Security apparatuses that emerge from conflict episodes with the autonomy to defy regime leaders’ preferences will tend to protect agents from oversight and accountability mechanisms, perpetuating extrajudicial executions and other forms of severe abuse. I support this argument using cross-national statistical analyses in addition to an in-depth case study entailing five weeks of field research in Kathmandu, Nepal.
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Shay, Christopher Wiley, "Violence After Victory: Explaining Variation in State Repression Following Contentious Politics" (2021). Electronic Theses and Dissertations. 1991.
Received from ProQuest
Christopher Wiley Shay