The Supreme Court and Title VII

Publication Date

1-1-2003

Document Type

Article

Organizational Units

Sturm College of Law

Keywords

Supreme Court, Religion, Title VII, Civil Rights Act of 1964, Civil Rights Act, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), Labor, Employment, Reasonable accommodations

Abstract

The express language of Title VII is sufficiently protective of religious practice in the workplace, allowing those who have religious conflicts with workplace requirements to, like their fellow workers, retain jobs or continue to work in those jobs on the same basic terms as their fellow workers. However, Supreme Court decisions interpreting Title VII have diluted the statutory language, and together send a message to employers and employees alike that requirements of religious conscience are simply not very important compared to the requirements of a job. Imagine the effect on a worker if he is told that he need not, and in some cases cannot, swap shifts with another worker to accommodate religious practice, or worse, the effect on workers as a whole when they are told that necessary personal business cannot include leave for religious observance. Michael Wolf, Bruce Friedman, and Daniel Sutherland, in their 1998 book Religion in the Workplace, have noted that the Supreme Court, in Hardison and Philbrook, has, in effect, "interpreted Title VII to give primary importance to an employer's economic interest; a cost that is an undue hardship when borne by the employer may nevertheless be reasonable when borne by the employee.

Rights Holder

Liberty Magazine

Language

English (eng)

Publication Statement

Copyright is held by Liberty Magazine. User is responsible for all copyright compliance.

This book was originally published as Roberto L. Corrada, The Supreme Court and Title VII, Liberty, January/February 2003.

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