Publication Date

2018

Document Type

Article

Organizational Units

Sturm College of Law

Keywords

Mixed motives, Causal relationships, Discrimination law

Abstract

The law of mental causation—or motives—is a mess. It is as if writers in the field are using different languages to describe a multiplicity of causal concepts. The plethora of causal terms and lack of definitional clarity make it difficult to understand the relationship among causal concepts within a single area of law, let alone across substantive areas of law. To reach a clear and consistent understanding of this mess, it would be useful to have a Rosetta Stone—a translation key describing causal concepts and the relationships among those concepts in a precise and universal way. Andrew Verstein’s article, The Jurisprudence of Mixed Motives, comes close to reaching this ideal. However, his model suffers from two critical flaws: failing to justify a key analytical move and using terminology that is more confusing than it is universal. In this Response, I suggest remedies to those problems as well as a way to transform Verstein’s model into a Rosetta Stone for mental causation.

Publication Statement

Originally published as Martin Katz, A Rosetta Stone for Causation, 127 YALE L.J. F. 877 (2017-2018). Copyright is held by the author. User is responsible for all copyright compliance.

Rights Holder

Martin J. Katz

Provenance

Received from author

File Format

application/pdf

Language

English (eng)

Extent

31 pgs

File Size

2.5 MB

Publication Title

The Yale Law Journal

Volume

127

First Page

877

Last Page

907

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