Publication Date
2018
Document Type
Article
Organizational Units
Sturm College of Law
Keywords
Mixed motives, Causal relationships, Discrimination law
Abstract
The law of mental causation—or motives—is a mess. It is as if writers in the field are using different languages to describe a multiplicity of causal concepts. The plethora of causal terms and lack of definitional clarity make it difficult to understand the relationship among causal concepts within a single area of law, let alone across substantive areas of law. To reach a clear and consistent understanding of this mess, it would be useful to have a Rosetta Stone—a translation key describing causal concepts and the relationships among those concepts in a precise and universal way. Andrew Verstein’s article, The Jurisprudence of Mixed Motives, comes close to reaching this ideal. However, his model suffers from two critical flaws: failing to justify a key analytical move and using terminology that is more confusing than it is universal. In this Response, I suggest remedies to those problems as well as a way to transform Verstein’s model into a Rosetta Stone for mental causation.
Publication Statement
Originally published as Martin Katz, A Rosetta Stone for Causation, 127 YALE L.J. F. 877 (2017-2018). Copyright is held by the author. User is responsible for all copyright compliance.
Rights Holder
Martin J. Katz
Provenance
Received from author
File Format
application/pdf
Language
English (eng)
Extent
31 pgs
File Size
2.5 MB
Publication Title
The Yale Law Journal
Volume
127
First Page
877
Last Page
907
Recommended Citation
Martin Katz, A Rosetta Stone for Causation, 127 YALE L.J. F. 877 (2017-2018).